Citizen Economists » Spain

Random Shots – Is it Over Yet?

Claus Vistesen — Mon, 17 Oct 2011 14:30:11 +0000

It was telling that just as the ECRI and other notable research outfits decided to push recession button on the US economy the data flow became notably more positive. This could be a sign of the times that the cycle is just too volatile for even capable analysts to call or it could simply be a blip to the otherwise fundamental issue that economic weakness is here to stay for now.

Risk asset markets however made no mince of the recent stabilisation of the euro land crisis as well as the better news flow from the US economy. Just take the following headlines from Bloomberg and you know exactly what kind of sentiment I am talking about.

Quote Bloomberg

U.S. stocks advanced, giving the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index its biggest weekly gain since July 2009, as retail sales beat economists’ estimates and the Group of 20 nations began discussions on Europe’s debt crisis.

(…)

U.S. 30-year bonds capped the longest weekly losing streak since January as concern eased that Europe is unable to curb its debt crisis and U.S. retail sales climbed, damping bets the country will fall into a recession.

The question is then whether it signals a decisive and lasting breakout or whether it was simply a rally to the top of a choppy range before we start another descend to test the lows. Recent weeks’ market movement will suggest that you sell the current levels as top of a post crash range and I, for one do not think we are out of the woods yet. It is important to emphasize two issues on the US economy when it comes to the likelihood of a recession.

Firstly, the US housing market has never recovered and inventories remain low. This means that there is not much room for the economy to slump even if it does enter a recession. Any recession is then likely to be relatively short. Secondly, all liquidity gauges we are watching are pointing strongly upwards which is likely to provide strong tailwinds for risky assets 9-12 months out. Excess global liquidity, US broad and narrow measures of money are all shooting up.

In addition, we should consider the slow but sure movements by all four major central banks to increase either the short term liquidity or simply re-starting QE.

The BOE put itself at the front of the pack with the recent addition of another bn 75 GBP worth of QE, but likewise at the ECB it was interesting to see that long term liquidity operations was re-instated together with an expansion of the covered bond purchasing programme. Additionally, the ECB has been and will continue to be more or less forced to support bonds in the periphery, particularly in Spain and Italy, in order to ring fence the periphery from the coming Greek default. In comparison, the Fed’s latest much debated Operation Twist looks almost modest since it is, by the letter of the theory, not quantitative easing but rather qualitative easing [1]. Of course, the market is fully expecting the Fed to act aggressively should the economy falter further with a joint financing programme with the Treasury for long duration mortgage products as the most likely initiative alongside the more technical move in the form of reducing interest rates on excess bank reserves to negative.

I think it is important to realise that the Fed, with its latest actions, have its gaze firmly fixed on stimulating a recovery in the US housing market which is seen as the most important missing leg in an already faltering US recovery.

In Japan, the BOJ’s situation is different in the sense that economic has been distorted by first the devastation of the earthquake and then obviously the technical recovery as supply side disruptions have eased off. I take note of the fact that the BOJ has verbally put a lot of promises on the table in terms of stimulating the economy not least, one would imagine, in relation to the ongoing strength of the JPY. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the BOJ’s balance sheet has actually expanded briskly in the past two months.

The main conclusion to draw here I think is that while it is certainly not over yet, developed market policy makers are starting to open the floodgates. The euro zone crisis will remain a severe drag and like an almost chronic illness will continue to flare up. A disorderly Greek default can still not be ruled out and as the euro zone policy makers seem to take comfort on even a second of calm it seems to me that the market will have to push harder before we get a realistic proposal for a Greek default.

The recovery in the periphery (or obvious lack thereof) is still not working. The internal devaluation in the European periphery is alive and well when it comes to nominal wage increases which is getting a beating but in the context of lingering inflation in core and headline it leads to a squeeze in real wages and further depresses the recovery. The problem is that a sharp reduction in living standards through a decline in real wages to restore competitiveness is needed but if it occurs without any form of nominal currency depreciation not to mention in the context of very sticky core inflation, it just becomes counterproductive. Absent a fiscal union to socialise the risks it is difficult to see how the euro zone policy makers will be able to come with a fudge that will satisfy markets. In that regard I agree with Chris Wood here.

Ultimately, GREED & fear’s view on all of the above remain the same. This is that the only coherent end game for Euroland remains a formal move towards collective fiscal responsibility, which would ultimately address the fundamental cause of the present crisis. This is the financial fault line represented by monetary union without fiscal union. Euroland either has to go down this path or it has to confront all the problems associated with a break up since in GREED & fear’s view there is no “middle way”

One positive development on Greece is that the private sector involvement (PSI) proposal originally envisioned seems to have been abandoned for a much more realistic haircut.

But more challenging issues remain.

It was hardly surprising that the S&P downgraded Spain last week which only serves to underline the issue that while Greece may be the imminent worry the real problem lies in Spain and quite possibly Italy. There is a limit to the amount of Italian and Spanish bonds that the ECB can buy as long as it is evidently clear that growth prospects continue to remain difficult.

In emerging markets and touching on the theme I dealt with in my last installment the recent inflation data from India indicate why I continue to think that investors may hold too high expectations for easing in big emerging markets.

Quote Bloomberg

India’s inflation exceeded 9 percent for a 10th straight month in September, maintaining pressure on the central bank to extend its record interest-rate increases.The benchmark wholesale-price index rose 9.72 percent from a year earlier after a 9.78 percent jump in August, the commerce ministry said in New Delhi today. The median of 21 estimates in a Bloomberg News survey was for a 9.75 percent increase.

Elevated inflation in India and China are crimping room for policy makers to ease monetary policy and support global growth amid Europe’s debt crisis and a faltering U.S. recovery. India’s central bank Governor Duvvuri Subbarao said yesterday that a more than 9 percent inflation is above “comfort level.”

Of course, the picture is not uniform here with notable economies such as Brazil and Indonesia already lowering interest rates but all eyes are currently on China (and secondarily India) and here I think that we will have to see stronger signs of a hard landing or a relapse into a more severe global slowdown we can expect policy makers to actively stimulate.

In summary, I think that we are indeed nearing an inflection point at which money printing in the developed world will once again provide relief to risky asset markets but the problem is that the underlying economic backdrop has not improved much. In particular, the ongoing lack of resolution in the euro zone represents an issue but Eastern Europe as well as a housing bubble in Australia (and perhaps even in Denmark) are also potential sources of uncertainty not to mention the unravelling of credit excess in China. As such, “it” is far from over but a tradable bounce in risky assets which goes beyond the current choppy range may soon represent itself.

–

[1] – The distinction between quantitative and qualitative easing is simple. The former refers to an expansion of the balance sheet through the central bank increasing its liabilities and adding a corresponding amount of assets. The latter refers to changing the composition of the asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet and as I am reading the gist of OT the Fed has committed to keep its balance sheet unchanged by selling short term bonds and buying long term bonds. Try this one for a good recap of what QE is and isn’t.

