The Sprotts: Silver Poised for Power Rally

Larisa Sprott Eric Sprott Opportunities abound in small- and mid-cap silver companies, according to Sprott Inc. Chairman Eric Sprott. In this exclusive interview with The Gold Report, Eric Sprott and Sprott Money Ltd. President Larisa Sprott say the fundamentals that drive the price of silver are as strong now as before the spring selloff—maybe even stronger—even though volatility is causing buyers to hold back a bit.

The Gold Report: The Greek economy is making headlines again, with the Greek Parliament recently voting in extreme austerity measures that include budget cuts of $40B plus a selloff of $72B in assets. When we spoke in March, Eric, you were quite worried about collapses in Greece, Ireland and Iceland. Do you see these new austerity measures as another step toward collapse, or do they signal a reprieve?

Eric Sprott: It’s the European troika advancing the money that’s really preventing the collapse, from the financial market point of view. The austerity program will create a collapse in Greece economically, but it at least gives them the opportunity to get the troika bailout. I refer to the troika as the ECB (European Central Bank), the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and maybe the BIS (Bank for International Settlements).

I think Greece is not much different from others that have gone before, whether Iceland or Ireland. Most governments in the world have taken on added monetary and fiscal responsibilities because of the financial collapse. For example, the U.S. wouldn’t be running a $1.5T deficit had there not been the collapse in 2008 because we wouldn’t have had the programs that we now have, trying to support the banking system that everyone thinks is too big to fail.

For quite a long time, my view has been that the banking system has been over-levered. The assets on the books aren’t worth what they would be in a normal monetary environment, and if they had to sell the assets, most banks in that situation would become insolvent. Who would you sell those assets to?

Imagine a Greek bank knocking on the door of any other bank in the world saying that they have Greek mortgages, loans to Greek companies and Greek bonds they’d like to sell. There’s no buyer, so the government basically has to step in, as happened in Ireland, Iceland, the U.K., the U.S. and Japan. It’s happened in almost every country, where the governments have come in to bail out the financial system.

This country with all of 11M people—as many people as live in Ontario—has almost taken down the whole system, as Lehman Brothers almost took down the whole system. What was Lehman? It was like a pimple, and on a relative scale, Greece is not a big situation either. But they want to prevent the falling of the first domino, because if the first one goes down, I can assure you what will happen. That’s what everyone’s guarding against. It would just spread amongst various banking systems.

TGR: Is there a possibility that Greece and other countries with debt issues could negotiate for pennies on the dollar to reduce their debts by 20%, 40%, or whatever? It would have an impact, of course, but not as bad as a default.

ES: That would be defined as a default for all intents and purposes. Some rating agencies have suggested that the voluntary rollover they’re talking about might still be officially a default because everyone knows that what they’re getting for what they’re giving up isn’t worth 100 cents on the dollar.

If a new party comes to power in Greece, they might say they’re going to rip up that agreement and take the default because Greece might be better off defaulting. Of course, the powers-that-be don’t want that. It’s as much the troika that doesn’t want it as the government in Greece. They’re all trying to prevent this contagion from starting.

TGR: But you’re suggesting that eventually the contagion will take hold.

ES: It’s kind of taken hold already, right? The weakest—Iceland and Ireland—have been knocked off already. Greece was the third weakest. Who knows where we go from here?

TGR: When we had our conversation in March, you said that sooner or later people will realize that it’s better to have real assets in physical metals than bank accounts.

ES: I’ve always believed that, and it’s even truer today. Would you rather have your money in a Greek bank or in gold? Would you rather have your money in an Egyptian, Irish or Icelandic bank or gold? Iceland took a devaluation; if the people in Iceland had their money in gold, they wouldn’t have lost a damn thing.

You also take a currency risk when you own a bank deposit. Even a U.S. resident who owns gold instead of a bank deposit would be better off, because the purchasing power of the dollar is going down on an international basis.

TGR: That’s why you called gold the investment of the last decade.

ES: Right.

TGR: And you’ve called this the decade of silver, saying that on the basis of the historical gold-to-silver ratio, silver may even triple the performance of gold. Do you still believe there’s the potential for outperformance at that level? And, if so, over what timeframe?

ES: It’s very difficult to pick timeframes, because so many events can transpire, but I really believe that silver will trade at a 16:1 ratio to gold. I certainly believe that gold can get to $1,600/oz. this year, and while I’m not suggesting that silver will make it to $100/oz. this year, it’ll certainly trade at a 16:1 ratio to gold within three to five years. By then, who knows? Gold could be at $2,500/oz.

