By B.P.T., on September 30th, 2011
With the stock market swinging up and down as the economies in the United States and Europe appear to be heading back towards a recession, it could be a good idea to move your savings out of the stock market and into safer asset classes. However, the Federal Reserve has stated that it plans to keep interest rates as low as possible for the foreseeable future, and has taken steps to drive interest rates even lower than the current record lows by swapping longer term debt for short term debt. Because of this, interest rates on savings accounts are hovering around 0%, making them a poor choice with inflation rates over 3%. Bonds are the other common alternative, but they are also seeing their rates driven down by the actions of the Federal Reserve, and they are affected by many of the same economic risks as stocks.
Since the stock and bond markets appear to be too risky at this time, and savings accounts paying near 0%, one alternative that allows savers to avoid risk and obtain a higher return on their savings is certificates of deposit, or CDs. According to the SEC, CDs are protected by the same insurance as savings accounts (currently $250,000), yet offer a higher yield than savings accounts, making them an attractive investment. However, savers are generally required to keep their deposit locked up in the CD for a fixed amount of time that can range from six months to 10 years, so it is important to ensure that the principal invested in the CD will not be needed until the CD matures, or a penalty could be imposed for early withdrawal. Other considerations to keep in mind are whether the CD offers a fixed rate, whether it can be called early by the bank, how often the earned interest is paid, and if a CD is offered by a broker instead of a bank, the reliability of the broker must be investigated, since they act as an intermediary between the saver and the bank where the funds will be stored.
Almost every bank offers CDs of some kind, and most banks will sell CDs to investors without requiring them to open a savings or checking account at the bank, so there are plenty of options available to people looking for a safe place to put some savings. I suggest researching the options online to see which CD is best for you, but when I checked today, Discover Bank offered rates that were well above the national average, along with easy funding options and reasonable early withdrawal fees. If you have some spare cash sitting around in a savings or checking account that is earning little to no interest and you know you won’t need it for some time, a CD could be a good investment choice.
Join the forum discussion on this post - (1) Posts
By The Gold Report, on September 13th, 2011
The money supply increases naturally by exactly the amount of increases in productivity in a healthy economy, notes Stansberry & Associates Investment Research Founder Porter Stansberry. He doesn’t have to point out that the economy isn’t healthy, nor that the money supply expands every time the printing presses run to bail out a failing business and bring on a new iteration of quantitative easing. The solution is a simple (albeit not necessarily easy) one, Porter tells us in this exclusive Gold Report interview: Return to the gold standard. That will happen, he says, when the people say, “Enough!”
The Gold Report: You’ve written a lot about the gold standard recently, and an article in your S&A Digest argues that we should greatly prefer gold-backed money because it would limit the ability to increase the money supply. It goes on to point out that increasing the money supply essentially causes inflation. If regulations prohibited governments from expanding the money supply, would fiat currency be as good as the gold standard?
Porter Stansberry: In theory, it could be, but in practice that’s never happened. I suspect that the market wouldn’t have much faith in such rules, and they’d be abused eventually. During the Volcker and Greenspan Federal Reserve periods, from roughly 1981– 2006, two central bankers created a de facto gold standard because they remained relatively consistent vis-à-vis money supply targets.
Volcker absolutely targeted money supply, as did Greenspan up until about 1999. He moved away from that stance due to Y2K fears and then the 2001–2002 recession. So we’ve seen long periods in fiat systems where money supply growth was targeted and fairly reliable.
The problem, of course, is that the gold-standard rules don’t apply across the banking systems. When the Fed was targeting money supply, bankers lobbied for all kinds of changes related to reserve ratios, which allowed them to massively increase the leverage on their balance sheets. Famously, the investment banks—Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and others—went from, say, 15:1 to 50:1. That had a tremendous impact on the amount of credit in the economy, which ultimately led to the collapse we well remember. Then the Fed started to radically increase the money supply to help reduce the impact of those bad loans.
That’s a long way of saying that efforts to mirror a gold standard by rule have never been effectual in history, and they haven’t worked in America over the past 40 years.
TGR: So changing the reserve requirements, in essence, increased the money supply.
PS: Let’s talk definitions. When I’m talking about the monetary base, I’m talking about the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, which is the foundation of the U.S. fractional reserve banking system. When you increase the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, you can have multiple increases of the actual money supply from that base. By targeting that base, Volcker restrained credit growth in the economy. Greenspan was less successful at that because he chose to expand the monetary base for political reasons.