Crunchtime in the Eurozone

Claus Vistesen — Fri, 12 Aug 2011 13:45:10 +0000

I am handing the mike to my good friend and colleague Edward Hugh who has penned what I consider to be the most accurate analyses to date of the issues facing the European continent.

With fiscal union off the table, there are basically three possibilities. The first is to stay more or less where we are, expanding the ECB’s bond-purchasing program and simply trying to hang in there. The stability fund could be increased, but the more numbers start being accounted for in detail, the further away the various parties get from being able to agree. If this continues, the ECB is likely to reach a ceiling beyond which it will be more than reluctant to continue buying, because the bank takes the view that the resolution has to come from the politicians.

But with Italy and Spain’s combined sovereign refinancing needs between now and the end of 2012 totaling about 660 billion euros, and given the financing needs of the banks on top of this figure, reaching agreement to expand the bailout mechanism looks pretty improbable, especially when one considers that there’s no turning back once it starts. So, at some point, the spreads will start to widen again as markets force the issue, with the inevitable outcome that the monetary union is pushed toward the brink of breakdown.

The second possibility would be to disband the union entirely, leaving each member to go back to its national currency. This would be a disastrous outcome for all concerned and for the global financial system. Coordinating the unwinding of cross-country counterliabilities would be a nightmare given the level of interlocking corporate and sovereign bond markets. The sudden disappearance of one of the major global currencies of reference would also cause havoc in financial markets. The dollar would most likely be pushed to unsustainably high levels in the rush for safety, and it is only necessary to look at what is happening to gold, the Swiss franc, and the Japanese yen to catch a glimpse of what would be in store. Of course, this kind of violent unwinding would never be undertaken voluntarily, but that doesn’t mean that it is impossible — particularly if solutions are not found and the force of market pressure continues.

Fortunately there is a third alternative: The eurozone could be split in two, creating two separate (and unequal) euro currencies. Naturally, the composition of the groups would be a matter of negotiation because some countries do not easily belong in either one group or the other. The broad outline is, however, clear enough. Germany would form the heart of one group, along with Finland, the Netherlands, and Austria. It might even take Estonia, which has been making it pretty clear that it would also be up for the ride. Spain, Italy, and Portugal would naturally form the nucleus of the second group, with Slovenia and Slovakia being possible candidates. Some countries, Ireland and Greece for example, might simply choose to opt out.

Go read!

Random Shots – All Back to Square One?

Claus Vistesen — Thu, 04 Aug 2011 19:15:16 +0000

Starting a new job and settling in a new city/flat has proved a little more unsettling for my blogging efforts than I had expected. Anyway, what better time to return to the fray when the SP500 completes its worst run in a long time returning to levels not last seen since March where we thought we had to write off the entire Japanese economy as a nuclear wasteland. So, is it all back to square one for the already weak recovery?

Arguably though the catalyst this time is more sinister in that it cannot really be pinned on any single event. Surely, the debt ceiling charade and the prospects of Spain and Italy spiralling further into the arms of what ever bailout that might be on offer are catalysts in themselves, but the underlying economic data is getting increasingly sour.

All the leading data we are looking at, both in terms of the global breadth of economic momentum and specifically on the US economy have rolled over in a dangerous fashion and a recession in the US cannot be entirely ruled out. Indeed, on some measures we would even be calling one. Elsewhere, the slump in the July Australian PMI also suggests that one of the hitherto strongest economies in the global recovery may be about to embark on its own homegrown downturn.

It was also interesting to see the SNB finally cave in (yet again) to the relentless rise of the CHF despite the bank’s efforts both communicative and with hard money to starve off the beast. As I have remarked before, safe haven flows hurts and can be akin to holding Old Maid. Indeed, it may turn interest rate decisions on their head as rates will be lowered going into a melt up of economic activity to attempt to deter speculative inflows.

Generally, one of the most obvious consequences of the recent bout of weakness will be that more stimulus is in the pipeline, at least in the US economy whereas the ECB will probably need a little time before the reality dawns on them. However, the underlying inflection point between an economic recovery that is clearly turning out much weaker than expected and the reality of too much debt is starting to hurt. In that vein, it is difficult to see a viable way out of the obvious need to cut spending and reign in excessive public spending with the simple fact that what has largely driven GDP in the recovery has been government consumption and investment.

We can consequently expect that the Krugmans of the world to get another big chunk of the discourse as the call for further and bolder stimulus packages increases. In this respect, the Squid had nice note out on Monday on the possible avenues a new round of QE would take where the main message seems to be that the Fed will try to further cement its position of low rates for an extended period. But more interestingly is the widespread expectation that if the Fed engages in further asset purchases it will be on the long end of treasury curve and thus to flatten the curve on the long end. Surely, this makes sense in so far as goes the idea that the housing market remains in an extremely poor condition. Mortgage rates are thus likely to be driven more by long term rates than rates on the short end or at the middle. Coupled with outright targeted asset purchases of MBS using the proceeds from its securities portfolio the Fed would be signalling that the size of its balance sheet will remain inact.

Sufficient on to the day and all that but with the current sinister backdrop of market currents and poor economic data we can expect Bernanke to step up any time now.

It has occured to me here that what we might be facing in the developed world is a mirror image of the situation in the emerging world and that the combination is not the best of mixtures for the global economy.

Consider then the situation e.g. in India where the RBI is trying frantically to weigh against excessive government spending not to mention China where you get the distinct feeling that at least some part of the inflation problem comes from the central authorities’ credit policies (or lack of tight standards). Conversely, in the developed world austerity is the name of the game quite simply out of necessity and faced with extremely fragile economies it is largely up to the central banks to attempt giving the economy some tailwind. On a personal note, this is also why I consider the ECB’s recent hiking campaign as the biggest policy failure since, well, they raised just before a recession the last time. The very best we can hope for in Europe is then not a recovery but simply that we might end up back at square one.

Vámonos – Voting With Their Feet in Spain?

Claus Vistesen — Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:59:24 +0000

As the proverbial line seems to be running out for Greece, I thought that I would look at a slightly longer, although no less important, issue in the context of Spain; more specifically the trend in net migration. While much of the focus on Spain’s membership of the Eurozone has been (rightly) centered on the effect of interest rates that were too low, for too long another important aspect is the boom in immigration that followed at the turn of the 21st century.

Indeed, when we today speak of Japan (and Germany) as the oldest economies of the world Spain was, by 2000), destined to become just this but an impressive net migration rate from 2001 to 2007 managed to buck the trend;

(click on pictures for better viewing)

The decline in net migration is naturally a by-product of the crisis especially as immigrants (and especially those who are more or less sans papiers) are in the front line when recession strikes.

(quote Time)

The wave of immigrants into Spain has been fast and furious. The nation’s foreign-born population shot up from little more than 2% in 2000 to more than 12% in 2010. “The process was so quick and so intense that Spaniards and politicians had a hard time understanding what was happening,” says Josep Oliver, an applied-economics professor in the Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona and one of the lead authors of the Yearbook of Immigration in Spain 2009.

