Economists essentially have a sophisticated lack of understanding of economics, especially macroeconomics. I know it sounds ridiculous. But the reason why I tell people they should study economics is not so they’ll know something at the end—because I don’t think we know much—but because we’re good at thinking. Economics teaches you to think things through. What you see a lot of times in economics is disdain for other’s lack of thinking. You have to think about the ramifications of policies in the short run, the medium run, and the long run. Economists think they’re good at doing that, but they’re good at doing that in the sense that they can write down a model that will help them think about it—not in terms of empirically knowing what the answers are. And we have gotten so enamored of thinking things through that the fact that we don’t know anything needs to bother us more. So, yes, it’s true that the average guy on the street doesn’t understand economics, and it’s also true that we don’t understand economics. We just have a more sophisticated lack of understanding than the guy on the street.

A study undertaken by Hörisch Hannah a couple of years ago does not seem to have the same potential for personal bias to influence the results obtained. Hannah implemented the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in a laboratory experiment using variants of the dictator game (see: ‘Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment’, Munich Discussion Paper No 2007-4). In the first experiment, one player, the dictator, decides how much of the pie will be received by the other player, given an efficiency loss of 50 percent for units that are transferred from the dictator to the receiver. The veil of ignorance is implemented by requiring each player to decide how much to give to the other player before being assigned the role of dictator or receiver (with equal probability). The second experiment is the same as the first except that the role of receiver is not actually assigned to a person so the outcome can be interpreted as a self-interested response to risk.

Only a minority of subjects opted for the maximin principle under either experiment. The vast majority of male participants perceived the veil of ignorance as introducing only risk. Among women participants, however, impartial social preferences were a second significant motivation that induces stronger concern for equality.

Although I think the results of the study are extremely interesting, they can hardly be presumed to reflect universal values. The study is quite small, with only 167 participants (all university students). There may be potential for bias because about two-thirds of respondents have studied some economics. It would be interesting to see results for similar studies, for people of different ages and backgrounds in different countries.

It would also be interesting to know whether there is any link between the values that people display when they play this game and their political views. Are the views of individual voters strongly influenced by principles that they support irrespective of their own perceived interests? If so, then perhaps politicians are whistling the wrong tune (or whistling to the wrong dog) when they are seen all the time to be responding to rent-seeking by narrow interest groups.

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There is a decent amount of empirical studies and health policy analyses on the patterns and causes of obesity. Obesity and the risk of premature death resulted from high blood pressure and the potential heart attack is the most individual cost of fast-food consumption. For a long period of time, we assumed that these costs at the individual level could be internalizied and, thus, raise no cost to the society. In the article published in Sunday’s edition of NY Times Greg Mankiw drew parallels between soda and tobacco tax. If individuals consume a lot of cigarettes at home, there is, presumably, no negative externality shifted onto the society. The logic could be applied to soda taxation. However, there is a flip side to the argument. Taxing soda, tobacco and other goods with a negative impact on bystanders is an answer to the growing cost of health care delivery to the individuals who consume these goods. The adverse impact levied on other individuals is seen through higher health insurance premiums and total cost of health care.

John Cawley published an extensive analysis of the causes of early childhood obesity (link), suggesting greater government intervention and various cost-effectiveness measures to mitigate the adverse impact of childhood obesity on other members of the society. A study by Jason M. Fletcher, Daniel Frisvold and Nathan Tefft (link) has been one of the first attempts to measure the effect of vending machines restriction on childhood obesity. The authors concluded by suggesting higher tax rates and soft drink access restrictions in schools to fight the on-going increase in childhood obesity.

As Kelly Brownell of Yale Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity mentioned, the link between sugary drinks and obesity is stronger than the link between obesity and any other kind of food (link). The evidence suggests that distance from fast-food restaurant is a significant feature of childhood obesity. A study conducted by Janet Currie et. al (2009) has shown that among children in the 9th grade, a fast-food restaurant within 1/10 of the mile in school is associated with at least 5.2 percent increase in obesity rates (link). The study found that the direct impact of distance from the fast-food restaurant is significantly larger for less educated African-American and less educated women.

The question is whether taxing soda and other kinds of fizzy drinks could potentially reduce and/or reverse the growing trend of obesity. The basic question to start with, is what is the elasticity of demand for soda drinks. The estimates suggests that price elasticity of demand for the majority of soda drinks ranges from -0.8 to -1.0. For example, -1.0 elasticity coefficient suggests that a 10 percent increase in the price of soda would – ceteris paribus – lead to 10 percent decrease in soda drink consumption. The price elasticity of demand for soda drink is relatively high considering that coefficients of price elasticity of demand for other kinds of food ranges from -0.2 to -0.5. If policymakers considered the introduction of a tax on soda consumption, the relevant question is who would bear the burden of the tax? Given elastic demand, the tax would be beared by consumers. However, high price elasticity of demand suggests that there is a widely availible range of close substitutes with potentially negative adverse effects for the individuals. So it is not unlikely that children would switch to other kinds of fast food with equally negative impact on obesity, blood pressure and quality of living.