In any case, just controlling the monetary base did not control the impact of increases to banks’ balance sheets and leverage ratios, simply because they lobbied successfully to change the rules. They got permission to increase their leverage. The monetary base didn’t change, but the money supply increased due to the actions of the banks. It would have been impossible under a gold standard for the simple reason that the banks would be subject to runs on their gold. That doesn’t happen in a paper system.
I’m not saying that there would never be another run on a bank, but bankers would have a palpable fear of losing control under a gold standard because the market discipline is so much fiercer now. They never would have leveraged 50:1 under a gold standard. It would have been completely implausible.
But as long as there’s this notion that they can get a bailout of any size by turning on the printing press, maybe the discipline isn’t quite so sound. That’s exactly what we’re seeing. So rather than allowing runs on the bank or rather than allowing banks to default and for depositors to lose, the government is printing as much money as is required and is giving it to the banks.
TGR: Is expanding the money supply actually a bad thing?
PS: In a healthy economy, the money supply would increase naturally by exactly the amount of increases in productivity. In fact, one of the main features of the gold standard is that it creates a balance between creditors and debtors. Creditors are more willing to lend money because they know the money they’re going to be repaid will be sound. Likewise, borrowers are more reluctant to take on debt because they know there’s not an easy way to repay it.
One of the main reasons you should prefer a gold standard is that it limits increases in the money supply to real increases in productivity. A second reason is that it simultaneously limits the availability of credit. Those limits mean that powerful interests in the economy and/or the government can’t simply create whatever credit they need to buy whatever assets they want. In a true free market, credit is relatively difficult to come by and can’t be manipulated by the various interest groups.
But in a free market that uses paper currency, it’s very difficult to actually maintain ownership of key assets because competitors in the marketplace may have access to political capital that allows them to buy whatever they want. You see this all the time in various industries, particularly those influenced by the government. In media, for instance, a very small number of vested interests end up owning and controlling all media properties because they have access to credit that their competitors don’t. That’s very difficult to pull off in a gold-standard system.
TGR: When you say they have access to credit that their competitors don’t, are you talking about on a worldwide basis?
PS: I’m talking particularly about the U.S. system, where the well-connected, money center banks—J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, etc.—essentially have access to unlimited amounts of credit, and they can finance almost any kind of takeover they choose, especially if it’s favored by the government that they do so. They can do that because, again, there’s so much flexibility in the monetary base, and credit is so easy to come by. It can be printed. You can’t print gold, so under a gold standard, the government wouldn’t allow the banks to have that much credit because it wouldn’t be able to bail them out.
TGR: So if the U.S. went to a gold standard, wouldn’t international companies have an advantage over those based in the U.S?
PS: No, not at all. If our currency were backed by gold, it would be very difficult for foreign investors to buy U.S. assets. One of the big calamities of our current situation is that by devaluing the dollar by 20% over the last three years—which is what’s happened—our government has made everything in the U.S. 20% cheaper for foreign investors. We’re burning the family furniture to keep the heat on in this country.
It doesn’t make any sense to devalue an economy the size of the U.S. by 20% merely in the hopes of making the stock market or employment go up a couple of percentage points. Giving away your country by devaluing your currency in order to produce economic activity is madness. That couldn’t happen under a gold standard.
TGR: One of your articles drew the link between devaluing the currency and calling it what it is: inflation. Your great chart, the CRB Futures Index Growth since 1955, shows a spike in 1971 when the U.S. went off the gold standard, and then bounces around rather wildly, never going back to the ‘71 levels. Presumably, that shows how the dollar’s purchasing power has declined, and you relate it to inflation. Interestingly, you also wrote that well-known economists—including some at Stansberry & Associates—continue insisting that there’s no inflation. What arguments do they use to support their viewpoints, and why are those arguments flawed?
PS: The most well-known person in the deflationist camp is Robert Prechter, but there are many others, including some who work for me who are persuaded by those arguments. We have a running debate because I think these people are foolish to be able to look at any long-term chart of the dollar’s purchasing power and claim any deflation’s going on.
TGR: When did this trend in decreasing purchasing power begin?
PS: Pick your date, and the dollar has lost 90% of its purchasing power from that day. A good way of thinking about this is to think about being a millionaire in 1900. To be a millionaire in 1900 was just unheard-of rich. At the time, gold was worth $20 an ounce, so to be a millionaire then, you’d have been worth 50,000 ounces of gold. And today? That amount of gold is worth about $100 million.
