The resource curse of land ownership

Land ownership in pre-modern India

In India, 50 or 100 years ago, land was a defining feature of wealth. The stock of land generated a flow of income. The landless were low-paid agricultural labour. The landed gentry of rural India were the kings of their heap. They had power, prestige, position, prosperity.

In the eyes of many, the initial conditions of high inequality of land ownership were a key barrier that held India back. It was argued
that a one-time bout of bloodshed was essential, to expropriate the rich, and to transfer land ownership in a more equitable fashion. In India, this capacity for State-inflicted bloodshed was present in some places only. In much of India, the unequal distribution of land ownership found in 1947 was left intact.

Fast forwarding into the present, there has been a sea change in the fortunes of the owners of agricultural land.

Agriculture is less important

Particularly after we escaped from the Hindu rate of growth (3.5%) in 1979, the share of agriculture in GDP has dropped sharply. In
relative terms, the wealth created through firms in industry and services has dwarfed the wealth of the landed gentry. The richest man in India is born of one who started out with no land. Government interventions continued to stifle agriculture, but shifted to a
greater laissez faire approach in industry and services; this helped accelerate the decline of agriculture.

The plight of those who stayed back

Rural to urban migration has unleashed new forces on the role and status of the landed lords. Within rich families, high IQ children may be going off to the city to a greater extent, e.g. based on the filtration by competitive examinations where outcomes are correlated with IQ. To the extent that such a process has been afoot, it has given a selection bias where the low IQ children were the ones more likely to stay back in the `idiocy of rural life’ (as Marx characterised it).

That there was an easy option – to live off the land – was a `resource curse’ which afflicted the households who had land. In
contrast, for landless households, there was no conflict of interest in moving to cities (other than the recently introduced NREG, which tries to perpetuate poverty by hindering rural to urban migration).

The power and status of the landed lords was now twice undermined. Their quick-witted cousins who established themselves in
the cities were connected into capitalism and getting ahead. Families of the landless have tended to move to cities and connect into
capitalism and get ahead. The erstwhile lords have started looking nervously at both groups of escapees, wondering whether land ownership was such a nice initial condition.

In a fascinating recent article, Devesh Kapur, Chandra Bhan Prasad, Lant Pritchett and D. Shyam Babu gave us some insights into these changing social structures. In their survey data, in 2007, 98.3 per cent of Harijans were contracting-out the work of tilling their fields to their erstwhile lords, the upper-caste men who owned and operated tractors. The upper tail of the Indian income distribution has, in a few generations, been reduced to operators of agricultural equipment.

The importance of engaging with the market

A defining issue of modern times, for an individual, is a continued and deep engagement with the market. For insights into this idea, see this interview with Tom Sargent. The Ljungqvist/Sargent story matters even more in India, when compared with what has happened in the West. At 7 per cent GDP growth, every few years, far-reaching change comes about in technology and processes. Each individual builds knowledge and human networks by continually engaging with the market. If a person is cut off from engagement with capitalism for even a few years, this generates a lot of damage to the human capital. At that reduced human
capital, the person has to either accept an offer at a much reduced wage, or stay unemployed (which further undermines human capital).

In this setting, consider the plight of a land owner, who has been living off the land, and has never engaged with modern India. Particularly in the post-1979 period, when India has experienced relatively rapid growth, each year of being a country hick owning land meant being further away from the skills required to participate in the contemporary Indian economy.

We see the plight of adivasis in India, who have been away from the market economy, and are unable to plunge into it. We see the plight of the unemployed of Europe: the welfare state pays them dole to stay warm and well fed for many years of unemployment, but after this they are unable to come back into the labour market.

We see a similar problem with the landed gentry of India. They lack the skills to participate in the market economy. Income from the land, their resource curse, dulls their incentive to overcome the barriers. They are often too proud to accept low wage assignments
which are the starting point through which the unskilled connect to capitalism. These problems have come together to give a unique vicious cycle of dis-engagement with modern India that now afflicts the rural landed gentry.

