By Simon Grey, on January 25th, 2012
Parlier earns about $13 an hour. She’d like to become one of the better-paid workers in the plant, but, in today’s factories, that requires an enormous leap in skills. It feels cruel, Davidson writes, to mention all the things Parlier would have to learn to move up. She doesn’t know the computer language that runs the machines. “She doesn’t know trigonometry or calculus, and she’s never studied the properties of cutting tools or metals. She doesn’t know how to maintain a tolerance of 0.25 microns, or what tolerance means in this context, or what a micron is.”
A good attitude and hustle have taken Parlier as far as they can. It’s hard, given her situation, to acquire the skills she needs to realize the American dream.
But skills aren’t always necessary. A dumbed-down UI can serve as a substitute for knowledge, particularly if a firm can hire a technician to know the technical aspects of the technology in use so other workers don’t have to. In fact, the trend of technology has generally been to serve as a substitute for knowledge and ability. Why learn Trig if you can run a fairly simple program on a computer?
Anyhow, this story is evidence of my claim of a technology gap. If labor were allowed to compete freely in a deregulated economy, technological growth would be slower and technological innovations implemented less frequently. This in turn ensures that labor is not stagnant or regressive, and also gives less intelligent laborers a chance to remain on the market longer as technology remains relatively expensive. In order to make technology more appealing, then, technological innovators will find it useful to dumb down the UI to make the device more readily accessible by lower-intelligence labor.
The point in all this, then, is that the government has basically set policies in place that pulls demand for technology forward, leaving less-intelligent laborers in the lurch. And since less-intelligent laborers tend to also be poor, it can be said that the government hates poor people.
By Ajay Shah, on January 19th, 2012
I was shocked by Lant Pritchett’s note on the appalling performance of India’s best two states on the international PISA assessment. Actually, I was not really shocked; I didn’t expect anything else as I’ve been listening to Lant for years now. By the same token, I agree with Jishnu Das that we really don’t know much about what works in education (other than that good teaching makes a difference) and that our bean-counting of inputs into education may be completely wrong headed. From conversations with him (also over years) I surmise that the only thing we really know about what leads to more learning is that it is correlated with how many years children stay in school. What that suggests, though, is that attention be directed towards the choice of parents and students to stay in school.
In my opinion people choose to do things if it is worth it to them. This is a common assumption for economists. While challengeable in some circumstances, does it make any sense to think that people send their children to school if they don’t think it’s worth it? If it is
compulsory: sure. With compulsion, attention of policy makers and carefully watchful observers such as Pratham should be to make sure school is worth the year of children’s attendance since people would not be able to decide for themselves. Until we see compulsory schooling enforced, though, years of education remain a family’s choice and we have to understand how and why people make that choice.
Unless we think parents are utterly clueless about the value of education and totally incapable of telling if teachers are doing anything or their children are learning anything, the effectiveness of teaching and the amount of knowledge imparted must be a major factor in their decision as to whether school is worth it. Don’t get me wrong, I’ve met dozens of educators and education officials in India who believe parents are, indeed, clueless and such decisions should be out of their hands. But they are the very people who gave us the PISA ratings and are indeed throwbacks to the License Raj where only bureaucrats were assumed to know anything. Further, with the explosion of private schools, even in rural areas, it is laughable to think that there are so many parents who value education so little. They are willing to forego free public education in order to pay for something more worthwhile.
Which brings us to accountability.
What could parents be looking at, that makes them think school is worth it? It must be based on performance: parents don’t really see
the inputs, they mostly just see their children learn. Or not learn as is the case. So how can they translate their concern for learning into actual learning? They have to be free to pick the educational context that they see is working for them or their neighbors. That’s where accountability comes in.
