By The Energy Report, on March 25th, 2011
John Pugsley, author of the highly successful newsletter, The Stealth Investor, is struggling with some sudden health issues. But in this exclusive interview with The Gold Report, he shared his insight on how the global economic situation, including the catastrophe in Japan, is affecting the prospects for precious metals-related investments.
Editor’s Note: Shortly after this interview was recorded, Mr. Pugsley suffered a major heart attack. Our thoughts are with him and his family as we share his insights. New subscriptions to The Stealth Investor have been temporarily suspended.
The Gold Report: Good morning, John. Please start by commenting on how the tragedy in Japan and conflicts in the Middle East might affect precious metals and mining stocks in the near future.
John Pugsley: We are in a particularly exciting period for speculating in the natural resource area and specifically the mining stocks. What’s going on right now in the world is we’ve gotten totally into paper money. Governments have had a big backlash from all the money that was printed over the last 20 years in all of the major countries of the world. When the 2008 economic bubble swept across the globe, governments tried to solve it by printing more paper money. Every time they get into a problem, they think they can bail out their past credit excesses by creating more credit. This is absolutely going to lead to inflation. Whether we want to call it hyperinflation or not, it’s going to come and it’s going to come with a vengeance. That’s the opportunity for all of us because this pile of government debt is building in all the banks and pensions funds around the world.
TGR: So how does the situation in Japan fit into this picture?
JP: It is absolutely insane to think that rebuilding after the devastating earthquake and tsunami in Japan could act as stimulus for GDP growth. That would be like saying that building bombs and blowing things up during a war stimulates the economy. That doesn’t create a better world for anybody. If wiping out entire cities really does create a rising GDP and standard of living, why not just go ahead and do that periodically and have a wonderful economy. That’s just insane. Instead, they’re going to print enormous quantities of paper yen, which will result in passing the loss on to lower-income individuals just as the federal deficits in the United States are passing losses down to the lower classes.
When prices rise, the retired and those on limited incomes will be the victims. I feel sorry for them. But, by the same token, those of us who have some assets can take advantage of this by positioning ourselves outside of the paper-money bubble by investing in natural resource commodities like gold and silver. The real assets are the things we use everyday—copper, steel, zinc, lead and aluminum. These natural resources are the opposite end of money—they are what the price level is priced against. The opportunities are going to be enormous in the next five years. That’s why every time we see a dip in any of these areas, we’re going in and buying. If they fall more, we buy more. So, we’re positioning ourselves.
TGR: When you point out copper, steel, zinc and lead, those are commodities that are used in an expanding economy. Are you so bullish on them because you’re expecting that, worldwide, we’re going to have an expanding economy over the next several years?
JP: Well, I’m very hesitant to ever try to judge the short-term direction of anything. I’m looking at the longer term. I don’t think we’re going to see a lot of expansion in one year, but that doesn’t mean we’re not going to be using these commodities. Clearly, when the world or one country goes into a recession there’s a lot less copper, zinc, lead, aluminum and so on used. But, those are only temporary setbacks.
The fact is that I have a very, very long-term positive view on the progress of man. There’s a wonderful book out now called The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves (Matt Ridley, Harper, 2010). It really helps you realize how, decade after decade, century after century, people are getting richer and richer. They’re demanding more and more in the way of standard of living. With India and China—and not too long ago, the Soviet Union—opening up to free market and free enterprise and breaking down some of the governmental barriers to individual initiatives, we’re going to see rising demand for goods and services. Look at the automobiles, refrigerators, air conditioners and cell phones that we have. This has happened very rapidly over the last decade and it’s going to continue. So, whether we have a brief setback here with this recessionary period of maybe two, three, five years doesn’t really break the long-term trend. It’s just one of those dips that provides buying opportunities.
TGR: How are you taking advantage of this situation?
JP: This is one of the reasons that we happen to be in the prospect-generation area. We’re at the very beginning. Most of our companies are not producing companies. Most of the things we look for are very tiny, what are known as “prospect generators.” They’re at the hot end of the whole business. History proves that discovery, and then selling off to property developers is the more aggressive, explosive, profit-making area. This is where the real money’s been made in the last decade and where we’ve made our money. You have to take a long view, however.
Between the time someone discovers a copper, gold or zinc deposit and the time it’s actually put into production is three, four, five, six years or longer. So, we’re not looking for instantaneous turnaround despite the fact that we’ve had some of those. The gap between picking up a few streambed samples, trenching and finally punching a hole and turning it into a mine is very involved. So, I don’t really look at the short term. I’m very optimistic about the 5- to 10-year run going forward.
TGR: It sounds like your position really hasn’t changed over the last year. So, despite the fact that most of these prices have risen substantially, you still believe that they present excellent prospects for investors out there?
JP: Yes, and they’re coming all the time. You just have to find the young companies, the new companies with bright young geologists behind them to go out and look. Because commodity prices have gone up, it has created a tremendous interest in this area. That’s one of the reasons that some of our juniors and some of our majors have improved so quickly. Rick Rule, who just returned from the Prospectors and Developers Conference (PDAC) in Toronto, said attendance at that event has exploded from 1,500 to 33,000 attendees in the 10 years he has been attending. That just tells you that people are flooding into a sector that’s doing well.
TGR: Isn’t that a dangerous sign?
JP: In 1928, every bellhop and elevator operator was touting stocks to anyone who would listen. Clearly, it was a bubble market. Whether this is a bubble market right now for these commodities depends upon the value of money. If I’m correct and the trillions and trillions of dollars, yen, deutsche marks and euros pouring into the banking systems continues, everything is going to go up in price.
One of the things that has to go up in price is the raw commodities that will be needed to continue civilization as we know it. So, I don’t think we have to look at this last period as a bubble that must be corrected. Sure it could correct somewhat, but I think the offsetting event here is the printing of this paper money. At some point, this has got to start coming back into the market. When prices start going up, that means the prices of commodities have to go up proportionately.
TGR: So, when you last interviewed with The Gold Report in April 2010, you told us about some of the resource-based stocks you were invested in at that point. You had some nice gains in those. I was wondering if you could give us an update on what’s happened with them.
JP: We’ve had some excellent experiences with many of our prospect generators. Esperanza Resources (TSX.V:EPZ) was one that we bought and really liked. The company was a prospect generator and it had a property in Peru that looked very, very exciting called the San Luis Project. Esperanza sold that off to Silver Standard Resources Inc. (TSX:SSO; NASDAQ:SSRI). It hasn’t participated greatly in the current rally, but the company will be coming out with a feasibility study. I think it’ll probably come out this fall and at that point, it’ll get taken over.
People haven’t noticed that Esperanza has almost a 40% position, which gives it control of another company, called Global Minerals, Ltd. (TSX.V:CTG; Fkft:DPF), and CTG’s got a very, very attractive silver project. It’s called Strieborna. It’s a silver/copper deposit in Slovakia that’s gotten some attention. It includes 14.3 million ounces (14.3 Moz.) of silver and 48 million pounds (48 Mlb.) of copper in the measured and indicated (M&I) categories and another 8–9 Moz. silver and 28 or 30 Mlb. copper. So, its stake is going to become very valuable. Already, I think the company is up about fivefold over what it paid when it originally made the investment. It also has the Cerro Jumil property in Mexico, which is a bulk tonnage gold deposit. It appears to contain almost 1 Moz. gold equivalent (Au Eq.) in the M&I category. In terms of its inferred resources, it has another 250,000 oz (Koz.). We bought Esperanza at $1.75. We sold when it more than doubled at $4.10, and then we bought it back again at $1. We sold half of that when it doubled, and now it’s $1.86.
So, I think that Esperanza is a good buy at this point. We’re holding it. I don’t have it in as a re-buy for our portfolio, but I think it’s an excellent company. It reminds me of another prospect generator that’s done very well for us. We went into a little company called Canplats that we bought back about four years ago at $0.22. It was a typical prospect generator with a project in Mexico, and its market cap was about $7 million at the time. Well, the company hit and we sold part along the way; but we sold our final piece when it was bought out at $4.60. So, it was a twentybagger along the way.
TGR: Any other companies you’re looking at that you really like?
JP: We’ve got a couple more prospect generators in there that I’m very hot on. Riverside Resources Inc. (TSX:RRI) is one and Miranda Gold Corp. (TSX.V:MAD) is another. They’re getting some press up there because specialists like Rick Rule, Paul van Eeden and Fred Cook are talking about these companies. I think they’re great. They give you the kind of high leverage and high return that you like. But the risk is relatively low because the property is good and the geologists behind them are top notch. These guys really know what they’re doing.
TGR: One of the companies you talked about last time was Altius Minerals Corporation (TSX.V:ALS). Are you still holding it and what does the company look like to you at this time?
JP: Altius Minerals is just a fantastic company. It hasn’t made any mistakes and has about $200 million in the kitty right now. Now, a lot of companies get cash in the kitty by selling shares. Altius hasn’t gotten the cash by diluting the stock. President and CEO Brian Dalton has gotten that cash by making some really wise deals selling uranium and copper properties that the company has discovered. This is a fantastic company and the best is yet to come. So, I’m a strong advocate of Altius Minerals. I think that anybody who gets in there and hangs with ALT is going to be a very happy investor.
