The resource curse of land ownership

By Ajay Shah, on January 13th, 2012

Land ownership in pre-modern India

In India, 50 or 100 years ago, land was a defining feature of wealth. The stock of land generated a flow of income. The landless were low-paid agricultural labour. The landed gentry of rural India were the kings of their heap. They had power, prestige, position, prosperity.

In the eyes of many, the initial conditions of high inequality of land ownership were a key barrier that held India back. It was argued
that a one-time bout of bloodshed was essential, to expropriate the rich, and to transfer land ownership in a more equitable fashion. In India, this capacity for State-inflicted bloodshed was present in some places only. In much of India, the unequal distribution of land ownership found in 1947 was left intact.

Fast forwarding into the present, there has been a sea change in the fortunes of the owners of agricultural land.

Agriculture is less important

Particularly after we escaped from the Hindu rate of growth (3.5%) in 1979, the share of agriculture in GDP has dropped sharply. In
relative terms, the wealth created through firms in industry and services has dwarfed the wealth of the landed gentry. The richest man in India is born of one who started out with no land. Government interventions continued to stifle agriculture, but shifted to a
greater laissez faire approach in industry and services; this helped accelerate the decline of agriculture.

The plight of those who stayed back

Rural to urban migration has unleashed new forces on the role and status of the landed lords. Within rich families, high IQ children may be going off to the city to a greater extent, e.g. based on the filtration by competitive examinations where outcomes are correlated with IQ. To the extent that such a process has been afoot, it has given a selection bias where the low IQ children were the ones more likely to stay back in the `idiocy of rural life’ (as Marx characterised it).

That there was an easy option – to live off the land – was a `resource curse’ which afflicted the households who had land. In
contrast, for landless households, there was no conflict of interest in moving to cities (other than the recently introduced NREG, which tries to perpetuate poverty by hindering rural to urban migration).

The power and status of the landed lords was now twice undermined. Their quick-witted cousins who established themselves in
the cities were connected into capitalism and getting ahead. Families of the landless have tended to move to cities and connect into
capitalism and get ahead. The erstwhile lords have started looking nervously at both groups of escapees, wondering whether land ownership was such a nice initial condition.

In a fascinating recent article, Devesh Kapur, Chandra Bhan Prasad, Lant Pritchett and D. Shyam Babu gave us some insights into these changing social structures. In their survey data, in 2007, 98.3 per cent of Harijans were contracting-out the work of tilling their fields to their erstwhile lords, the upper-caste men who owned and operated tractors. The upper tail of the Indian income distribution has, in a few generations, been reduced to operators of agricultural equipment.

The importance of engaging with the market

A defining issue of modern times, for an individual, is a continued and deep engagement with the market. For insights into this idea, see this interview with Tom Sargent. The Ljungqvist/Sargent story matters even more in India, when compared with what has happened in the West. At 7 per cent GDP growth, every few years, far-reaching change comes about in technology and processes. Each individual builds knowledge and human networks by continually engaging with the market. If a person is cut off from engagement with capitalism for even a few years, this generates a lot of damage to the human capital. At that reduced human
capital, the person has to either accept an offer at a much reduced wage, or stay unemployed (which further undermines human capital).

In this setting, consider the plight of a land owner, who has been living off the land, and has never engaged with modern India. Particularly in the post-1979 period, when India has experienced relatively rapid growth, each year of being a country hick owning land meant being further away from the skills required to participate in the contemporary Indian economy.

We see the plight of adivasis in India, who have been away from the market economy, and are unable to plunge into it. We see the plight of the unemployed of Europe: the welfare state pays them dole to stay warm and well fed for many years of unemployment, but after this they are unable to come back into the labour market.

We see a similar problem with the landed gentry of India. They lack the skills to participate in the market economy. Income from the land, their resource curse, dulls their incentive to overcome the barriers. They are often too proud to accept low wage assignments
which are the starting point through which the unskilled connect to capitalism. These problems have come together to give a unique vicious cycle of dis-engagement with modern India that now afflicts the rural landed gentry.