A provider of any good or service is likely to be most accountable when their livelihood depends upon attracting customers. If what they provide is worth it, people will take the service, and the provider can make a living. If not, parents won’t pay and teachers won’t get paid. As of now, there is no mechanism to allow families to make that choice. There is no such compulsion for teachers to provide a service worth paying for. No doubt there are many teachers (probably most) who are doing the best they can regardless of how they are paid. But with over 24% absenteeism, large numbers of teachers observed to be doing anything but teaching, and many sub-contracting their position to under-qualified replacements at a fraction of government salaries, there is substantial room for improvement.
Further, if we are going to get more students (and, hence, teachers) into classrooms, the dedicated teachers may be the ones who are already on the job. People induced to enter the profession may not be as dedicated and, hence, need some other way to hold them accountable than internally felt professional ethics.I am an educator (of sorts) but have no opinion about what the bottleneck in children’s learning really is. Jishnu says the most successful headmasters all say different things (after good teachers – but then, don’t we judge the goodness of teachers by whether their students actually learn? It’s an output based judgment, too.) I know little of pedagogical theory. But I know just as little about the inner workings of most complex things I use — computers and the Internet, water systems, bicycles. I can tell when they work and when they don’t, though. Similarly, I know that my sons learned to read and
write, become responsible citizens and to develop and exercise critical intellectual capacities (sometimes way too critical for my
taste) even though I have no idea how they learned them. I did know that their teachers were in school almost every day and doing things that sounded like teaching to me. I did not have to be an expert on pedagogy to hold the schools completely accountable for my children’s education.
I was also fortunate enough to be able to take (or threaten to take) them out of government schools if I thought otherwise. Funding
for government schools (in the U.S.) follows enrollment, if not so directly and obviously as for private schools. So my threats about
shifting my children out of government school directly mattered to their teachers.
There is no reason why Indian parents can’t do the same. They, on average, may not have my education but after talking to hundreds of families in rural areas, tribal villages, urban slums and SC hamlets, I hear no less concern for their children’s future than I have for
mine and no less ability to tell if a teacher appears to be doing his job. They may be more capable than me since they are more likely to see the teachers themselves — I needed to ask my children.
In many rich countries, the issue of vouchers to pay for schools is emotionally charged. Historically, free compulsory public education was a result of fights between church and State (even in Japan where `church’ doesn’t quite fit — but religion and State does). Children were already attending school in high percentages and there was a fight for their hearts and minds. In rich countries currently, suggestions to provide vouchers instead of State-run schools re-kindle this old antagonism against religious instruction.
India never had this fight nor this evolution of public provision. Our view of schooling here in India was imposed based on the final result of universal free education seen in rich countries without the history from which that final result evolved.
India needn’t go through the phase of fighting over who gets to teach students who are already highly motivated to learn and have seen learning take place. If India wants to see all children educated, she can certainly pay for the cost of education (in fact, the job can be done for much less per student is presently spent) so that families don’t have to. But the government doesn’t have to provide it directly (though government schools should be free to compete for this money if it can). The fight is the State against society (families), not against the church.
What the State can do is make as much information known to parents as possible. What should children know after how many years of school?
How do you know if your child is keeping up? How do you know what you’re paying for is worth it? As of now, this information is
certainly not given to parents. Maybe State run schools don’t want parents to know (and, unfortunately, most Indian parents will not know about PISA). And as of now, there is nothing parents (particularly poor parents) can do about it anyway.
By Simon Grey, on January 9th, 2012
Direct and indirect federal subsidy is often offered as the primary reason for the occurrence of the current college bubble. Most effects of the college bubble are traced back to federal funding, in the forms of student grants and subsidized loans, not to mention research grants as well as general academic funding and diversity grants (wherein a college or university receives federal funding for certain campus offerings, mostly related to making women and minorities feel good about themselves). Basically, federal money is the cause of the college bubble.
This view is not altogether incorrect, but it seems to ignore the role of federal regulation and the role of shifting cultural/societal views regarding student self-esteem. The two generally go hand-in-hand and feed off each other, and so trying to delink the two is impossible. At any rate, what’s neglected in the discussion of the college bubble is the concept of grade inflation.