Given the lack of experiments and availibility of household surveys, it is difficult to estimate the consumer response to the introduction of tax on soda. The estimate of price elasticity of demand suggests that part of the tax would be beared by the consumer. However, it also suggests that a change in the relative price of soda would induce children to consume other varieties of fizzy drinks. Experimental studies by health policy experts suggests different approaches to tackling the adverse impact of soda drinks and other kinds of fast food. The most notable approach is the restriction of vending machines in school districts. However, restricting the access to vending machines would encourage the consumption of fast food outside school districts. A general tax on soda would be preferable to the restrictions of access of vending machines. There is absolutely no doubt that a tax would discourage consumption of soda and other kinds of fast food. Estimates suggest that soda and other kinds of fast food such as hamburgers, donuts and cakes are complementary. Assume, the cross-price elasticity of demand for burgers is -0.9 Thus, if the price per unit os soda increases by 10 percent, the demand for donuts, burgers and cakes decreases by 9 percent (0.9×10 percent). Since a tax on soda would raise the relative price of soda, the consumption of these kinds of fast food would diminish, resulting in less adverse impact of fast food consumption on the individuals. I would disagree with the statement that negative externalities from soda and fast food consumption are internalized by the individual. For example, an article by Trasande, Liu, Fryer and Weitzman (2009) published in Health Affairs (link) investigated the annual cost of childhood obesity in the U.S. between 2001 and 2005, based on the nationally representative data from U.S. hospitals admissions. The authors found that from 1999 to 2005, obesity-related hospitalizations doubled. In addition, costs related to hospitalization, treatment and diagnosis of obesity increased from $125.9 to $237.6 million, an 88.7 percent increase. The cost is partly beared by Medicare while the rest of the total cost is beared by the private insurance premiums.

Given the perverse system of employer-provided health care and implicit subsidizing of health insurance suppliers by the federal government, the periodic increase in obesity-related health care costs indicates a further rise in Medicare expenditures and health insurance premiums. In such conditions, there is little incentive for children and parents to reverse the consumption of soda drinks and fast food. Taxing soda and complementary fast food is a step in the right direction. But it should be noted that the introduction of a tax on soda should be compensated by a corresponding decrease in personal income tax. However, without the parent-guided awareness of the adverse impact of fast food on obesity, it would be difficult to reverse the increasing pattern and cost of childhood and adult obesity. Therefore, much of the obesity-related health care risk in childhood can be solved within the household. It would be irrational and foolish to believe that a tax on soda and government paternalism could solve the obesity puzzle and mitigate its neighborhood effects on bystanders.

The final sentence of the first paragraph explains: “Overall, accounts of subjective indicators of well-being will help policy makers make wiser decisions regarding policy alternatives and help citizens be better educated about the choices that affect their lives”.

I am in favour of research to enable people to become better informed about the choices that affect their lives. I hope that what the authors mean by “help citizens to be better educated” doesn’t involve anything more sinister than publication of research findings.

While reading the book I became irritated by what seems to me to be a naive view it presents of the policy making process. Although the nature of policy making is largely incidental to the purpose of the book, I will devote the remained of this comment to policy making. I promise to focus on the substance of the book in a later post.

According to the “public interest” view presented in the book, public policies are made by “policy makers” who would make wise decisions if only they knew what policies would improve the well-being of citizens. In reality, however, the policy making process is a messy business which involves politicians seeking votes and hoping to further their careers, civil servants seeking to expand and protect empires, voters who have little interest in most policy issues and even less incentive to understand likely consequences of the proposals being considered, interest groups seeking to further the interests of the people they represent and electoral rules that may give disproportionate power to particular groups. The process also attracts ideologues of various kinds who wish to advance their particular views of the good society.

In my view, rather than attempting to persuade us that more information on the subjective well-being of citizens would help some hypothetical “policy maker” to make better decisions, it would have been better if the authors had sought to persuade us that this information would enable policy processes to produce better outcomes.