Sale of land in the outskirts of cities

At the edges of all cities, urbanisation is proceeding through developers buying land from the local landed rich and transforming it
into the endless suburbs. In the short term, this has generated immense windfalls of wealth for the landed rich. But in some ways,
this is a bit of a disaster for many of them. Lacking in knowledge about the market economy, they are scammed by insurance salesmen and such like. Much of this newfound wealth tends to get dissipated in a few years.

Urbanisation and land development throws open vast opportunities for trade and industry. But the erstwhile landed rich tend to be
uniquely ill equipped at harnessing these opportunities. They tend to be too proud to work for someone else, and inadequately equipped to stake out on their own. They experience a brief blaze of glory when paid fabulous prices for their land, and then fade away into insignificance.

Some politicians have been moved to advocate special legal protections for the hapless rural rich who sell land to the modern
sector. It’s quite a turnabout within a few generations: from landed elite that oppress the others, to witless folk who need to be
protected by special laws that inhibit the sale of land.

The curse of land

A few decades ago, the left-of-centre view dominated the thinking in India. It was felt that inequality of land was a major bottleneck
that held India back. Many argued that the failure of Indian democracy to engage in a one-time bout of class warfare was a major mistake that was holding India back. It was argued that the Chinese path was the right one: to expropriate the landowners and then start a capitalist economy where everyone is equal.

With the benefit of hindsight, things look different. I think this story reiterates the dangers of social engineering. We are dealing
with enormously complex systems that we only dimly understand. As far as possible, it is wise on our part to use the force of the State as little as we can, and to always avoid treading on fundamental human rights such as property rights.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to K. P. Krishnan , Suyash Rai and Mihir Thaker and for insightful conversations.

Jersey Shore voting with their feet

It’s going to be a migration story week.   Via the AP and the New Jersey Star Ledger is the story of the day.   It says that more and more residents of New Jersey are fleeing….   to Pennsylvania?

I thought we were a tax hell or something like that?  Everyone should be fleeing Pennsylvania I thought.  I know I read that somewhere???

Note that the New Jersey folks are probably not heading into the state for the shale gas jobs. Will have to look a bit more closely at this data myself to see if there is anything to be said about migration of shale workers into the state.

The parsing has only begun actually.  Pittsburgh (city, region or pick your county) has always ranked near the top in a metric of what percentage of householders have lived in their current place of residence the longest.  I will have to look at the data the folks are reporting on to see if that is still generally true or if we have budged out of the top spots.

and I have updated my regional migration report on the UCSUR publications page fwiw.

Marcellus Bar None

Things that fascinate me.  From the Legal Intelligencer on Marcellus Shale induced migration to Pittsburgh…  of lawyers of course.

See:  Marcellus Shale Attracts Laterals From Miles Around

Curious quote in there. I can’t quite figure why it is there:

“I don’t want to be a wannabe,” he said. “Somebody once said to me, ‘There are a lot of people with great ideas in cemeteries; they just never spoke to anybody about those ideas.’

Ok then…  We’ve become the place to self-actualize. The New New Pittsburgh.  I was born somewhere else.

Tex-Pats out there somewhere

There is a new report via Penn State and some partners on the economic impact of Marcellus Shale development.  According to the news coverage the report has some new data on the great Marcellus worker mystery.  From Somerset County’s Daily American:

The study also suggests that a large majority of industry employees are coming from out of state. While overall employment increased in about half of the municipalities, only 28 percent experienced lower unemployment rates in 2010.”

This all gets to just a small debate over whether the development of shale gas in Pennsylvania is generating jobs for folks residing in the state already, or for folks coming into the state from elsewhere.  My version of that is that it makes a difference whether you are talking about folks who are flying in temporarily in stints, versus people moving into the state from elsewhere.  If folks are actually moving into the state it clearly will have positive impacts on state-wide population trends as well as economic growth.  If folks just fly in and fly out,  but continue to make their permanent residences elsewhere, it makes the Pennsylvania T akin to a large North Sea oil platform. Or to use a US analogy.. maybe places like Altoona, or even Pittsburgh are the Port Fourhon’s of Midatlantic?  If folks are not living here permanently, they will be buying their homes elsewhere.  Making all of those home related purchases elsewhere and raising their families elsewhere and so forth and so on.