Sale of land in the outskirts of cities

At the edges of all cities, urbanisation is proceeding through developers buying land from the local landed rich and transforming it
into the endless suburbs. In the short term, this has generated immense windfalls of wealth for the landed rich. But in some ways,
this is a bit of a disaster for many of them. Lacking in knowledge about the market economy, they are scammed by insurance salesmen and such like. Much of this newfound wealth tends to get dissipated in a few years.

Urbanisation and land development throws open vast opportunities for trade and industry. But the erstwhile landed rich tend to be
uniquely ill equipped at harnessing these opportunities. They tend to be too proud to work for someone else, and inadequately equipped to stake out on their own. They experience a brief blaze of glory when paid fabulous prices for their land, and then fade away into insignificance.

Some politicians have been moved to advocate special legal protections for the hapless rural rich who sell land to the modern
sector. It’s quite a turnabout within a few generations: from landed elite that oppress the others, to witless folk who need to be
protected by special laws that inhibit the sale of land.

The curse of land

A few decades ago, the left-of-centre view dominated the thinking in India. It was felt that inequality of land was a major bottleneck
that held India back. Many argued that the failure of Indian democracy to engage in a one-time bout of class warfare was a major mistake that was holding India back. It was argued that the Chinese path was the right one: to expropriate the landowners and then start a capitalist economy where everyone is equal.

With the benefit of hindsight, things look different. I think this story reiterates the dangers of social engineering. We are dealing
with enormously complex systems that we only dimly understand. As far as possible, it is wise on our part to use the force of the State as little as we can, and to always avoid treading on fundamental human rights such as property rights.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to K. P. Krishnan , Suyash Rai and Mihir Thaker and for insightful conversations.



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A False Analogy

By Simon Grey, on July 26th, 2011
Robin Hanson makes a predictable mistake:

Similarly, the kinds of innovation activities and intellectual property rights that make sense depend on available institutions and technologies. I’m happy to admit that today intellectual property (IP) is not obviously a good idea. Such property can create large “anti-commons” transaction and enforcement costs that greatly raise the cost of combining old ideas into valuable new ideas. Such costs often outweigh the social benefits of the incentives to create IP, in order to sell it. Today, it is often better to rely on other social incentives to innovate, incentives that don’t require such expensive support.

But if true, this is a sad fact about our limited abilities, not a fundamental natural law or right. You have no fundamental right to enjoy the innovations produced by others without compensating them. You owe them, at least your gratitude. Yes for now it may be best to let you take innovations freely without paying, since the alternative seems too expensive. But you have no right to expect that situation to last forever, any more than ranchers had a right to expect they could forever let their animals trample nearby farms.

The problem with Hanson’s comparison of IP rights to real property rights is that intellectual production is not tangible whereas real property is, and one can adapt another’s idea without in any way diminishing its usage by its originator. As Jefferson aptly observed centuries ago, as it is possible to use another’s candle to light one’s own without diminishing the other’s flame, so too can one use another’s idea as one’s own without diminishing the other’s usage of their idea. Taking another person’s ideas and using them does not any way prevent him from using his own ideas in whatever way he sees fit. Since using another’s ideas does not trample upon his rights, it is absurd to compare this to cows trampling a neighbor’s fields. Using an idea is not inherently deprivatory in the way that using property is, and so the comparison is false.
At any rate, since ideas are not tangible, there is no conceivable limit to their spread save for demand. Basically, demand, not supply, is the limiting factor for the production of any given idea and, as such, there is no need for prices or any other limitation of ideas. Prices indicate scarcity relative to demand, and attempting to attach prices to ideas is essentially an attempt to attach scarcity to ideas. Since there are an infinite number of ideas and production costs of ideas are close to nil (or at least so close to infinity and nil respectively that the upper bound makes a price schedule impossible), the only effect that bringing costs to ideas would be to limit something that is naturally unlimited.
Also, note that Hanson’s claims that “you have no fundamental right to enjoy the innovations produced by others without compensating them” and “you owe them, at least your gratitude” are both spurious. The first is false, but only because of how he qualifies it. He is correct in saying that no one has the right to enjoy the innovations of others. No one has the right to anything save for life, liberty, the pursuit of property, and any derivatives thereof. But it does not stand to reason that anyone deserves to be paid for what they produce, whether it be an idea or a physical object. Quite simply, no one has a right to an income of any sort. If you wish to be paid, convince consumers that you deserve it, whether it be on the technical merits of your product or whether it be on the ease of purchase relative to the cost of piracy. In keeping with this, if one does not have a right to income for producing something, then one certainly does not deserve gratitude either. Again, if a producer wants something from consumers, he must make or do something that causes consumers to respond favorably.
As can be seen, Hanson’s argument is riddled with plenty of intellectual errors, leading to erroneous conclusions. He would do well to simply acknowledge that IP is a myth, and that no one is inherently deserving of anything just because they happened to produce something.