TGR: So, if an investor doesn’t have a position in Altius, is this a good time to buy? Or should we wait for a pullback?
JP: I think it’s probably a good buy at this point. It’s been bobbing around the $10–$13 area. It could easily be a $20 or $30 stock. The Stealth Investor originally bought it back in April 2006 at $6 and it rose quickly. We sold about one-third of it and bought it again when it dropped to $7. Then we bought a tranche at $5. So, all of our tranches have done extremely well. I’m not a buyer at this point because we’re looking for little $10- to $50-million market cap companies, but I’m certainly going to hold on to it.
TGR: Earlier, you gave the examples of copper, steel, zinc and lead. Do you have any of these everyday commodity-oriented juniors in your portfolio that are really intriguing to you at this point?
JP: We’ve got a couple of others, Mansfield Minerals Inc. (TSX.V:MDR) is one. But I hate to give it away before I actually add the company. My subscribers come first.
TGR: That’s understandable. How about some final thoughts on strategic changes readers might consider in their investment philosophies?
JP: Watch what the banking system and the government are doing. I published an article a couple of months ago called Rethinking Gold, a long-term historical look at money and commodities. A better understanding of the big picture should influence what you do in the short term heavily.
TGR: Thanks again for taking the time to share your insights on the investment implications of current world economic events and how this impacts our readers’ relative to gold and metals investments.
John Pugsley entered the investment business in the late 1960s and started sharing some of what he’d learned through his first book, Common Sense Economics. The book sold more than 150,000 hardcover copies. The second book he penned—The Alpha Strategy: The Ultimate Plan of Financial Self-Defense for the Small Investor—spent nine weeks on the New York Times’ bestseller list and is considered a standard reference for stocking up on food and household goods as a hedge against inflation. He started Common Sense Viewpoint, an investment-economic newsletter covering political, economic and investment topics, in 1975 and published it for 10 years. At its peak, it had more than 30,000 subscribers. He then wrote and published John Pugsley’s Journal, for another decade. A popular speaker and talk show guest, as well as a prolific author and successful investor, he is currently pouring his experience and energy into Stealth Investor, a weekly stock advisory that alerts subscribers to potential investments beneath the radar of the big funds and brokerage houses. (Please note that new subscriptions to Stealth Investor have been temporarily suspended.)
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By Claus Vistesen, on March 21st, 2011
The past week has showed the dark side of media coverage and analysis of current events and a test on just how much information you stuff down the public’s throat. In the narrowness of my own world the financial industry has a tendency to produce an extra amount of hyperbole in situations of geo-political tensions and/or natural disasters with unknown consequences. In some sense this is a reflection of one of the oldest theories of finance and economics in the form of the efficient market hypothesis and how it tends to break down in the context of extreme uncertainty. Still, I swear that if I open one more report whose authors are turning self-made nuclear scientists overnight I will bin it!
Yet, the long term consequences of the ongoing upheaval in North Africa and the Middle East as well as how Japan manages to rebound from the worst crisis for the country since the Second World War are important for investors. In the following and with a promise of no mention whatsoever of nuclear fuel, rods, or Chernobyl I will evaluate some of the potential effects on Japan’s economy (and indeed, Edward has beat me to it over at JEW, so do have a look there too).
Saving for a Crisis?
In some sense it is too early start putting a numerical figure for the costs of reconstructing in Japan, but it also almost certain that the economy retains the capability to rebuild itself and thus to stage a strong “technical” growth rebound.
Yet, the crisis may also lead to a number of structural changes.
As a first point I would note that the earthquake is likely to speed up the path towards the inflection point at which the BOJ starts monetizing the marginal flow of Japanese government bonds (JGBs) or Japan starts to borrow externally. In principle, I would hold these two scenarios to be one or the other, but in reality we could see a combination.
Two points are important.
1) Japan owes much of its growth rate and indeed its ”survival” to a very strong net international investment position. This is crucial to understand. Japan owns much more assets abroad than foreigners own in Japan and this adds a positive income flow which adds to gross national income (GNI).
2) A strong net investment position essentially translates into positive external savings and leads to a positive income balance which, alongside the trade surplus (or deficit), makes up the current account . This means that when we speak about Japan as export dependent it is a misnomer. Japan is much more dependent on positive net foreign asset income (the income balance) than the exports of excess widgets. If the CA/GDP is about 3% in Japan 2% is the income balance and 1% is the trade surplus (as a rule of thumb). Obviously, on the margin export flows matter a lot but added together over time the ”national wealth effect” from the income balance is higher.
In relation to the reconstructuring efforts, the standard story goes that Japan would have to repatriate these foreign assets effectively selling foreign assets and getting USD, EUR, AUD etc and converting them back into JPY. This would then lead to JPY appreciation which would further crimp the Japanese economy.
Now evidently, this week’s snappy moves in the JPY has nothing to do with this as this is likely to be a slow process but structurally this may become important and a real challenge for Japan. According the initial judgement of the situation by Fitch, the Japanese insurance industry (and indeed the global re-insurance) existing capital buffers should be plentiful.This suggests that this is a non-issue, but given the evolution of savings in Japan relative to the demand for JGB financing there is alreadt a very large future claim on these foreign assets. More specifically, Fitch is arguing in the context of potentially downgrading Japanese insurers on the capital loss of paying for the rebuilding efforts and thus the analysis can not be directly related to Japan’s foreign assets.
Megan McArdle is less sanguine;
(…) while the global reinsurance industry will bear some substantial losses, in many cases, the losses will be borne by the government–or by people and companies whose insurance does not cover the damage that was done. The nuclear industry was required to buy insurance through a special industry insurer with liability limits that now seem laughably small–about $2 billion. And many of the damages simply aren’t insured at all.
In a cynical way, this squares off well with Fitch’ concrete assessment of the insurance industry in that they are likely to dodge the main costs. On the other hand, as Megan also points out, this is certain to put an even stronger strain on Japan’s already overstrained government finances.
Indeed, even if the reconstructing would not drain anywhere close to all of Japan’s foreign assets it would constitute a de-facto claim on these assets either directly or because it would lead to a higher flow of JGBs in the primary market in need for buyers.
There is an alternative of course. As I have argued before, it would be infinitely more attractive for Japan that the BOJ printed money to fund the reconstructing so that the export machine did not falter, but this again would bring the point closer at which the BOJ would effectively be the only bid for the marginal flow of JGBs. You might call this the obviously irresponsive reply, but remember that Japan is still stuck in deflation and thus the cost of such policies is effectively zero at this point.
The big macro picture here is then that Japan may now be forced to run down its only source of savings and essentially its main source of economic growth.
The metaphor here is very simple. Let us say I am unemployed and only earn very little income from the bits and bobs of small jobs I can find (i.e I have a low ”trend growth in income” as Japan does). However, my uncle left me a pool of money and these are all parked in tasty dividend stocks which gives me some income each year so that I can live well.
Now, my house burns down and I have no insurance. What do I do?
Well, I do the only thing I can. I would need to sell those stocks in order to build a new house with the proceeds, but then once my house is rebuilt, my portfolio of dividend stocks will be much smaller and I will earn less dividend income (and I will still unemployed!). This, in a nutshell is the issue for Japan. When I have no more dividend stocks, I go to the bank and they either charge me an interest rate I can’t pay or tell me to bugger off altogether.
And I would re-emphasize that Japan is in a really tight spot since domestic growth and savings are in a structural downtrend and deflation is now a reality in Japan. So it will become very difficult to rebuilt those external savings.
Now for the good news. On even the worst estimates, it is very unlikely that the rebuilding efforts will eat away all Japan’s external savings and let us remember that Japan won’t sink into the Pacific. But with the power grid in need of major structural overhaul, the ensuing and looming disaster with the nuclear reactors at Fukushima, the general knock to economic growth, the already already public debt overhang etc one would be complacent if one did not think a little about straws and camel backs. Indeed, this is also the conclusion made by Edward;
Serious as the short term impacts may well be, in the longer run the shadow which will be cast by what is currently happening in Japan could well be very long indeed, in a way which few today can even contemplate (although see this for a good first pass). The justification for this assertion is not only our increased awareness of our collective vulnerability to the impact of natural disasters, there is also Japan’s pioneer status in one very new and very global phenomenon – population ageing – to think about. As we will see below, the optimistic (I would say denial) prognosis is that Japan will soon valiantly overcome this latest bout of adversity in a similar way to which they overcame the post WWII devastation. The Japanese will surely be valiant in their efforts (one only has to think of the spirit of sacrifice of those poor workers who have been asked to handle directly the reactor problem), but their ability to overcome adversity will not be comparable to that registered in an earlier epoch when they had the wind behind them rather than gusting straight into their faces.
Shock and Awe by the BOJ?
Even before the earthquake roiled Japan, comments were beginning to emerge that the BOJ was going to be forced into a shock and awe jolt of QE that would trump even that of the Fed. The reasons here though would be the same as they would be now. Essentially, the BOJ is fighting a war on three fronts.