So gold’s supply-and-demand dynamics haven’t changed that much, and its intrinsic value, I would argue, hasn’t changed at all. What has changed, of course, is that the value of our dollar has collapsed by almost 100%. If you go through history and you realize that in 1971 gold was worth $35 per ounce, you can see that it’s declined 97% since then.
Just during the time Greenspan was at the Federal Reserve, the purchasing power of the dollar fell by about 50%. There’s no deflation in our money supply, and therefore no real lasting decline in prices. For people to say otherwise, I think, is incredibly stupid. No evidence whatsoever suggests that a fiat-backed currency system will ever cause a lasting deflation. And to believe that a short-term decline in prices in one market or another is tantamount to deflation is simply bad economics. It’s not true at all.
You have to look at broader measures of prices to see the impact of inflation, and you have to understand the impact of increasing the monetary base. If you increase the monetary base threefold, over time you’re going to see a very large increase in prices. Then, beyond all these nuts-and-bolts aspects, just look at history. Where is the fiat currency that collapsed because it became too valuable?
TGR: Part of the logic in going to a gold standard is to eliminate the inflation or eliminate the devaluation of the dollar. Isn’t some level of inflation a good thing?
PS: Why? Why should the monetary system favor one party over another? Why should debtors have an advantage over creditors? Doesn’t that retard lending? Doesn’t it retard economic growth when creditors constantly worry what the inflation rate’s going to be?
TGR: Speaking of economic growth . . .
PS: The fastest period of wealth creation in American history happened in the decade of the 1880s, during which the U.S. was on the gold standard. If you go back all through history, you find that economies do better with sound money. It’s no mystery why. You can’t make long-term investments without stability in the money. The instability does nothing but increase the prestige and power of the vested interests who control money supply, interest rates and the inflation rate. It makes it impossible for everyone else to do business.
Why isn’t a gold standard automatically the status quo in a democracy? Why would anyone ever want to get away from that, allowing the government to have both the swords of justice and the scales of money under its control? The outcome is always the same disaster. Credit grows uncontrollably and eventually the printing presses have to get turned on to pay back all the debt. Needless to say, we’re in the midst of one of those scenarios now.
TGR: Were any economists in 1971 warning that at some point down the road, abandoning the gold standard would trigger these credit problems and massive inflation?
PS: Absolutely, and some great economists were raising these issues as early as 1933, when FDR began to really move the U.S. away from the gold standard by making gold inconvertible, meaning that you couldn’t go exchange your dollars for gold at the bank. From that point forward, we were really on a pseudo-gold standard. All the economists who warned about what would happen were right.
TGR: And people apparently didn’t know the history of fiat currencies.
PS: True. Also, of course, it takes a lot longer for paper systems to break down than people expect because they’re completely reliant upon the confidence of the people using the system, and it’s in everybody’s best interest to play “hear no evil, see no evil”—nobody wants to see the whole house of cards crumble. But eventually it does crumble and people hedge their potential inflationary losses by buying gold and silver. That’s happening now.
TGR: A common argument is that there isn’t enough gold either in vaults or in the ground to return to the gold standard. The amount of gold above the ground was estimated at 158,000 tons in 2008, or 5 billion ounces. The nominal gross domestic product (GDP) in the U.S. is $14 trillion.
PS: The nominal GDP has nothing to do with the monetary base, which is where to look in terms of understanding a healthy ratio between gold and the dollar. The monetary base in the U.S. is a fraction of the GDP—about $2.865 trillion. Even so, if you tried to back every single dollar with an ounce of gold, you’d have an astronomical price of gold—that won’t work.
You want a gold standard that you can get to without taking 50 years or without greatly reducing the amount of money in circulation in your economy—a sensible transitional period that isn’t so deflationary that everyone goes bankrupt. Going from a situation in which we’d had inflation of 4–6% a year over the last 40 years to a period where you’re actually having deflation of the monetary base by 4–6% a year in order to get back on the gold standard would devastate debtors. You want a transition that treats creditors and debtors fairly and gets the economy back on a fixed standard, from which point we can move forward.
But you don’t need an ounce of gold backing every single dollar to maintain the standard in the vault. You need good lines of credit so that demand can be met. That was done over long periods of time, hundreds of years, very safely, very effectively, with relatively small amounts of gold in reserve.