TGR: The gold price has been climbing neatly along the 200-day moving average, while the silver price has been all over the place. Do you foresee a time where metals just go hyperbolic?

ES: Yes, I think that will happen. When people ask when I’d get off the gold train, I say that it would cause me to reconsider things if governments and central banks appeared to be getting responsible. I’d say if it evolved into a mania ala NASDAQ 2000, you might decide to exit the investment. Of course, if they made gold the official reserve currency, I wouldn’t need to own it anymore because I could convert my currency to gold or silver at any time.

So, it’s hard to define when it’s going to happen. Earlier this year, I was totally convinced that silver would easily make $50/oz., and for all intents and purposes, it has. I think silver will rally pretty powerfully from this little selloff we’ve had, and hit a new high this year.

TGR: Larisa, has Sprott Money seen a corresponding increase in silver to gold this year?

Larisa Sprott: When we last spoke in March, in terms of dollars, silver was outselling gold by a ratio of about 5:1—we were selling five times more dollars of silver than dollars of gold. The silver market has had a price correction and it’s been a volatile commodity over the last month or so. I’ve seen a rather dramatic shift in sales toward gold. In terms of dollars, gold is now outselling silver on a 3:1 ratio.

It’s not that people have lost their taste for silver, but they’re holding back on purchasing silver because of the increased volatility in the market. I think that once the silver price demonstrates less volatility, our sales will return to the aforementioned ratios.

TGR: Do people still tend to take possession of their purchases, or are more keeping it in your storage depository?

LS: They’re taking possession simply because at this time we only offer storage in the United States. Some of our U.S. clients fear that a 1933-type confiscation scenario will happen again, so they would prefer to store in Canada or internationally. I’ve even seen people drive from places such as Florida and Washington to take possession of their bullion so that they may store it in a safety deposit box in Canada.

We’re opening a storage depository in Canada, but that’s still three to six months out. I’ve had a lot of interest from clients who say that as soon as that facility opens they’ll be moving their bullion up here.

TGR: What else is new at Sprott Money?

LS: We are working on increasing our U.S. presence. We anticipate opening our New York office by October of this year. We are also minting a Sprott silver bar and coin set to be ready for sale in early 2012. And as a proud supporter of GATA (Gold Anti-Trust Action), I am pleased to announce that we will be selling the GATA gold coin at their upcoming conference in London this August.

TGR: We’ve seen that Sprott Money is the major sponsor of the GATA Gold Rush 2011 conference coming up in London in August. How did your organization get interested in GATA and what it has to say?

ES: When I started investigating an investment in gold and silver in 2000, among the most outspoken—to whom I’m ever so thankful—were the GATA people, who suggested that central banks, in a somewhat coordinated fashion, were suppressing the gold price. There seemed to be some compelling evidence for that because central bankers were huge sellers of gold, which retrospectively looks like the dumbest thing they could ever have done. With 20/20 hindsight, that decision looks like one of the greatest knucklehead moves of all time. Here we are 10 years later and where they were sellers of 400 tons of gold a year, now they’re buyers of 400 tons of gold.

GATA was prepared to challenge the system and to explore the data behind various government moves, why they did it and why they always advertised that they were selling gold, which almost necessitated getting the worst price possible instead of the best price. The whole attitude they were taking to gold seemed ridiculous.

The GATA people have been a big influence on the increasing interest in gold. They’ve been incredibly helpful in terms of keeping people focused on what’s going on in the precious metals markets. They had a wonderful conference in Dawson City in 2005.

The people who spoke there—and who will speak at this GATA conference in London—are all independent thinkers who aren’t swayed by the conventional. They’re typically contrarian. You have to work hard to be a contrarian, because you have to win what would seem to be very difficult arguments. They’re just top-notch people. When I look back over the last decade, I think those who were skeptical and outspoken are the true heroes.

If more people had listened to them, they wouldn’t have suffered the kind of financial damage that has transpired in the last decade. Certainly, if they owned gold and silver in lieu of any other investment, they would’ve been better off.

TGR: You noted that when the central banks started selling gold about a decade ago, they pretty much locked in the worst possible price by announcing their intentions ahead of time. Is it the same now that they’re announcing in advance their buying intentions?

ES: They only announce after they’ve bought. For example, in either 2008 or 2009, the Chinese Central Bank revealed that it had purchased 400 tons of gold over about four years, but that was well after the fact. Obviously those purchases were an active force in the market. China hasn’t announced anything in the last three or four years, but I suspect it’s been a buyer all this time. The Central Bank of Mexico recently announced buying 93 tons, which undoubtedly concluded its purchasing program.