- General freeze in money markets and general cash/liquidity levels in the economy
- Backstopping the JGB market which could take a severe knock here. I think Ben is very right to point to the risk that the CDS on Japan is very sticky, once it goes up it does not go down. I mean, why should it really?
- The JPY.
On the first, I think time is working for the BOJ and after last week’s extreme bout of uncertainty due to the unravelling of the nuclear reactors, pressures should already be easing. I would then hold this to be ”managable”.
On the second, it could get very serious, very quickly and I would be looking closely at the BOJ balance sheet. In this week’s G&F Chris Wood points towards how the earthquake has given the BOJ room for movement;
From a valuation perspective, the Topix is now trading below book value again at 0.96x price-to-book . Global investors should use this opportunity to overweight Japan if they have not already done so. GREED & fear’s bull case rests on two foundations, as discussed here recently (see GREED & fear – An ode to the BoJ, 3 March 2011). The first point is the extent to which Japanese corporates have proven they can live with a stronger yen. This is why it is not necessary any more to believe in a weakening yen to assume an outperforming Japanese market. Second, there are clear indications that Japan has commenced a new property upturn which increases the collateral value of the banking system. On this point the earthquake has “helped” in the sense that it has prompted the Bank of Japan to increase its assets purchase programme of private sector assets, and not just JGBs. Thus, the BoJ doubled its asset purchase programme to Y10tn on Monday, with the maximum amount of purchases in index-linked ETFs and J-REITs both doubled to Y900bn and Y100bn respectively.
Two effects need to be noticed here. One is the effect from the BOJ expanding its balance sheet on equity markets and secondly, there is the need to support the structural deficit spending. On the latter, it is noteworthy that CDS on Japanese long term government debt has been creeping up especially as it may prove quite sticky. This means that the BOJ may need to massage the curve on the long end it stands to reason that mounting concern over long term debt sutainability in Japan could lead to a strong steepening of the curve. This is to say that the long term default risk of Japan could rise very quickly since in the end, they will default at some point so in theory it could simply go parabolic. I am not saying that this will happen, but think about the Eurozone. The ECB is effectively the only buyer of peripheral bonds … it could be the same for Japan and long dated bonds.
Naturally, they could move the financing down the yield curve which could mask some of the default risk as duration changes, but in the end it would be the same. But here I am shooting blanks since I don’t know the maturity schedule of Japan’s government debt portfolio.
Structurally, the BOJ faces two main challenges with the JGBs. One is to soak up the annual excess issuance of JGBs relative to domestic demand and secondly there is the flow in the secondary market as pension funds run down their balance sheets to fund pension payouts.
On the third, nilly willy intervention in the spot market will work for about five minutes and then it will get bid down again. In this context, it was interesting to see that the violent move in the JPY prompted the G7 to intervene. Whether they have the clout to lean against the market here is debatable, but ironically they may soon have to back off if the BOJ starts monetizing debt as the rest of the world tightens.
Japan will Move On
In the end, we should all already be vindicated by the strong resilience shown by the Japanese people in the face of their current tragedy. I am certain that Japan will move on as a people and as a society. However, as a macroeconomy things are looking increasingly grim. We don’t yet know what will really come of the attempts the by G7 to keep a lid on JPY appreciation and failing that, we don’t really know what the world will look like with a BOJ engaged in QE far and beyond what the Fed is currently administering.
The point here is not to kick a country which is already down but simply to face up to the realities that the costs of this truly exogenous shock will weigh down on an already unsustainable economic system. So although Japan may now see the opportunity to push the reset button in a number of corners of society, there is no economic equivalent.
By Ajay Shah, on March 14th, 2011
If you are in India, and hear news about the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear reactors in Japan, you might want to trade on this. Either because you are hedging Japan exposure that’s embedded in your Indian equity holdings, or because you think you are an informed speculator who has a better and faster judgment about what these events mean for Japan.
Sadly, the Indian capital controls don’t let you trade on the Nikkei 225, which is the Nifty of Japan. But there is something you can do: Trade on the JPY/INR futures trading on NSE.
Quite a few people seem to have thought like this. Here’s a graph of the turnover:
Now let’s pause to think about the story playing out on this market. On one hand, it’s the purely domestic speculators or hedgers, who are buying and selling from each other. This is fine, but where are the linkages to the global financial system?
The most important arbitrage which should be at work is in the currency triplet INR/USD, USD/JPY and JPY/INR. But unfortunately, currency futures trading in India does not include the USD/JPY contract, so one crucial leg of the arbitrage is not readily available. With turnover like $100 million in a day, I’m sure some people are doing such arbitrage in some painful ways.


By Claus Vistesen, on March 11th, 2011
I recently asked the opnion of my readers regarding the question of whether the global economy is in for inflation, deflation, or stagflation. Given the obvious issue that it may be all three at different points in time it seems as if recent market action suggests that we should be looking at the d-word.
QE1 + QE2 +…+QEn = Deflation?
Even if macro soothsayer’s favorite comparison between Japan and the US is misleading because the former has decidedly more miserable demographics than the former, it is clear that US policy makers are steering into largely uncharted waters.
Consider then Atlanta Fed President Dennis Lockhart’s recent comments before the National Association of Business Economics that the Fed would contemplate cueing in QE3 in the event that the current oil price shock proved to be more severe. On the face of it this makes sense in so far as goes the idea that the main effect from sharply rising oil price is a relapse into recession and thus deflation. Indeed, the Fed can hardly be blamed for acting in the context of events which are essentially geo-political in nature.
Yet, it is much more complicated than that.
It then stands to reason that while the Fed should certainly be forward looking in conducting policy the primary effect of ongoing measures of quantitative easing is exactly to put pressures on headline inflation and commodities in general. As I noted recently at this space;
Given that we seem to be looking at a re-run of 2008 it must be factored in that the volatility and speed (and subsequent decline) of commodity prices are a problem in itself. The famous loss function which must then be metaphorically minimised is the one which plots the trade-off between the cost of recurrent flares of commodity prices and the need to act as a counter trend to the destructive forces of a balance sheet recession. Here, it becomes a rather serious issue if one of the main collateral effects of providing buckets of liquidity is to engender strong commodity melt-ups with a subsequent deflationary outcome.
And perhaps this is what is running through the mind of Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher who, in the same picece as linked above, is quoted of voicing oppositon towards QE3 and indeed that he would like QE2 to be phased out sooner rather than later.
Which way the tide will turn at the Fed is not a trivial question. There are plenty of signs that after the SP500 having tested the 1350 level, and failed, the market is running on the evaporating fumes of QE2. As one of my many market spies noted today:
(…) it is definitely possible that the market will discount the end of QE2 ahead of time this time around. This is what happened in Japan too – the market began to rally as soon as their QE2 was announced (since it had rallied smartly on QE1) , but halfway through the implementation the Nikkei began to fall, ultimately losing 45% from the interim peak and ending below the level of the day QE2 was announced. Mind, I’m not saying it will play out in the exact same manner, this is just to point out that there can be leads and lags between QE and its effect on the stock market – the QE1 experience is not necessarily a road map that needs to be repeated.
Again, we have that comparison with Japan which is then only to say that repetitions in the market rarely occur the way you expect them to, but there is definitely an unwinding narrative emerging. Team Macro Man gives their list of bearish omens today and I find it difficult disagreeing with them on the general idea that the reflation trade might be in for a stutter; at least until the next round of QE.
To their list I would add that another favorite punt of the reflationistas, gold, is finding it mightly difficult to reach new highs above the 1420s (today, Thursday, getting a right beating back to 1405ish). Now, we should always remember that the market can move three ways, where sideways is the third. Yet, the fundamentals of the gold trade kind of black or write so the ongoing difficulty reaching new highs will be rightly worrying the g-bugs.
More generally however the SP500 is only now coming down to the 50dma (at pixel time) and I would wait to see whether it forcefully breaches that level before putting on the tin foil hat.
(click image for better viewing)

As you can see dear reader, the chart is telling you to buy the dip, but chartism on such short time scales can make plenty of widows too, so be careful out there.
Looking into the rearview mirror at the ECB
I wasn’t really sure whether to cry or laugh last week when Trichet mounted himself in front of the microphones to deliver an almost sure signal of future rate increases by invoking the idea of strong vigilance. Indeed, the ECB let it be known that it was perfectly possible that their April meeting would be accompanied by a rate increase. Game set and match then!
As I have noted before at this space, stranger things have happened than the ECB raising rates just before a global slowdown. I even ventured to call it a leading indicator. Soc Gen’s always enjoyable Albert Edwards dryly noted recently (HT: FT Alphaville); “all we need now to push the world back into the recession is an ECB rate rise.”
This seems an apt take on the situation and my good friend Edward Hugh similarly notes that all this has an alltogether well expected outcome invoking the idea of the Chronicle of a Policy Error Foretold.
Now the problem with this latest policy initiative is not only that it represents something akin to the chronicle of an early death foretold for a much troubled and highly fragile Spanish economy, where around 90 percent of mortgages are variable rate ones.
It also draws attention to an area which it would be much better for the ECB not to draw attention to at this delicate moment in its history: the convenience of having a single-size monetary policy applied to such a diverse group of economies.