Obviously, you need more reserves during times of crisis when people are nervous about the system. But what makes the system work is that the price at which people can demand gold remains unchanged. And people need faith that balance will return even if there’s a disruption in the demand system. After the Civil War, for instance, it was important that the greenback returned to its prewar value, that the gold standard was reinstated at the same price. And that price remained in effect all the way until 1933. So it’s not important to have an ounce of gold to back every single dollar; it is important, however, to have a reserve system that works, confidence that it works, and the political will to stick to the price to ensure that it keeps working.
TGR: That good credit you mentioned, especially when you hit economic bumps—where does that credit come from?
PS: The various large bullion banks would have swap lines with one another. If there’s an economic problem in Germany, for example, the Fed might lend gold to the German Central Bank to meet requests for the redemption. You can do it any way you want.
TGR: Would other countries also have to return to the gold standard to have that international credit option?
PS: The U.S. could do it alone, but it would certainly work a lot better if more of our trade partners agreed to the same standard. The economic area would be larger, too, so there would be more diversification of labor and more economic growth.
TGR: You’ve suggested that we could return to a gold standard by setting a target date 10 years in the future and then allowing the market to reach the appropriate price level. Taking only 10 years to get it back in balance sounds optimistic.
PS: It really depends on what you want the price to be. After the Civil War, it took 14 years because it was important to the bankers at the time that we return to the right price.
You probably could set the price easily between, let’s say, $5,000 and $8,000 per ounce of gold, and have the reserves necessary to make the system work today at the Treasury. People could go exchange dollars for gold as much as they wanted, and have confidence in the system at that price. You could do it right now.
TGR: What would be the catalysts to spark the move to return to the gold standard?
PS: I think the catalysts will be the destruction of the dollar and the ongoing inflation. Look at corn prices. When people around the world can’t afford food because the U.S. dollar has lost its purchasing power, it leads to revolutions, unrest, violence, people abandoning the dollar, failures of banks, collapsing markets and all these volatilities that we see. In my mind, returning to the gold standard is inevitable because nothing in human nature has changed in 4,000 years. As long as there is paper currency, it will be debased, and it will cause problems. Sooner or later, people will tire of it and return to gold. I think we’re in the middle of that transition as we speak.
TGR: If we’re in the middle of it, when do you suppose we’ll actually have a plan to go back to a gold standard? Steve Forbes says it’ll happen within the next five years.
PS: I think it’ll happen during the next Administration. At some point, to get people back to work, to get the country moving in the right direction, we’ll have to make a big economic readjustment. We’re going to have to get rid of the large overhead costs of government, return to lower taxes, and return to sound money.
TGR: Do you really think anything like that can happen, considering the recent debacle over the debt ceiling in Congress?
PS: I personally think we’re going to have an enormous dollar crisis, and that we’re only in the very beginning of it. The dollar has lost 20% of its value since 2008. I think it will lose another 20% over the next 12 months, and the population in America will get really tired of that very quickly. I expect a big political change in this country when people are fed up and say, “We’ve had enough—enough bank bailouts, enough of the money printing, enough of our wages being stolen by inflation. We want a system that doesn’t depend upon the good graces of politicians for its value. We want to use gold as money so that our savings are protected.”
TGR: So the people rather than the politicians will provide the political will needed to return to the gold standard?
PS: Absolutely. Politicians are never leaders in political thought. They follow the polls.
TGR: You’ve made it pretty clear that had we been on the gold standard we wouldn’t be struggling with this economic crisis. You mentioned people’s wages being stolen by inflation. Millions of Americans aren’t even making wages these days because they’ve lost their jobs. And we still have that tremendous debt load hanging over us.
PS: There’s no doubt at all that if we had been on a gold standard we would have never seen a credit bubble the size of the one we have now. It would have been very difficult for us to have the kind of economic problems we’re having.
As for the debt, there’s 400% of debt-to-GDP in the U.S. right now—not future liabilities, not Medicare out to 100 years from now. We can’t get people back to work and jumpstart our economy because we cannot afford to pay these debts. These debts are also the reason why we have to keep printing more money. We’re absolutely drowning in debt, and the only way out is to paper those debts over by printing enormous amounts of money that will devalue people’s wages through inflation and also, of course, diminish their net worth by lowering the value of everything they own.