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How Silly Were J.S. Mill’s Views About Income Distribution?

By Winton Bates, on August 18th, 2009

J S Mill wrote: “The laws and conditions of the Production of wealth partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing optional or arbitrary in them. … It is not so with the Distribution of wealth. That is a matter of human institution solely. The things once there, mankind, individually or collectively, can do with them as they like. They can place them at the disposal of whomsoever they please, and on whatever terms” (Principles of Political Economy, 1848, II,1.1).

In 1983, Friedrich Hayek commented that this view of J S Mill “is really an incredible stupidity, showing a complete unawareness of the crucial guide function of prices …” Hayek explains: “We must face the truth that it is not the magnitude of a given aggregate product which allows us to decide what to do with it, but rather the other way around: that a process which tells us how to reward the several contributions to this product is also the indispensable source of information for the individuals, telling them where they can make the aggregate product as large as possible” (Conference paper published in Nishiyama and Leube, “The Essence of Hayek”, p 323). This must have been one of the most intemperate remarks that Hayek ever made about anyone.

One of the things I have learned from Richard Reeves book, “John Stuart Mill, Victorian Firebrand” is that Karl Marx was also unimpressed by Mill’s attempt to separate the laws of production and distribution. Marx viewed this as “a shallow syncretism” (Reeves, p 210). He thought Mill was attempting to reconcile irreconcilables.

How silly were Mill’s views about distribution? In order to answer this question I think we need to understand Mill’s views about property and inheritance.

I see a lot of merit in much of what Mill wrote about property. For example: “The institution of property, when limited to its essential elements, consists in the recognition, in each person, of a right to the exclusive disposal of what he or she have produced by their own exertions, or received either by gift or by fair agreement, without force or fraud, from those who produced it” (“Principles of Political Economy”, II, 2.2).

It is when Mill writes about “landed property” that I begin to see problems: “When the “sacredness of property” is talked of, it should always be remembered, that any such sacredness does not belong in the same degree to landed property. No man made the land. It is the original inheritance of the whole species. Its appropriation is wholly a question of general expediency” (“Principles of Political Economy”, II,2.26). Given that land can be exchanged for other goods I don’t see how it is possible to argue that rights to ownership should not be recognized as the same for land as for other goods.

The problem that Mill had with “landed property” seems to be associated with the potential for a relatively small number of families to have a disproportionate amount of wealth and to exercise disproportionate political power. He was against the inheritance of “enormous fortunes which no one needs for any personal purpose but ostentation or improper power”. Richard Reeves points out that Mill was particularly concerned to distinguish between “earned” and “unearned” income. Mill viewed inheritances as “unearned” and argued that it would be socially beneficial to impose a limit on the amount any person could inherit.

Mill’s views about redistributive taxation were also influenced by his aversion to inherited wealth: “To tax the larger incomes at a higher percentage than the smaller is to lay a tax on industry and economy; to impose a penalty on people for having worked harder and saved more than their neighbours. It is not the fortunes which are earned, but those which are unearned, that it is for the public good to place under limitation. …I conceive that inheritances and legacies, exceeding a certain amount, are highly proper subjects for taxation: and that the revenue from them should be as great as it can be made without giving rise to evasions … such as it would be impossible adequately to check” (“Principles of Political Economy”, V, 2.14).

It seems to me that Mill’s claim that distribution of wealth should be viewed as entirely separate from production was silly – and contradicted by his own views about the adverse consequences of progressive taxation. Mill’s idea for an upper limit on the amount that anyone could inherit also seems extremely silly. I can see some wisdom in his views about taxation of inheritances, but even here it seems to me that he was fooling himself if he thought that inheritance taxes would impose no disincentives to working and saving. Despite all this silliness, however, Mill still had many sensible things to say about property rights and taxation.

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