By Ajay Shah, on February 9th, 2012
Economics is a rich and fascinating subject. But all too often, the teaching process forces young people in the field to look at the tail
of the elephant, to think about macroeconomics as the game of solving dynamic models. There is actually much more going on. (On a related note, you might like to see Books that should be read before starting a Ph.D. in economics on this blog, 18 May 2011).
In this blog post, we walk through the evolution of the key ideas in historical order, and offer suggestions to interesting readings,
which will help you see the fuller picture. Many of them are on your reading list, but some are not.
The old paradigm
Nobody tells it better than The age of uncertainty by John Kenneth Galbraith.
The old paradigm is now in the dustbin of history. But in order to comprehend the revolution in macroeconomics, it is rather useful to start from there. One encounters these arguments from time to time, so it’s worth knowing about the furniture of that mind.
The revolution of modern macroeconomics
The starting point is a speech : The role of monetary policy by Milton Friedman, American Economic Review, 1968, which had enormous influence in arguing that the mainstream Keynesian paradigm was fatally flawed, and that it was not going to work as a guide to policy on a sustained basis. By the early 1970s, the empirical evidence was showing that Friedman was on the right track, which led to everything that followed. This speech is arguably the beginning of modern macroeconomics. At the same time, this was only an argument conducted in English, and not a model.
The next big milestone was the Lucas critique: Econometric policy evaluation: A critique by Robert Lucas, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 1976. This devastated traditional macroeconomics. In addition, it’s a remarkably elegant idea.
Lucas, Sargent and others mapped out a work program in a series of non-technical pieces, which were enormously influential. They set a generation of economists going to build a class of models that were rooted in the intuition of Friedman, 1968, and were invulnerable to the Lucas critique. You should read: Understanding business cycles by Robert Lucas, Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, 1977; After Keynesian Macroeconomics by Lucas and Sargent, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 1978; Methods and problems in business cycle theory by Robert Lucas, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1980.
As important as the Lucas Critique was Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans by Kydland and
Prescott. An accessible set of materials on this work is found in their 2004 Nobel Prize page.
This work came to fruition in the early 1990s in the form of the NK-DSGE model with a policy rule. Important tools got developed in a
classical setting (the RBC model), and then Keynesian frictions were put in, to give the NK-DSGE model. It has many problems, but with this, the Lucas program did work out. Nice readings on the NK-DSGE model are The science of monetary policy: A new Keynesian perspective in the JEL by Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1999), and their Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability: Evidence and some theory in the QJE in 2000.
The new macroeconomics is nicely showcased in Technology, employment, and the business cycle: Do technology shocks explain aggregate fluctuations? by Jordi Gali in AER, 1999. This is a wonderful example of confronting empirics with theory, plus a fundamental (if highly controversial) contribution in the eternal quest for the sources of business fluctuations.
On the other side, there is a powerful critique of the micro-founded approach to macroeconomics: The scientific illusion of empirical macroeconomics by Larry Summers, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1992.
By the late 1990s, there was a lot of progress to report. There is a nice article: Thirty-Five Years of Model Building for Monetary Policy Evaluation: Breakthroughs, Dark Ages, and a Renaissance by John B. Taylor, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2007. There is the best single book on monetary policy: Monetary Policy Strategy by Frederic S. Mishkin, 2007. And, there are two other nice articles: A stable international monetary system emerges: Inflation targeting is Bretton Woods, reversed by Andrew K. Rose, Journal of International Money and Finance, 2007, and How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary Policy, by Marvin Goodfriend, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2007.
The second stage
Once the basic plan was laid, important work emerged in connected fields. A critical issue that came to fore was the role of finance in macroeconomics. Agency costs, net worth, and business fluctuations by Bernanke and Gertler, AER 1989, is the most elegant illustration that financial structure matters for macroeconomics.
We close this off with a canonical reference about fiscal policy from a macro perspective. A good recent treatemnt is Activist fiscal policy to stabilise economic activity by Auerbach and Gale, from the 2009 Jackson Hole symposium.
Post-crisis revisionism?
On this, see Monetary policy and financial stability: Is inflation targeting passe? by Takatoshi Ito, July 2010.
By Simon Grey, on September 22nd, 2011
Aside from these lies, Social Security is a Ponzi scheme. The major difference between Social Security and Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme is his was illegal. Three Nobel laureate economists have testified that Social Security is a Ponzi scheme. Dr. Paul Samuelson called it “the greatest Ponzi game ever contrived.” Dr. Milton Friedman said it was “the biggest Ponzi scheme on earth.” Dr. Paul Krugman predicted that “the Ponzi game will soon be over.”
The media and government need to take a hint here. When two Nobel-prize-winning Keynesians say that Social Security is a Ponzi scheme, it’s safe that Social Security is a Ponzi scheme.(Because if there’s anyone who knows Ponzi schemes, it’s going to be a Keynesian.)Incidentally, I was also ahead of the game in demonstrating that Social Security is a lie, at least in terms of guaranteed benefits. While I only focused on Flemming v. Nestor, it is important to also look at Helvering V. Davis: Another lie in the Social Security pamphlet is: “Beginning November 24, 1936, the United States government will set up a Social Security account for you. … The checks will come to you as a right.” Therefore, Americans were sold on the belief that Social Security is like a retirement account and money placed in it is our property. The fact of the matter is you have no property right whatsoever to your Social Security “contributions.”
You say, “Williams, you’re wrong! We have a right to Social Security payments.” In a U.S. Supreme Court case, Helvering v. Davis (1937), the court held that Social Security is not an insurance program, saying, “The proceeds of both (employee and employer) taxes are to be paid into the Treasury like internal revenue taxes generally, and are not earmarked in any way.” In a later Supreme Court case, Flemming v. Nestor (1960), the court said, “To engraft upon the Social Security system a concept of ‘accrued property rights’ would deprive it of the flexibility and boldness in adjustment to ever-changing conditions which it demands.” [Emphasis added.]
Of course, Social Security is not technically a Ponzi scheme because one is not forced to pay taxes contribute to a true Ponzi scheme: It’s true that Ponzi engaged in fraud; his victims never would have “invested” with him, had he accurately explained the business model. Libertarians therefore agree with everybody else that Charles Ponzi was a criminal and would have to face legal consequences in any just legal order.
