By Simon Grey, on March 30th, 2011
Cohen’s book proceeds as follows. First, he has us imagine a camping trip among friends. Food and goods are shared freely. Everyone abides by (purportedly) socialist principles of community and equality. Everyone does his part. No one takes advantage of anyone else. No one free rides. Everyone contributes. Everyone shares.
After a while, people begin to act like capitalists (as Cohen understands realistic capitalistic behavior). Harry demands extra food because he is especially good at fishing. Sylvia demands payment when she finds a good fishing spot. Leslie demands payment for her special knowledge of how to crack nuts. Harry, Sylvia, and Leslie refuse to share without extra payment. Morgan, whose father left him a well-stocked pond 30 years ago, gloats over having better food than the others.
The fundamental flaw in this argument is that there is an assumption of scalability, which simply means that socialism, which works well on a small scale, should also work well on a large scale. Unfortunately, this assumption is simply incorrect.
In the first place, socialism requires a large degree of knowledge in order to be systemically efficient. When one is dealing with a small number of people (e.g. a family), it is possible to have a large degree of knowledge without necessarily possessing a large amount of knowledge. When more people enter the people, the degree of knowledge necessary remains the same while the absolute amount of raw knowledge required increases correspondingly (e.g. 60% of 10<60% of 100). As the famous Dr. Sowell has remarked, “economic decisions are about tradeoffs, not absolutes.” This principle applies to determining which economic system should be used.
In the second place, socialism requires that actors within a system be close in proximity. It is difficult to ensure that all producers are producing enough if they are scattered over a large geographic area. It is also difficult to determine who isn’t pulling their weight if people are not close in social proximity as well, which simply means that people who aren’t “close” to one another, in a platonic sense, are not likely to know what the others do.
Again, these two factors play a significant role in determining which system to use. For small-scale societies, like the nuclear family, the socialist system makes more sense, for the absolute knowledge demands are low, and proximity is near. This, then, is a very economical way of determining how to distribute production and resources, based on the specific skill sets and desires of the individuals working within the small-scale society. In fact, socialism naturally lends itself to a system of informal barter.
Socialism is not, however, well-suited to a large-scale society. The knowledge demands are simply too great for one person, or even a large number of persons. And since large-scale societies also require large amounts of land for sustenance, there is then not enough proximity to reinforce the necessary social norms, leading to a significant free-rider problem. Capitalism (or, more accurately, the free market) solves this problem through the division of labor, which requires only that system participants pay attention only to those things which are directly related to their interests, thus solving the knowledge problem and, to some extent, the proximity problem.
The break-even point for these systems is unknown, but I am willing to bet that the system size strongly coincides with Dunbar’s number. At any rate, it should be obvious that advocating wide-scale socialism based on the success of small-scale socialism is as foolish as advocating small-scale capitalism based on the success of large-scale socialism. Note: I use the word “capitalism” interchangeably with “free market” in this post, simply for the sake of syntactical brevity.
By Winton Bates, on October 23rd, 2009
In my last post I suggested that nearly everyone would agree that a good society has the following characteristics:
· institutions that enable its members to live in peace;
· institutions that provide opportunities for members to flourish; and
· institutions that provide members with security against various threats to flourishing e.g. foreign military threats and economic misfortune.
There is substantial overlap between the institutions of a good society and the institutions of the “great society” or “open society”, as discussed by Friedrich Hayek.
Hayek emphasized that “only the observance of common rules makes the peaceful existence of individuals in society possible” (LLL, I: 72). He argued that the aim of the rules of just conduct is to define “the protected sphere” of each person in order to prevent, as much as possible, “the actions of different individuals from interfering with each other” (LLL, I: 108). He observed: “The Great Society arose through the discovery that men can live together in peace and mutually benefiting each other without agreeing on the particular aims which they severally pursue” (LLL, II: 109). Hayek went on to make the point that in the great society we all “contribute not only to the satisfaction of needs of which we do not know, but sometimes even to the achievement of ends of which we would disapprove if we knew about them (LLL, II: 109-10). In the great society we have no way of knowing the purposes for which others will use the goods we supply.
If we perceive living in peace to be a necessary condition for a good society then I think we must accept the primacy of liberty – individual freedom and rules that determine the boundaries of the domains of freedom (the protected spheres of each person) are necessary conditions of a good society.