There probably should be transparency in these transactions anyway. The central banks should be telling the populations they represent where they are investing their money.

TGR: You’ve indicated that GATA was founded on evidence of collusion among financial institutions that resulted in suppressing the gold price. We also hear about market manipulation through derivatives. Tell us a little bit about this.

ES: First, understand that commodity markets rarely settle in physical commodities; they’re really paper markets. Let me give you an example.

We produce 900 Moz. (million ounces) of silver in a year. When silver was up around $48/oz., between the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA), the COMEX, the SLV Silver Trust and some vehicles in China, we were trading 1 Boz. (billion ounces)/day silver in the paper market. We produce just a little over 1 Moz./day for consumption as an investment. So we trade 1 Boz. of paper silver and yet there’s only 1 Moz. of physical quantity available for investment. That makes you wonder.

They get after the silver speculators who are long. I can understand being long silver, because maybe those speculators think they’d like to own it. What are those who are selling the billion ounces thinking when there’s no physical silver to settle with?

TGR: What might change to slow this down?

ES: There should be position limits, and trading limits per day. What’s the net effect of trading 1 Boz. when the stuff doesn’t even exist on the face of the earth? The short position in the silver market was so concentrated amongst the four largest bank-owned firms that it was shocking. Why they should be short that much silver is beyond me.

TGR: Let’s talk a little about options for the individual investors.

ES: I’m very comfortable having a very large weighting in precious metals, which are way more likely to hold their value than paper assets. And I feel so involved in trying to get people to own more precious metals because I think it’s the one thing that will save them in a very difficult financial time. But most won’t take the steps of getting a little bit of insurance by owning precious metals.

TGR: If another financial trauma is coming, should investors be more weighted with the actual physical metals or should they continue with the equities too?

ES: People worry about the banking system, and I think ultimately they’ll put their money into gold and silver. If the prices of gold and silver go up because of that, notwithstanding a short-term decline in the market, ultimately people also will realize that gold and silver stocks are good things to invest in. But you may have to go through a six-month swoon.

We went through a swoon like that in 2008. Gold was probably $900 at the time. Owning gold and silver would’ve been very propitious. Today it’s $1,500. I think this next time around, as we see gold and silver gaining more recognition as to their intrinsic merits, that will get transmitted into the gold and silver shares.

TGR: As you look forward, are you holding or considering some equities that you feel will swoon less than the market?

ES: Let’s face it—if you use the HUI Index, precious metal stocks have gone up by a factor of about 12 to 13 times from the 2000 bottom. On a long-run basis, there aren’t many losers in those stocks, and certainly on a relative basis, they’re all winners.

Until a few months ago, any silver stock on the board had such a massive run that everybody could sell at a profit. It’s important to know that most people like to sell their winners. At the first sign of problems, you sell the stock that’s got the biggest profit for you. And, it’s very easy to sell it. Maybe it’s not so easy to sell some bank stock that’s still 60% from its high, but it’s not too tough to sell a gold and silver stock that’s 5% from its high because it has had a good run.

We get more volatility in this group because of that. Any stock that has gone up a lot will be more volatile than one that hasn’t. That’s just the way it is. The high flyers always get knocked down the most, because they’re easy to sell. That’s the situation we find ourselves in. Most of these stocks have been the best performers of the last decade.

Every time there’s a little hiccup in the market, people sell them. It doesn’t mean that the fundamentals have changed. That’s just the way people react in a market selloff. Give it time. People will get calm again about where they should have their money.

TGR: We were talking with Rick Rule and Brent Cook a couple of weeks ago about the fact that most juniors are off 10%–20% since April and May. They suggested it might be a good time to own some mid-caps and seniors. Considering the profit-taking you just described, do you agree?

ES: I’ve been investing in small-cap stocks for roughly 40 years, and the opportunities in small caps are far superior to those in big-cap stocks on a sustainable basis. It’s always been the case because they’re under-owned, under-followed and under-capitalized. You can do a lot in the small- to mid-cap area that you can’t do in the large-cap area. You can buy a junior gold stock on a relative valuation of probably a third of any major stock just because they’re seasoned and that’s where the big money goes. Opportunities abound in the small- to mid-cap area, so that’s where I’m going to stay. In a sustainable rally, I guarantee you they’ll outperform the large caps.

TGR: Peru is one of the best mining addresses on the planet, but we’ve seen a lot of decrease in share prices in some of the Peruvian mining equities. You have some interests there, too, that have been specifically affected by government action. Could you comment on that?