The total debt in our country right now is $56 trillion, and the Fed has monetized roughly only $3 trillion of it through quantitative easing (QE) so far. We haven’t even begun to see this happen yet. We’re going to see QE3, then QE4, and on and on. And, in general, each level will be larger than the previous, so the numbers will get bigger and bigger as the Fed races against the market to devalue these debts.
TGR: Then how do we get back on the gold standard?
PS: Sooner or later people will say, “Enough!” I can’t tell you when that day will arrive, but I’d be surprised if the next Administration comes and goes without a return to gold.
TGR: This has been a pretty compelling conversation, Porter, and a lot of our readers will want to watch your video/read your essay that goes beyond what we’ve talked about today.
But before we let you go, you’ve said that unless investors are willing to speculate and start shorting equities, they probably should stay out of the equity market because you’re looking at a long, serious bear market. You advise these people to put 50% of their money into short-term Treasuries and 50% into gold. What’s the logic of the Treasuries if you expect the dollar to be devalued?
PS: One-year Treasury bills offer some protection from inflation because they have such a short-term duration. You won’t lose a lot to inflation with such instruments. They pay you something to hold them, too—although not very much.
The reason for holding these instruments is to reduce the volatility of the gold holdings. If you’re not going to hold other securities, all you want is to keep the value of your account stable. Taking half of the uptick in gold over the last year—a gain of maybe 20% and there’s no way that price inflation has been 20% in the last year—you’ve made a net gain in real terms.
If people are simply able to retain the purchasing power of their savings in the midst of this massive global monetary crisis, they’ll have done a great job. The thing to do now is not to lose, and the safest way not to lose is to go half gold, half cash.
On the other hand, investors who are in a position to be able to speculate can look at my newsletter’s portfolio and see that we’re long certain stocks that are positioned to profit from these problems and we’re short the stocks that are positioned to suffer from them.
After serving a stint as the first American editor of the Fleet Street Letter, the oldest English-language financial newsletter, Porter Stansberry began Stansberry & Associates Investment Research, a private publishing company, 11 years ago. S&A has subscribers in more than 130 countries and employs some 60 research analysts, investment experts and assistants at its headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland, as well as satellite offices in Florida, Oregon and California. They’ve come to S&A from positions as stockbrokers, professional traders, mutual fund executives, hedge fund managers and equity analysts at some of the most influential money-management and financial firms in the world. Porter and his team do exhaustive amounts of real world, independent research and cover the gamut from value investing to insider trading to short selling. Porter’s monthly newsletter Porter Stansberry’s Investment Advisory, deals with safe value investments poised to give subscribers years of exceptional returns. You can learn more about Porter and his ideas by clicking here.

By The Energy Report, on August 31st, 2011
The recent tumultuous downturn in stocks has created deeper values and new opportunity in the agricultural space. Dahlman Rose & Co. Managing Director Charles Neivert is a near-term bull on fertilizer companies, but the window could close and diminish prospects in the not too distant future. In this exclusive interview with The Energy Report, Charles talks about the complex dynamics that affect the farming and fertilizer industries, and reveals his best pick for a core holding.
The Energy Report: Charles, I was looking at an un-weighted basket of fertilizer stocks, and they were down about 23-24% for the last week of July through the first six trading days of August. Has this opened up some tremendous value for investors? Or is this downturn signaling a commensurate slowdown in agriculture along with the general economy?
Charles Neivert: I think that as a group this is probably more of a signal of a very strong value for investors over the next three to six months—possibly longer than that depending on the company. We don’t see a great change in the agricultural landscape due to the changing economy. It is certainly part of the things going on, but it may have less bearing on the fertilizer names than some other material spaces. That’s simply because food is involved and the grain crop out there that may have been damaged in some ways—though possibly not quite as definitive as we might see in other products. As a result, we think there is a lot of value in the fertilizers.
TER: The key difference is that it’s food?
CN: Yes. The demand for food is less elastic. Certain amounts of food are needed to keep going and global inventory is limited. This year, a number of grain crops were not exceptionally large. As a result, we don’t see a big rebuilding of inventories. The potential is that the price of some of these grains could continue to go up if the harvest does not come up. So, you could see things going up even though the economy is backing off simply because supply is being cut away.
TER: It sounds like you are near-term bullish on some fertilizer names, but that you have longer-term fundamental concerns.
CN: Yes, that is the case. Company prospects really depend on which nutrient is involved during which timeframe. The near-term is very good, I think, for any nutrient given the food and grain situation. However, as you mentioned, fundamentals for some of these products could potentially deteriorate over time while others are likely to be stronger for a little bit longer.