I heartily agree that it is due time that we, yet again, try to evaluate what it means to have a single interest policy in the eurozone. More specifically, there is the question of divergence of fortunes when it comes to deflation and inflation;
Inflation on the periphery has much more to do with rising commodity prices and the application of a misguided policy of consumption tax increases as a way of reducing fiscal deficits than ever it has to do with economic overheating.
I think it is pretty obvious that there will be no second round effects in the eurozone periphery and if the ECB is seriously suggesting this to be the case, I would dearly like to see the empirical evidence for such a claim (even a theoretical would do actually!).
Finally, we should never neglect to mention that all this might be a bluff and that the ECB like most other rational institutions can change direction based on the evidence before them. Yet, herein also lies the rub because the current vigilance comes on a backdrop which smells a lot like the last time the ECB raised only to see the deck of cards fold before their eyes. Perhaps they ought to look closer into the rear view mirror.
Random Shots indeed
The immediate conclusion here would seem to be that Trichet should get on a plane and relieve Bernanke of his post in Washington and leave the tower of Frankfurt to Benny. As FT Alphaville (see link above) quotes from Gavekal;
Since its inception, the ECB has typically been slow to cut rates (famously rising them in July 2008!) and slow to raise them. So is the fact that the ECB is now considering a tighter monetary policy before the Fed a sign that the ECB is making a mistake? Or a sign that the Fed is starting to really fall behind the curve?
I am not sure that it is either really. Core inflation in the US is still nudging down but I think that ongoing loose monetary policy will run the risk of replicating the UK more than Japan. Put differently, I think the US economy is in a position where inflation expectations might take hold which is not the case in the Eurozone periphery at large.
At the time of writing it seems an awful lot as it the deflation trade is back and thus that the market has already sucked QE2 dry and now awaits the third version. A spike in oil prices helps no-one too, but oil at current levels is not the problem, but a quick zoom to 150ish and we would have grave problems. This would then be ample catalyst for QE3 and even if this would not prevent the correction which seems evident now, it would setup another meltup in all things unprintable and risky.
We can only hope then that central banks, on either side of the pond, are taking more than random shots at our current problems.
By Ajay Shah, on December 29th, 2010
Since most of us in India can talk about little else other than corruption, do read this article by Nauro F. Campos and Ralitza Dimova on voxEU which is an interesting meta-analysis about papers which analyze the impact of corruption on growth. I have long heard about meta-analysis, but this one made me sit up and notice.
Anand Giridharadas in the New York Times on Arthur Bunder Road in Bombay.
Roger Bate and Tom Woods, in The American, point to a new dimension in India’s crisis of fake medicines.
II Sc will now use the IIT JEE as their entrance examination for the new Bachelor in Science course. Given that the IIT JEE is a well managed and difficult examination, it would make sense to have more and more schools plugging into it in order to filter their intake. But as you move away from the top .01% of the distribution, the statistical precision of the score on a very difficult exam as a measure of student capability tends to decline. The managers of the IIT JEE will need to shift towards adaptive testing, where the questions are dynamically modified based on student characteristics, in order to retain efficiency across the distribution. Once this is done, the IIT JEE would be useful for sifting through millions of students, and exert a beneficial effect of all of them facing a more demanding high-stakes examination.
Shobhana Subramanian in the Financial Express on C. B. Bhave.
A fascinating article by Nicolai Ourussoff in the New York Times about the attempt to reinvent Saudi Arabia.
Sadness about Europe by Orhan Pamuk in the New York Review of Books, and a tragic perspective on Istanbul by Claire Berlinski in City Journal.
A dystopian future for the world: a story of ageing and depopulation from Amakusa in Japan.
Liu Xiaobo’s beautiful acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize for Peace. A lot of countries of the world, including India, have much to do in order to achieve freedom.
Philippines?
Tourism in Afghanistan by Damon Tabor.
Steven Johnson in the Financial Times on the future of linking to information sources on the web.
With 75% of world GDP in service, trade liberalisation in agriculture or manufacturing is not that important. The really big story is trade liberalisation in services, and there the picture is quite bad. Read this article on voxEU by Bernard Hoekman and Aaditya Matoo on how to obtain progress.
Understanding the rise in currency turnover by Michael R. King and Dagfinn Rime on voxEU.
Anders Aslund, on Project Syndicate, on the remarkable story of the global crisis as it played out in East Europe. Also see this
story in The Economist on the same subject, which is a bit less optimistic. The recovery in East Europe matters for recovery in Europe and elsewhere. It also illuminates our thinking on some of the grand policy questions.
David Alexander points out how Australia is the role model for the world.
Barry Eichengreen, Daniel Gros and Ila Patnaik on the resolution of Europe’s problems.
Devin Friedman in GQ on the strange world of social networking.
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By Claus Vistesen, on December 15th, 2010
I did have some plans to do a series of post to give a brief overview of my main macro and trade themes for 2011, but time has, not surprisingly, caught up with me. As such, you will have to make due with a special version of random shots.
Risky Assets to fly in 2011? – This one is a bit too general to answer in full of course, but one interesting discourse that has emerged lately is that as bond vigilantes are feasting on the Eurozone (and even going for an altogether larger prey in the US), investors are being pushed into equities.
Following a well worn cliché in the world of finance, equities is the least ugly alternative.
Now, this may only be a working explanation on the surface since the underlying move into equities is also part of a more structural consequence of QE2 since the Fed is not only trying to move investors around on the yield curve, they are also trying to move them out of the curve altogether and into more risky alternatives. In this sense, what appears to be a melt up in equities might just be a slow but steady excess liquidity driven grind. Surely, Bernanke is in no rush to raise interest rates in 2011 and if the US economy continues to slowly heal, there will be only speed bumps ahead of a general trend upwards. One interesting thing here will be how the market reacts to event the slightest hawkish tone from the Fed or perhaps even a downtoning of the dovish stance. I think; not all too well but precisely because of this assumption (which I think many share with me), the Fed will remain uber dovish as far ahead as the eye can see.
Technically, I think the melt up towards the end year is in for a rude stop in the beginning of the year and I have the SP500 declining to about 1180-1190 in January. This would then provide a potentially tasty entry point for a 2011 rally. Other than a veritable cataclysm in the Eurozone (which appears the main source of systemic risk at the moment) and China suddenly slamming on the breaks in an unduly harsh manner, I see little resistance for risky assets in 2011. This is especially the case as the BOJ and the ECB will likely add their interpretation of “QE2″ to the table to respond to the ongoing sluggishness of their respective economies.
We have already gotten a barrage of 2011 predictions and outlooks from research houses, banks and other financial sages and quite frankly it is quite difficult to get a bearing on it all. I did find the Barclay Macro survey quite interesting though as it shows that about 70% of all investors see risky assets in the form of commodities and equities to outperform in 2011 while US treasuries will underperform. The underlying rationale is again quite simple I think. Given the severity of the crisis, monetary policy will tend to apply the brakes with a considerable lag and if 2010 saw the first signs of the effect of such a lag, 2011 could give us the full force. Again, this is especially important to note as the ECB and the BOJ might just be about to join the party.
On the other hand, “underperforming treasuries” will also present Bernanke with a dilemma in the sense that the extent to which the infamous bond vigilantes fancy more than a pot shot on US bonds he may be forced to apply even more pressure to keep yields low.
Low Growth in the OECD – This one is hardly news and hardly one exclusively for 2011 either. However, I still think there is a lack of recognition of just how low growth in the OECD is likely to come in for the coming years. In this way and just as investors have their focus set on outperformance in Asia and Latin America, I think that the ultimate growth outcome in the OECD will be worse than the market currently expects.
The point I am basically getting at is that we need to think about the fact that the Eurozone periphery essentially are going to be hampered by negative trend growth rates and that the rest of the OECD will be dependent on exports to grow (think mainly Germany, Japan and now also the US). Apart from any productivity miracle or some other exogenous source of growth, the growth engines in the OECD are simply tapped out. Indeed, this is probably the most important structural macro theme for me at the moment.
Now as for 2011, a lot of this will also depend on whether economies really intend to walk the walk in terms of fiscal tightening or whether they are simply talking. Clearly, countries under the spotlight in the form of the Eurozone periphery will see their growth rates severely dented by the need to consolidate public finances. In the US on the other hand, I think the latest estimate for the 2011 budget deficit is 10% of GDP which is hardly tight.
According to the IMF’s latest forecasts “Advanced Economies” will be running a deficit on the structural balance to the tune of 5% in 2011 and the G7 as a whole one of 5.88%.
But all this only goes to accentuate the issue since if there is one thing we have learned by now it is that one cannot borrow ad infinitum and especially not as you are essentially borrowing against a depreciating asset in the form of future growth held down by population ageing. So the big (as in biig!) question is; if you substract the 5% government spending induced deficit from the equation what kind of trend growth rate is left in the OECD as a whole?
Clearly, we know that some economies are now basically saddled with negative trend growth rates, but I think that even the aggregate number in advanced economies would be scary reading. We could call this decoupling in reverse and thus how vulnerable we now are to the continuing growth spurt of Asia and other so called emerging economies. But in the end, it is a basic question of not having any more components of the national identity to lever up as it is obviously clear that governments are only going to find it increasingly difficult to borrow (even in the case of very generous central banks).