ES: Bear Creek Mining Corp. (TSX.V:BCM) has been one of my favorites because of its two ore bodies. It’s unfortunate the governments have made the decisions they’ve made. We see this in different places, not just in the less-developed countries, where governments come in and change the rules. If it’s not Ecuador, it’s Peru. If it’s not Peru, it’s Bolivia. Somebody’s always doing something.

TGR: In the case of Peru, though, this was an injunction signed by outgoing President Alan Garcia that halted Bear Creek’s Santa Ana silver project specifically.

ES: You take those risks with any country. People always ask if I think the U.S. government will confiscate gold. You hear chatter about the U.S. government nationalizing the gold mines someday. If you want egregiousness, that’s almost as bad as Ollanta Humala (Peru’s new president) declaring that one property is not going to continue to be owned by somebody. It could happen anywhere. That’s one of the problems you face when you’re an investor; you don’t know exactly what the political flavor is.

If I were a betting man, I’d bet the Santa Ana mine comes into production within the next 10 years. The stock market doesn’t like delays, but they don’t detract from the merits of the property. When people calm down and know the regulation is in place to try to prevent environmental problems, it will ultimately get the go-ahead.

TGR: Do you feel just as bullish on small caps in gold as you do in silver?

ES: Because I think the price of silver probably will outperform gold by maybe 2.5 times, I have to look much harder for silver equities than gold equities. That’s what we’ve done in the last 18 months. So I prefer silver junior equities to gold for sure.

When I look at the demand and supply fundamentals, it’s all in place as far as I’m concerned. Lots of times the market doesn’t corroborate your view for a while, but the important thing is the market corroborates your view along the way. Yes, we had to deal with that gut-wrenching selloff in the gold stocks in 2008, but when you look back at it now you wonder what the hell the market was thinking.

TGR: What are some of the good silver small caps you found in your search?

ES: We’ve been in lots of companies. We’ve been involved with Fortuna Silver Mines Inc. (TSX:FVI; Lima Exchange:FVI), First Majestic Silver Corp. (TSX:FR; NYSE:AG; Fkft:FMV), Argentex Mining Corp. (TSX.V:ATX; OTCBB:AGXM), SilverCrest Mines Inc. (TSX.V:SVL), Silver Quest Resources Ltd. (TSX.V:SQI), Aurcana Corp. (TSX.V:AUN) and Mirasol Resources Ltd. (TSX.V:MRZ). I’ve got a long list.

TGR: Those names have assets all over North America and South America.

ES: Most of them tend to be in North America, particularly Mexico, Central America and South America. But I own stocks in companies with silver in other places, too. One example is Minco Silver Corp. (TSX:MSV), which has its Fuwan silver deposit in China. I’ll buy a silver asset wherever it is located.

TGR: So clearly, you still do see this as silver’s time to shine.

ES: I do. And I’d refer readers who’d like to know about why I believe the robust fundamentals for silver are only getting stronger to the Caveat Venditor! article we’ve just posted to Markets at a Glance on our website.

TGR: We’ll be sure to check that out, too. Thank you both for your time.

Eric Sprott is chairman of Sprott Inc., CEO, CIO and senior portfolio manager of Sprott Asset Management LP and chairman of Sprott Money Ltd. He has more than 40 years’ experience in the investment industry. After earning his designation as a chartered accountant, he entered the investment industry as a research analyst at Merrill Lynch. In 1981, he founded Sprott Securities. After establishing Sprott Asset Management Inc. as a separate entity in December 2001, Eric divested his entire ownership of Sprott Securities to its employees. Eric has been stunningly accurate in his predictions, including foreseeing the current financial crisis. He chronicled the dangers of excessive leverage and the bubbles the Fed was creating, while also correctly forecasting the tragic collapse of the housing and financial markets in 2008. Eric’s predictions on the state of the North American financial markets, as well as macroeconomic analyses have been presented in Markets at a Glance, a monthly investment strategy newsletter.

Larisa Sprott joined Sprott Money Ltd.(www.sprottmoney.com) in the role of President in December 2009. As one of Canada’s largest owners of gold and silver bullion, the company’s goal is to facilitate ownership of precious metals to the general public. Larisa has more than 15 years experience in the financial industry, having worked at Sprott Securities Inc. (now Cormark Securities), first as an office administrator in the Vancouver office, and later in roles in research and corporate finance at the Toronto headquarters. Larisa then spent five years with Sprott Asset Management in the capacity of client services, sales and marketing. In November 2007, she became an investment advisor responsible for servicing and managing high net worth clients.

What went wrong with supply-side economics?