Then came the credit crunch, with its mass layoffs, stagnant growth and fiscal austerity. More than a million migrants have lost their jobs, homes and small businesses in a boom-to-bust cycle not seen since the Great Depression in the U.S. To be sure, migrants around the world are feeling the pain of the recession. But Spain’s massive and recent immigrant influx, compounded by economic restructuring beyond the construction industry, has taken a particularly high toll on foreigners, magnifying the crisis for the country as a whole.

With the unemployment rate almost surely on the wrong side of 20% you could be excused for arguing what exactly the problem is here. Surely with this kind of excess capacity in the labour market the last thing Spain needs is for the migrants to stay competing for already incredibly scarce jobs. Indeed, the Spanish government has tried to create incentives for unemployed migrants to leave in order to free up the mismatch between supply and demand for labour.

This approach however does not hold up to basic economic intuition even if it is an understandable move from a political point of view. First of all, there is likely to be a low value added skill bias in the kind of jobs migrants are taking. This is then an often misunderstood point in the context of western societies’ attempt to cherry pick the brightest graduates and lure highly skilled foreign labour to the country with lucrative tax breaks. As such, low value added labour (relative to the average level of value added in the receiving country) can provide a crucial labour input to the labour market in the form of filling up vacancies that domestic labor seekers would otherwise shy away from.

Now, you might again protest that in a severe crisis and as desperation among job seekers kick in, the matching for vacancies become subject to a general process of trading down as people accept jobs they are not qualified for simply in order to make ends meet. This is undoubtedly true but this is also the difference between a win-win and lose-lose situation then.

Migrants are ultimately attracted by work opportunities and the sharp decline in migration rates in Spain can be seen as migrants voting with their feet. In this sense, net outward migration of relatively low value added labour only to let domestic workers compete for these same jobs is not a sign of virtue let alone a recovery. I would hold this to be one of the most important structural issues to look out even if the long run effect of an economic crisis on migration is difficult to predict. In addition, and this is evident in Eastern Europe, there may be a strong (and worrying) me too effect from foreign immigrants leaving as it migh even incite Spanish young people to contemplate leaving as well especially as the labour market continues to look dire.

Finally, the obvious question is whether Spain needs immigration? Indeed it does;

As such and strong immigration notwithstanding Spain is still ageing and, rapidly so! Note especially, the twin peaks of first the 20-39 age group in 2002/03 and then the 35-54 age group in 2011/2013. This is then the great tragedy of the peripheral economies in the Eurozone in the sense that whatever last ounce of demographically induced momentum they had will likely be completely erased by the demands for fiscal austerity and internal devaluation. And once this process has run its course (whatever that means) their population pyramids will be beyond repair.

Looking at age specific migration in Spain and considering that by definition migration occurs among the most mobile part of the population (i.e. the working age population), the trend has reversed. This is also why migration flows are an important input to the analysis of global population ageing even if immigration, in no country, would be able to completely nullify the wave of ageing (indeed in some economies such as China and Russia immigration will be almost impossible to achieve in sufficient scale to dent the force of ageing).

The influx of migrants to Spain in the age group 20-39 has consequently steadily declined in the past 4 years.

The article above by Time personifies the Spanish migrant in the form of 35-year-old Colombian construction worker Doney Ramírez who used to police one of the many, now idle, construction cranes in in and around the building sites of Madrid. You could then note that Spain certainly does not need Mr Ramírez anymore as the future of Spain is not built on construction of empty houses. Indeed I would agree, Spain now needs to export. But neglecting the importance of Ramírez would be poor economics since quite possibly he could do a different job (if the economy could create one for him) and more importantly the fact that he is now more likely to leave than stay says a whole lot on the effect of ongoing deflation and deleveraging faced by Spain.

Can the Eurozone Survive?

Rok Spruk — Mon, 27 Dec 2010 20:18:10 +0000

The ongoing difficulties in overcoming the persistence of debt-to-GDP ratio in EU countries highlight the question whether the European Monetary Union can survive the set of shocks which prevailed since the 2008/2009 economic and financial crisis. Recently, European Commission has presented the 2010 review of public finances in EMU (link), suggesting that macroeconomic outlook for Eurozone economies has deteriorated in the light of a growing debt-to-GDP ratio.

The launch of government bailouts in various European countries has added considerable amount to the stock of public debt across the Eurozone. Since 2008/2009, general government balance in Eurozone countries has continually resulted in persistent government deficits which further added to the stock of debt. Since public debt is by definition the sum of previous deficits, the European macroeconomic outlook suffers significantly from downgraded stability of public debt.

The anatomy of sluggish economic recovery in Eurozone consists of different set of economic policies. Countries at the European periphery (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Italy, Spain) seem to be hit most by the sluggish economic recovery. From the viewpoint of macreconomic stability, the economic policymakers in these countries have pursued the most discretionary economic policies to mitigate the effects of decline in GDP on employment, earnings and tax revenues. In addition, highly expansionary monetary policy by the European Central Bank provided a bulk of quantitative easing, resulting flooding liquidity to supplement the interbank lending and, hence, to contain the effect of overleveraged financial sector on macroeconomic stability. In Ireland, income per capita in 2010 notably decline back to 2004 level (link). As I previously emphasized in one of my previous posts (link), the depth of the economic crisis in Ireland is largely attributed to the overleveraged banking sector, vulnerable to the interbank interest rate increases. Since the sovereign CDS spread on Ireland exceeded 500 basis points in late September this year, the Irish public finance outlook deteriorated significantly in the light of the innate ability of the Irish government to bailout Anglo-Irish Bank. Recently, the IMF estimated (link) that by 2012, Irish debt-to-GDP ratio would reach 67 percent, up from 12 percent in 2005.

A prudent reduction in debt-to-GDP would be accomplished only under restrictive fiscal policy based on the reduction in government spending and a permanent fiscal rule on budget surplus at a given target level. If Irish government set the surplus target at 3 percent of GDP in the next ten years, debt-to-GDP ratio could be considerably reduced within the range of Maastricht fiscal criteria.

The macroeconomic outlook in peripheral countries suffers from high fiscal expenditures and rigid labor market institutions. By 2012, Portugal’s debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to reach nearly 85 percent of GDP. In addition to soaring public debt, the Mediterranean part of the EMU suffers heavily from high unemployment rate. Eurostat recently reported that, by October 2010, the unemployment rate in Spain reached an astonishing 20.7 percent. Double-digit unemployment rate in Spain, Greece (12.2 percent) and Portugal (11 percent) hamper the economic recovery since, in the past, these countries exercised expansionary fiscal policy and the policy of automatic stabilizers to mitigate the effects of high unemployment on aggregate consumption decline. In the aftermath of financial crisis, these countries experienced recessionary output gap in which economic contraction is marred by unchanged inflationary pressures.