Again, given the nature of the agriculture business, it is really difficult to have a very long-term outlook within the context of a potentially extremely volatile production range, meaning grains. That is because the grains can go anywhere from very, very large harvest years to rather challenged times without any real rhyme or reason. There are no traditional business cycles. The agricultural cycles are all based on weather. If weather is extremely cooperative across a broad range of geographies, you could have an enormously large crop at a time when you don’t really want an enormously large crop. You may already have inventories, but there is not much you can do about it.
You might also get a small crop on top of small inventories, or something in-between. You don’t have the same control, particularly on the supply side, as you do with a manufacturing operation that can back off production when inventories are long. For the most part, the rules that governments have put into place to enforce land set-asides to help control production, have largely been abandoned. Those policies are no longer used, particularly in the U.S. and even in some other areas. So, you can get large or small crops completely opposite of what you might want or need at that time.
TER: Let me just flip here to the macro-economy for a moment. In a detailed statement following a meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on August 9, the Fed signaled a prolonged period of slow growth and, in an extraordinary comment, said that interest rates are expected to remain low until mid-2013. How does this affect the agricultural universe?
CN: Well, those rates are pretty much focused on the United States. So, I don’t think it really has that much of an impact on the Ag space. In fact, it may have none. Low interest rates, to the extent that they affect the dollar could present some potential challenges because the dollar is weak or because the dollar is strong. That does have a lot to do with corn or soybean costs to potential importers of U.S. products versus some competitors. But, it will have nothing or little to do with what the farmer is going to plant in any given year.
TER: Charles, what are your institutional investor clients telling you now during this selloff? Are they holding off on buying stocks for fear of needing cash for redemptions at this point?
CN: Each portfolio manager may take a different tack, so really this one is a little hard to answer. My guess is that now people are moving and seem to like the Ag space for the time being. We are seeing good activity. A lot of it is to the buy side where activity levels are good.
TER: Can a case be made that some of these plant nutrient producers are defensive stocks?
CN: In the current environment, you can make that argument. They are not typically defensive in the way you think of a food stock in a recession. In a recession, these guys get hit. When grain production is being challenged, they become defensive opportunities.
TER: Potash is traded in a negotiated market, not a globally efficient and tight market. But we have seen some transactions of $490/ton in India. Could this represent an upward trend?
CN: Well, the price of this product has been coming up for over a year now as demand has come back from the trough of 2009. I won’t say it’s impinging on capacity, but it starts to be a snug market because we have run through a fair amount of inventory over the last year to a year-and-a-half. That is what ultimately justifies the fertilizer price. For the sake of argument, if this year’s crop turned out to be extremely large and we rebuilt inventories substantially, fertilizer pricing would have a very tough time going up from here. By the same token, if the crop comes in short, and the way it’s looking, it would increase the price of grains and therefore be a bit supportive of a price increase in potash. What we found in 2008 was that crop price is a very important determinant in what the fertilizer price can ultimately do.
TER: Are you currently bullish on potash as a commodity?
CN: No. Near term I like all the names and products, but on a longer-term basis, I’m not as bullish. I see an awful lot of capacity on the horizon. Some has begun to come up and more is coming over the next few years. It will be a pretty steady stream from a very wide variety of potential producers and some new entrants.
TER: At what price-per-ton would you be bullish on potash equities generally?
CN: I don’t look at the price of the product as a sign at all. I look at the price and prospect for the grains and consider what needs to happen from that point. So, when grains are at low prices and the crop is looking strong, I’m not going to be bullish.
TER: Is the extraordinary heat wave in the U.S. affecting crops?
CN: It’s definitely affecting crops. The timing of the heat wave is also an issue. If you get periodic rain, it reduces that impact. But, there are times where heat can be extremely damaging and other times when it’s less damaging. If heat hits at certain points of the growth cycle, plants can be far more damaged than at other stages of their growth. The heat that came through the Midwest earlier in the year hit around a time when certain plants were going through a key stage maturation, and that can be a problem.
TER: Is there a play for investors on drought-resistant crops?
