The Euro Crisis

Paul Krugman has blogged an interesting analysis of the anatomy of the recent economic crisis in Europe (link).

Europe’s difficult macroeconomic situation in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis has exacerbated rising fiscal deficits and public debt alongside strong deflationary pressures. These pressures were triggered by the highly negative output gap – the difference between the economy’s potential output and the real output. In fact, a brief observation of the output gap estimates (link) shows that the sick men of Europe (Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy, Slovenia) are likely to face negative output gaps. In 2010, Spain is likely to reach -2.12 percent output gap. Slovenia, Italy and Greece will also face a negative output gap. The negative output gap triggered strong deflationary pressures since the nominal aggregate demand is insufficient, causing a decreasing price level.

Before the financial and economic crisis of 2008/2009 evolved, Europe’s peripheral economies faced strong asset price bubble. As real estate prices were soaring, these economies attracted significant capital inflows which lead to inflationary pressures. Before the crisis, the inflationary dynamics in the peripheral countries of the Eurozone were strong. In Greece, Spain and Slovenia, consumer prices increased by more than 3 percent on the annual basis. The asset bubble was further spread by low interest rates. The asset price inflation in these countries was very high. In Slovenia, five-year asset prices increased by 500 percent (see: IMF, International Financial Statistics). As the increase in asset prices widened, Europe’s sick men were faced with rising current account deficit.

In 2007, Spain’s current account deficit amounted to more than 10 percent of the GDP. In such circumstances, a clever monetary policymaker would push up interest rates. As interest rates were at historic lows during the pre-crisis period, the real cure was on behalf of the fiscal policy. Before the crisis, Spain’s fiscal picture was very well indeed. From 2004 to 2007, Spain was running a fiscal surplus which reached the level of 2 percent of the GDP in 2006 and 2007. However, massive capital inflows were not sterilized by raising interest rates which further inflated the real estate bubble and overheating of Spain’s economy.

Independent fiscal policies and a common monetary policy – which is an economic model of the EMU – cause asymmetric shocks. During the years of high growth, these shocks are mostly neglected. However, during the crisis these shocks might cause a serious trouble in the macroeconomic adjustment. Greece, which recently declared a worrisome possibility of debt default, is a typical case of what happens when asymmetric shocks persist.

As Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Slovenia now face high fiscal deficits and poor economic growth, these countries will likely face years of deflationary pressures and high unemployment. The fiscal policymakers already exhausted the ability of governments to boost spending. Further growth of government spending is impossible unless European countries want the Greek debt episode to evolve in a domino effect throughout the Eurozone. The ECB will sooner or later this year raise the baseline interest rates to avoid the inflationary swings in Germany, Austria, Netherlands and other countries with current account surplus.

The macroeconomic outlook for the Eurozone is backlashed by the debt crisis in Mediterranean countries. An economic recovery may include indepedent monetary policies to adjust interest rates and prevent another asset bubble episode as well as to target current account balance. However, European countries will have to rethink the role of indepedent and discretionary fiscal policies pursued by the sick men of the Eurozone.

Join the forum discussion on this post - (2) Posts

Is Slovenia The Next Sick Man of Europe?

Recently released data from OECD Economic Outlook (link) suggest that the recessionary period is likely ending as the output in world’s major economies is reversing the trend of the past year. In 2009, the U.S economy is expected to contract by 2.8 percent annually. Germany, suffering from a significant decline in inventory orders and foreign demand, is set to contract by 6.1 percent and Japanese economy is likely to decline by 6.8 percent. The end of the global recession will be continued by a slow recovery as the economic growth in the OECD economies is most likely to reach 0.7 percent in 2010 after a 4.1 percent decline in 2009.

Besides Israel and Estonia, Slovenia is the next country to join the OECD. The macroeconomic outlook for Slovenia, unfortunately, remains sluggish. In Q2:2009, Slovenian economy contracted significantly. The output decreased by 9.3 percent. In Q1:2009, the economic activity decreased by 9.However, the data on GDP decline is too optimistic compared to the real sector. According to the latest availible data, the industrial production in April contracted by 28.26 percent, followed by double-digit consecutive declines each month. Investment, which in 2008 accounted for 28.9 percent of the GDP declined significantly. In Q1:09, the business investment contracted by 32.3 percent.