Clearly there are new jobs in Pennsylvania resulting from shale gas development.  The scale of employment projections I have seen make it impossible that all the new jobs are being filled by folks in the parts of Pennsylvania where most of the drilling has been happening.  The fundamental question is whether the folks are itinerant or permanent migrants into Pennsylvania.

So is this migration happening?  It was brought up specifically recently by Brian O. in the PG.  Brian isn’t the only one who has brought up this issue of Marcellus Shale induced migration…  for some rather colorfully named “Tex-Pats” I learn.  I thought I might try to find the migrants in the data.  Has there been some shift in migration flows that correlates with the beginning of shale gas development in Pennsylvania is the question.  Seemed the best place to start was to look specifically at migration flows between Texas and Pennsylvania. That is obviously just one particular migration flow, but since Texas is the place with the shale gas expertise, it is the place you would expect to see some of the specific shale gas talent diaspora.  Here is what I get from the IRS migration data which will capture those who are telling the IRS they have moved in or out of Pennsylvania.. probably correlates pretty clsoely to where they are paying most of their taxes overall:

So maybe there are a few net new migrants resulting from shale gas development, but I don’t think you will find much evidence of a change in trend in the data state-wide as shown there.   At least from this data the answer to whether the the shale workers are moving to Pennsylvania is no.. but it may be it is too soon to measure the full migration flow that shale development may be inspiring.  This data reflects moves that have happened in 2009 at the latest. So the better answer is at least through 2009 is ‘not yet’.

Still, look at the scale and for state-wide migration flows those are not the biggest of numbers. It will not take much new migration to really show some shift in the trend.. or any shift in trend.  Seems to me that the argument that folks are moving into Pennsylvania because of shale development has been floating out there for a couple years now at least so you would see something by now in the IRS data.  So we will keep watching.  I would be surprised if you do not see some movement in this trend in subsequent years.   Just an exogenous extra 1,000 migrants a year (roughly a total of 15 people per county in Pennsylvania…  in other words just a few households) from Texas to anywhere in Pennsylvania would cut that net migration time series in half from where it has been recently.  Given the scale of employment impacts that are floating out there, seems like it would be hard to hide any meaningful impact on migration flows.

For those who want more detail, this is the table that I made the graph from.

TX to PA
PA to TX
Net
2004-2005 5,204 6,488 -1,284
2005-2006 5,236 7,405 -2,169
2006-2007 5,220 7,452 -2,232
2007-2008 5,372 7,834 -2,462
2008-2009 5,488 7,637 -2,149

When down means down, and when it does not

So the news headline is that the state’s unemployment rate dropped from 7.8% to 7.5%. If you look at the 6 month change it is a full percentage point decline from 8.5% just in October to 7.5% last month. So when was the last time the state saw a full percentage point drop in the unemployment rate over 6 months?

1984

So does that mean there is anything today comparable to 1984? Hmmm. Between April 1983 and April 1984 was probably the peak outmigration from both the Pittsburgh region and the state resulting from the recession and job destruction at the time. That was purely an economic migration generated by young workers fleeing the region. The apparent drop in the unemployment rate back then was all the result of workers looking for work elsewhere. Yet this period of dropping unemployment rate is a period when we think people are on net moving into the Pittsburgh region and most likely Pennsylvania as well. So of the two periods, in one the drop in the unemployment rate is a sign of severe economic weakness. In the other……….

So if you take out the 1983/4 miasmic period, when were the previous times when there was a comparable 6 month drop of a percentage point or more in the state’s unemployment rate? One single period ending in November 1975, and another period in the first quarter of 1973, both of which I suspect may have been the end of strikes or the reopening of whole mills as the nation came out of recessions. So there just aren’t a lot of recent (recent as in the last half decade or so) examples for the unemployment rate dropping so far so fast.