CN: Seeds haven’t yet gotten there. There is no seed out with the label of drought-tolerant. It’s hard to say resistant. It’s really a matter of degrees. If you get no water, nothing will help you. But, if you get smaller amounts than normal, some seeds under development will still produce near- or full-yields under less-than-ideal conditions, but they are not in the market yet. They are within a few years, so the claim goes, and we will see when they make it. All the major seed players are working on that particular trait. You can get into the companies that would provide that pipeline by looking at the typical seed names of the world—du Pont de Nemours & Company (NYSE:DD) and Monsanto Company (NYSE:MON).
TER: Low equity prices have left a lot of companies with cash on their balance sheets. What does this bode for M&A activity?
CN: It’s a tough call. It depends on the product because some of the markets may be so consolidated already that it will be difficult to get anything by the antitrust people. Cheap prices may or may not allow for acquisition because people will look at the price from six weeks ago for comparison. A perfect example is what PotashCorp (TSX:POT; NYSE:POT) went through when BHP Billiton Ltd. (NYSE:BHP; OTCPK:BHPLF) took a run at them. The stock was down in the high ’80s to low ’90s for a long time. BHP was thinking it could get the company for $130, but just before the offer, PotashCorp’s share price went up to $106 because the wheat market in Russia started to give way. Russia was experiencing a serious drought. The prices started to move up, and even though the $130 offer was actually still a pretty substantial premium, it was not accepted. Not only was it not accepted by the company, but, as conditions in the grain marketplace worsened with stress from the U.S. corn crop, that price got even higher. So, it easily surpassed the offer number. Either people were expecting a much higher bid, or something is going on that makes the stock just worth more—like getting another bid. When the BHP bid was pulled, the stock didn’t drop.
TER: What are you telling your clients right now Charles? Where are the value and the growth stories?
CN: The name we like the most in the group is CF Industries Holdings Inc. (NYSE:CF) because we see the pressure on the corn crop in particular leading to a very positive, constructive situation for corn into 2012. The biggest beneficiary of a corn crop that needs to have a very large planting is more likely to be a name that is heavy in nitrogen, as opposed to one heavy in potash and phosphate.
We think there is going to be a fairly significant increase in corn acres planted next year, and if you need acres in corn, the U.S. doesn’t have a lot of new, unplanted acres to go after and would have to probably use acres currently in another crop. Often that tradeoff is in soybeans, which would result in an increase in the application of nitrogen.
TER: Even in this downturn, CF Industries is still up 82% over the past 12 months and it’s flat over the past month. So, it’s held up pretty well under this pressure.
CN: CF Industries is our only straight-out buy. We’ve been recommending this stock for a long time. Even when I was less constructive on the industry, this was the name we liked the best.
TER: Even though CF Industries is your only straight out buy-rated stock, you still recommend that money managers create a basket of these stocks, do you not?
CN: Right.
TER: And, what would that basket include?
CN: We are sort of constructive on all the fertilizer names, at least through the fall application season and possibly a bit beyond. CF is only in nitrogen with some phosphate exposure and no potash exposure. So, we would tell people to get some potash exposure, but pick your name carefully. We lean toward PotashCorp as a name, but you have to look at it at that moment in time and see how the company is performing against The Mosaic Company (NYSE:MOS) or Intrepid Potash Inc. (NYSE:IPI). It’s really a close call based on a lot of different metrics. That is why we recommend a basket within the group to your preferred weighting. You have to own some of everything, but include some of all of the nutrients. You could cover it all with two or three stocks in the basket.
We have upgraded the entire industry to an attractive level, and in a strong agricultural situation, you don’t want to be left completely unexposed to one particular nutrient because they will all move well and you want to catch some of that. It’s always hard to tell which one will be the best of the group.
TER: These companies are all mid- and large-cap. Are there any small- or smaller caps under a billion dollars where investors might be able to get a little more leverage?
CN: The only one that I deal with that gets down close to that range is CVR Partners LP (NYSE:UAN). It is a pure play on the nitrogen side structures as an MLP (Master Limited Partnership). It features a good payout, but tends to mute the share price a bit.
TER: Want to mention any other phosphate, potash or nitrogen companies?
CN: The only company I haven’t mentioned in the universe is Agrium Inc. (NYSE:AGU). I hesitate to use the word defensive play, but it has a big retail operation that it uses very effectively to move an awful lot of product. It does very nicely in that business. It is also spread across all the nutrients. It has nitrogen, potash and phosphate exposure. It also happens to be based-in and sell a lot of product in Canada, which means that it is a bit isolated from the rest of the market. That actually gives the company a pricing advantage because the market up there is a bit higher-priced. Its big retail exposure is sometimes a little bit of a turnoff if what you are trying to do is play the fertilizer space in a pure way. It’s a good company and well run. But, people tend to look at it and say it’s not exactly what they are after.