However, so far as we know Ponzi never threatened anybody. He didn’t tell struggling young workers, “Give me 15 percent of your paycheck every week, so that I can make you a fantastic return — or else I’ll send goons to kidnap you.”
In this respect, Social Security isn’t a Ponzi scheme after all. It’s more analogous to mobsters shaking down people for protection money, because otherwise “bad things could happen.”
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By Winton Bates, on June 25th, 2010
 Richard Posner’s recent book, ‘The Crisis of Capitalist Democracy’, is mainly about the global financial crisis, how it came about in the US, the lessons that the author thinks we should have learned from it and what governments should do to prevent similar crises in future. According to this distinguished author the crisis came about because of lax regulation; we have learned from it that the financial system is inherently fragile and that Keynes is still relevant; and the way to avoid similar crises in future is to introduce regulatory reform in the financial sector.
To be fair, Posner condemns some of the knee jerk responses of governments introducing tighter financial regulation and acknowledges that he is not entirely happy with his own suggestions for regulatory reform. He views the only ambitious proposal that he discussed sympathetically – the separation of commercial banking from other forms of financial intermediation – as ‘fraught with problems’ (p.362).
It is arguable that the global financial crisis was a crisis of capitalism. A milder financial crisis might still have occurred if central banks had not previously acted in ways that led major financial institutions to expect that they would be bailed out if their excessive risk-taking resulted in major losses. It is even possible to entertain the idea (as I did here) that the financial crisis has highlighted a fundamental problem in that laws governing the financial system currently permit financial intermediaries to make promises that they can’t always keep. But why view this economic crisis as a crisis of democracy?
The title of the book arises from Posner’s view that while the American political system can react promptly and effectively to an emergency, it ‘tends to be ineffectual’ in dealing with longer term challenges:
‘The financial collapse and the ensuing depression (as I insist we must call it) have both underscored and amplified grave problems of American public finance that will not yield to the populist solutions that command political and public support. The problems include the enormous public debt created by the decline of tax revenues in the depression, the enormous expenses incurred by government in fighting the depression, and the boost the depression has given to expanding the government’s role in the economy. These developments, interacting with a seeming inability of government to cut existing spending programs (however foolish), to insist that costly new programs be funded, to limit the growth of entitlement programs, or to raise taxes, constitute the crisis of American-style capitalist democracy’ (p.387-8).
Unfortunately, the quoted passage appears in the final paragraph in the book rather than the introduction. There is not much discussion in this book about this supposed weakness of the US democratic system. The author implies that it is largely a problem of political culture. Republicans favour low taxes but they have been reluctant to reduce government spending. Democrats favour high levels of government spending but they have been reluctant to raise taxes. As a result:
‘From the standpoint of economic policy we have only one party, and it is the party of profligacy’ (p.384).
As a person living in a democratic country in which a large part of the electorate has come to equate responsible economic management with budget surpluses and minimal public debt (to the dismay of some left wing economists who would like to see more public sector investment) I find it difficult to take seriously the idea that the current political culture in the United States involves a crisis of capitalist democracy. I am confident that before too long Americans will insist that their governments balance their books in order to avoid the problems currently being experienced in Greece and other European countries.
However, the picture might look a lot different from within the US. Before a change in political culture can occur in the US it will be necessary for a lot more Americans to become concerned about the future implications of current fiscal policies. Richard Posner claims that he has no idea how to solve the problem of America’s political culture (p.385) but I think he is contributing to the solution by merely raising awareness of the problem.
By Richard Daughty, on March 9th, 2010
I was recently reminded of the old argument about Say’s Law, and that reminded me that it was Keynes who twisted Say’s theories around to create the ridiculous argument that supply created its own demand, which I say is a load of crap, which pretty much sums up a lot of what Keynes did, probably because he was an egotistical idiot-savant who erroneously thought that he could put economics and human behavior in terms of absolutes that you could turn into equations, a particular, arrogant stupidity that has, nonetheless, fascinated generations of economists since then, all of whom childishly delight in equations and computers, whether it means anything or not, which it doesn’t, which I can actually prove – prove! – with an entire storage area full (the “supply”) of ashtrays made out of dried dog crap, which nobody wanted to buy (the “demand”), proving that supply does NOT create its own demand.
Instead, it is actually true that demand created its own supply, like the “supply” of new “neighbors” at the storage place are demanding (“demand”) that I get that stinking, festering fecal mess out of there or they are going to sue me or something, to which I said “Great! I’ll pay you off with some of these ashtrays, which will make wonderful gifts for your friends and family!”
I bring this up not, as is often rumored, as a last minute appeal to you, the American consumer, to buy a bunch of these dog-poo ashtrays with their “keepsake quality”, and take them off my, literally, stinking hands, but to show you that one of the reasons why the economy is doing badly is that the latest unemployment numbers are Bad News Aplenty (BNA), as people do not buy as much stuff (demand) when they don’t make as much as much money, and the people who make stuff (supply) are then laid off, proving, once again, that supply follows demand.
And, since we are talking about it, people are not buying as much stuff, which I cleverly conclude from the fact that consumer installment debt has been going down since September 2008 as the American consumer is gradually, slowly, ever so slowly, almost glacially, paying down some of their super-sized, staggering $2.5 trillion in consumer installment debt.
How much? Consumers have, in a year and a half, paid down a measly $135 billion! Hahaha!
At this rate, one wonders, at 20% interest on the unpaid balance, how many freaking lifetimes will it take just for consumers to pay off their $2.5 trillion in existing debt, which doesn’t even count the debt they are going to incur in the future, just trying to buy the basics, as the inflation in prices from the insane inflation in the money supply makes things so costly that they get to the choice of debt or starvation, and even then, most people will buy food instead of gold, silver and oil.
Hoping to gently motivate them, and to provide the apparently necessary motivation delivered in a non-threatening, person-centric, positive way, I say, “Hey! You could stand to lose a few pounds there, chubby! Stop eating for a couple of days and use the ‘found’ money to buy yourself some gold, silver and oil, you moron!” but even then, they always act upset, like I said something wrong! See the kind of stupid crap I have to put up with around here all the damned time?
Anyway, their only hope is that everything survives a massive inflation, so that $135 billion dollars is, in terms of buying power, less than a week’s average minimum wage or something like that! Hahaha! Problem solved! Hahahaha!