Since EMU countries withheld domestic currencies and adhered the adoption of the Euro, the macroeconomic adjustment to the recovery is possible only by a prudent fiscal policy. High unemployment rates and a persistent divergence of economic policies in EMU countries could substantially increase discretionary fiscal policies that would eventually result in the serious possibility of country default. The economic crisis in Greece resulted in 11 percent cumulative GDP decline between 2010 and 2012. In the same period, government net debt is expected to reach the 120 percent of GDP thresold. A divergence between Member States towards highly discretionary fiscal policy would probably alleviate the persistence of high unemployment but at the expense of bold increase in the rate of inflation as well as in the persistence of debt-to-GDP ratio and large government imbalances. Hence, the survival of the Eurozone would depend on the ability of EU Member States to adjust government balance by reducing fiscal expenditure and adopt the fiscal rule to pursue fiscal surplus in the coming years as to reduce the stock of public debt.

Even though a common fiscal policy could accomplish the goals of stabilization policy, the mitigation of fiscal asymmetries would be easily accomplished by labor market integration. A currency union between different countries implies integrated and assimilated labor markets under relatively homogenous preferences. It would be nearly impossible to envision the European Monetary Union without these key macroeconomic features.

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Bailout in the Air

Claus Vistesen — Thu, 25 Nov 2010 20:21:36 +0000

With apologies to John Paul Young …

Bailout in the air

Everywhere I look around

Bailout in the air

Every sight and every sound

And I don’t know if it’s just the Irish

Don’t know if we can afford it

But it’s something that I must believe in

And it’s there when I look in your eyes

Bailout in the air

And the Euro’s going up

Bailout in the air

In the Union that we got

And I don’t know if Porto is next

Don’t know if Proell will pay

But it’s something that I must believe in

And we hope that they do what they say

Bailout in the air

oh, oh, oh…

Bailout in the air

In the rising of the debt

Bailout in the air

Now the scores must be set

And I don’t know the Euro will make it

Don’t know if Spain wiill fold

But it’s something that I must believe in

And I hope that the debt will be sold

And I don’t know if it’s just the Irish

Don’t know if we can afford it

But it’s something that I must believe in

And it’s there when I look in your eyes

Bailout in the air

oh, oh, oh…

Love is in the air
Everywhere I look around
Love is in the air
Every sight and every sound

And I don't know if I'm being foolish
Don't know if I'm being wise
But it's something that I must believe in
And it's there when I look in your eyes

Love is in the air
In the whisper of the trees
Love is in the air
In the thunder of the sea

And I don't know if I'm just dreaming
Don't know if I feel sane
But it's something that I must believe in
And it's there when you call out my name

Love is in the air, Love is in the air, oh, oh, oh...

Love is in the air
In the rising of the sun
Love is in the air
When the day is nearly done

And I don't know if you're an illusion
Don't know if I see it true
But you're something that I must believe in
And you're there when I reach out for you

Love is in the air
Every sight and every sound
And I don't know if I'm being foolish
Don't know if I'm being wise

But it's something that I must believe in
And it's there when I look in your eyes

Love is in the air, Love is in the air, oh, oh, oh...

(Contributed by Shay Griffiths - May 2002)

Public Pension Crisis in OECD Countries

Rok Spruk — Mon, 01 Nov 2010 19:15:44 +0000

The central aim of my bachelor’s thesis is to demonstrate the unsustainability of public pension system in OECD countries in the longer run through the lens of a rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis.

The origins of contemporary public pension schemes date back to 19th century when Bismarck Germany in 1881 first adopted a universal old-age public pension system based on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) funding principle. The principle itself captures full advantages of high (stationary) population growth rate. In the simplest form, PAYG pension scheme is based on the notion of generational solidarity upon which current generations pay mandatory social security contribution into the public scheme. Aggregate contributions are then paid out to current retirees. The cycle is then expanded through generations. However, PAYG funding scheme is sustainable as long as the population growth is high and above the marginal productivity of the capital. Back in 19th century, public pension schemes were adopted under unrealistic assumptions about future population prospects. In 19th century, advanced countries experienced high population growth rate, high fertility rate and an extremely low share of dependent old population that was receiving universal old-age support from PAYG pension schemes. These set of assumptions was crucial to the stability of government-provided old-age support embodied in the public pension schemes.

The sustainability of PAYG pension system requires the equivalence of population growth rate and real interest rate. In the early 20th century, the advanced world shifted towards aging population, declining fertility rates and lower labor market entry rate. In broad terms, a growing old-age dependency ratio led to the pure disequilbrium effects. In a theoretical framework, I re-examined the neoclassical framework of lifecycle hypotheses embodied in Samuelson and Cass-Yaari models of life-cycle utility maximization. The lifecycle hypothesis is based upon the assumption of the three-period model where individuals maximize the consumption in the course of a lifetime. In the first period, individuals do not discount the future consumption since, in this period, individuals acquire the human capital. In the second period individuals enter the working age and discount the future consumption. Hence, in the third period, individuals retire consume the output produced in the working-age period. Since future discounting is compounded, the lifetime consumption increases geometrically. In purely analytical terms, the individuals maximize the utility of consumption through time preference rate.

Considering the abovementioned equivalence between population growth rate and real interest rate, the stability of the equilibria requires the period discount rate to equal the population growth rate. If population growth rate decreases, the stability of the equilibria requires that individuals decrease the future discount rate by the same rate to keep the PAYG pension system within the theoretical limit. The rigorous theoretical formulation of the neoclassical model of lifetime consumption, which essentially captures the necessary conditions for equilibrium stability of public pension schemes, had been put forth by Paul A. Samuelson in his seminal contribution to the theoretical foundations of stationary “PAYG” public pension scheme .

In the course of the last decades, OECD countries have experienced a significant drop in fertility rates, population growth and, under the political climate of social democracy, a widespread adoption of early retirement schemes and generous social security benefits. In addition, labor market exit age dropped significantly, initiating a trend towards the unprecendent growth of generational indebtedness.

The OECD estimated that between 2000 and 2050, old-age dependency ratio is forecast to increase to the largest extent in Japan (193 percent), Spain (136 percent), Portugal and Greece (135 percent). The astonishing increase in the estimated old-age dependency ratio directly reflects the declining fertility rate in OECD countries from 1960s onwards. I estimated the ratio of fertility rate between 1960-1970 and 2000-2006 for OECD countries at around 2, which means that average fertility rate between 1960-1970 was twice the fertility rate between 2000-2006. The highest fertility ratios were found in Spain (2.23), Italy (1.96), Ireland (2.00) while the lowest ratios were found in Denmark (1.37), Netherlands (1.72) and the United States (1.46).