Grade inflation has occurred primarily for two reasons. First, as mentioned before, the relatively recent self-esteem movement has encouraged the dumbing down of the general curriculum in order to make subpar students feel good about themselves. The history of this movement is dodgy, relative to political intervention. There is no doubt that the government has latched on to the self-esteem movement, but it is not clear if the government was the first mover. Even if it weren’t, private desire and public policy has basically become a self-reinforcing feedback loop, so the point is basically moot. At any rate, the effects of the self-esteem movement are clear, in that students perform moderately well, relative to the world (see Steve Sailer’s take on PISA scores, eg.), while being told that they are highly intelligent. Fortunately, the self-esteem movement does not have as much momentum as it once did, at least from my perspective.
Second, the government has certainly played a role in grade inflation due to the increasing federalization of public schools. The federal government loves uniformity, particularly of outcome, and school outcomes are no exception. As my recent book review pointed out, in brief, the increased bureaucratization of public education has led to a situation where students perform better on an admittedly arbitrary class at the expense of learning things that aren’t on said test. NCLB, in particular, is responsible for this recent effect, and it is part of a larger trend. This trend has led to the inflation of grades in two ways. First, the decreased role of non-test subjects has led to less classroom time dedicated to them, which means that grades in these subjects are based on a smaller sample size of work, and teachers are likely to cut kids slack when grading (at least in my own experience). Second, teachers have cheated on the tests in order to make sure that the kids do well, which sometimes makes students seem smarter than they would otherwise.
Primary and secondary education simultaneously suffered from dumbed-down curriculum and grade inflation, shortchanging intelligent children. They needed some way to fight back and prove their higher intelligence and cognitive abilities, which is where college comes in. While direct federal subsidy of post-secondary education is blamed for the current college bubble—and rightfully so, I might add—this is not the whole picture. The dumbing down of public education has also contributed to the need for college because it now provides the surest means for intelligent students to finally get ahead.
If education is viewed as a way to signal work fitness, then a high school degree has become essentially meaningless. Graduating from high school is no longer a guarantee that one is proficient in math and can speak and write in plain, understandable English. Many colleges tacitly admit this fact with their offering of basic remedial courses. Thus, having a high school education no longer signals that one can be counted on to be a reliable employee.
Thus, intelligent students have two options: drop out of or avoid high school, or go to college. The former is not a good signal for future employment prospects, and thus should be avoided by all but the most entrepreneurial of intelligent students. The latter option—going to college—is the most viable option to demonstrate employment fitness. Thus, intelligent students can no longer simply graduate with good grades at the top of their high school class, they must also get a post-secondary education of some sort as well.
Therefore, while the current increases in college enrollment are undoubtedly the consequence of direct and indirect federal subsidy, it is both foolish and dangerous to ignore the effect of the self-esteem movement and federal regulation, and how both have distorted the signal of secondary education. As such, popping the college bubble won’t be as simple as ending federal regulation. Popping the bubble will also require federal deregulation, and a more appropriate view of the role of self-esteem in a child’s educational development.
By Thomas Knapp, on January 4th, 2012
Our household transitioned to Compact Fluorescent Lamp (CFL) light bulbs years ago. We did it over time, replacing our incandescent bulbs as they burned out. At this point, the only remaining incandescents in the house are those “makeup bulbs” in the significant other’s vanity lamp.
Why did we change over? Because the CFLs were advertised — truthfully, so far as I can tell — as longer-lasting and more efficient, such that they more than cover the higher cost. My recollection is that in four years or so, we’ve had one CFL “burn out” (and a couple get broken, but incandescents would have broken in similar situations too). We’re happy with the quality of light, I don’t have to climb around changing bulbs as often, and the effect on our electric bill, if relatively small, has at least been in the right direction.
Personally, I think CFLs, LEDs, etc. are the bee’s knees. But let’s get one thing straight: The “incandescent light bulb ban,” intended to make you use them, has little or nothing to do with energy efficiency. It’s about money and it’s about using government regulation to strangle competition.