In case you were curious, I put a lot of it down to the unholy combination of moronic do-gooders trying to save my life and greedy governments trying to drain my blood, as they, all over the place, raised cigarette taxes by several dollars per pack, so that the quarter of adults (54 million) who smoke a theoretical carton a week, have $40, $50, $60 sometimes more than $70 a week less money to spend on everything else, which comes to, at an average of $6 per pack, $3.24 billion per week, or a tidy $168 billion a year in lost spending power!
In short, tobacco addicts stopped buying other things so as to afford one thing that has become so expensive.
If they were smart, smokers would be spending their money on gold, silver and oil, waiting a little while until their prices soar as the government deficit-spends the massive, monstrous amounts of money that the Federal Reserve creates, and THEN taking up smoking when they could easily afford cigarettes at any price, the higher price for insurance, and the needed medical treatments, also at any price!
It’s enough to make you say, “Whee! This investing stuff is easy!”
Consumer Debt and the Supply-Demand Dynamic originally appeared in the Daily Reckoning.
By Richard Daughty, on March 5th, 2010
Okay, I will admit that we had a little accidental gunfire around here recently, but nobody was hurt, and all that really happened is that I wasted a lot of very expensive ammunition and scared the hell out of a lot of people, including myself, a commotion which instantly activated my Amazing Mogambo Reflexes (AMR), making me drop the delicious Hostess Cupcake that I was noisily eating and take cover on the floor, falling, as I did, on top of the aforesaid cupcake, smashing it all over myself, and all over the floor, which made it taste terrible after that.
But the surprising gunfire was not my fault, as I had just read that the Federal Reserve is being as dangerously incompetent as ever by continuing to massively increase the money supply (which is so horrible because it causes inflation in prices) so that they can buy up (monetize) at least a part of the massive, monstrous, mega-moolah Treasury debt issuance that will be necessary to fund the unbelievable sum of, as I understand it, $1.9 trillion in government deficit-spending in the upcoming One Freaking Year (OFY) as a result of the massive spending of the terrible, awful, worse-than-I-had-feared, demon-from-hell Obama administration, plus trillions more for the needs of the private sector, and a trillion or so in Congressional “supplemental appropriations” throughout the year as Congress periodically, almost ritually in a Satanic kind of way, “discovers” that their original estimate of their borrowing needs was inadequate, and – surprise! – that these slimy, lying bastards need LOTS and lots more money!
I can see by rereading that paragraph that I was so wrapped up in heaping Massive Mogambo Scorn (MMS) on the arrogant, radical-Left Obama, on every sniveling Democrat in the place, most of the Republicans, and on the despicable, guilty-as-charged, incompetent Federal Reserve that I never actually got around to telling you how much money and credit the Fed created last week, which was the original point I was going to make for some reason other than decrying such irresponsible expansions of the money supply that will guarantee horrific, economy-destroying, dollar-destroying, soul-destroying inflation in prices, but I forgot what I was planning to say about it, to tell you the truth, but with or without it, the increase in Fed Credit last week was another $5.2 billion, which (although terrifying), is less than his usual increase, and at $5.2 billion, is merely twice the usual weekly rate of money and credit creation by the monster Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, who – single-handedly! – created all the economic mess of the world by merely creating $10 billion-or-so per month of new Federal Reserve money and credit!
Now, Fed chairman Ben Bernanke, a clueless academic, still stubbornly hews to that same, tired, insipid-yet-stupid neo-Keynesian econometric theory that has now been shown to be not only wrong, wrong, wrong, but also stupidly and catastrophically wrong, which doesn’t say anything at all about the morons, like Ben Bernanke and Alan Blinder, who are themselves mere representative examples of the neo-Keynesian econometric bozos rampant in the world today, all of whom believe in such imbecilities as their precious economic theories in the face of, literally, overwhelming evidence to the contrary! It is absurd on its face! Ya gotta laugh! Hahahaha!
Interestingly, a crucial part of the stupid Keynesian nonsense holds that the government can, by virtue of borrowing the money, replace any perceived lost “consumer demand”, in any economic downturn, by merely borrowing and spending money, even if borrowing and spending money was the cause of the original downturn, and that there are no repercussions that cannot be solved by more borrowing and spending, and that inflation in prices has nothing to do with the money supply but with irrational exuberance! Which doesn’t even make any sense! Hahahah! It doesn’t even freaking make sense!!
Sharp-eyed Junior Mogambo Rangers (JMRs) will recognize the two exclamation points as indicators of something, usually the preceding sentence (as in this case), as being very important, as, now that I notice, it is, in this case, in that it is Beyond Freaking Crazy (BFC)!!!
Horrors! The punctuation using the rare triple exclamation point! You can tell I am on a roll here! I suggest you go to someplace safe in your house where your enemies would have to attempt a painful frontal assault against you, and as you wait, you think to yourself, “Obviously, this is extremely important! As indeed it is, now that I think about it after it has been drawn to my attention, thanks to the Magnificent Mogambo (MM), because you do not get anything except total, unmitigated disaster from inept management by people who cannot be controlled and who are Beyond Freaking Crazy (BFC)!”
I am very proud of you for thinking this, as it shows that it has all become clear: The preponderance of people on this planet, and in our universities, and in our media, and in our governments, and in our central banks are BFC lunatics if they think that borrowing (racking up debt) and spending money will “cure” the bust of the boom produced by borrowing (racking up debt) and spending the money! Hahahaha!
I immediately think of the joke, “Doctor! I’ve been gorging myself, but I never lose any weight!” but it doesn’t seem to fit the conversation, somehow, and it doesn’t really seem to have anything to do with anything I was talking about, which makes me think that maybe my subconscious is telling me that I SHOULD have been talking about it, which doesn’t make any sense, either, because I don’t think anyone needs advice on how to gorge themselves, and in fact, people seem quite disgusted when I do it, although it makes their kids laugh, meaning that the kids like me better than they like their own parents, which is a small victory for me and, although small, is a victory.
So I say to the kids, who just showed how much they love me, “Hey, kids! Tell your parents that they are idiots unless they buy gold, silver and oil right now, because unless they do, they are going to be poor when excessive government deficit-spending and excessive Federal Reserve over-creation of money and credit make prices soar as the buying power of the dollar falls, which means that you will be poor, and you tell them how you don’t want to be poor, and how you have been thinking about, in an idle sort of economic self-defense way, the many, many advantages of being too young to be charged with a capital crime should they fail to acquire the aforesaid gold, silver and oil!”