The pre-crisis boom in business investment was surged by quantitative easing and low interest rate which contributed to historic highs of credit stock. In addition to deteriorating macroeconomic outlook, the export of goods and services, which once used to be the core engine of Slovenia’s economic growth, contracted by 21.1 percent in the Q1:2009. Thus, during 2008, the economic activity experienced unusually high rates of economic growth spurred by investment, foreign demand and historically high consumption spending. Throughout 2008, the economy was starting to exhibit strong signals of overheating.

By the beginning of the crisis, the economic policy pursued a radical debt-driven infusions of liquidity in the banking and bailouts to the real sector. Consequently, the state of public finance changed dramatically. For decades, Slovenia maintained on of the lowest public debt/GDP ratios in Europe. As a fiscal measure, low public debt had been of the merits that enabled the fulfillment of convergence criteria before entering the EMU.

As a result of government intervention, debt guarantees and surging public spending, the public debt is likely to soar from 21.5 percent of the GDP in 2008 to 32.6 percent of the GDP in 2009. The public debt is expected to rise further. If the current trend continues, the public debt is estimated to soar up to 53.7 percent by 2013 (link).

The black line and the left axis on the graph show general government balance while the left axis and yellow bar show public debt. Both categories are expressed in percent of the GDP.

Public debt and general government balance as a percent of the GDP (2004-2013)

Source: Ministry of Finance (link)

As we can see, the primary budget deficit will move from -0.27 percent of the GDP in 2008 to 6.58 percent of the GDP in 2009. By 2013, the deficit is estimated to move to -7.4 percent of the GDP. Compared to small and open economies, Slovenia’s primary budget deficit is higher than in most small and open economies. It is, for instance, higher than in Denmark, Greece, Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and Norway. As far as I know, Norway is the only developed country without budget deficit in the near future (According to the OECD and Norges Bank, Norway will post 8.6 percent budget surplus in 2009, down from 18.8 percent in 2008. In 2010, the budget surplus will likely increased by 0.4 percentage point).

The government intervention in the real sector further regulated the labor market by introducing subsidies to employers to retain the employees and discourage layoffs to prevent the rise in unemployment. However, recent data suggested that public sector employment grew significantly while private sector employment declined respectively. In Q2:09, private sector employment decreased by 9.3 percent. Public sector employment, on the other hand, increased by 1.4 percent on the annual basis.

For at least two decades of transition, Slovenia’s gradualist economic policy favored rigid and inflexible labor market embodied in collective bargaining, high tax rates on labor supply and barriers to entry. The economic policymakers created discriminatory labor market structure which still discourages young graduates from entering the labor market after graduation. Consequently, unit labor costs are among the highest in the EU. Recently, The Economist snapped a nice chart, showing that tax burden on labor supply in Slovenia is the highest in the world (link). In combination with ageing population and of the youngest retirement generations in the world, the abovementioned labor market dualism further encouraged policymakers to raise health and social security contribution rates. It lead to one of the lowest growth rates of private sector employment in the EU. It further lead to the highest tax wedge in the EU and the unusually high growth of unit labor cost relative to productivity growth. In addition, strongly regulated labor market is the major cause of Slovenia’s low productivity convergence relative to the EU15. The majority of central European and Baltic countries have been lowering the productivity gap behind the Euroarea much faster than Slovenia.

In 2009, Slovenia reach 90 percent level of EU27’s GDP per capita. Compared to the Euroarea, Slovenia reached 83 percent level of the GDP per capita. Compared to EU15, which is a reasonable measure of comparison, Slovenia reached 81.7 percent level of GDP per capita. Compared to Switzerland, Slovenia sustains only 64 percent level of Swiss GDP per capita (link). Interestingly, if Slovenia were a part of the U.S, its GDP per capita would be at the 54 percent of the U.S level, even lower than in Mississippi and West Virginia – the least developed states in the U.S.

Although Slovenia is often cheered as being the “Switzerland of the East” and the most developed former communist country, its economy will likely resemble slow growth in Italy, Germany and France rather than dynamic growth in Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia and Switzerland. Current economic policies are the recipe for eurosclerosis, experienced by pre-Thatcher Britain. If such pattern of economic policy will continue, the Slovenian economy will, sooner or later, exhibit economic stagnation with low economic growth, onerous tax burden, high structural unemployment and rapidly ageing population.