Here’s how it works:
Big light bulb players (General Electric, Phillips, Osram Sylvania) develop and patent CFL technologies, and put big money into facilities to mass produce them. Then they milk what money they can out of their patent-protected monopolies.
But it turns out to not be as much as they’d have liked — most people would still rather spend 50 cents on a 100-watt incandescent bulb than three bucks on a 26-watt CFL. And there are plenty of smaller companies still making those cheaper bulbs. When the patents expire, instead of rushing to produce CFLs too, those smaller companies just keep cranking out those cheap incandescents. And the big guys keep taking it in the shorts, or at least not making nearly as much money as they believe they’re entitled to make.
Solution? “Hey, we spent bazillions of dollars developing and implementing this technology that not everybody wants … let’s spend a little lobbying forcing them to use it … and while we’re at it, let’s force those smaller firms to either spend bazillions of dollars implementing it as well or get out of the light bulb business, too.”
In a real free market, CFLs, LED bulbs, etc., would — in my opinion — have eventually triumphed over the incandescent bulb (with some niche/aesthetic exceptions) by getting ever cheaper and ever more efficient. But why continue to compete and innovate when you can just drag a few papers sacks full of cash down K Street and get your competition outlawed?
Some people refer to this as “light bulb socialism.” I call it “actually existing capitalism.”
By Bron Suchecki, on December 23rd, 2011
Following on from this post from 2009 where I identified five types of storage (Segregated Allocated, Unsegregated Allocated, Unsegregated Physical Backed, Unallocated Fully Hedged, Unallocated Unhedged), we now have confirmation that “Allocated” metal at a bullion bank is unsegregated from this interview with Kyle Bass (42 minute mark) where he talks about bars being all over the place when they did an audit.
The unsegregated nature of bullion bank allocated is why Bob Pisani picked up the wrong bar in his visit to the GLD vault as part of a HSBC promo.
This unsegregated storage is not necessarily a problem and would not make a difference in any bankruptcy of a custodian as the key “segregation” is the specific bar numbers and weights in the client name. Whether bars belonging to two different clients sit together on the same pallet or are on separate pallets separated by air, I cannot see making a difference.
By Bron Suchecki, on December 22nd, 2011
Digital Gold Currency Magazine is reporting that GoldMoney is suspending the ability to make and receive payments in precious metals to or from other GoldMoney customers due to the “global increase of compliance requirements for payment service providers.”
This capability was the key differentiator of GoldMoney to other online precious metal storage businesses. It is an unfortunate development for gold standard advocates.
The decision was not entirely driven by increased regulations as GoldMoney also indicate that “our customers’ use of the metal payments and currency exchange services is not significant.” Looks like a case of disporportionate compliance effort for GoldMoney on something that didn’t drive business.
Interesting then that customers have voted and said they aren’t really interested in gold as money. Possibly this may change if those customers are faced with high inflation or banking system instability, but it will be hard for GoldMoney to restart the functionality and catch up with any regulatory requirements in place at the time (assuming there is any regulatory tolerance for alternative payment systems at that time).
Freegold anyone?

By Simon Grey, on December 21st, 2011
Those advocating a cut in the corporate tax rate today generally ignore the tax on dividends, as well as many other provisions of United States and foreign tax law that may reduce the effective tax rate well below the statutory rate.
A recent study found that only 25 percent of the largest American corporations pay anywhere close to the statutory corporate tax rate of 35 percent on their earnings, while 40 percent pay less than half that rate.
Indeed, General Electric, the nation’s largest corporation, paid no federal corporate taxes in the United States in 2010, according to a report in The New York Times.
The sheer diversity of effective tax rates binding corporations—even though there is only supposed to one rate—suggests that the corporate tax rate is being used as a political tool. This perception is certainly encouraged by GE facing an effective rate of zero. If, as the current evidence suggests, the corporate tax rate is used as a political tool for punishing and rewarding certain corporations, then perhaps abolishing the corporate tax rate would be a good step.