This is where the parents turned around and gave me this “dirty look”, which I interpreted to mean, “I surrender, under protest, to your magnificent, powerful presentation of the case for gold, silver and oil, enhanced by the paranoid notion that my own children are threatening to kill me in some bizarre extortion racket involving gold, silver and oil that you have planted in my head, which I realize is all for my own good because I now see that only an idiot would not buy gold, silver and oil when the government and the banks are acting so despicably! Thank you, handsome stranger!”
The name’s Mogambo, ma’am. It’s my job.
Borrow and Spend Economics to Pay for Borrowing and Spending originally appeared in the Daily Reckoning.
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By Richard Daughty, on February 23rd, 2010
I can tell you the exact date (Saturday, February 13, 2010) that I saw that TheDailyBell.com had a “guest Editorial” by Dr. Ron Paul, who I admire because he is the only Senator in Congress whose economic philosophy is the Austrian school of economics, which, in fractured German, is “ein Austrian economischer”, which I purposely use to paraphrase John Kennedy, who famously said, “Ich bin ein Berliner”, which actually translates from German as “I am a cream-filled pastry”, but everybody knew what he meant, which was that he was just another clueless American Democrat who wanted to save the whole world by taking over the whole world so that they could change the whole world, and who had the majority of American voters and Congress behind him, all of whom have heads that, for all apparent intents and purposes, are cream-filled, and that is why Kennedy said that he, too, behaved as if he had a head filled with whipped cream.
Oh, I am sure that there are those who disagree with my interpretation of what a dead president meant when he said he was a “cream-filled pastry”, and there are those who dispute my understanding of the vital role of the taco (“The prefect snack, any time!”) and the candy bar (“Perfect for times between tacos!”) in today’s modern, health-conscious world, too, so go figure. Idiots!
Regardless, the state of my mental faculties or the fact that I sound, look and act exactly like an idiot is not the point. The point is about the importance of owning gold, silver and oil when the truly idiotic Federal Reserve keeps increasing the supply of credit and money, especially as it is used mainly to buy an avalanche of new government debt (monetizing the debt! Gaaaah! We’re freaking doomed!), and how the title of his article, “More Spending is Always the Answer”, is so ludicrously ridiculous that I could not believe my eyes that Senator Ron Paul, of all the people in the world, is saying that “more spending is always the answer”, because nothing could be farther from the truth, and it is, instead, waaaAAAaaay out there past the outermost, frigid fringes of Truth, a place where we find “The promise of True Love” and “The check’s in the mail.”
It turns out that he was being sarcastic, as I should have known, and he says, “Continually increasing the debt is one of the logical outcomes of Keynesianism, since more government spending is always their answer. It is claimed that government must not stop spending when the economy is so fragile. Government must act.”
The problem is that “when times are good, government also increases in size and scope, because we can afford it, it is claimed.” Exactly!
In short, the blockheads in Congress, the Federal Reserve, the majority of the laughably-incompetent university economics professors in the country, the morons of the President’s council of economic advisors, and all Democrats, all believe that “There is never a good time to rein in government spending according to Keynesian economists and the proponents of big government.”
As a case in point, “Last week, the House approved another increase in the national debt ceiling”, he says, meaning that the idiotic American government can now legally borrow $1.9 trillion more, on top of the $12 trillion already borrowed and owed, “to stay afloat and avoid default”, although he did not mention that this monstrous new load of debt is only expected to last until just after the mid-term elections this year, at which point Congress will take us farther and farther into a deadly financial quicksand with another extension of the debt limit! Hahaha!
In this regard, Junior Mogambo Ranger (JMR) Alan L. writes, “Call one drop of water a dollar. Five drops equals one milliliter. Question: What is the volume of water of $14 trillion?”
Instantly, I am back in high school, feeling panicked and trapped because the teacher has asked me a question that not only do I NOT know the answer to, or how to figure it out, but I don’t even care, and I never WILL care about it because if I was ever actually on a train that was leaving Chicago towards Los Angeles, 2,000 miles away, going 60 miles an hour, and I knew that another train was leaving Los Angeles going to Chicago at 70 miles an hour, I wouldn’t get on the damn train! It’s that simple!
So I don’t freaking CARE how long it would be before they met and they crashed into each other with a big explosion and there are bodies everywhere and what a mess, because I won’t be there! I’ll read about it!
Apparently, JMR Alan saw the panic in my eyes, or perhaps it was the way I was reaching under my jacket preparing to shoot my way out of here if necessary, but either way, he was pretty quick coming up with the answer: “Twenty times the volume of the Great Lakes. That puts the entire area of the United States 50 meters underwater.”
Wow! I seem to remember some handsome rascal and clever bon vivant, with a twinkle in his dazzling blue eyes and a roughish grin on his boyish-yet-rugged face, say “We’re freaking doomed!” as a result of the abject stupidity of Congress and the Federal Reserve in the last 90 years or so since the Fed was created, and especially as a result of the stupidity of the last 40 years when Nixon refused to exchange dollars for gold, and doubly especially since 1997 when Alan Greenspan really started getting insane with monetary policy, and triply especially since 2008 when the unbelievably preposterous Ben Bernanke and his loathsome Federal Reserve doubled the money supply at a stroke! At A Freaking Stroke (AFS)! Doubled!
This – THIS! – is the worst thing that could happen for those of us whose fear of hyperinflation, which is guaranteed after a hyperinflation in the money supply, makes us buy gold, silver and oil with a fearful, frantic frenzy that precludes even thinking about spouses and children, except maybe about how they are a big, heavy weight around my aching neck and my only hope is to get more gold, silver and oil, which, when I do, make the whole problem worse and worse! I can’t win!
And don’t get me started on the hassles of having a few defensive fortifications in the backyard to further protect yourself against the massive social unrest that inflation causes. Neighbors are always whining about something, like maybe a couple of accidental shots, probably less than a hundred rounds all told, allegedly emanating from the Mogambo Bunker Of Trembling Terror (MBOTT), that didn’t even hit anybody, and the only real damage was Carl’s stupid barbeque grill, which was old, rusty and ugly to start with, and I didn’t think he would even mind, and there was some collateral damage to his stupid water heater, too, which was ditto on the old, rusty and ugly.
But the point is that the Federal Reserve is going to kill us with inflation in prices as a result of their relentless inflation in creation of money and credit as a result of the federal government deficit-spending so incredibly much money, and you should get some gold, silver and oil right away!