High and stable effective retirement age is the main assumption underlying the stationary stability of PAYG pension system. In the 20th and 21st century, OECD countries have experienced an unprecendent decline in effective retirement age. Blöndal and Scarpetta (2002) estimated the decline in labor market exit age for OECD countries between 1960 and 1995. The female labor market exit age had declined significantly in Ireland (10.7 years), Spain (9.1 years) and Norway (8.8 years). Male labor market exit age exerted persistent decline in all developed OECD countries except for Iceland. The exit age declined significantly in the Netherlands (7.3 years) and Spain (6.5 years).

In a large part, declining labor market exit age has confluenced the rapid growth of unemployment and disability benefits and early retirement incentives from the second half of the 20th century onwards. As the OECD correctly contemplated, in a number of countries, disability pensions and unemployment benefits can be used as de facto early retirement schemes. In a large part, widespread growth of early retirement schemes and implicit incentives for moral hazard in retiring too early via unemployment and disability schemes is held responsible by generous welfare states in the aftermath of the World War II.

When I examined various features affecting early retirement choices, I came across an interesting finding. I regressed labor market exit age and marginal tax rate in a cross section of 23 OECD countries in 2007. I estimated the relationship between exit age and marginal tax rate using a classical OLS linear regression model. The estimate suggests that, holding all other factors constant, if marginal tax rate increases by 1 percentage point, average labor market exit age decreases by 1.88 months. Surprisingly, 51.74 percent of sample variation is explained by marginal tax rate alone. The sample constant is statistically significant, suggesting that if the hypothetical marginal tax rate were zero, the average labor market exit age in randomly chosen country from OECD sample would be 69.65 years. The sample constant is consistent with a prior theoretical expectations since it concurs with the “substitution effect” hypothesis that higher marginal tax rate leads to lower labor supply and fewer working hours.

The cost of early retirement in OECD countries

Source: T.T. Herbertsson & J.M. Orszag, The Cost of Early Retirement in OECD, 2001. OECD, Pensions at Glance, 2009.

Fiscal imbalances arising from unsustainable PAYG public pension systems in OECD countries cannot be assessed without a sufficient estimate of economic costs of unfunded pension liabilities. I approximated the cost of early retirement using Auerbach-Kotlikoff-Gokhale (1999) methodology that directly estimates the size of generational imbalances created by public social security systems. Large and rapidly unsustainable net pension liabilities occured in late 1980s. Van den Noord and Herd (1993) estimated the size of net pension liabilities in seven major OECD countries. The results suggest that continental European countries have had the largest net pension liabilities in terms of GDP. The size of pension liabilities in France and Italy had been about 2.5 times the size of their respective GDPs and twice the stock of the public debt.

Gokhale (2008) directly estimated fiscal imbalances arising from unfunded pension liabilities to current and prospective generations. The size of generational fiscal imbalance, as a share of the GDP, is extremely large and rapidly unsustainable in all OECD countries. In fact, the size of the imbalance is the most severe in Greece (875 percent of the GDP), France, Finland and the Netherlands (500 percent of the GDP) while it is more than twice the size of the GDP in all OECD countries except for the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Fiscal imbalance in OECD countries

Source: J. Gokhale, Measuring Unfunded Obligations of European Countries, 2009.

I built the econometric model of public pension expenditure for a cross section of 23 OECD countries in 2007 to assess which variables might explained the cross-country variation in public pension expenditures. I’ve been aware of the possible drawbacks of choosing a cross-section model since it might be vulnerable to specification errors and the unbiasedness of regression coefficients. To account for possible specification bias, I conducted Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Shapiro-Wilk and Jarque-Bera normality tests. By performing normality tests, I have examined whether the normality assumption of normally distributed error terms is valid in the studied sample of 23 OECD countries considering error terms as identically and independently distributed.

In the set of explanatory variables that might yield consistent and robust estimates of regression coefficients I chose 10 various demographic, economic and institutional independent variables. Apart from demographic and economic variables, institutional variables are dichotomous since the institutional features can be captured by binary modes of choice. The dependent variable is the size of public pension expenditures in the share of the GDP.

The results suggest that public pension expenditures are positively correlated with the share of population aged 65 and older (0.746**), difference in life expectancy after age 65 between 1960 and 2005 (0.477*) and dichotomous variable for continental European countries (0.697**) where * and ** indicate the statistical significant of the sample correlation coefficient at the 5% and 1% level. The estimates suggests that the probability of higher pension expenditures in the share of the GDP is likely to occur in a continental European country known for a relatively large share of older population and a high difference in life expectancy after age 65 between 1960 and the present. On the other hand, public pension expenditures are negatively correlated with average effective retirement age (-0.475**), private pension funds as a share of GDP (-0.658**), labor market exit age (-0.523**), dichotmous variable for Anglo-Saxon countries (-0.544**) and a dichotomous variable for private pension system (-0.672**), where ** denotes the statistical significant of the sample correlation coefficient at the 1% level. Again, the estimates suggest that the probability of lower pension expenditure is likely to occur if a randomly chosen country from the OECD sample is Anglo-Saxon and has a high effective retirement age, large private pension funds as a share of the GDP, high labor market exit age and a mandatory private pension system. The coefficients suggest that in repeated sampling, the estimated sample correlation coefficient will include the true or correct population value in 99 percent of cases.

I conducted the econometric model which consisted of 8 regression specifications. I chose double-logarithmic model which yields direct elasticities as regression coefficients. However, I added two exceptions. In regression specifications 5 and 6, I chose a mixed specification mostly due to the inclusion of private pension funds (assets) variable in the regression specification. Unfortunately, but the share of private pension funds in Greece in 2007 equals 0 percent of the GDP which does not enable the researcher to apply double-logarithmic model as the basis of regression specification.

The estimates suggest that the share of population aged 65 and older is statistically singificantly positively related to the share of public pension expenditures in the GDP. Hence, the elasticity of public pension expenditures with respect to effective retirement age ranges from -1.465 to -4.935, suggesting that an increase in effective retirement age by an additional year leads to per unit increase in public pension expenditures by more than a unit increase in the share of the GDP. The coefficient of private pension funds is highly statistically significant. The elasticity of public pension expenditures with respect to private pension funds (as a share of the GDP) ranges from -0.34 to -0.38 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The elasticity suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of private pension funds reduces the share of public pension expenditures in the GDP, on impact, by 3.4-3.8 percent, holding all other factors constant. In addition, the estimates of coefficients for dichotomous variables suggest the following: the probability of higher public pension expenditures (as a share of GDP) is likely to occur in continental European countries with mandatory private pension system. Five estimates of dichotomous coefficients are statistically significant at the less than 10% level.

The significance of dichotomous (dummy) coefficients has been tested by beta coefficient analysis to rank the magnitudes of separate effects of explanatory variables on public pension expenditures as dependent variable. The results suggest that continental European countries are significantly more likely to face higher public pension spending in the share of GDP compared to Anglo-Saxon countries.