While abolishing the corporate tax would not lead to massive economic growth, it would certainly be a step in the right direction. In the first place, corporations could actually focus on producing things instead of playing pointless political games. Furthermore, government costs could be slightly reduced—the natural result of reduced compliance requirements and the corresponding enforcement costs.
While corporate taxes do not apply to the vast majority of businesses, nor do they account for anything but a minor amount of tax revenue. However, this is no reason to accept an incredibly stupid, highly politicized tax system.
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By Christopher Briem, on December 13th, 2011
If you are not paying attention to the niche news about what is happening within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), you probably should be.
There is a bit of mixing different geographies in this, but here is data I pull when I extract data by occupation across all regions in the US with measurable employment in two of the most specialized occupations out there: Nuclear Engineers and Nuclear Technicians. Added together and ranked by absolute employment counts the graph below is what I get. In sheer numbers these are not huge anywhere, but they are the core and proxies for the far larger establishments that rely on these workers. So you see why any hiccup in the nuclear industry will have impacts here as much as anywhere.
By Ethan Zuckerman, on December 12th, 2011
 
Robert Neuwirth is bringing new insights to familiar (for him, unfamiliar for most of us) territory in his book, “Stealth of Nations“. His previous work, “Shadow Cities” was a plea to take squatter cities and informal settlements seriously, rather than dismissing them as slums. (My review of Shadow Cities is here.) His mission in this new book is for us to reconsider the “informal economy”, which he rebrands “System D”.
“System D” is an abbreviation for “l’economie de la débrouillardise”, a tern coined in French-speaking Africa to refer to a system of “resourceful and ingenious” people who make their livings outside the formal, taxed and regulated economy. Neuwirth rejects the term “informal” because the coiner of that phrase, British anthropologist Keith Hart, included the criminal underground in his term, “the informal economy”. Neuwirth wants to celebrate the energy and ingenuity of people who make their living outside formal economic structure, but distinguish those he celebrates from those who are selling drugs or running prostitution rings. The heroes of System D may avoid taxes, smuggle goods or operate without permits, but Neuwirth sees them not as criminals but as hardworking people trying to make a living in systems that are broken and corrupt.
Neuwirth’s great strength is as a traveler and storyteller. Like “Shadow Cities”, “Stealth of Nation” is packed chock full with stories from the communities he’s visited in Brazil, Paraguay, Nigeria, China and the United States. We meet street merchants selling pens and cakes in São Paolo, a handbag manufacturer in Guangzhou and the baker of high-end (if unlicensed) olive oil cake in New York City. He takes a particularly deep dive in Lagos, a megalopolis he describes as “a System D city”, where virtually no infrastructures are provided by the state, and where basic services like power, drinking water and public transit are provided by private industry and workers’ collectives, who build systems that function with limited licensing, taxation or oversight.
This wealth of narratives helps make the case that System D is massive and pervasive. Working from numbers from the World Bank and using the insights of Austrian economist Friedrich Schneider, Neuwirth offers an estimate that System D is responsible for roughly $10 trillion in goods and services bought and sold annually. That makes “Bazaristan” the second largest economy in the world, behind the United States. He further argues that System D provides employment for a majority of adults in many developing nations. Whether or not we approve of the activities of System D, Neuwirth argues, we need to take it seriously because of the large number of individuals it impacts.
Neuwirth’s inquiry is extremely broad in scope, both in terms of the subjects he considers and the timescale he examines. Chapters look at phenomena like piracy and counterfeit goods, and smuggling across international borders, which Neuwirth examines primarily via Paraguay’s Ciudad del Este, a urban center that exists primarily so Brazilian citizens – and merchants – can avoid paying taxes. To provide a historical context for these sorts of trade, Neuwirth calls on classical economists, including Adam Smith, as well as histories from the 18th century to demonstrate the ongoing demonization and dismissal of System D merchants. For me, these excursions into the past are less enjoyable that the wealth of contemporary examples he provides, though they’re helpful in establishing that System D is a very old system as well as a new one.