Would this have made any difference to the book? Although the basic arguments about the validity of subjective well-being measures and their potential usefulness would have been unchanged, I think this change of focus would have made some difference. In particular, it seems to me is that the authors would have had less difficulty convincing readers that they “do not advocate the idea that governments should intervene strongly to move society towards a primary goal of increased well-being” (p209). When most of the book seems to be devoted to telling “policy makers” how they can use subjective information to improve the well-being of citizens it is natural enough to expect readers to be concerned that some “policy makers” might act paternalistically in using this information. Some readers might not be entirely reassured that paternalistic “policy makers” would have regard to the findings of happiness research which show that humans tend to feel most satisfied when they perceive that they have freedom to choose how to live their lives.

The problem of how paternalistic interventionists might like to use research findings is placed in perspective once it is recognized that competing interests are involved in policy-making through discussions in a range of different forums. These discussions are about various things, but the matters discussed by vast majority of participants usually relate in some way to the effects of different policies on the well-being of people.

The important issue is whether measures of subjective well-being can make useful contributions to the discussion of policy issues.

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In truth, “structural unemployment” is created by the misallocation of financial resources resulting from the Federal Reserve’s fiat-money central banking regime and other government interventions into the economy, most notably minimum wage laws. Under a gold standard and laissez-faire, there would be real full employment. But of the myriad cockamamie government intrusions into the market unnecessarily causing unemployment, one that deserves special focus amid the current economic depression is unemployment insurance.

From Textbooks to Real Life

Let’s make this personal. I have a younger brother, of whom I’m very proud, who decided to start his life over in Medford, Oregon, 2,300 miles away from his home in South East Michigan. Moving out there with nothing more than he could fit in his car, he quickly got a sales job at Circuit City. A few weeks later, he was promoted to a management position. That was a little over six months ago now.

Now, as you know if you keep up with the business press, Circuit City declared bankruptcy a while back and is now on the verge of being forced into liquidation. Many of the firm’s stores have been closed, but my brother’s in Medford, OR is still open—for now. If they are shut down, then my brother will receive 80 percent of his wages for a full year as part of Oregon’s unemployment insurance program. The only catch: he can’t find another job in the meantime.

Now who in their right mind would want to find a new job given this scenario? Imagine your boss coming in and telling you he has to cut your pay by 10 percent—but the good news is, you only have to work one day a week. Ninety percent of your pay for 20 percent as much work would seem like a pretty good deal, wouldn’t it? How about 80 percent of your pay for zero percent as much work? Who would screw up a sweetheart deal like that by going out and finding a new job?

Disincentivizing Work

Theoretically, of course, my brother could find a job that offered him higher pay. In that case, he might be smart to take it. But when a company goes bankrupt, one of the factors contributing to their insolvency is that they were paying inefficient employees too much money. My brother is a great salesman, but he’s undoubtedly the exception to the rule. After all, if Circuit City were paying their employees the “right” amount, they wouldn’t be going under. If they were overpaying by, oh say 20 percent, then their former workers from Oregon would have a hard time finding new jobs that paid them as much as they’ll receive just for staying home and doing nothing. Where is the incentive to find work?

This mismatch of incentives doesn’t apply only to firms that have gone belly-up, either. Even employees who are laid off have generally been paid too much: if their marginal utility was higher than the wage they were being paid, then the company would have kept them—so of course they’re going to have to take a pay cut to find another job! Why, then, does the government incentivize not finding a lower-paying job?

President-elect Barack Obama, of course, wants to extend unemployment benefits across the nation (and who knows, maybe the world, too). This is obviously a prescription for extended mass unemployment and a deepening of the current depression. If the government must intervene, and apparently it must, then the concept of “wage insurance” makes a lot more sense.

Wage Insurance: An Alternative Idea

Wage insurance is a program whereby displaced workers receive benefits—but only once they find a new job. For example, if a factory worker who had been making $20 per hour were laid off and got a job at a convenience store for $10 an hour, wage insurance would make up part (or all) of the $10 differential between his previous wage rate and his new, lower wage rate. Over time, this benefit would be scaled back as the worker learned new skills that would presumably result in salary increases.

Now as you can see, unemployment insurance incentivizes not finding a job, while wage insurance incentivizes actually procuring employment. Which one do you think would do more to get us out of recession? Even better, unlike unemployment insurance which could never be handled by the free market (due to its incentivizing of bad behavior), wage insurance could be: workers could pay optional insurance premiums for individualized wage-insurance policies. Insurers would be happy to underwrite these moral hazard-free contracts.

Contrast this to our current situation: productive workers are forced to sacrifice their earnings through reduced wages and higher taxes to subsidize the unproductive and non-working. Only the government could set up such a perversely counterproductive and destructive scenario and call that which ails us—over-regulation—a miracle cure.