The economic crisis of 2008/2009 had confronted the mainstream economic theory with an unpalatable task of revisiting the notions and perils of the ideas which dominated the course of economic theory in the last few decades. In 2003, delivering a speech to the American Economic Association, Robert Lucas famously noted that the central problem of depression prevention had been solved by mainstream macroeconomic theory which was built by combining the rational expectation hypothesis with New Keynesian macroeconomics. Although one should not obscure the achievements of new classical macroeconomics and new Keynesian macroeconomics, the criticism of contemporary macroeconomic theory is not uniform. It stems from the unrecognized role of systemic shocks in the financial sector and the spillovers from Wall Street to the Main Street. In contemplating the the linkages of over-leveraging and biased financial deregulation, it should not come as a surprise that early warnings of the financial crisis, mainly leveraged borrowing in the U.S subprime mortgage market, were earmarked in the mainstream economic theory.

In fact, in 1970, George Akerlof’s influential paper on the issue of adverse selection in the market for lemons, was a landmark achievement in the economic theory since it demonstrated the fallacies of perfectly competitive market mechanism when the information on quality of various commodities is distributed unevenly. In addition, a series of papers in 1970s by Joseph Stiglitz on screening theory and asymmetric information, has dealt exactly with the central origins of the 2008/2009 financial crisis. Subprime loans and highly-complex derivative schemes which enabled the exponential growth of overleveraging of the banking sector were most likely to be used by the least sophisticated and accordingly the most risky borrowers. The only difference is that in normal circumstance, banks would recognize adverse selection by rationing credit to risky borrowers but the continuous obsession with home-ownership and the reluctance of the Federal Reserve to “remove the bowl of punch when the party started” – to use the analogy of Preston Martin, former Vice President of the FED – added to the turbulence of overleverage that turned into the most disastrous financial meltdown after the Great Depression.

The fact is that contemporary macroeconomics had little to offer to predict the subsequent financial meltdown although Robert Shiller of Yale University has repeatedly warned against unstable stock market fundamentals, particular notorious price-earnings ratios after the dot-com bubble came to burst. However, the central element of the critic of mainstream economic theory should revisit the notorious paradigm of supply-side economics whose intellectual melange of fervent belief in tax cuts and a dangerous preoccupation with deregulation as the cure of the malaise which led to stagflation in early 1970s, have proved how dangerous the conclusions could become.

First, the rise of the supply-side economics in the political economy began in early 1980s. But the intellectual influence of the supply-side economics should not be confined to the theoretical paradigm itself. The field of the political economy of taxation manifested itself as the intellectual triumph of supply-side economics. The original idea of the Laffer curve, the relationship between tax rate and tax revenues, was not disputable after all. In fact, if tax rates reached predatory levels, decreases in total tax burden would yield considerable gains, not only in total tax revenue but also in terms of higher level of productivity. However, when average and marginal tax rates were at moderate levels, it would be foolish to believe immense revenue gains would ensue by reducing the rates of taxation to bottom-levels, arguing for significant gains in terms of employment growth, productivity boost and total tax revenues. Even though cross-country empirical evidence does suggest an increase in tax revenues amid the decline in average tax rate, the pattern is confined to the episodes where average and marginal tax rates were very high, exceeding 70 percent threshold. Once tax rates were reduced, there is no evidence of higher revenue gains.

The major peril of supply-side economics is the claim that tax reduction would boost the aggregate supply and stimulate productivity growth. On the other hand, the valuable contribution of supply-side economics is the notion that additional tax increases do not generate much higher revenue. One should not feel reluctant to recall the 1964 Kennedy-Johnson tax cut which decreased marginal tax rates substantially. Although supply-side economics has repeatedly blasted the intelectual heritage of Keynesian macroeconomics, the 1964 tax reform was itself a Keynesian prescription for the U.S recession in the years prior to Vietnam war. Back in early 1960s, Paul Samuelson wrote that “Congress could legislate, for example, a cut of three or four percentage points in the tax applicable to every income class, to take effect immediately under our withholding system in March or April, and to continue to the end of the year.” (link). Therefore, Samuelson’s mindful observation that additional spending would not automatically counteract the recession unless complemented by tax reductions, probably would not come due in the framework of supply-side economics. Moreover, what distinguished the supply-side economics from the framework of sound economic analysis taught in microeconomic and macroeconomic textbooks, was adverse propensity to enforce tax cuts for the rich while leaving the middle class and low-income households no pie from tax reductions. The striking features of income inequality in the U.S. suggest that from 1970s, median household income stagnated (link) while top 5 percent of households have received disproportionately windfall gains from tax reductions up the point where more than 85 percent of total income was earned by top 5 percent of households (link). Moreover, one should distinguish between patterns of good and bad inequality as Gary Becker recently suggested (link). It is envitable that income inequality has some great value in the society when market outcomes lead to better overall health, less stress and higher standard of living and the evidence is yet inconclusive whether the narrowing of income inequality would return health improvements for the poor – since poor health outcomes of low-income households are mainly attributed to deteriorating dietary habits and dangerous lifestyle.