Rust Belt Ball

City… region….city…region….

See the USAToday with the most ill-conceived thesis ever in this article today: Indians, Tigers, Pirates and Reds fighting population loss in the Rust Belt.

Does anyone in the world really think Pirates’ attendance problems (worst in the NL according to the article) have anything at all to do with population loss in the City of Pittsburgh proper which is the only factoid they reference for us in that article.

I do have a question though; what is the top attendance at AAA games around the country?

****

Speaking of population though..  this factoid may be more important as symbol, but something I put up over here is some recent census data released on the population in group quarters as of 2010. For Allegheny County the population in nursing homes is down significantly, while the population in college dorms is up a large amount over the decade.  Check it out.

Wonk trivia

Here is a trivia question.  What has been the average unemployment rate for the Pittsburgh region’s labor market over the last 40 years?

6.6%

That certainly includes some bad times averaged in there, but it also averages in some pretty good times as well.  The question was prompted by the quote in the paper today describing the regional unemployment rate drop down to 6.8% as being “still a long way to go to return to normal employment“.

So not even any light there at the end of the tunnel as yet?  Like waiting for Godot for a positive sign in the local economy.

Again, I like to keep track of the relative unemployment rate for a lot of reasons, but mostly because it is a decent predictor of net migration rates for metropolitan regions.  Here is what that looks like which when you combine the length (54 months since the national unemployment rate was higher than Pittsburgh’s) and depth (2 full percentage points below the US rate) clearly now represents some unprecedented times for the region in terms of how the region is performing compared to the nation.

So still not an absolute record in just how far below the US we are.  There was one month in April of 1975 when we were 2.1 percentage points below the national unemployment rate. Darn rounding error is messing up my factoid.  And just for one other little sidebar to this all  The City of Pittsburgh unemployment rate is coming in for March at 7.3%.  The City of Detroit for example, seems stuck above 20%.

Lots more to parse of course.  Some confusion over what is happening in the labor force which has not grown much in recent months.  While the relative unemployment rate chart would indicate there is still net migration into the region, the fact that the post-recession labor markets are beginning to recover nationally means that the pressure to move out of many other regions is nowhere near as dire as it was a year or two ago.  So I would not be surprised if say the flow of folks from places like Detroit (which is now down to 11% unemployment) for example to Pittsburgh has come down.  There is also the issue of the folks who wound up remaining in the labor force a bit unwillingly because their retirement portfolios took such a hit in 2008.  That was the story with a lot of elderly deferring retirement.  Well… you may have noticed the stock market has done quite well the last couple years and at least at the margin, a lot of folks who were continuing to work may now feel empowered to finally retire. Probably a part of what is happening to the unemployment rate as those openings filter down.

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Vámonos - Voting with their feet in Spain?

As the proverbial line seems to be running out for Greece, I thought that I would look at a slightly longer, although no less important, issue in the context of Spain; more specifically the trend in net migration. While much of the focus on Spain’s membership of the Eurozone has been (rightly) centered on the effect of interest rates that were too low, for too long another important aspect is the boom in immigration that followed at the turn of the 21st century.

Indeed, when we today speak of Japan (and Germany) as the oldest economies of the world Spain was, by 2000), destined to become just this but an impressive net migration rate from 2001 to 2007 managed to buck the trend;

(click on pictures for better viewing)

The decline in net migration is naturally a by-product of the crisis especially as immigrants (and especially those who are more or less sans papiers) are in the front line when recession strikes.

(quote Time)

The wave of immigrants into Spain has been fast and furious. The nation’s foreign-born population shot up from little more than 2% in 2000 to more than 12% in 2010. “The process was so quick and so intense that Spaniards and politicians had a hard time understanding what was happening,” says Josep Oliver, an applied-economics professor in the Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona and one of the lead authors of the Yearbook of Immigration in Spain 2009.