The implications of the primacy of liberty might be more profound than they appear at first sight. For example, a society in which the majority of people flourish could hardly be viewed as a good society if it has laws that cause individuals to be denied liberty if they pursue lifestyles that are offensive to the majority, even though those individuals have done nothing to infringe the protected spheres of other people. The majority might argue, perhaps with good reason, that the individuals concerned would have a better chance of flourishing if they were put in jail, but this does not justify the use of force to make them change their lifestyles.
Other aspects of the relationships between particular sets of institutions and opportunities for human flourishing and security against threats to flourishing seem to be of a more empirical nature. I would argue, for example, that high levels of economic freedom tend to provide greater opportunities for human flourishing, but that is a testable hypothesis. Some relevant discussion is here. Similarly, I would argue that governments have an important role in providing members of society with security, but the extent to which such a role might be warranted involves empirical questions.
The institutions of a good society may differ from those of the great society in relation to personal income security. Hayek argued that the provision of some kind of welfare safety net was not only “a wholly legitimate protection against a common risk to all, but a necessary part of the Great Society in which the individual no longer has specific claims on the members of the small group into which he was born” (LLL, III: 55). He recognized, however, that national safety nets that would be higher in wealthier countries would necessitate restrictions on migration. In my view such considerations may make it necessary for the institutions of a good society – one that its good for its members – to depart to some degree from the liberal principles of the great society.
By Winton Bates, on October 22nd, 2009
In my last post, (Is there such a thing as a good society?) I suggested that a good society would have good institutions – norms and laws that are good for its members.
In thinking about the characteristics of a good society different people tend to emphasise different things that they consider to be important e.g. egalitarianism, personal freedom, moral values and spirituality. Rather than just agreeing to differ I think it might be useful to try to identify some characteristics of a good society that nearly everyone would agree to be important. Then it would be possible to consider what evidence might be available about the nature of the institutions that would foster those characteristics. This might enable us to develop a view about the nature of the institutions of a good society that would be widely accepted.
So, what are the characteristics of a good society? First, as I suggested in my last post, the most important characteristic of a good society is a set of institutions that enable its members to live together in peace. This entails an absence major threats to persons or property such as those associated with civil war, high levels of corruption and absence of rule of law. The institutions should also prevent use of the coercive powers of the state by despots or influential interest groups to enrich themselves at the expense of others or to restrict the freedom of others to choose how they will live their lives. Institutions that promote the peaceful co-existence of individuals and groups with differing interests and values are obviously a necessary condition for human flourishing.
Second, nearly everyone would agree that a good society would provide its members with opportunities to flourish – to have more of the things that are good for humans to have. This would include opportunities to live long and healthy lives, economic opportunities, opportunities for educational and cultural pursuits, opportunities to make important decisions affecting themselves and their families and opportunities to participate in political processes.
Why focus on opportunities rather than outcomes? Good institutions can make it possible for humans to flourish but humans can’t be made to flourish – for much the same reasons as you can lead to water but can’t make it drink. Human flourishing is an inherently self-directed process. The best we can hope for is a set of institutions that will maximize the probability that any individual chosen at random will be a flourishing individual.
Third, I think there would be widespread agreement that a good society would provide its members with a degree of security against potential threats to individual flourishing. For example it would endeavour to maintain good foreign relations and provide national defence capability sufficient to deter foreign aggression; it would maintain safeguards against government corruption and misuse of the coercive powers of the state (e.g. processes that make it difficult for narrow interest groups to acquire or maintain disproportionate influence in policy-making processes and processes for removal of governments that do not have popular support); it would maintain appropriate machinery to prevent or deal with environmental disasters; it would prevent “the tragedy of the commons” by maintaining appropriate institutions for ownership, pricing and use of natural resources; and it would provide members with a degree of personal economic security against misfortunes such as accidents, ill-health and unemployment.
What evidence do we have about the institutions that tend to foster these characteristics of a good society? An attempt to answer that question will be left to a later post.
By Winton Bates, on August 24th, 2009
In “John Stuart Mill, Victorian Firebrand” Richard Reeves suggests that the question of whether Mill’s essay, “Utilitarianism”, can be reconciled with his more famous essay, “On Liberty”, is one that “will keep scholars engaged for the foreseeable future” (p. 330). That is probably correct, but I don’t think Mill would have had a huge problem in reconciling his views in the two essays if he had felt inclined to do so.
What is it that needs to be reconciled? In “On Liberty”, Mill argues that human flourishing requires the exercise of individual choice: “The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice. He who does anything because it is the custom, makes no choice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what is best. The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only by being used” (Ch. 3).