The danger in both of Neuwirth’s books is that he loves his subject so much, he occasionally celebrates it uncritically. “Shadow Cities” occasionally read to me as a marketing brochure for Brazilian favelas, suggesting we abandon traditional urban planning and invite urban entrepreneurs to rewire the electrical grid to meet their needs. “Stealth of Nations” is more careful, and Neuwirth engages with the ways in which Lagos can be a nightmare for the people who live there, not just a creative laboratory for urban innovation. At the same time, he urges us to take seriously the miracle that Lagos works at all, a miracle that can be hard to see underneath the diesel smog, caught in an hours-long go-slow.
This appreciation for the complex systems that compose System D can push Neuwirth towards a sort of conservatism that’s familiar to readers of Jane Jacobs. Neuwirth’s Robert Moses is Lagos State governor Babatunde Fashola, who Neuwirth lambasts for clearing street merchants from busy intersections and setting up formalized markets in inconveniently located parts of the city. Neuwirth is right to point out that Fashola, and other urban planners, have a tendency to undervalue the contributions of street merchants, and tend to propose unworkable alternatives to current systems. But celebrating contemporary Lagos in the ways that Jacobs celebrated the Lower East Side seems to miss two critical points. First, to the extent that Lagos works right now, it just barely works – Neuwirth acknowledges as much when he points out that some of Lagos’s most impenetrable traffic jams are caused by the tendency of merchants to turn roadways into markets. Second, Lagos is growing at a ferocious pace, and Fashola seems to be taking seriously the challenge of allowing the city to continue functioning as a megalopolis, likely to soon be one of the world’s largest cities. One possible response to Neuwirth’s criticism is to point out that Fashola was just re-elected with 81% of the vote in a poll most observers saw as free and fair.
Neuwirth is a journalist and documentarian, not an economist or an urban planner, and it may be unreasonable to ask him to solve the thorny problem of bringing System D and the formal economy into closer partnership. Neuwirth examines Hernando de Soto’s work on formalizing System D through property rights. De Soto’s most helpful intervention is the observation that the poor have wealth – homes, businesses, assets – but few ways to access them. By creating a paper trail, establishing ownership over houses and other real estate, de Soto argues that the poor can access their wealth, borrowing against their homes and using the loans to start new businesses. Neuwirth looks at de Soto’s native Peru and concludes that formalization hasn’t done much to help System D. The problem is the banks, who are perfectly willing to accept deposits from System D entrepreneurs, but unwilling to lend to them. Neuwirth’s anger is rightly placed, and his solution – that communities and governments need to demand that banks serve the communities they are located in, not just their shareholders – is timely and correct, even if difficult to implement.
The solutions Neuwirth offers for strengthening and legitimating System D are, by his own admission, modest in scope. Merchants should work together to regulate their activities, settling disputes within mediation mechanisms. They should take responsibility for the physical spaces they inhabit and work to make them clean and safe. They should consider systems that review product safety and ensure the quality of goods sold. Neuwirth isn’t opposed to regulatory involvement in this space – he looks closely at the “pure water” industry in Nigeria, where entrepreneurs drill wells, pump water and purify it under government standards before selling it in single-use sachets to thirsty customers. The system could be a health nightmare if minimum health standards are not enforced. The Lagos government can’t provide clean drinking water to its citizens, so it has found a way to work with System D to ensure that people have water and the water doesn’t kill them – for System D advocates, there’s potential in that story and a model other governments might follow.
But the pure water story also reveals the apparent limits of System D. “Pure water” usually won’t kill you, but it’s an environmental nightmare, as millions of nylon bags clog the Lagos sewers. It’s a wonderful thing that Lagosians can drink safe water, but a system where thousands of school-age girls sell sachets of water because you can’t drink the water out of the pipes isn’t a system any sane planner would advocate for. System D can get Lagos’s citizens to work, but it’s never going to build affordable and environmentally sound public transportation. If merchants follow Neuwirth’s advice, they may collectively buy bigger diesel generators, but they’re unlikely to fix Nigeria’s laughably inadequate power grid.