Then came the credit crunch, with its mass layoffs, stagnant growth and fiscal austerity. More than a million migrants have lost their jobs, homes and small businesses in a boom-to-bust cycle not seen since the Great Depression in the U.S. To be sure, migrants around the world are feeling the pain of the recession. But Spain’s massive and recent immigrant influx, compounded by economic restructuring beyond the construction industry, has taken a particularly high toll on foreigners, magnifying the crisis for the country as a whole.

With the unemployment rate almost surely on the wrong side of 20% you could be excused for arguing what exactly the problem is here. Surely with this kind of excess capacity in the labour market the last thing Spain needs is for the migrants to stay competing for already incredibly scarce jobs. Indeed, the Spanish government has tried to create incentives for unemployed migrants to leave in order to free up the mismatch between supply and demand for labour.

This approach however does not hold up to basic economic intuition even if it is an understandable move from a political point of view. First of all, there is likely to be a low value added skill bias in the kind of jobs migrants are taking. This is then an often misunderstood point in the context of western societies’ attempt to cherry pick the brightest graduates and lure highly skilled foreign labour to the country with lucrative tax breaks. As such, low value added labour (relative to the average level of value added in the receiving country) can provide a crucial labour input to the labour market in the form of filling up vacancies that domestic labor seekers would otherwise shy away from.

Now, you might again protest that in a severe crisis and as desperation among job seekers kick in, the matching for vacancies become subject to a general process of trading down as people accept jobs they are not qualified for simply in order to make ends meet. This is undoubtedly true but this is also the difference between a win-win and lose-lose situation then.

Migrants are ultimately attracted by work opportunities and the sharp decline in migration rates in Spain can be seen as migrants voting with their feet. In this sense, net outward migration of relatively low value added labour only to let domestic workers compete for these same jobs is not a sign of virtue let alone a recovery. I would hold this to be one of the most important structural issues to look out even if the long run effect of an economic crisis on migration is difficult to predict. In addition, and this is evident in Eastern Europe, there may be a strong (and worrying) me too effect from foreign immigrants leaving as it migh even incite Spanish young people to contemplate leaving as well especially as the labour market continues to look dire.

Finally, the obvious question is whether Spain needs immigration? Indeed it does;

As such and strong immigration notwithstanding Spain is still ageing and, rapidly so! Note especially, the twin peaks of first the 20-39 age group in 2002/03 and then the 35-54 age group in 2011/2013. This is then the great tragedy of the peripheral economies in the Eurozone in the sense that whatever last ounce of demographically induced momentum they had will likely be completely erased by the demands for fiscal austerity and internal devaluation. And once this process has run its course (whatever that means) their population pyramids will be beyond repair.

Looking at age specific migration in Spain and considering that by definition migration occurs among the most mobile part of the population (i.e. the working age population), the trend has reversed. This is also why migration flows are an important input to the analysis of global population ageing even if immigration, in no country, would be able to completely nullify the wave of ageing (indeed in some economies such as China and Russia immigration will be almost impossible to achieve in sufficient scale to dent the force of ageing).

The influx of migrants to Spain in the age group 20-39 has consequently steadily declined in the past 4 years.

The article above by Time personifies the Spanish migrant in the form of 35-year-old Colombian construction worker Doney Ramírez who used to police one of the many, now idle, construction cranes in in and around the building sites of Madrid. You could then note that Spain certainly does not need Mr Ramírez anymore as the future of Spain is not built on construction of empty houses. Indeed I would agree, Spain now needs to export. But neglecting the importance of  Ramírez would be poor economics since quite possibly he could do a different job (if the economy could create one for him) and more importantly the fact that he is now more likely to leave than stay says a whole lot on the effect of ongoing deflation and deleveraging faced by Spain.

Daily Ranking: Drain to Gain

I think Jim already has some comments on this, but note the latest from Brookings: Migration Declines Further: Stalling Brain Gains and Ambitions

In particular check out their Table 2.II.  Looks to me that if you skip New Orleans and their particular circumstances (euphemism for flood, disaster or calamity, pick your semantics)… Pittsburgh has the biggest magnitude of swing in that table in terms of shifting from migration loss to migration gain among folks with college degrees.

Bafflegab I tell you… Bafflegab.