In “Utilitarianism”, written about the same time, Mill argues that people should be indoctrinated with a version of utilitarian morality: “To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes; so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being’s sentient existence (Ch 2).
Different people have different views about the tension between Mill’s emphasis on the importance of individual choice and his proposals for indoctrination of an indissoluble association between individual happiness and the good of the whole. For example, Linda Raeder writes: “A deep immersion in Mill’s thought leaves one with the decided impression that his aspirations for human beings were not for the flowering of their unique individuality but for their conformity to his personal ideal of value and service” (“John Stuart Mill and the Religion of Humanity”, 2002). Richard Reeves adopts a more conventional view of Mill’s aspirations: “The animating idea at the heart of Mill’s life and work is individual liberty. His image of a good society was one in which every man (and, he would add, every woman) can shape the course of their own life. … Mill wanted our lives to be free, but he also wanted them to be good ” (p. 6).
Mill’s view on the importance of diversity in education seem to me to provide an example of the way in which it would have been possible for him to reconcile his desire for us to be free with his desire for us to be good. He wrote: “All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education. A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body. An education established and controlled by the State, should only exist, if it exist at all, as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence” “On Liberty”, Ch 5.
Mill also emphasised the value of experimentation at a more general level:
“It will not be denied by anybody, that originality is a valuable element in human affairs. There is always need of persons not only to discover new truths, and point out when what were once truths are true no longer, but also to commence new practices, and set the example of more enlightened conduct, and better taste and sense in human life” (“On Liberty”, Ch 3).
In his “Autobiography” Mill noted that he viewed “On Liberty” as “a kind of philosophic text-book of a single truth, which the changes progressively taking place in modern society tend to bring out into ever stronger relief: the importance, to man and society of a large variety in types of character, and of giving full freedom to human nature to expand itself in innumerable and conflicting directions” (Ch 7).
It seems to me that it would have been possible for Mill to reconcile his views on liberty and ethics by making the case that recognition of the right of individuals to experiment in living as seems best to themselves is of over-riding importance to society. Not only does this open the possibility of discovering new truths, it also opens the possibility that people can learn from the mistakes of others. As Friedrich Hayek wrote: “It is whenever man reaches beyond his present self, where the new emerges and assessment lies in the future, that liberty ultimately shows its value” (“Constitution of Liberty”, p. 394).
If Mill had argued more explicitly that the right of individuals to live as seems best to themselves is of over-riding importance it would have been clearer that he did not intend that his personal values should be imposed on people who do not desire them.
By David Barr, on April 21st, 2009
The great insight of modern economics is the power of markets to align the interest of society and the individual. The idea that attending to your own affairs and following your passions is all that one must contribute to society is incredibly liberating. The market system has proven an incredibly powerful, efficient and innovate tool for distributing societies resources.
But it is time that we recognize that markets are not omniscient, they are merely a tool. The invisible hand does not free us from the obligation to actively create the society that we want. There are many well documented limitation to the power of markets. There is a vast array of goods and services that markets provide better and cheaper than any other system.
But there is an equally important set of goods that are incompatible with a market system. A healthy society must find a balance between the market economy and the need for public goods. Blind faith in the superiority of private investment over public investment has skewed this balance.
I was recently watching a Seinfeld rerun and it made me realize how rapidly technology has changed day to day life. The past 15 years has seen the near universal proliferation of the internet, cell phones and a host of other innovations that have fundamentally rearranged the way that people relate to their world. Yet the achievements of the technology sector underscore the societal failure in other areas.
Over the span of a generation we have built multiple nationwide cell phone networks yet allowed our transportation infrastructure disintegrate into the laughingstock of the developed world. While the internet blossomed into the greatest conduit of information in human history we have failed to provide a depressingly large percentage of our population with an adequate education. While drug makers have cured impotency and perfected the face transplant we have raised a generation of young people that is unlikely to outlive their parents.
The brightest minds of our generation have viewed trading derivatives on wall street or developing new gadgets in Silicon Valley as valuable contributions to economic growth. While government work has been the domain of the lazy or untalented. But in the enthusiasm for private investment the central signal of a capitalist economy has been ignored.
Prices are the brains of any market; by indicating what is needed price signals lead the way for investment. So what have prices been telling us? Over the past 15 years the profit margins of consumer goods from computers to clothing to fast food have been declining. At the same time public and semi-public goods have been kicking and screaming for more investment. It is clear that the bloated private sector has been starving the public sector of essential resources. Once we stop pretending that the private sector is morally superior to the public sector we will better be able to allocate resources between market goods and public goods.
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