While bad inequality, especially rents from non-market outcomes, have precipitated the decline in good inequality in the last two decades, there is an overwhelming evidence that stagnation of median household income (despite moderate productivity improvements) caused a somehow lower quality of the U.S. labor force and a widening gap in educational achievements of American children. The drawbacks of widening inequality were largely ignored by supply-side economics or justified on the hands-off approach to the issues of the poor. It should not be forgotten that negative income tax, which favored low-income families, was suggested by Milton Friedman, whom supply-siders have taken for the intellectual father without a detailed knowledge of his precious contribution to economics.

Second, supply-side economics has been perhaps known for favoring the deregulation as the cure for social ills and staggering income growth. Despite substantial euphoria caused by the pioneers of deregulation of banking and financial sector, the regulatory framework eventually jeopardized sound regulation that could prevent hazardous outcomes as shown in the seminal work of George Akerlof and Joseph Stiglitz. In fact, deregulation of the banking sector, hailed by supply-side economics as the triumph of its own ideology, laid the basis for rigorous financial innovation by special investment vehicles (SIV) and shadow banking institutions.

In fact, deregulation of the banking and financial sector was not the central issue per se. The main systemic flaw was rather the adoption of unsound regulation that did not predict the perils of over-leveraged banking sector and especially the system-wide spillovers during the financial crisis. Moreover, the loosening of the monetary policy and the series of fiscal stimulus have notified two main drawbacks in the macroeconomic outlook. The first is the invariant postponement of taxation fuelled by the mountain of government debt. And the second is the hidden explosive potential for inflation following the flood of money supply in the balance sheet of the banking sector.

Generally speaking, the intellectual adventure of supply-side economics has overlooked the possibility of pitfalls brought up by rigorous tax cuts to the wealthy and deregulation of banking and financial sector. It would not come due to label mainstream economic theory as a cataclysm which the financial crisis proved accordingly. It would be either insensible to tarnish the useful contribution of supply-side economics. In fact, tax cuts do generate systemic incentives, particularly in the response of the labor supply to tax reductions. However, the elusive quest for higher growth and job creation after reducing tax rates for the wealthy, is an important lesson we should learned from the unfortunate turn of supply-side economics in favoring deregulation without acknowledging the possibility of systemic banking collapse and the consequences carried over by society at large.

Wanted: International Buyers of Danish Mortgage Bonds

Not too long ago, I compared the Japanese economy to a bumblebee because of the economy’s ability to keep on chucking along even as the government debt/GDP ratio stormed above the 200% mark. I am starting to think that the same comparison might be warranted too in the case of my home country.

One striking aspect of the Danish economy that any economist following the discourse on Denmark must be pondering is that despite the widespread idea that Denmark has a serious productivity problem relative to its peers, it has not yet shown up in the data. Denmark is still running a sizeable trade as well as income surplus which together adds up to a tasty current account surplus.

So what gives and can this situation be maintained?

The reason that I have been forced to think about this was today’s report by Bloomie that the Danish bank and mortgate originator Nykredit announced that it would actively seek to widen its international investor base for covered bonds backed by mortgages of which the bank is Europe’s largest holder and which contributes to making the Danish market for mortgages one of the world’s biggest.

Basically, the problem for Danish financial institutions is that under the new Basel rules, covered bonds backed by mortgages will be treated as less liquid than government bonds (and thus less liquid than is currently the case) and thus Nykredit et al will be left holding way too many of these securities. The problem in a nutshell is this;

Denmark is leading efforts to persuade the European Union to ease liquidity rules set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision that the Nordic country says penalize the world’s third-largest mortgage-bond market. While the EU has signaled it may accommodate some of the demands, standards scheduled to take effect by 2015 are still likely to treat covered bonds as less liquid assets than government debt, Engberg Jensen said.

“I don’t think we can totally avoid a haircut” on how banks treat covered bonds in their liquid assets, he said. “I don’t think that we’ll end up with rules where covered bonds and government bonds are equal.” This means “we need to find a broader investor base. We want to be stronger in Europe and we have also started in the Middle East and the Far East. We’ve had investors for many years in the U.S. and Europe.”