You will be glad you did, and you can fit a surprising lot of them in even the most modest-sized bunker, yet still have lots of room for supplies of ammunition, frozen pizzas and pornography. So, whee! This investing stuff is easy!
Money Supply Flood to Drown US Economy originally appeared in the Daily Reckoning. The Daily Reckoning, offers a uniquely refreshing, perspective on the global economy, investing, gold, stocks and today’s markets. Its been called “the most entertaining read of the day.”
By Thersites, on February 11th, 2010
Though I have written extensively about the Recession of 1920, it is worth revisiting it per Glenn Beck’s show last night. Beck rightly pointed out that the policies of decreased taxes and decreased government spending implemented by both Harding and Coolidge paved the way for the dramatic economic growth of the roaring 20s. What Beck didn’t mention was that prior to this period of unprecedented economic expansion, President Warren Harding had inherited one of the worst recessions in American history. This Recession of 1920-21 is another one of the dirty secrets glossed over in the Progressive history books.
By late 1919, America was facing inflation in prices as measured by CPI of 20%. Between 1920 and 1921, unemployment doubled from 5.2 to 11.7%. During this same period, from their peak in June of 1920, prices declined by 15.8% on a year-over-year basis, a 50% greater deflation in prices than during ANY 12-month period during the Great Depression. So what was Harding’s proposal to deal with this mess? To understand how to get out of recession, Harding looked towards how we got into it in the first place.
For America was coming out of World War I. Government was controlling huge swaths of the economy, as it had mobilized land, labor and capital towards war production and away from normal commerce as dictated by consumer demand. In addition to the mass of resources that needed to be reallocated according to market forces, the economy had been further distorted due to the policies of the Federal Reserve which had inflated the money supply by 71% from 1913-1919 (while the physical volume of business had only increased by 9.6%), and whose policies had led to an increase in prices of a staggering 234% between 1914 and 1920. Prices needed to readjust according to the reallocation of resources. In addition, not surprisingly, due to the costs of war, the federal budget had grown to $18.5bn.
One will note the parallels to our economic situation today. Just as war led resources to be allocated away from where an unfettered economy would have directed them, so too did the artificial boom fueled by the Federal Reserve and various government policies lead resources to be misallocated towards assets such as houses and stocks during our most recent boom and bust cycle. While unsustainable businesses and concomitant rises in prices developed in the private sector, the government too drastically increased.
Harding understood the root cause of recession. As he noted in his inaugural address:
The economic mechanism is intricate and its parts interdependent, and has suffered the shocks and jars incident to abnormal demands, credit inflations, and price upheavals. The normal balances have been impaired, the channels of distribution have been clogged, the relations of labor and management have been strained. We must seek the readjustment with care and courage…All the penalties will not be light, nor evenly distributed. There is no way of making them so. There is no instant step from disorder to order. We must face a condition of grim reality, charge off our losses and start afresh. It is the oldest lesson of civilization.
And so what was his big Keynesian stimulus plan to bring the economy back from the abyss? He argued during his Republican nomination speech:
Gross expansion of currency and credit have depreciated the dollar just as expansion and inflation have discredited the coins of the world. We inflated in haste, we must deflate in deliberation. We debased the dollar in reckless finance, we must restore in honesty. Deflation on the one hand and restoration of the 100-cent dollar on the other ought to have begun on the day after the armistice, but plans were lacking or courage failed. The unpreparedness for peace was little less costly than unpreparedness for war. We can promise no one remedy which will cure an ill of such wide proportions, but we do pledge that earnest and consistent attack which the party platform covenants. We will attempt intelligent and courageous deflation, and strike at government borrowing which enlarges the evil, and we will attack high cost of government with every energy and facility which attend Republican capacity. We promise that relief which will attend the halting of waste and extravagance, and the renewal of the practice of public economy, not alone because it will relieve tax burdens, but because it will be an example to stimulate thrift and economy in private life.
And so, shockingly Harding practiced what he preached. Regarding deflation, the Federal Reserve jacked up interest rates from 4.75% in January 1920 to 7% in June 1920, and held this rate through the aforementioned major drop in prices through May of 1921. Harding slashed the federal budget from $18.5bn in 1919 to $6.4bn in 1920 all the way down to $5.1bn in 1921. Meanwhile, the government actually ran surpluses during these years, allowing them to pay down the debt by $300mm from 1920-21. The Chief Economist of Chase National Bank of the era, Benjamin Anderson summed Harding’s philosophy and his attack on the recession as follows:
The idea that a balanced budget with vast pump-priming government expenditure is a necessary means of getting out of a depression received no consideration at all. It was not regarded as the function of the government to provide money to make business activity. It was rather the business of the US Treasury to look after the solvency of the government, and the most important relief that the government felt that it could afford to business was to reduce as much as possible the amount of government expenditure, which had risen to great heights during the war; to reduce taxes—but not much; and to reduce public debt.
Nor did the government increase public employment with a view to taking up idle labor. There was a reduction in the army and navy in the course of these years, and there was a steady decline in the number of civilian employees of the federal government. This policy on the part of the government generated, of course, a great confidence in the credit of the government, and the strength of the gold dollar was taken for granted. The credit of the government and confidence in the currency are basic foundations for general business confidence. The relief to business through reduced taxes was extremely helpful.
According to Anderson, how did the recession end?
…we took our losses, we readjusted our financial structure, we endured our depression and in August 1921 we started up again. The rally in business production and employment that started in August 1921 was soundly based on a drastic cleaning up of credit weakness, a drastic reduction in the costs of production, and on the free play of private enterprise. It was not based on governmental policy designed to make business good. (See Benjamin Anderson’s Economics and the Public Welfare or his gratis “The Return to Normal“)
Now we can debate fiscal and economic policy all day, but across the spectrum, it should be clear to all that a government that intervened and created the conditions for economic crisis will not be able to solve it. If government’s can create prosperity when the private sector is imperiled, then why would Americans be against government central planning when all is rosy? Do the rules of economics not apply during downturns?