Indeed, as we move forward I see this low growth environment for the OECD (and actual negative trend growth in some economies) as one of the main components in my call that we are going to see some spectacular and costly sovereign defaults in the OECD edifice going forward. On this, I think the current mess in the Eurozone is only the beginning.
The Euro and the Eurozone - Actually, I have not followed FX a lot lately so I am a bit of out form here, but I still use my Old Maid metaphor when thinking about big global currency movements and intra G3 movements especially. Interestingly, 2010 saw the JPY as a looser and thus holder of Old Maid in the sense that it appreciated significantly against the USD and Euro. In essence, the USD was being held down by the Fed’s policies and the Euro actually acted as a nice buffer against the crisis in the Eurozone as it fell strongly throughout the spurts of Eurozone tension in turn providing a much needed boost to external competitiveness when it was needed the most.
In principal, these trends do not stop at year end and will continue to dominate at least part of the intra G3 movements in 2011. The main question is what kind of bazooka, if any, the BOJ will pull out to revive the ailing Japanese economy. If it becomes the kind of shock and awe many are expecting we could be into a nasty long squeeze in the JPY. This also goes for the Euro in the context of the ECB being forced, kicking and screaming, into supporting Eurozone bond markets. I hold this to be almost given since the current setup simply does not work.
Today, Trichet called for more bold action on the fiscal front and in terms of capitalising the stability front (didn’t he just tell them to tighten their belts?). This is no doubt part of a futile attempt to preempt any defacto query, to the ECB, by part of the EU on taking an active and open role in the bailout. Trichet and his compadres are not going to like it, but the alternative asking Italy and Greece to pay for the bailout of Spain who in turn helped finance Greece and Ireland is simply hogwash.
As I have noted on several occasions; should the issue turn out to be contained with Greece, Ireland and Portugal the fiscal solution/stability fund would suffice, but evidently we are looking at a much more structurally problematic issue and Spain is surely next in line and even yields on German and Belgium bonds have begun to break loose. As such, it is becoming increasingly clear that the ECB will have to take a more active part beyond “simply” supplying liquidity to the banking system and buying bonds on the drip (or covertly).
I tend to have little opinion on the EUR/USD in general, but I will timidly forward the idea that we can expect the ECB to surprise with some of open support to the periphery, it should provide some pressure on the single currency. Yet, it is also fair to assume that the extent to which risky assets fly in a bath of excess liquidity the USD will depreciate and the Eurozone will gain on carry flows as interest rates are still higher in the Eurozone (especially, if things get so calm that the ECB starts turning hawkish again, but this may be selfdefeating in itself of course).
Emerging Markets – Well, the EM story is important enough to merit its own section even if it is intimately tied to the risky asset story. Yet, there is no need to re-invent the wheel and in this sense I think that Morgan Stanley’s Manoj Pradhan’s recent note on the 2011 EM outlook is pretty much accurate in all the important areas.
Especially his first point is important on structural outperformance by the EM relative to the developed world whereas 2011 should see EM growth cooling and, hopefully, growth in the developed world nudging up. As such, 2011 will see relative outperformance by developed markets. This is a bold, but also astute, call. It is bold because I think the link between the EM and DM is still too strong to see DM growth decouple entirely for a relative slowdown in emerging markets. In this sense, how far and how fast monetary policy in emerging markets are tightened in response to fears of overheating will be key. It is astute because, all things point in the direction of a slowdown in the emerging world after a breakneck 2009 and 2010 and in this sense, on the margin, perhaps the developed world is the place to be in 2011 on a tactical basis.
I also like that he spends some time on the inevitable, but important, process of rebalancing away from a reliance of an overlevered Anglo-Saxon consumer in the OECD (and of course, a now cracked Eurozone periphery). Reverse decoupling and rebalancing towards the emerging markets are two of the main global discourses and real economic drivers at the moment.
Finally, I think it is also important to re-emphazise the basic problems emerging markets face as they try to cool their economies through higher interest rates only to allow more hot money flowing in. The policy mixture is obviously being developed as we move along with some form of capital controls being implemented across the board. In a world of structural excess liquidity this policy dilemma becomes an additional issue on top of the more traditionally discussed trilemma.
As such, I am large cautious on the emerging markets going into 2011 as I think they are overloved, but the long term bull call stands uncontested. In addition, there appears to be general acceptance and expectation that key emerging economies (China most notably) will react strongly to any lingering signs of overheating and just as Bernanke might not care that his low interest rates will fuel asset bubbles far from the shores of the US, so may Chinese policy makers care very little if they have to slam on the brakes to the detriment of global growth and OECD’s recovery.
By Rok Spruk, on November 1st, 2010
The central aim of my bachelor’s thesis is to demonstrate the unsustainability of public pension system in OECD countries in the longer run through the lens of a rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis.
The origins of contemporary public pension schemes date back to 19th century when Bismarck Germany in 1881 first adopted a universal old-age public pension system based on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) funding principle. The principle itself captures full advantages of high (stationary) population growth rate. In the simplest form, PAYG pension scheme is based on the notion of generational solidarity upon which current generations pay mandatory social security contribution into the public scheme. Aggregate contributions are then paid out to current retirees. The cycle is then expanded through generations. However, PAYG funding scheme is sustainable as long as the population growth is high and above the marginal productivity of the capital. Back in 19th century, public pension schemes were adopted under unrealistic assumptions about future population prospects. In 19th century, advanced countries experienced high population growth rate, high fertility rate and an extremely low share of dependent old population that was receiving universal old-age support from PAYG pension schemes. These set of assumptions was crucial to the stability of government-provided old-age support embodied in the public pension schemes.
The sustainability of PAYG pension system requires the equivalence of population growth rate and real interest rate. In the early 20th century, the advanced world shifted towards aging population, declining fertility rates and lower labor market entry rate. In broad terms, a growing old-age dependency ratio led to the pure disequilbrium effects. In a theoretical framework, I re-examined the neoclassical framework of lifecycle hypotheses embodied in Samuelson and Cass-Yaari models of life-cycle utility maximization. The lifecycle hypothesis is based upon the assumption of the three-period model where individuals maximize the consumption in the course of a lifetime. In the first period, individuals do not discount the future consumption since, in this period, individuals acquire the human capital. In the second period individuals enter the working age and discount the future consumption. Hence, in the third period, individuals retire consume the output produced in the working-age period. Since future discounting is compounded, the lifetime consumption increases geometrically. In purely analytical terms, the individuals maximize the utility of consumption through time preference rate.
Considering the abovementioned equivalence between population growth rate and real interest rate, the stability of the equilibria requires the period discount rate to equal the population growth rate. If population growth rate decreases, the stability of the equilibria requires that individuals decrease the future discount rate by the same rate to keep the PAYG pension system within the theoretical limit. The rigorous theoretical formulation of the neoclassical model of lifetime consumption, which essentially captures the necessary conditions for equilibrium stability of public pension schemes, had been put forth by Paul A. Samuelson in his seminal contribution to the theoretical foundations of stationary “PAYG” public pension scheme .
In the course of the last decades, OECD countries have experienced a significant drop in fertility rates, population growth and, under the political climate of social democracy, a widespread adoption of early retirement schemes and generous social security benefits. In addition, labor market exit age dropped significantly, initiating a trend towards the unprecendent growth of generational indebtedness.
The OECD estimated that between 2000 and 2050, old-age dependency ratio is forecast to increase to the largest extent in Japan (193 percent), Spain (136 percent), Portugal and Greece (135 percent). The astonishing increase in the estimated old-age dependency ratio directly reflects the declining fertility rate in OECD countries from 1960s onwards. I estimated the ratio of fertility rate between 1960-1970 and 2000-2006 for OECD countries at around 2, which means that average fertility rate between 1960-1970 was twice the fertility rate between 2000-2006. The highest fertility ratios were found in Spain (2.23), Italy (1.96), Ireland (2.00) while the lowest ratios were found in Denmark (1.37), Netherlands (1.72) and the United States (1.46).
High and stable effective retirement age is the main assumption underlying the stationary stability of PAYG pension system. In the 20th and 21st century, OECD countries have experienced an unprecendent decline in effective retirement age. Blöndal and Scarpetta (2002) estimated the decline in labor market exit age for OECD countries between 1960 and 1995. The female labor market exit age had declined significantly in Ireland (10.7 years), Spain (9.1 years) and Norway (8.8 years). Male labor market exit age exerted persistent decline in all developed OECD countries except for Iceland. The exit age declined significantly in the Netherlands (7.3 years) and Spain (6.5 years).
In a large part, declining labor market exit age has confluenced the rapid growth of unemployment and disability benefits and early retirement incentives from the second half of the 20th century onwards. As the OECD correctly contemplated, in a number of countries, disability pensions and unemployment benefits can be used as de facto early retirement schemes. In a large part, widespread growth of early retirement schemes and implicit incentives for moral hazard in retiring too early via unemployment and disability schemes is held responsible by generous welfare states in the aftermath of the World War II.