Under the new rules, banks must abide to a limit of 40% in terms of how much of the securities portfolio that can be made up by (mortgage) covered bonds which leads to the obvious result that …

“If we get the new rules, most Danish banks will have to restructure to sell mortgage bonds and buy government bonds,” Engberg Jensen said. While Danish banks have relied on the country’s covered bonds to generate liquid assets, lenders in Germany and Asia have room to purchase the securities without breaching Basel’s 40 percent limit, Nykredit estimates. The company wants to sell its bonds to banks in those regions to make up for the selloff it expects to see in Denmark, Nykredit Group Managing Director Karsten Knudsen said in the same interview.

Denmark has a problem here, a big one in my opinion and the only chart you need to look at is the following.

(click on picture for better viewing)

Despite the crisis, Denmark has not delevered substantially and mortgage debt remains a sizeable portion of GDP; 134% by my calculations in 2010. And this is mortgage debt alone and thus leaves out a large private debt burden, all corporate debt as well as a growing government debt.

It is important to understand where Denmark is here. Denmark is like Spain, Ireland and Australia with large a large private debt burden which will only really make itself felt once the government has to assume the final bill (think Ireland here). Now, at this point my compatriots would know doubt file this post under the “one flew over the (…)’s nest” folder as comparing Denmark with the countries made above seem more than outrageous. But try to get the main point here. Denmark’s main debt problem is in the private sector and given the Irish experience, once the sovereign has to plug a hole in the domestic financial system, it is the total debt that matters and not merely the government debt.

Recently, the EU commission issued a report with a stark warning to Danish policy makers that both the size and structure of the housing market with the majority of loans made up by variable interest rate and no-amortisation/down payment (often both in the same loan!) represented a current and future source of instability. The Danish central bank has even suggested to phase out these loans entirely even if it seems that such a proposal has not got political backing in the Danish parliament regardless of the result of this year’s election.

According to Bloomberg, Nykredit and others have noted that they will try to separate the way they funds their adjustable rate mortgage portfolio from their fixed rate portfolio. This is almost hilarious in its uselessness in my opinion since the main problem here is not a flow issue but a stock issue as evidenced by the chart above.

When all is said, I think you should take away the following point from this.

Essentially, if Danish mortgage originators start selling bonds to foreign investors for the obvious rational reason that they need to abide to new capital requirement rules it will mean a defacto deterioration of the current account (not necessarily a problem, just a fact when you sell securities abroad). So, the question is; how willing will foreigners be to finance one of the most overlevered housing markets in the world and at what yields?

When I run the scenario in my head, I end up in a situation where it might be quite difficult to push Danish covered bonds to foreigners at acceptable prices, liquidity will dry up and re-financing will get more difficult. In addition, if yields go up prices (i.e. house prices) will fall and exacerbate the difficulty in pushing the securities since the prices on the underlying collateral (i.e. property will go down).

Now, far be it from me to attempt to put Denmark in a club to which it does not belong but think about it for a minute. The road map for how a Danish government might be forced to issue government bonds and swap them for unsellable covered bonds in order to allow its financial institutions to abide to the Basel rules is an almost sinister way in which the Danish sovereign ultimately may end up being on the hook for the total stock of debt in the society, just as we have seen elsewhere.

Am I seeing ghosts? Perhaps, but consider yourself warned.

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Is AIG a Precious Metal Manipulator?

Further to this Zero Hedge post note the following from CPM Group’s Mr Christian:

Bullion Banking Explained (dated Feb 2000):

Many banks use factor loadings of 5 to 10 for their gold and silver, meaning that they will loan or sell 5 to 10 times as much metal as they have either purchased or committed to buy. One dealer we know uses a leverage factor of 40. (Long Term Capital Management had a leverage factor of 100 when it nearly collapsed in 1998.)

So CPM Group knew of a 40:1 precious metals leveraged firm in 2000, who were they? Mr Christian tells us in his April 10 2010 interview with Jim Puplava of Financial Sense at the 44 minute mark:

AIG was not a bank, was not a commercial bank, and under the US laws non-commercial banks don’t come under the law, the guidance of the office of the controller of the currency. AIG used a leverage factor of 40, so if people gave them a million ounces of gold to hold for them, they could lend out 40. I mean, I have friends who are metals traders who were looking for job years ago and, you know, they went to AIG and AIG said “we use a leverage factor of 40” and the trader is a seasoned guy and he’s worked at major banks and investment banks, he said “I can’t operate at that level of leverage its just too risky more me” and AIG trading said “well this is what we do”, right, so there is a loophole in our regulatory system, its doesn’t really have anything to do with gold and silver per se but it allows non-banks to participate in banking activities in a way that skirts banking regulations that are designed to promote stability in the banking system.