Earlier I mentioned the necessity of normality assumption in yielding robust, consistent and unbiased estimates of regression coefficients. The assumption has been questioned by conducting Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S), Jarque-Bera test (J-B) and Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) normality test. The aim of the testing the normality assumption is to observe whether error terms distribute normally so that estimated test statistics, standard errors and confidence intervals are reliable. In setting test statistic, I set the normality assumption as null hypothesis. The results from K-S, J-B and S-W tests show that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 5% level, suggesting that the normality assumption is valid in the studied sample. Hence, test statistics, standard errors and confidence intervals are both valid and reliable.

The meaningful question to evaluate the prospects of the coming public pension crisis is how to reverse the growth of fiscal imbalances and reform public pension system as to avoid erratic generational indebtedness. Aging population and the growth of old-age dependency ratio trigger an enormous future burden on public finances in OECD countries. Lower fertility rate and population growth shall place an incurable burden on the stability of PAYG public pension systems. The estimates suggest that life-expectancy after the age of 65 is likely to increase by 2050 and gradually approach the age of 90 for both male and female. Assuming the effective retirement age is 65, the remaining life expectancy is 25 years or almost one-third of the average lifetime. As Alemayehu and Warner (2004) suggest: “Old-age health care costs thus will impose increasingly severe pressure on private finances and government coffers. Indeed, applying our age-specific estimates to the age distribution anticipated for the year 2030, we find that if nothing is done to alter current patterns of health care, per capita health care expenditures will rise by one-fifth due to population aging alone.”

The long-term pension reform that aging societies of the West should undertake is a complementary measures of three key policy features of the reform.

First, the transition to fully-funded retirement savings accounts is the only viable and sound pension reform that can alleviate the damage generated by the growing fiscal imbalances. The theoretical foundation of the transition from public pension systems to fully-funded pension system has been laid down by Feldstein and Liebman (2001). The authors derived an algebraic solution which suggests that keeping a PAYG public pension system does not attenuate the persistence of a growing demographic pressure on the stability of public pension system. As I discussed earlier, PAYG system crucially depends on three key assumptions: high fertility rate, very low share of population older 65+ and high population growth. These assumptions are incompatible with actual demographic parameters and, hence, OECD countries should undertake a drastic transition towards fully-funded pension systems based on individual savings accounts. Otherwise, the growing demographic pressure will inevitably result in the exponential growth of generational debt, creating an enormous deadweight loss for current and prospective generations.

Fully-funded pension system is based on the premise of investing pension contributions into the capital market, earning a compound interest over time. The stock of individual’s lifetime earnings is paid in the form of annuities upon individual’s withdrawal from the labor market. In addition, there is a growing disparity between the implicit return of PAYG public pension system and real rate of return in the capital market. Under realistic assumptions, such as that the marginal product of capital (MPK) is below the welfare-maximizing level and the real rate of return exceeds the implicit return from PAYG system, fully-funded pension system would not create a deadweight consumption loss to the working-age population. In fact, Feldstein and Liebman (2001) derived an analytic solution for the transition to fully-funded pension system in which the transition induces a short-term consumption loss in the next period while, at the same time, it creates a geometrically-growing future consumption for both retired and working-age population.

The only remaining question is whether the real rate of return would compensate the consumption loss of working-age population and, hence, increase the stock of future consumption to all generations. According to Feldstein and Liebman (2001), assuming 6.5 percent inflation-adjusted rate of return, the payroll cost of fully-funded pension system would represent only 27 percent of the payroll cost incured under PAYG public pension system. Tax rate, required to bear the cost of current stock of pension liabilities is 12.4 percent respectively.

According to Congressional Budget Office, the average real rate of return for large-company stocks between 1926 and 2000 is 7.7 percent, 9.0 percent of small-company stocks and 2.2 percent for long-term Treasury bonds. Feldstein (1997) estimated that PAYG implicit rate of return is 2.6 percent.

Assume an individual wants to maximize the lifetime earnings in the capital market. An individual is offered 2.6 percent implicit return from PAYG system. The individual enters the labor market at certain age, say 25, and intends to retire upon the age of 65. Assume he invests $10.000 annually in the capital market to create retirement annuities upon labor market withdrawal. Assuming the implicit rate of return (2.6 percent), the stock of overall annuity would be 10 times the initial investment in 90 years. Assuming the average long-run real rate of return from large-company stocks (7.7 percent), the the overall annuity would be 10 times the initial stock of investment in 31 years. Therefore, the individual would reach the desired level of lifetime earnings at the age of 56 or 9 years before the targeted retirement age.

I assumed the distribution of lifetime investment portfolio is weighted average of availible asset types: large-company stocks (33 percent), small-company stocks (19 percent), long-term corporate bonds (20 percent), long-term Treasury bonds (20 percent) and 3-month Treasury bills (8 percent). According to the average annual real rates of return in the United States (1926-2000), I calculated the weighted average real rate of return (5.247 percent). Investing $10.000 annually at the age of 25 would buy $100.000 annuity at 5.247 real rate of return in 45 years (the age of 70) compared to 90 years (the age of 115) under the PAYG implicit rate of return (2.6 percent). Of course, the time to buy the annuity would shift alongside the changing composition of portfolio.

In addition, OECD countries should immediately increase the effective retirement age. I believe the solution suggested by Gary Becker is both meaningful but sustainable in reversing the growth of generational debt. Becker (2010) suggested “One simple and attractive rule would be to raise retirement age by an amount that makes the ratio of years spent in retirement to years spent working equal to the ratio that existed at the beginning of the social security system.”

When President Roosevelt signed the notorious Social Security Act in 1935, the normal retirement age was 65. However, life expectancy after the age of 65 was significantly lower than is today. In 1940, average life expectancy after 65 in the U.S was 13.7 years. In 2006, it stood at 18.6 years, according to OECD. In 1935, the average life expectancy at birth in the United States was 61.7 years. We assume that individuals in 1935 worked for 35 years and spent 12 years in retirement. The ratio is thus 0.4 (12/ 35=0.34). Today, if individuals retire at the age of 65, they can expect further 18.6 years in retirement. To equalize the ratio to the 1935 level, (18.6/x=0.34), individuals should spend 54.7 years working. The estimate time is an equivalent measure of years required to spend working if PAYG public pension system is left intact. Assuming the individuals enter the labor market at the age of 25, then the expected effective retirement age is the age of 80.

In the long run, PAYG public pension system is unsustainable since demographic parameters do not suffice the assumptions under which the PAYG system is possible without distortions of labor supply incentives. The future of OECD countries will be marked by aging population, lower fertility rates and a growing demographic pressure on public finances. Without bold and decisive pension reform, OECD countries will experience increasing pension deficits and, hence, an explosive growth of generational indebtedness.

Parametric pension reforms are not a substitute for the postponement of paradigmatic pension reform. Thus, implementing the transition to fully-funded pension system essentially requires higher effective retirement age. A comprehensive pension reform cannot be made possible without these measures. At last, but not least, the major challenge in the systematic pension reform in OECD countries to address the burden of global aging, is whether political courage will withstand the pressure of interest groups to maintain the status quo of early retirement incentives. Nonetheless, eliminating early retirement incentives is the essential step towards creating retirement system without perverse incentives to retire too early. Unless political leaders encourage a transition to fully-funded pension system, OECD countries will be unable to withstand the deadly consequences of an enormous generational indebtedness.