When I examined various features affecting early retirement choices, I came across an interesting finding. I regressed labor market exit age and marginal tax rate in a cross section of 23 OECD countries in 2007. I estimated the relationship between exit age and marginal tax rate using a classical OLS linear regression model. The estimate suggests that, holding all other factors constant, if marginal tax rate increases by 1 percentage point, average labor market exit age decreases by 1.88 months. Surprisingly, 51.74 percent of sample variation is explained by marginal tax rate alone. The sample constant is statistically significant, suggesting that if the hypothetical marginal tax rate were zero, the average labor market exit age in randomly chosen country from OECD sample would be 69.65 years. The sample constant is consistent with a prior theoretical expectations since it concurs with the “substitution effect” hypothesis that higher marginal tax rate leads to lower labor supply and fewer working hours.
The cost of early retirement in OECD countries
Source: T.T. Herbertsson & J.M. Orszag, The Cost of Early Retirement in OECD, 2001. OECD, Pensions at Glance, 2009.
Fiscal imbalances arising from unsustainable PAYG public pension systems in OECD countries cannot be assessed without a sufficient estimate of economic costs of unfunded pension liabilities. I approximated the cost of early retirement using Auerbach-Kotlikoff-Gokhale (1999) methodology that directly estimates the size of generational imbalances created by public social security systems. Large and rapidly unsustainable net pension liabilities occured in late 1980s. Van den Noord and Herd (1993) estimated the size of net pension liabilities in seven major OECD countries. The results suggest that continental European countries have had the largest net pension liabilities in terms of GDP. The size of pension liabilities in France and Italy had been about 2.5 times the size of their respective GDPs and twice the stock of the public debt.
Gokhale (2008) directly estimated fiscal imbalances arising from unfunded pension liabilities to current and prospective generations. The size of generational fiscal imbalance, as a share of the GDP, is extremely large and rapidly unsustainable in all OECD countries. In fact, the size of the imbalance is the most severe in Greece (875 percent of the GDP), France, Finland and the Netherlands (500 percent of the GDP) while it is more than twice the size of the GDP in all OECD countries except for the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
Fiscal imbalance in OECD countries
Source: J. Gokhale, Measuring Unfunded Obligations of European Countries, 2009.
I built the econometric model of public pension expenditure for a cross section of 23 OECD countries in 2007 to assess which variables might explained the cross-country variation in public pension expenditures. I’ve been aware of the possible drawbacks of choosing a cross-section model since it might be vulnerable to specification errors and the unbiasedness of regression coefficients. To account for possible specification bias, I conducted Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Shapiro-Wilk and Jarque-Bera normality tests. By performing normality tests, I have examined whether the normality assumption of normally distributed error terms is valid in the studied sample of 23 OECD countries considering error terms as identically and independently distributed.
In the set of explanatory variables that might yield consistent and robust estimates of regression coefficients I chose 10 various demographic, economic and institutional independent variables. Apart from demographic and economic variables, institutional variables are dichotomous since the institutional features can be captured by binary modes of choice. The dependent variable is the size of public pension expenditures in the share of the GDP.
The results suggest that public pension expenditures are positively correlated with the share of population aged 65 and older (0.746**), difference in life expectancy after age 65 between 1960 and 2005 (0.477*) and dichotomous variable for continental European countries (0.697**) where * and ** indicate the statistical significant of the sample correlation coefficient at the 5% and 1% level. The estimates suggests that the probability of higher pension expenditures in the share of the GDP is likely to occur in a continental European country known for a relatively large share of older population and a high difference in life expectancy after age 65 between 1960 and the present. On the other hand, public pension expenditures are negatively correlated with average effective retirement age (-0.475**), private pension funds as a share of GDP (-0.658**), labor market exit age (-0.523**), dichotmous variable for Anglo-Saxon countries (-0.544**) and a dichotomous variable for private pension system (-0.672**), where ** denotes the statistical significant of the sample correlation coefficient at the 1% level. Again, the estimates suggest that the probability of lower pension expenditure is likely to occur if a randomly chosen country from the OECD sample is Anglo-Saxon and has a high effective retirement age, large private pension funds as a share of the GDP, high labor market exit age and a mandatory private pension system. The coefficients suggest that in repeated sampling, the estimated sample correlation coefficient will include the true or correct population value in 99 percent of cases.
I conducted the econometric model which consisted of 8 regression specifications. I chose double-logarithmic model which yields direct elasticities as regression coefficients. However, I added two exceptions. In regression specifications 5 and 6, I chose a mixed specification mostly due to the inclusion of private pension funds (assets) variable in the regression specification. Unfortunately, but the share of private pension funds in Greece in 2007 equals 0 percent of the GDP which does not enable the researcher to apply double-logarithmic model as the basis of regression specification.
The estimates suggest that the share of population aged 65 and older is statistically singificantly positively related to the share of public pension expenditures in the GDP. Hence, the elasticity of public pension expenditures with respect to effective retirement age ranges from -1.465 to -4.935, suggesting that an increase in effective retirement age by an additional year leads to per unit increase in public pension expenditures by more than a unit increase in the share of the GDP. The coefficient of private pension funds is highly statistically significant. The elasticity of public pension expenditures with respect to private pension funds (as a share of the GDP) ranges from -0.34 to -0.38 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The elasticity suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of private pension funds reduces the share of public pension expenditures in the GDP, on impact, by 3.4-3.8 percent, holding all other factors constant. In addition, the estimates of coefficients for dichotomous variables suggest the following: the probability of higher public pension expenditures (as a share of GDP) is likely to occur in continental European countries with mandatory private pension system. Five estimates of dichotomous coefficients are statistically significant at the less than 10% level.
The significance of dichotomous (dummy) coefficients has been tested by beta coefficient analysis to rank the magnitudes of separate effects of explanatory variables on public pension expenditures as dependent variable. The results suggest that continental European countries are significantly more likely to face higher public pension spending in the share of GDP compared to Anglo-Saxon countries.
Earlier I mentioned the necessity of normality assumption in yielding robust, consistent and unbiased estimates of regression coefficients. The assumption has been questioned by conducting Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S), Jarque-Bera test (J-B) and Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) normality test. The aim of the testing the normality assumption is to observe whether error terms distribute normally so that estimated test statistics, standard errors and confidence intervals are reliable. In setting test statistic, I set the normality assumption as null hypothesis. The results from K-S, J-B and S-W tests show that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 5% level, suggesting that the normality assumption is valid in the studied sample. Hence, test statistics, standard errors and confidence intervals are both valid and reliable.
The meaningful question to evaluate the prospects of the coming public pension crisis is how to reverse the growth of fiscal imbalances and reform public pension system as to avoid erratic generational indebtedness. Aging population and the growth of old-age dependency ratio trigger an enormous future burden on public finances in OECD countries. Lower fertility rate and population growth shall place an incurable burden on the stability of PAYG public pension systems. The estimates suggest that life-expectancy after the age of 65 is likely to increase by 2050 and gradually approach the age of 90 for both male and female. Assuming the effective retirement age is 65, the remaining life expectancy is 25 years or almost one-third of the average lifetime. As Alemayehu and Warner (2004) suggest: “Old-age health care costs thus will impose increasingly severe pressure on private finances and government coffers. Indeed, applying our age-specific estimates to the age distribution anticipated for the year 2030, we find that if nothing is done to alter current patterns of health care, per capita health care expenditures will rise by one-fifth due to population aging alone.”
The long-term pension reform that aging societies of the West should undertake is a complementary measures of three key policy features of the reform.
First, the transition to fully-funded retirement savings accounts is the only viable and sound pension reform that can alleviate the damage generated by the growing fiscal imbalances. The theoretical foundation of the transition from public pension systems to fully-funded pension system has been laid down by Feldstein and Liebman (2001). The authors derived an algebraic solution which suggests that keeping a PAYG public pension system does not attenuate the persistence of a growing demographic pressure on the stability of public pension system. As I discussed earlier, PAYG system crucially depends on three key assumptions: high fertility rate, very low share of population older 65+ and high population growth. These assumptions are incompatible with actual demographic parameters and, hence, OECD countries should undertake a drastic transition towards fully-funded pension systems based on individual savings accounts. Otherwise, the growing demographic pressure will inevitably result in the exponential growth of generational debt, creating an enormous deadweight loss for current and prospective generations.
Fully-funded pension system is based on the premise of investing pension contributions into the capital market, earning a compound interest over time. The stock of individual’s lifetime earnings is paid in the form of annuities upon individual’s withdrawal from the labor market. In addition, there is a growing disparity between the implicit return of PAYG public pension system and real rate of return in the capital market. Under realistic assumptions, such as that the marginal product of capital (MPK) is below the welfare-maximizing level and the real rate of return exceeds the implicit return from PAYG system, fully-funded pension system would not create a deadweight consumption loss to the working-age population. In fact, Feldstein and Liebman (2001) derived an analytic solution for the transition to fully-funded pension system in which the transition induces a short-term consumption loss in the next period while, at the same time, it creates a geometrically-growing future consumption for both retired and working-age population.