The people Neuwirth celebrates are – rightly – frustrated by their governments. They avoid paying taxes both because those taxes can be arbitrary and unaffordable, and because they see very few government services in exchange bought with those revenues. But governments need revenues to build infrastructures. And, as economist Paul Collier argues, they need taxes – and need to put those taxes to use in productive ways – in order to have legitimacy. System D seems like a local maximum in an equation – when it works well, it’s amazing what entrepreneurial people can accomplish against impossible odds. But the solutions created are convoluted and incomplete, and it’s reasonable to worry that System D may prevent more formal systems from providing more complete solutions to societal problems.
I don’t actually disagree with Neuwirth on this point – I wrote an essay some years back about incremental infrastructure, an idea I’d had from studying African mobile phone markets, that suggested that systems like power grids and roadways might be built by the cooperation of entrepreneurs when governments failed. My proposal suffers from the same weaknesses I’m criticizing Neuwirth for: it’s hard to see how a collective of merchants builds a railroad, and sometimes a railroad is what’s really needed for economic development.
But that’s an awfully big problem to demand that Neuwirth tackle – if you want to understand precisely how complicated that problem is, try this thought piece from Collier, proposing a possible solution to railroad construction in sub-Saharan Africa. Neuwirth’s job isn’t to solve the problems of System D. What he does – compellingly, readably, engagingly, and frequently, brilliantly – is give the reader a picture of how the world’s economies actually work, and a convincing argument that we need to respect and understand these economic systems. It’s a good read and an important book.
When you pick up Neuwirth’s new book, also consider grabbing a copy of Gordon Mathews’s “ Ghetto at the Center of the World”, a remarkable ethnography of a single building in Hong Kong, Chungking Mansions. Chungking Mansions is a nondescript and somewhat run-down tower block in one of the more crowded corners of Kowloon. Inside is a remarkable market, where Chinese, Pakistani and sub-Saharan African merchants interact with one another in a microcosm of global trade. Mathews refers to this economic phenomenon as “low-end globalization”, and his book unpacks the history, mechanics, personalities and motivations in a way that is absolutely fascinating.
Chungking Mansions exists because of a peculiarity of Hong Kong’s visa policies. Tourist visas to Hong Kong are easily obtained by citizens of many nations – residents of countries like Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya often have difficulty obtaining visas to Europe, the US or China, but are able to travel to Hong Kong for anywhere between 7 and 90 days, depending on the discretion of the immigration officer. As China became a major manufacturing power, Chungking Mansions became a critical interface between Chinese factories and developing world markets. The upper floors of the building feature low-cost guesthouses that cater primarily to traveling merchants, and restaurants that offer home cooking for the African and South Asian migrants who work out of the building.
On the ground floor, dozens of stalls feature Pakistani merchants selling Chinese-made mobile phones to African middlemen. Mathews documents the trade in intimate detail, explaining the ownership of the individual stalls (they are generally rented from Chinese owners who are rarely present in the building, but have a powerful owner’s association that governs the working on the market), the provenance of the phones sold (including the difference between original phones, 14-day phones – original phones returned to the vendor by dissatisfied customers, good fakes and bad fakes) and the economics of importing phones into sub-Saharan Africa. Mathews posits (without much data to back this claim) that up to half the mobile phones in Africa come through Chungking Market and enter African markets through the luggage of entrepreneurs.
I found Mathews’s account so compelling that Chungking Mansions was my first stop when visiting Hong Kong a few weeks ago. Based on his explanation of Chinese perceptions of the building (as a dangerous place filled with drug addicts and criminals), I expected a much shadier place than I actually found. Chungking Mansions is immediately familiar to anyone who’s bought electronics in the developing world – it’s cleaner and better organized than markets I’ve been to in Nairobi and New Delhi, but in some ways, functionally the same place. Walking through the stalls, I experienced a tesseract, a folding of space that let me move between Hong Kong, Pakistan and West Africa over the course of a few meters. I dropped into one of the few non-phone stores, a clothing store featuring street fashions, including a wide array of Yankee caps. I gave the merchant grief about not stocking Red Sox hats, quickly figured out that he was Ghanaian, greeted him in Twi, and was warmly embraced and invited upstairs for fufu and groundnut soup. It wasn’t at all hard to figure out why Mathews had fallen in love with the place – if you’re interested in how globalization is transforming economies, Chungking Mansions really is one of the centers of the world.