If we can agree that recessions are the result of resources being improperly allocated, then we can also agree that the only way to return to economic health is to allow for their reallocation according to the market. This involves allowing nonproductive business ventures to go belly-up, prices to naturally fall where they have unjustifiably risen and reduction in the size of government allowing resources to be released to entrepreneurs to reverse the ills of the artificial boom and spur growth. All measures that impede the natural cleansing of an economy will only ensure pain and suffering like that witnessed over the last few decades in Japan. Harding had things right and it would do our lawmakers good to follow his lesson: central planning and government control creates problems; innovative Americans are the only ones who can solve them.
By Thersites, on January 13th, 2010
In my study of political economy, one of the most overlooked yet fascinating historical episodes I have come across is the Recession of 1920-21. A handful of free-market economists have tackled this crisis, and I decided to throw in my lot with them and pursue the subject further myself.
Below is the abstract for my critique of the acutely sharp downturn (so you know what you’re getting into) and the embedded paper in Scribd format. Scribd however is a bit screwy in its formatting of the paper, failing to capture various diagrams for example, so I strongly suggest instead reading the Word doc downloadable HERE.
Enjoy!
Abstract: Many attribute our current recession to the evils of unbridled capitalism. In response, our leaders have embarked on the typical Keynesian recession prescriptions in order to stimulate the economy and lead the nation out of the economic doldrums. Unbeknownst to most Americans however, prior to the Great Depression, policymakers used different tools to help guide the country out of recessions. Herein we examine the causes, responses and insights gleaned from the Recession of 1920-21, the last downturn in which leaders relied on the age-old policy of laissez-faire, combined with massive reduction in government and encouragement of deflation.
By Rok Spruk, on December 16th, 2009
On Sunday, December 13th, Paul A. Samuelson has died at the age of 94 (link).
He was on the economic giants of the 20th century. His ideas reshaped the economic science and revolutionized the mode of economic thinking around the world. With the mathematical rigour and analytical mastermind, his groundbreaking approach to economic analysis transfored the economic science into a dynamic problem-solving tool. In this short essay, I will present my reflections on the life and contributions of Paul A. Samuelson to the economic science.
I first came across Paul Samuelson in the year before I entered the university. In the first year of the undergraduate class, Samuelson and Nordhaus’s Economics was the assigned reading for the Introductory Macroeconomics. I read the textbook back and forth and I liked it; not because of its simplicity in introducing the analytical framework of economics but rather because of the clarity, intuition and incentives to undertake a rigorous pursuit of analytical economics at the theoretical and empirical level. In addition, Samuelson penetrated the application of linear programming to economic problem-solving.
Together with Milton Friedman, Paul A. Samuelson is the economic giant of the 20th century. Hardly any economist could take the same place in the scope of influence as an economic thinker. He conducted the Neoclassical synthesis. As an interested reader can verify in his Nobel prize lecture (link), Samuelson’s synthesis combined a Keynesian macroeconomics with a rigorous Marshallian microeconomics. In microeconomics, Samuelson extended the Marshallian analysis of partial equilibrium with strong mathematical articulation of demand and supply curves, cost curves and deadweight loss. On the abstract level, together with Abram Bergson, he constructed social welfare functions based on three marginal conditions and extracted from earlier work of Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky analysis (link). In macroeconomics, Samuelson further affirmed the dominance of Keynesian macroeconomics with a strong emphasis on the role of fiscal policy in stimulating full-employment output. In addition, he invented the term multiplier and the acceleration, the former relating to the effect of change in exogenous macro variables on endogenous variable (notably, output) and the latter referring to the partial adjustment of aggregate investment to the capital stock. Samuelson-Hansen multiplier-accelerator principles spurred the theoretical foundations of Keynesian economic policy. He also popularized Overlapping Generations Model which later became the corner stone of innovations in the modeling of aging population. In macroeconomics, Samuelson also proposed the so-called “Samuelson-Mishi condition” for the efficient provision of public goods. When the condition is satisfied, it implies that further substitution of private goods provision for public goods will result in a diminishing social utility.
Assuming Pareto efficiency, Samuelson-Mishi condition satisfied the criteria for Lindahl equlibrium. The equilibrium states that when individuals are willing to pay for the provision of public goods according to marginal benefits, it will be Pareto efficient. However, such condition is not compatible with the incentive mechanism since it requires the complete knowledge of individual demand functions for particular public good which could result in the asymmetric distribution of benefits in response to relevation-principled taxation.
As a student of international economics, I came across the influential theoretical work of Paul Samuelson. Modern international economics is a combination of mathematical economics, advanced microeconomics, game theory and international finance. One of the most interesting and penetrating areas of international economics are theorems in international trade. Under particular assumptions theorem postulate axiomatic explanations based on previous statements. Back in 1941, he proposed Stolper-Samuelson theorem together with Wolfgang Stolper. The theorem quickly became a source of academic debate. In its simplest form, the theorem states the following: assuming constant returns to scale and perfect competition, a rise in the relative price of good will lead to higher return on the factor which is used more intensively in the production of the good and to the fall in the return to the other factor. Stolper and Samuelson wrote:
“Second only in political appeal to the argument that tariffs increase employment is the popular notion that the standard of living of the American worker must be protected against the ruinous competition of cheap foreign labor… In other words, whatever will happen to wages in wage good (labor intensive) industry will happen to labor as a whole. And this answer is independent of whether the wage good will be exported or imported.”
The theorem showed that the international trade between two countries could lead to the opposition of international trade since the relative price of labor-abundant good in the high-wage country will be higher than the world price of that good, reflecting the relative abundance of capital or human capital. The theorem quickly became the main theoretical weapon of opponents to free trade. Even today, Stolper-Samuelson is the best explanation of why labor unions in high-wage countries oppose free trade agreements and further economic integration with low-wage countries.
Another important contribution of professor Samuelson is the so called Ballasa-Samuelson effect which states that higher growth productivity growth rate in tradable goods relative to non-tradables will lead to the real exchange rate appreciation. Balassa-Samuelson effect also went through numerous time-series regression. The effect has been tested 60 times in 98 countries. Cross-section regression studies of Ballasa-Samuelson effect were analyzed in 142 countries. In a vast majority, the empirical evidence of Ballasa-Samuelson hypothesis was supported. The main empirical findings emphasize that productivity differential between tradeable and non-tradable sector is positively correlated with differences in relative prices. The empirical evidence also supported Samuelson’s initial proposition that productivity differentials translate into higher purchasing power parity through real exchange rate appreciation.