Interesting that in 2000 CPM Group could publicly talk about “one dealer we know” having 40:1 leverage and it was not considered an issue (although he didn’t publicly mention is was via a “loophole”) – sign of those times I suppose. Question is, has anything changed?

Deep Thinking on Banking

Forbes has a fascinating article by Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Edward Leamer, with fundamental thinking about banks.

They trace the problems of banks to the fundamental contradictions of having a highly leveraged financial firm, with assured returns and full liquidity for depositors, and opaque + illiquid assets. I agree with this gloomy prognosis. A more fleshed out argument is in this pair of articles — link and link — which were opinion pieces in 1999.

I stopped chasing those lines of thought because it seemed dishearteningly hard, trying to sell a world without banks as we know ‘em. But if you are persuaded by these arguments, then you will like a world where we do more finance through securities markets, through `defined contribution and NAV-based’ financial firms (i.e. direct household participation in financial markets, mutual funds and DC pensions), and less through `assured returns’ financial firms such as banks, DB pensions and insurance companies.

In a perverse way, India’s prodigous mistakes of policy on banking have helped steer the country into a more market-dominated financial system, which has helped build a better financial system.

Since we’re unlikely to reconstruct the economy in radical ways, we have to confront the problems of banks. I feel the most important element of safe and sound banking is: a proper deposit insurance mechanism. Chapter 6 of Raghuram Rajan’s report is the best blueprint out there about setting up a deposit insurance corporation, and other dimensions of improving systemic risk (see `V. Preventing Crisis and Dealing with Failure’).

You might like to also see this picture on banking reforms.

Can budget deficits cure the debt problem?

When I first met Jim (that is not his real name) a few days ago he seemed like a fairly harmless businessman. But when he heard that I was an economist, he said that there was something he wanted to ask me.

I had the feeling that I would not like Jim’s question, so I mentioned that I had retired. Jim pretended not to hear. He said: “The current financial crisis was caused by too much debt wasn’t it? Before I could respond, he had added: “So, tell me how the world’s governments are going to solve the problem by having bigger budget deficits and more debt?”

I tried to get out of answering by saying that I didn’t know much about short-term macro-economic management. That response didn’t satisfy Jim. He said: “Come on, you must have some idea about what governments are trying to achieve.”

I started my explanation by going back to the cause of the problem. Making my explanation as simple as possible, I said that the problem had arisen basically because lending institutions in the U.S. thought that it was safe to lend a high proportion of the value of houses because they felt that house prices would continue to rise. This meant that when the bubble burst and house prices fell, a lot of borrowers had debts that were greater than the value of their houses. So defaults started to increase and that created big problems for banks.

At that point Jim interrupted. “I know all that”, he said, “what I don’t understand is why the governments didn’t just let the rotten banks fail”. I explained that the financial system had become like a house of cards, built on the expectation that some financial institutions were too big to fail. When the U.S. government let one bank collapse, this led to a crisis of confidence in the whole financial system.

Jim looked skeptical. “You still haven’t answered my question”, he said. “How can governments solve the problem by creating budget deficits? Doesn’t this just make the problem worse for countries that have been living beyond their means. Shouldn’t they be living within their means rather than going further into debt?”

I told Jim that I thought that was a good point, but the problem was how to get from where we are now to where we want to be. I suggested that the idea behind what governments were attempting to do was not stupid because they were trying to restore confidence and to avoid increased unemployment. I said that if you look at an economy and see a lot of people becoming unemployed and a lot of spare capacity emerging, this suggests that consumer demand is too low, not too high. I also explained that governments don’t actually have to go into debt to fund their deficits. They have the power to create the additional money that they spend.

Jim then looked alarmed. “Do you mean that they might use the printing presses like Robert Mugabe does? So we could end up with hyperinflation like in Zimbabwe?”

I tried to calm Jim down by telling him that at the moment a lot of economists – those who know about these things – seem to be more worried about deflation than inflation. They are worried that we might get stuck in a situation like that in Japan in the 1990s, with falling prices and economic stagnation. I said that the policy aim was to give economies just enough of a boost to restore economic growth without inflation.

Jim seemed to understand. He said: “So what these economists are trying to do is a bit like getting a satellite into the right orbit – they just want to give the economy the right amount of thrust?” I acknowledged that the policy problem could be a bit like that.

Jim smiled before he added: “Yeah, well I reckon that’s the problem with you economists. You think you are rocket scientists!”