Random Shots for October 5, 2010

Claus Vistesen — Tue, 05 Oct 2010 15:24:52 +0000

The Eurozone has its “does not compute” moment

First, it was there, then it left and then suddenly the Spanish prime minister Zapatero assured us that it was gone, but somehow the lingering European crisis of confidence in relation to the status of sovereign and private debt sustainability in key membership economies never seem to have gone away.

Now, please don’t think that the headline above is in any way related to the flurry of whether Spain has been faking its GDP numbers. FT Alphaville ran the story, got cold feet and took it down (although I reckon you can easily find the report if you try). Now, the flurry was real and the questions asked by the report fair I think. Clearly, if it was such nonsense it should be easily refutable and while some of the explanations I have seen for the the sudden dis-correlation between the Market Services Gross Value Added (GVA) and the Indicator of Activity in the Service Sector (IASS/SSAI) make sense (especially the import component point) the Spanish statistical office is still mute and the ministry of finance is just playing the part of an insulted child. So, if those of us who are skeptic are so stupid then really, now is the chance for those much more clever than us to give us a lecture.

But I digress.

Moving on, Ireland has recently been at the center stage of things and the latest number from the finance ministry is that the butcher’s bill for bailing out Anglo Irish amounts to more than 30% of GDP in the form of a running deficit in 2010. That is a almost unbelievable number by any standards and I would take very little comfort here in the fact that Ireland remains fully financed until mid 2011. What really matters here is that with this amount of debt overhang that needs to be transferred to the government’s balance sheet and ultimately over to the private sector in the form of taxes Ireland is being played straight into the hands of the IMF and the European Stability Fund. But this is not only about Ireland since the all the fundamental questions are still left unanswered.

How do you correct external competitiveness deficiency from within a currency union at the same time as implementing fiscal austerity without risking debt levels to spin out of control?
How long should Southern Europe and Ireland endure deflation relative to the core to restore external competitiveness (will Germany accept a lower external surplus as result)?
How might a sovereign restructuring in a Eurozone economy play out?

The last one is particularly important since no official inside the Eurozone has even begun to voice an opinion on this even if it is blatantly obvious that this is where we are headed. I mean, I am not talking about the entire stock of PIGS bonds being wiped out and marked to 0, but merely of a reasonable and fair estimate of the haircut we all know that is coming. Yet, so much water has gone under the bridge that it is difficult to see how such a memo would look. For starters, the stress tests carried out recently on Eurozone banks would have to be, uhm, redone with proper assumptions of haircuts and impairment in the context of real sovereign stress in the Eurozone.

However, what really clinched it for me and what leads me to note that we have now had one of (several to come) those does not compute moments was Wolfgang Munchau’s basic bond arithmetic of the the European Stability Funds lending conditions and the means with which it allows access to its funds. From FT Alphaville …

Münchau comes up with a rough estimate that borrowers could end up paying a total interest rate of about 8 per cent — far above and much more than the 5 per cent Greece paid when it tapped its €110bn European Union emergency loan back in May.

BarCap’s back-of-the-envelope calculations has the total borrowing cost above 8 per cent. That’s about 80bps (3m Euribor) + 300bps (EFSF mark-up) + 150bps (due to the fact that the interest has to be paid on the whole loan) + 300bps (service fees). As BarCap also note, requesting EFSF funds would also likely entail some strict policy conditions, similar to IMF conditionality.

Now, let me be quite clear here. 8% or even anything in that vicinity makes the whole exercise quite pointless since there is no way that any of the Eurozone economies would be able to pay off their debts at these conditions. So, if one or more Eurozone economies were to find themselves in a situation where they could no longer tap international bond markets due to the yield on offer, the alternative would be no better. I called this a catch 22 recently and even wrote a paper, in part, about it. However, Munchau’s article makes it all so clear. Whatever funds that are paid out of the stability fund at these conditions would in itself be subject to a haircut in the context of an inevitable sovereign debt restructuring and thus it is really and ultimately a question of on whose balance sheet the final loss will be put. One would only hope that this soon will come to compute a little better with the agenda that will and has to emerge in the Eurozone at some point.

Some (academic) food for thought

As many of you might have noticed I am about to start my research degree here in the UK and while I am in general surprised and disappointed about the utter lack of creativity on the part of the economic faculty in terms of constructing a curriculum with the sole purpose of testing your abilities in math (rather than you know, uhm economics!) I hope and believe it will be fun. On that note and while the cracks have clearly not yet transcended to the way underlings such as myself are treated, I found the following paper (The Dahlem Report) interesting and important (thanks Scott for sending it over).

The economics profession appears to have been unaware of the long build-up to the current worldwide financial crisis and to have significantly underestimated its dimensions once it started to unfold. In our view, this lack of understanding is due to a misallocation of research efforts in economics. We trace the deeper roots of this failure to the profession’s insistence on constructing models that, by design, disregard the key elements driving outcomes in real-world markets. The economics profession has failed in communicating the limitations, weaknesses, and even dangers of its preferred models to the public. This state of affairs makes clear the need for a major reorientation of focus in the research economists undertake, as well as for the establishment of an ethical code that would ask economists to understand and communicate the limitations and potential misuses of their models.

Now, as an immediate testament to the importance of this paper and echoing my points above I can say for certain that my generation of economists will be trained no differently on a PhD level than they were, I suspect, 30 years ago. Same old axioms, same old models, same booring (and often stupidly difficult) math problems. Two of the co-signers of the paper are David Colander and Alan Kirman and I recommend readers to have a look at their work if you want a good critique of the way we (still) do economics today (don’t forget James E. Hartley too). I don’t want to be a cry-baby, but surely; running through the proof of why a utility function should and might exist (in mathematical terms) is not only waste of good time, it is an insult to any serious economist eager to get on with some real work. But now, I really(!) digress.

To balance things a bit I did actually find much enjoyment in Oded Galor’s recent synthesis of what really kicked off the demographic transition back in the days of the industrial revolution.

This paper develops the theoretical foundations and the testable implications of the various mechanisms that have been proposed as possible triggers for the demographic transition.Moreover, it examines the empirical validity of each of the theories and their signicance forthe understanding of the transition from stagnation to growth. The analysis suggests thatthe rise in the demand for human capital in the process of development was the main triggerfor the decline in fertility and the transition to modern growth.

Here in the 21st century such a paper essentially reads as a piece of economic history as the demographic transition never really ended and whereas some form of the quantity/quality tradeoff might have started the whole process, we are now dealing with a much more complicated process in which both a quantum and tempo effect acts as a driver of the fertility decline (and eventual or potential(?) catch-up as the tempo effect fades). However, Galor’s recent paper provides an important finetuned representation of the way we think about the quantity/quality trade off and as such it is important.