In finance, Paul Samuelson penetrated the analytical aspects of lifetime portfolio selection. In 1972 he published The Mathematics of a Speculative Price which later became the ground of option pricing. Based on discoveries of Bachelier’s pioneering work, he laid the foundations of stohastic price movements and random forecasting matches. His pioneering work in financial theory of speculation and random walk (stohastic) movements in stock prices became the underlying theoretical foundation in the emerging financial industry. In an article entitled Probability, Utility and the Independence Axiom (Econometrica, 1952), he discussed the role of probability models in measuring the overall utility. In this sense, he relied on Keynesian defence of subjective theory of probability and argued that the subjective perception of probability does not inhibit the proper functioning of financial markets. In 1965, he published A Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly where he provided the foundation of the efficient market hypothesis that has been further developed by Eugene Fama and other scholars. For a detailed discussion of Paul Samuelson’s contribution to financial economics, see Merton Miller’s contribution in Britannica (link).
In addition to his theoretical and empirical work, he is the founding member of the Econometric Society and its president in 1951. In 1961, he was the president of American Economic Association. In the political sense, Paul A. Samuelson influenced the economic policy of the Kennedy Administration. In 1960, the U.S headed for the recession. President Kennedy, following Samuelson’s advice, enacted tax cuts and a balanced budget. In 1964, when Kennedy tax cuts were enacted, top marginal tax rate was reduced from 91 percent to 70 percent. The economic reasoning behind tax reductions was firmly laid in the Keynesian multiplier (1/(1+c)(1+t)). Paul Samuelson and Walter Heller (Chairman of Council of Economic Advisers during Kennedy Administration) argued that lower tax rate would stimulate consumption spending and boosted output and employment. Throughout the 1960s, the U.S economy experienced one of the longest periods of stable economic growth, favorable employment outlook and balanced federal budget. Here is how JFK, following Samuelson’s advice, supported the tax reduction (link). Also, David Greenberg’s article on Kennedy tax reduction is a worthy source of further information on that topic (link).
On Sunday, the economic titan passed away. He not only revolutionized the field of economic science but also spurred the interest for economics and popularized it in a manner that turned dismal science into a problem-solving science based on theoretical foundations and empirical verification of theoretical postulates. His approach to economic analysis combined Marshallian microeconomics and Keynesian macroeconomics which he joined together after the WW2 in a Neoclassical synthesis. Compared to other economic thinkers, he knew how to formulate theoretical postulates in a manner that stimulates the research interest for further investigation.
He will be missed and remembered as the giant of the economic thought and a titan of economic theory.
By Thersites, on September 1st, 2009
In a recent New York Times Op-Ed entitled “Till Debt Does Its Part,” Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman rebuffs those few reactionary souls who argue that all this debt we are incurring is a bad thing. He assures us,
…don’t fret about this year’s deficit; we actually need to run up federal debt right now and need to keep doing it until the economy is on a solid path to recovery. And the extra debt should be manageable. If we face a potential problem, it’s not because the economy can’t handle the extra debt. Instead, it’s the politics, stupid.
Sometimes you really have to wonder what the standards are for winning a Nobel Prize. We have an economy built on consumer debt which relative to disposable income increased from a low in 1945 to its peak in 2007. As the Daily Reckoning further notes, we have $20 trillion in excess debt to work through over the coming years. Yet while on the private side, we need to pay for our sins, liquidate our debts, allow malinvestments to go belly up and start over on more solid fiscal ground, apparently the public sector can just keep on trucking.
As the sage Mr. Krugman notes,
Right now deficits are actually helping the economy. In fact, deficits here and in other major economies saved the world from a much deeper slump. The longer-term outlook is worrying, but it’s not catastrophic. The only real reason for concern is political. The United States can deal with its debts if politicians of both parties are, in the end, willing to show at least a bit of maturity. Need I say more?
Explain this to me exactly. When are deficits a help to an economy in distress? If the whole reason we are in economic distress is because of a glut of debt, then why is the answer to pour more gasoline on the fire? Any company that still functions in any semblance of a free market knows that if it can’t service its debt, it will be forced to make difficult decisions, potentially opting for bankruptcy. It cannot continually slop at the trough of the debt market.
But Krugman seems to think that the government can have its cake and eat it too. Where a sober person might argue that in hard times, a government must tighten its belt, like an business or a man, cutting back to the bare minimum, Krugman seems to think that incurring more and more debt, in essence stretching out the inevitable painful liquidation whilst creating another debt/currency crisis down the road is better. Why have one financial crisis when you can have two or three stretched out over a longer period of time? You get the sense that Krugman’s agenda is more political than economic sometimes.
Which brings me to my next point. Krugman believes the only reason for concern over the debt is “political.” Proud of this claim, Krugman states “Need I say more?” Well yes, I think you need do so. Our currency, and the debts run up by our government denominated in our currency are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government; which is to say our money and debt are backed by our economy, our people. If we are in for a prolonged period of negative growth, high unemployment and increased intervention in all aspects of life, especially our economy, how can Krugman make the assumption that the ability to continue adding to our debt solely rests on the “maturity” of the politicians? Can Barney Frank snap his fingers and suddenly make the world buy our paper?
If the government wishes to be “immature,” it can do so through intervention and coercion. Alternatively, if the politicians wish to be mature, they can remove themselves from the private sector, slash their spending and taxes, let whole swaths of industry go belly up and allow people to foreclose on their homes.
But Krugman as one might expect opts for the former, immature route. Mind-numbingly, he proclaims:
If governments had raised taxes or slashed spending in the face of the slump, if they had refused to rescue distressed financial institutions, we could all too easily have seen a full replay of the Great Depression. As I said, deficits saved the world.
In fact, we would be better off if governments were willing to run even larger deficits over the next year or two. The official White House forecast shows a nation stuck in purgatory for a prolonged period, with high unemployment persisting for years. If that’s at all correct — and I fear that it will be — we should be doing more, not less, to support the economy.
Krugman, going along with all the other Keynesians and socialists under the sun forgets about all of the interventionism even before his idol FDR ever got into power during the Depression, in addition to the misguided policies (which he of course advocated) over the last two decades in Japan. The same illogical government gobbledygook that merely prolonged the Depression has been followed to a tee, all the way up to “cash for clunkers”, the modern day equivalent of FDR’s forced killing of crops and slaughtering of pigs in order to raise the price of agricultural products. Mr. Krugman seems to think that interventionism is what saves economies. Might I ask then, why not intervene from the start? If the state is so good at managing crises, why not let it manage all industry in good times as well? Is the free market only sufficient when the Dow is rising? And if deficits are the cure-all, then why do nations ever default on their debt? Why is Zimbabwe the way Zimbabwe is? Could it be that perhaps the central planners are not so divine after all?