I had the chance to meet Mathews when we lectured together at the University of Hong Kong a few days later. He’s as wonderfully crazy as you’d imagine him to be, and told me that he’d written the book in a bar across the street from his research site. “The key is that the bar has roasted peanuts in the shell. I’d shell a peanut and think, then write a sentence, then sip my beer. That writing pace is just perfect as long as you remain under three beers.” Rarely have I learned so much from a single ethnographer – how to smuggle phones into Ghana in my luggage, the best strategies for overstaying my Hong Kong tourist visa, how to befriend Nepali heroin addicts, and how to pace my writing.
I’ve been pushing Mathews’s book on the ethnographers I know because it’s an amazing example of the power of the deep dive. It’s possible that no one on the planet understands Chungking Mansions as thoroughly as Mathews does based on his decade of research. But his insights are profoundly helpful not just for understanding this one wonderful and strange building, but for understanding globalization as it is actually practiced. Where Neuwirth takes a broad view, considering economies on four different continents, Mathews rarely leaves the confines of a single building and still manages to tell a story that’s global in scope and impact.
By Simon Grey, on December 6th, 2011
Street vending has been a path out of poverty for Americans. And like other such paths (say, driving a taxi), this one is increasingly difficult to navigate. Why? Because entrenched interests don’t like competition. So they lobby their powerful friends to erect high hurdles to upstarts. It’s an old story.
Now, growing local governments are crushing street vendors.
The city of Atlanta, for example, has turned all street vending over to a monopoly contractor. In feudalist fashion, all existing vendors were told they must work for the monopoly or not vend at all.
…
Institute lawyer Elizabeth Foley says the regulations make “it virtually impossible to be an effective street vendor. You can’t be within 300 feet of any place that sells the same or similar merchandise. That’s absolutely ridiculous for the government to use its power to enact a law like that. … These people are just trying to make an honest living, and the city is making it impossible to do so.”
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Raul Martinez, the mayor when the law passed, defended the rule.
“You don’t want to have everybody in the middle of the streets competing for space on the sidewalk without some sort of regulations. In the city of Hialeah, we’re not overregulating anybody.”
He says one purpose of the law is simple fairness: Street vendors don’t pay property taxes. Brick-and-mortar stores must.
No one likes paying taxes, and so everyone tries to either avoid the misery or spread it around. One common justification for paying taxes, then, is fairness: Why should I pay taxes when my competitor doesn’t?
That is, perhaps, a legitimate question, but it is irrelevant nonetheless because fairness does not exist. For starters, no two people can even agree on what constitutes fairness. And even if they could, ensuring fairness requires more data than anyone possesses or could hope of possessing.
Taking the case at hand, it seems obvious that it is unfair for street vendors to not pay taxes. But should their tax bill be comparable to brick-and-mortar stores? The answer isn’t straightforward because one must consider how much less of a burden street vendors are to the local government relative to brick-and-mortar stores. One must also compare the relative advantages of each venue—a street vendor does not offer the same product as a restaurant, even if the menu offerings are identical. Trying to determine a fair tax rate in light of the considerations is simply impossible.
As such, it is simply best for the government to surrender the battle on fairness and simply say that the government needs X amount of dollars in revenue and that policy Y is the easiest way to attain this. The continual bickering over fairness simply increases systemic costs, damages the economy, kills people’s job prospects, increases political rancor, and does absolutely nothing to improve the system in the long run. Therefore, the government would be better off implementing one simple tax and living within its means, and stop concerning itself with fairness.
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