The only remaining question is whether the real rate of return would compensate the consumption loss of working-age population and, hence, increase the stock of future consumption to all generations. According to Feldstein and Liebman (2001), assuming 6.5 percent inflation-adjusted rate of return, the payroll cost of fully-funded pension system would represent only 27 percent of the payroll cost incured under PAYG public pension system. Tax rate, required to bear the cost of current stock of pension liabilities is 12.4 percent respectively.
According to Congressional Budget Office, the average real rate of return for large-company stocks between 1926 and 2000 is 7.7 percent, 9.0 percent of small-company stocks and 2.2 percent for long-term Treasury bonds. Feldstein (1997) estimated that PAYG implicit rate of return is 2.6 percent.
Assume an individual wants to maximize the lifetime earnings in the capital market. An individual is offered 2.6 percent implicit return from PAYG system. The individual enters the labor market at certain age, say 25, and intends to retire upon the age of 65. Assume he invests $10.000 annually in the capital market to create retirement annuities upon labor market withdrawal. Assuming the implicit rate of return (2.6 percent), the stock of overall annuity would be 10 times the initial investment in 90 years. Assuming the average long-run real rate of return from large-company stocks (7.7 percent), the the overall annuity would be 10 times the initial stock of investment in 31 years. Therefore, the individual would reach the desired level of lifetime earnings at the age of 56 or 9 years before the targeted retirement age.
I assumed the distribution of lifetime investment portfolio is weighted average of availible asset types: large-company stocks (33 percent), small-company stocks (19 percent), long-term corporate bonds (20 percent), long-term Treasury bonds (20 percent) and 3-month Treasury bills (8 percent). According to the average annual real rates of return in the United States (1926-2000), I calculated the weighted average real rate of return (5.247 percent). Investing $10.000 annually at the age of 25 would buy $100.000 annuity at 5.247 real rate of return in 45 years (the age of 70) compared to 90 years (the age of 115) under the PAYG implicit rate of return (2.6 percent). Of course, the time to buy the annuity would shift alongside the changing composition of portfolio.
In addition, OECD countries should immediately increase the effective retirement age. I believe the solution suggested by Gary Becker is both meaningful but sustainable in reversing the growth of generational debt. Becker (2010) suggested “One simple and attractive rule would be to raise retirement age by an amount that makes the ratio of years spent in retirement to years spent working equal to the ratio that existed at the beginning of the social security system.”
When President Roosevelt signed the notorious Social Security Act in 1935, the normal retirement age was 65. However, life expectancy after the age of 65 was significantly lower than is today. In 1940, average life expectancy after 65 in the U.S was 13.7 years. In 2006, it stood at 18.6 years, according to OECD. In 1935, the average life expectancy at birth in the United States was 61.7 years. We assume that individuals in 1935 worked for 35 years and spent 12 years in retirement. The ratio is thus 0.4 (12/ 35=0.34). Today, if individuals retire at the age of 65, they can expect further 18.6 years in retirement. To equalize the ratio to the 1935 level, (18.6/x=0.34), individuals should spend 54.7 years working. The estimate time is an equivalent measure of years required to spend working if PAYG public pension system is left intact. Assuming the individuals enter the labor market at the age of 25, then the expected effective retirement age is the age of 80.
In the long run, PAYG public pension system is unsustainable since demographic parameters do not suffice the assumptions under which the PAYG system is possible without distortions of labor supply incentives. The future of OECD countries will be marked by aging population, lower fertility rates and a growing demographic pressure on public finances. Without bold and decisive pension reform, OECD countries will experience increasing pension deficits and, hence, an explosive growth of generational indebtedness.
Parametric pension reforms are not a substitute for the postponement of paradigmatic pension reform. Thus, implementing the transition to fully-funded pension system essentially requires higher effective retirement age. A comprehensive pension reform cannot be made possible without these measures. At last, but not least, the major challenge in the systematic pension reform in OECD countries to address the burden of global aging, is whether political courage will withstand the pressure of interest groups to maintain the status quo of early retirement incentives. Nonetheless, eliminating early retirement incentives is the essential step towards creating retirement system without perverse incentives to retire too early. Unless political leaders encourage a transition to fully-funded pension system, OECD countries will be unable to withstand the deadly consequences of an enormous generational indebtedness.
By Ajay Shah, on October 11th, 2010
C. J. Chivers has a story in the New York Times from Uzbekistan which links up to an idea that I have often thought would be a great step forward for India: the interior of every police station in the country should be blanketed with video cameras giving feeds out to the Net. As Robert Kaplan says, underdevelopment is where the police are more dangerous than the criminals. If we think surveillance cameras are important in public places, they are triply important to watch the interiors of police stations. On a related note, see this harrowing story about a journalist in Pakistan. Do we do similarly?
A fascinating fact about insurgencies: while a diverse array of weapons can be in fray, ammunition is quite well standardised. Writing about the guns used by the Taliban, C. J. Chivers points out on the New York Times blog, `for the 24 rifles and machine guns in the locker, produced in multiple nations over many decades, only three types of cartridges are required to feed them‘.
Shobhana Subramanian in the Financial Express on C. B. Bhave. And, Sandeep Singh has a story in the Hindustan Times about Mr. Bhave coming through fine on one attack on him.
Ashok Desai reviews a book in Business World. Also see.
Auditor and Audit Committee Independence in India by Jayati Sarkar and Subrata Sarkar.
Developments on MCX:
- John J. Lothian is a respected observer of the global securities business. He has written a piece about Financial Technologies Group titled You gotta earn it.
- Mobis Philipose in Mint.
- Deepshikha Sikarwar in the Economic Times.
- A story by Deepika D. Thapliyal on NDTV.
An editorial in Business World on the MoF Working Group on Foreign Investment.
Learn R in Bombay.
Gautam Bhardwaj in the Indian Express on using the NPS to solve the problems of EPFO.
Sunil Jain on the difficulties of the data reported by the Indian statistical system.
An editorial in the Business Standard about developments on private container train companies, which reminds me of the conflicts between DoT and private telecom companies in the early 1990s.
Mobis Philipose worries about the apparent turnover numbers that we’re seeing.
An editorial in the Mint on the latest attempt to keep FMC separate from mainstream financial regulation.
Jan Sjunnesson Rao in Education World on the damage that the Right to Education Act is causing.
The Economics of Foodgrain Management in India by Kaushik Basu, DEA Working Paper, September 2010.
A recent paper by Guido Heineck and Bernd Sussmuth finds that the blight of communism runs deep: Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we find that despite twenty years of reunification East Germans are still characterized by a persistent level of social distrust. In comparison to West Germans, they are also less inclined to see others as fair or helpful..
A great interview with Condoleezza Rice on Spiegel Online about the halcyon days of 1989.
The last practical connection with World War I just died away. The legacy of that war, of course, remains with us; everything that came after was attenuated.
David Sanger in the New York Times; Jaswant Singh and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom on Project Syndicate, on Engaging China. Also see these threats being made against Norway.
Mick Meenan in the New York Times about kabbadi going places.
A great story about the innovative logistics of the Italian army in Ethiopia in 1938.
Greg Mankiw on the high marginal tax rates which are hobbling labour supply in many countries.
China’s Charter 08 is a brilliant and well-crafted document, worthy of a Nobel Peace Prize.
Norman MacLean wrote a great article in Lapham’s Quarterly about his 1928 experiences with violinist, watercolorist, chess player, and physicist: Albert Michelson. They don’t make men like that these days.
Randall Stross in the New York Times on the making of Steve Jobs.
Brad DeLong on Who can replace Larry Summers?.
A great article by Michael Heilemann on binarybonsai: George Lucas Stole Chewbacca, But It’s Okay, which made me think about how copyright, patents and `intellectual property’ fit uneasily into the creative process. As he says: Chewbacca didn’t spring to life out of nowhere, fully formed when Lucas saw his dog in the passenger seat of his car. That’s the soundbite. A single step. The reality is complex and human. From vague names floating around, the kernel of an idea, changing purposes and roles of characters, major restructuring, the design hopping from person to person, scrapping the existing concept and going down a different path, seeing existing things in a different light and having to conform a range of ideas to complement and enrich one another.. Everything is a remix.
At the frontiers of computing is `cloud computing’, where users rent equipment, e.g. by the hour. Amazon’s tariff card for such rental is bad news for developers who built knowledge on Microsoft technologies.
John Taylor has a story about Japanese currency manipulation. Recent research shows that the role of the Yen in global currency arrangements has been waning, and this episode of currency trading by the BoJ will exacerbate this trend.

By Claus Vistesen, on October 8th, 2010
I have just been listening to Ben Davies’ podcast (see also FT Alphaville here) from Hinde Capital about the funding issues of the Japanese government and the points he makes are important. I have used the metaphor of Japan as a bumblebee before and while I believe that the story on Japanese savings may just be a little more complicated than many believe I think Ben points his finger at two very important points. One is how Japan has difficulty with both deflation and potential inflation (higher yields) at the same time which not only puts the economy in a very tight spot, but also locks in Japan towards a balance between veering to far in either direction, a balance which can be difficult to strike. The second is that while Ben believes that Japan will ultimately pop, the central bank (and indeed Japan itself) will try to do everything it can before that happens. Especially the last point is very important. Coupled with the need for Japan to attempt to maintain a structural external surplus it brings me back to a point I have made before (and which I will continue to make again and again).