To be fair, Krugman, digressing notes:
But what about all that debt we’re incurring? That’s a bad thing, but it’s important to have some perspective. Economists normally assess the sustainability of debt by looking at the ratio of debt to G.D.P. And while $9 trillion is a huge sum, we also have a huge economy, which means that things aren’t as scary as you might thinkHere’s one way to look at it: We’re looking at a rise in the debt/G.D.P. ratio of about 40 percentage points. The real interest on that additional debt (you want to subtract off inflation) will probably be around 1 percent of G.D.P., or 5 percent of federal revenue. That doesn’t sound like an overwhelming burden.
Even though all this debt we’re adding on might not actually be so great, we have a huge economy. Ah, the panacea of the huge (albeit shrinking) economy – an economy based on consumption, services and debt, the hallmarks of any economic powerhouse. He also argues that a rise in debt/GDP of 40% is OK, since this debt will only be 5% of federal revenue, which doesn’t sound so overwhelming. So essentially, because it’s only 5% of a massively-sized federal government which will have ever-decreasing tax revenues necessitating continued debt financing (to pay for more boondoggles), we should be OK to pay off our debt (with devalued dollars I suppose?).
What might our lenders think about that? Krugman has an answer for this too.
Now, this assumes that the U.S. government’s credit will remain good so that it’s able to borrow at relatively low interest rates. So far, that’s still true. Despite the prospect of big deficits, the government is able to borrow money long term at an interest rate of less than 3.5 percent, which is low by historical standards. People making bets with real money don’t seem to be worried about U.S. solvency.
I would challenge the assumption that the US government’s credit will remain good. As Krugman notes, our debt/GDP is going to rise significantly, “
The official White House forecast shows a nation stuck in purgatory for a prolonged period, with high unemployment persisting for years,” and as I mentioned government is intervening in the economy on an unprecedented scale, but relax, our friends in the Far East will continue to bankroll us. Krugman should take a page from Milton Friedman’s playbook (along with pages from the playbooks of Hayek, von Mises and Bastiat) and remember that there is no such thing as a free lunch. All government can do for “revenue,” is directly tax, or indirectly tax through issuing debt (taxing future generations and/or devaluing the currency) or printing money.
While Krugman argues that the people “making bets” don’t seem worried about our solvency, as numerous publications have noted, the Chinese are buying less treasuries and stockpiling commodities (however short-lived the Times may think it will be), indicating that they are diversifying out of dollar-denominated assets. Meanwhile, the government has had to take the drastic measure of purchasing its own Treasuries, with the Fed committing to buy $300bn in notes (i.e. printing $300bn) and also monetizing the debt more discretely. In other words, the government has had to keep its own borrowing costs down artificially, making up for the lack of demand of its primary dealers by bidding for its own debt. But look at the YTD yield curve for the 10-Year Treasury, and tell me that the markets aren’t reacting at all to our fiscal recklessness:
Moreover, just because rates haven’t spiked by 500bps in the last year, does that mean that market participants really aren’t scared about our solvency? Markets can stay irrational for long periods of time, just look at the housing bubble or any of the other bubbles which after the fact we have said were obvious. Further, I would argue that creditors like China are being perfectly rational. They are trying to shift their money towards assets with real tangible value like commodities, while doing as little as possible to spook the government debt markets, because doing so would hurt the value of their own paper. If they flooded the markets with Treasuries, all of their dollar-denominated assets would plummet in price. It’s not in their interest for there to be a run on the US government yet. But that doesn’t mean that they won’t slowly but surely make their exit from US paper assets, leading to higher borrowing costs for our government and less confidence in our dollar. As I mentioned, there is no free lunch.
Krugman notes that other governments with comparable profligacy like Belgium and Italy never faced financial crises in the early 1990s, but there are obvious notable differences. We are the biggest economy in the world, and were the most prosperous one. We have the world’s reserve currency. Our people are not used to the kind of fiscal stagnancy faced in Europe. I just do not see Krugman’s comparisons hold water. A more apt comparison in my eyes would be the US versus the Roman or British Empires circa their collapses.
Regardless, I want to return to the fundamental point that going into more debt to solve a problem caused by too much debt makes no sense. One might argue that sometimes debt can be beneficial and not cause long term harm. One might cry that parents are right to take out a mortgage on a house to raise their children. If the family can reasonably expect to generate the cash flows to retire this debt over time, then this will certainly be fine. But the US is like one giant family of drug-addled deadbeats looking to buy a mansion in the Hamptons, having already foreclosed on its subprime mortgage, maxed out all of its credit cards and traded in its Rolex’s to the local pawn shop.
Debt is OK if you can reasonably expect to pay it off. To incur even greater debt in the face of debt that you will already be unable to service is downright immoral and will lead to severe consequences for the people.
These deficits in and of themselves are not productive. They represent a stealing of wealth from future generations. As I mentioned, the only way to pay down the debt will be to tax future generations, either directly or indirectly through inflating the money supply and thus devaluing the currency. Further, regarding what the deficits are actually being used to finance, as I have argued in accordance with sound Austrian economics, the deficits used to bail out failing ventures stop the market from naturally adjusting, and lead to less productive if not downright destructive “jobs” being diverted from the private sector.
So in some respects again, Krugman is right that our politicians need to be mature. But the people get the government they deserve, and as of yet though there have been some bright signs, the majority of people don’t seem to want to deal with the pain that mature servants of the citizenry would allow them to withstand today for a brighter tomorrow.
It is worth noting that in Krugman’s delusion, he actually makes a redeeming comment noting,
Over the really long term, however, the U.S. government will have big problems unless it makes some major changes. In particular, it has to rein in the growth of Medicare and Medicaid spending.
He actually has me for a second, until the subsequent stanzas:
That shouldn’t be hard in the context of overall health care reform. After all, America spends far more on health care than other advanced countries, without better results, so we should be able to make our system more cost-efficient.
But that won’t happen, of course, if even the most modest attempts to improve the system are successfully demagogued — by conservatives! — as efforts to “pull the plug on grandma.”
Keep it classy, Paul.
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