I also take more than a passing interest here since it is after all my field and while I eventually opted for the original quantity/quality model by Becker and Lewis in my thesis I have almost been turned to Oded Galor’s theory with this recent paper. Yet, the two theories are still ultimately very close to each other and for laymen the finer grained theoretic subtleties of the trade-off are not important.

Perhaps you should read Oded Galor first and then the Dahlem paper afterwards. Actually, yes you definitely should!

The Catch 22 of Eurozone Imbalances – Fighting the Debt Snowball

Claus Vistesen — Tue, 18 May 2010 18:55:19 +0000

Edward does a nice job to sum up the flurry of the past week which saw the ongoing problems in Greece elevated to a full fledged systemic crisis in the Eurozone economy which, if it ultimately blows, will have ramifications far beyond the borders of the European continent. Being a firm believer in the notion of markets as conversation it is funny to see that although Lehman Brothers is dead and buried, people are talking an awful lot about it.

Consequently, the official figure for a Greek bailout has now risen to EUR120-130bn and with S&P downgrading Spain earlier this month it suggests that the ultimate cost of this mess may exceed the already dizzying number note above many times over. As the Economist neatly puts it this week;

THERE comes a moment in many debt crises when events spiral out of control. As panic sets in, bond yields lurch sickeningly upwards and fear spreads to shares and currencies. In September 2008 the failure of once-stellar Lehman Brothers almost brought down the world’s banking system. A decade earlier, Russia’s chaotic default on its sovereign debt rocked the credit markets, felling Long Term Capital Management, a hugely profitable American hedge fund. When the unthinkable suddenly becomes the inevitable, without pausing in the realm of the improbable, then you have contagion.

As the Economist goes on to argue events are indeed spiraling out of control, a statement with which I concur in full. One question then which, at the moment, may not seem particularly important is how we managed to get ourselves into this mess.

In my most recent working paper entitled Quantifying and Correcting Eurozone Imbalances – Fighting the Debt Snowball I try to provide an intial answer to this question. Well actually, I don’t set out to address this question specifically. But, I do think that if you want to understand why the Eurozone has ended up where it is today and why it is essentially threatened as an economic entity you need to take a long hard look at the issue of intra-Eurozone imbalances and why correcting them from within the Eurozone is almost impossible without some form of disruptive sovereign default in key member economies.

As an introduction, here is the abstract:

This paper quantifies and discusses the concept of Eurozone current account imbalances. Using panel data estimations, the analysis shows how the external positions of the Eurozone economies can be modelled as a function of divergences in unit labour costs. Specifically, the results indicate that the formation of EMU has exacerbated the extent to which even relatively small divergences in unit labour costs may materialize in large current account imbalances. These results are framed in the context of the idea of a debt snowball effect and why the idea of an internal devaluation as a tool to correct external imbalances is inconsistent with the current setup of the Eurozone.

So, do I bring anything new to the table in terms of the overall discourse on the Eurozone’s economic problems? Not really. The story I tell is pretty well known but I still see the main contribution of the paper as the attempt to give a concrete quantitative perspective on the effect of divergent inflation rates (in my case unit labour costs) in an economic setting where countries are grouped together with seperate control over fiscal policy and no sovereign monetary policy and exchange rate.

Crucially, I argue that the forces which have lead to the build-up of imbalances are joined at the hip with the same forces which make it almost impossible to correct from within the Eurozone. Specifically the idea of a debt snowball effect is a good way to show why it will be almost impossible for some economies to correct their external imbalances without an explosive evolution in government debt and since they need to correct external competitiveness issues in order to achieve economic growth, the whole thing turns into a vice and essentially a catch 22.

Please note that this is a first draft only and still subject to several re-reads and editing (especially the tables) before I send it off for hopeful approval somewhere. However, for now your comments are welcome both on the paper itself as well as the topic.

The Welfare State and the Future of the Eurozone

Rok Spruk — Thu, 13 May 2010 14:08:33 +0000

The $140 billion rescue package to Greece is a milestone in the European Monetary Union. A lively debate on recent macroeconomic imbalances in the weakest economies of the Euroarea – Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal – in the Eurozone has reopened the old debate on whether the Eurozone is an optimum currency areas (here, here, here and here). The idea of optimum currency areas was first proposed by Nobel-winning economist Robert Mundell. In general, if several countries form a currency union, they should have at least four common macroeconomic features as essential framework of the currency union. In this article, I’ll review the labor market criteria and fiscal adjustment criteria in the light of a recent imbalances in the Euroarea, and leave production diversification and export criteria for future discussion.

First, there should be a high degree of labor mobility between countries in the currency union. The basic idea behind the labor mobility criteria is that the lack of labor mobility triggers divergence of productivity growth rates and asymmetric adjustment of wages. If inter-country productivity divergence persists, there is an upward pressure on wages adjustment given the lack of exchange rate adjustment since the countries share a common monetary policy. The formation of the currency union in the United States was relatively straightforward given the fact that labor mobility between the states is very high. In Europe, the level of labor mobility is relatively low. The lack of labor mobility has a lot to do with labor market institutions in European countries. Workers from the European periphery can hardly move to Germany, Netherlands or Denmark as they do not speak the same language. The lack of inter-country mobility resulted in significant wage premiums and rise in rents since European labor markets share a pretty high degree of monopoly power since European workers can’t switch easily between labor market structure. The resulting outcome of the lack of labor market competition was a significant “union capture” of the labor market, leading to rigid wage determination and high market switching costs.

Paul Krugman recently argued (link) that the major problem behind the European Monetary Union is the lack of common fiscal policy. To a very large extent, the absence of common fiscal policy seriously affects the future prospects of the European Monetary Union. Common fiscal policy could easily absorb asymmetric shocks withing the Euroarea. However, instituting the policy could not alter the trade-off between fiscal autonomy and asymmetric shock intensity. In other words, the main problem of the Euroarea right now is the free-riding of Eurozone’s most problematic countries on a common monetary policy using disrectionary fiscal policy. Before the economic crisis, Spain had a budget deficit while, at the moment, the 2010 budget deficit forecast is more than 8 percent of the GDP. The estimate Greece’s balooning public debt in 2009 ranges from 110 to 115 percent, depending on the consensus forecast. If the EMU countries unified a fiscal policy, the countries would not have an incentive to free-ride on discretionary fiscal policy and further increase the stock of public debt. The major impediment on the recovery and long-term economic outlook of Eurozone countries is largely dependent on how these countries will reform the pension systems in the light of a growing old-age dependence and a near fiscal insolvency of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension schemes. It will be impossible to reverse the aging population and its persistent pressure on an increasing public debt. The integration of fiscal policy would require a sizeable harmonization of taxes given high costs of coordination and sufficient incentives for moral hazard. Without the reversion of long-term public debt pressure from aging, discretionary spending and entitlements, countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal would leave the Eurozone.