Ageing societies are not, in the main, characterised by aggregate dissaving but rather by the fight against it.
So, Japan will fight and the central bank will do the government’s dirty work and the most intriguing question here is how long it will take of unsterilised hyper-QE before an economy such as Japan stuck in both a fertility and liquidity trap [1] implodes in hyperinflation; will it happen at all(?) and what can the country do to balance the trade-off between deflation and inflation.
Finally, on Ben, he is bullish on gold but then again, he would be wouldn’t he as runs a gold fund. But there is a subtler point underneath the reaffirmation of the bull market in gold since Hinde is also, following Ben’s comments, long volatility, a bet which has not, yet, paid off (and one would assume the “position” has some carrying/opportunity costs even if volatility is flat). Or put differently, gold (precious metals) have performed strongly alongside risky assets as liquidity has been plenty but what has not happened yet is the ultimate shakeout in which volatility spikes and investors buy gold and not the dollar. I think that you need to fit two stories in your head. One is why gold might move alongside risky assets as fiat currencies are slowly debased as well as how gold should do also do well in a situation where volatility suddenly increases quickly and abruptly although I suspect this last situation is the ultimate endgame with the interim mainly being one of dollar strength in times of sudden reversals in market fortune.
But even gold can’t be a free lunch, right? Perhaps, this is one way to rationalize that fact that investor performance currently seem to be demarcated by those who climbed on the gold train a year ago (or 2-3 years ago if you will) and those who didn’t. When times are tough and volatility spikes, the USD rallies but as such events almost inevitably carries an immediate response of more liquidity so will gold (and other non-printable assets) do well. But then as liquidity manages to smooth over markets and as the SP500 starts to tick back up this should again be constructive for gold since after all; the whole precondition for low volatility at the moment is the promise of more QE from the Fed (well not quite, but still very close I think). This is then good for a long gold position but not a long volatility position although I am intrigued by the ultimate punt on the final coup de grace in which gold and volatility becomes the only place to be. Still you got to have that acking feeling on gold, I mean; either it trades as a risky asset or becomes the safe haven of choice in times of volatility. So, which is it? I don’t know, but perhaps we are going to find out very soon.
The Punchbowl
Indeed, I suspect that many readers would have counted on me pointing to gold as the ultimate punchbowl and while I can certainly envision a situation is which gold takes a 10-15% correction (or even more) the point is that this would not counter the trend (not even close). This brings me to the real punchbowl at the moment; equities, emerging markets and high beta EM currencies (Asia and Latam). I am largely indifferent to the first in the long run, long term bullish on the second, and by consequence pretty constructive on the latter as well in the long run [2].
However, in the short run I think that while the punchbowl never left the table, talks about a new round of QE and how Japan’s intervention might actually be a leading indicator of more to come from OECD central banks all at the same time as the SP500 breaks 1160 is extraordinary.
(quote Bloomberg)
The Bank of Japan may have acted first in a new round of central bank action to prop up the global economy as recoveries in industrial nations falter.
The unexpected decision by the Japanese central bank yesterday to drop its interest rate to “virtually zero” and expand its balance sheet follows the U.S. Federal Reserve’s move toward more unconventional easing. Bank of England officials will consider further stimulus tomorrow, while the central banks of Australia, Canada and New Zealand are among those now holding fire on further interest-rate increases.
It reminds me of a point made recently [3] that the marginal returns of additional QE measures (Q1, Q2, Q3 … QN) are declining rapidly. I mean, how much QE do we need before the SP500 hits 1200 or 1250 perhaps? Certainly, I think this is a worthwhile consideration when talking about the effects of QE even if the ultimate policy rationale for additional measures has intensified with the macro environment definitely turning darker in the OECD.
Actually, if you will allow me a mathematical description of this.
The first derivative of QE with respect to the macroeconomy and risky assets are positive but the second derivative appears to be negative for the macroeconomy. More and more is needed to have a smaller and smaller effect. But it is more complicated than that and some asset classes clearly have a very positive second derivative (gold for instance) and look at those poor emerging markets as well. More and more liquidity chasing relatively few assets and high yield opportunities are relatively scarce. This is then a positive second derivative and a clear risk of a bubble.
Quote Bloomberg
Emerging-market borrowers are on course to sell more bonds than ever this year after yields hit record lows and developing economies rebounded faster from the credit crisis than advanced nations. Governments and companies in developing countries including Vale SA, the world’s biggest iron-ore exporter, and Korea Electric Power Corp., South Korea’s largest electricity producer, borrowed $196 billion from July to September, the most for any quarter, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Bond sales surged from $157 billion in the second quarter of 2010 as yields in developing countries slid to an all-time low of 5.4 percent on Aug. 23 from as high as 6.8 percent in February, JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s EMBI+ index shows.
(…)
Brazil doubled the tax yesterday on foreign investment to 4 percent on fixed-income securities to stem the currency’s two- year rally and help shore up exports. The move coincided with the Bank of Japan’s reduction of the overnight call rate target to a range of zero to 0.1 percent, the lowest since 2006, and said it would set up a fund to buy bonds. Brazil’s benchmark interest rate, at 10.75 percent, is the second-highest among the Group of 20 nations after Argentina’s and is luring demand for local-currency debt. “The IOF tax isn’t enough to contain the flows coming from the liquidity injection by the Japanese central bank and global dollar weakening,” said Luis Otavio Souza Leal, chief economist with Banco ABC Brasil SA in Sao Paulo.
(…)
Governments from South Korea to Brazil are stepping up attempts to control their currencies as investors pour a record amount of money into emerging markets.
Regulators in Seoul will start an audit of lenders handling foreign-currency derivatives on Oct. 19 to curb volatility caused by capital flows, the finance ministry said today. Brazil doubled a tax it charges foreigners on investments in fixed- income securities to 4 percent yesterday. The yen fell the most in three weeks after the Bank of Japan cut benchmark interest rates and pledged 5 trillion yen ($60 billion) to buy bonds and other assets, having sold $25 billion worth of its own currency last month in the first intervention since 2004.
This is just a small smørrebrødsbord then of the effects this is having in emerging markets where more and more creative policy measures are being tried to keep the money out. This is then a strongly positive second derivative effect and one which is a key mechanism to be aware of in the global economy.
The point here is of course that there is a lack of stability. It is fairly well established from Japan’s experience that once caught in a liquidity trap and with a rapidly ageing society the extra effect of more liquidity is almost 0 with respect to the macroeconomy (until of course the balance tilts, but sufficient unto that day and all). Yet, there is always a bubble waiting to inflate elsewhere as such the Japans of the world create a huge externality in the global economic system by filling the proverbial punchbowl for risky assets.
Yet for now and as markets seem to be wanting more and more QE to push forward it appears that investors should be careful diving too deep into the punchbowl even if it currently might appear as a golden opportunity.
—
[1] – For more on the fertility trap, look no further.
[2] – Although an AUD/USD at 0.97 is unbelievable to me. I think this is one of the brightest stars high their looking for a strong correction.
[3] – I can’t for the life of me remember who it was.
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By Claus Vistesen, on August 23rd, 2010
I know this is a cheap shot, but still. Team Macro Man picks up an all time favorite over at MM and asks 20 questions (check this out for other answers) to which I have offered 20 answers.,
- Will the 10yr Treasury yield breach 2% this year?
- When will the Japanese intervene?
- Will the US finally get tough with China in the run up to the mid-terms?
- When will the UK have a 4% CPI print?
- What will US GDP be for 2H 2010?
- Will SNB LLC resume macro punting (aka EURCHF interventions) this year?
- Does the SPX trade 1040 or 1140 first?
- Will Simon Hughes cause the ConDem coalition to collapse?
- Who will win the Labour leadership contest?
- Are we turning Japanese?
- Who will be the first to hike? Fed, BoE or ECB?
- Does Drukenmiller’s departure herald the end of Macro trading?
- When will the divergence between Eurozone and US growth surprises begin to close, and how? Eurozone weakness or US strength?
- Will the Republicans capture the House?
- Will Voldemort ever stop taking the piss?
- Which will be the next Macro fund to call it quits?
- Is the Bank of England losing control of inflation?
- Is there a bond bubble?
- When will the Fed move the Interest On Reserves (IOR) Rate negative?
- What will happen to the GSEs?
And my answers …
1: Yes (Q4)
2: If the USD/JPY hits 80 or if it stays at 85 til Q4
3: No
4: They won’t
5: (qoq) Q3 0.3%, Q4 0.2%
6: No
7: 1040
8: No Idea
9: Ibid
10: Europe is, the US is touch and go; I think they might just make it!
11: Fed in Q4 2011
12: Who?
13: In H02 2010 (Eurozone weakness)
14: Yes
15: No
16: Not yours I hope!
17: No
18: Yes, but it has some time still to run
19: H01 2011
20: Nothing in the next 18 months.
Don’t bet all your portfolio on this though. It is just fun and sports!
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