TER: Charles, thank you very much for your time today.
CN: Thank you.
In May 2009, Charles Neivert joined investment bank Dahlman Rose & Company LLC as managing director to head the firm’s new Agriculture and Chemicals Research division. Prior to Dahlman, Charles was an executive director at Morgan Stanley where he re-launched the firm’s commodity, specialty and fertilizer chemical equity research practice. He was also co-founder and president of New Vernon Associates, an equity research boutique specializing in global chemicals, which was awarded Institutional Investor’s “Best of the Boutiques and Regionals—Commodity Chemicals” honor for nine consecutive years. At New Vernon, Charles conducted all fundamental industry research on a global level, including analysis and forecasting of 50 distinct chemicals. He earned his Bachelor of Arts degrees in chemistry and economics from the University of Pennsylvania.

By Bron Suchecki, on August 24th, 2011
Nigel Moffatt, Treasurer of the Perth Mint, breaks from his leash with some really bullish statements in an interview with The Australian newspaper:
He said he could see no end to the gold boom.
“If you’re in the US or Europe, what on earth are you going to put your money into?” he said. “You wouldn’t touch the equity market at this stage. Interest rates are low, and frankly precious metals are a hell of a good way to go. I can’t see anything around to stop it. Bit it won’t go northwards in a straight line because people will always be taking profits.”
By Mark Anderson, on August 19th, 2011
Prevailing practitioners of economics tell us that inflation stimulates exports. They get this inverted. Otherwise, pray tell, why wouldn’t Zimbabwe be the world’s leading exporter? Inflation inflicts injury upon the manufacturing base, engendering capital outflow and the destruction of jobs.
Contrary to prevailing economic orthodoxy, inflation is not export-friendly. Inflation nurtures dependence upon cheaper foreign markets to supply us with production (i.e. begets capital outflow). Capital outflow can be reversed by compelling the Fed to tighten. If the Fed tightens, interest rates rise, prices caollapse to reflect wages, the market clears (only then does the economic recovery begin), dollars that have accumulated in foreign reserves will coming flowing back into the domestic loan market, thus lowering the natural rate of interest.
“The dollar rose against most major currencies on Thursday as a latest report showed U.S. trade deficit plunged in February,” pursuant to one news source. (1)
“The contraction in the deficit came with a big recession-driven fall in imports and an unexpected rebound in exports, the Commerce Department said overnight in the US,” pursuant to another news source. (2)
In July of 2008, the dollar went through a rally – albeit, a pseudo-rally – marked by falling nominal prices. Although falling nominal prices is not deflation (i.e. the contraction of the money supply, which would be a healthy thing), that’s the definition of deflation pursuant to prevailing orthodoxy. When the dollar rally began, the trade deficit declined, due to both falling imports and increasing exports. In other words: the fall in the trade deficit had been accompanied by a dollar rally. What prevailing economic orthodoxy teaches regarding the international cycle of trade betrays this possibility.
In November of 2007, Ben Bernanke put on an exhibition of his confusion when he said that inflation is inconsequential for everything but imports. (3) He literally said that dollar devaluation raises prices of everything not denominated in….dollars! Apparently, Bernanke has been blinded by prevailing orthodoxy, which tells us that inflation mitigates a negative balance of trade – another Keynesian apologia for inflation that needs to be buried.
On a peripheral note, Bernanke’s argument runs slightly afoul of prevailing orthodoxy. Prevailing orthodoxy tells us that inflation does raise prices for Americans, and that this magically lowers real prices for foreigners. If Bernanke can’t figure out that increasing the supply of dollars raises dollar denominated prices, then the average person is hopeless for understanding the international cycle of trade and how capital flows.
The decline in imports and rise in exports in juxtaposition with the short-lived dollar rally were not a fluke, nor is this inexplicable. The trade “deficit” is but a symptom of monetary policy. A trade “deficit” isn’t bad per se. A trade “deficit” between two countries is no worse than a trade “deficit” between two towns. The consequential part is if the trade “deficit” is due to something other than comparative advantage (e.g. inflation).
“Again, suppose, that all the money of GREAT BRITAIN were multiplied fivefold in a night, must not the contrary effect follow? Must not all labour and commodities rise to such an exorbitant height, that no neighbouring nations could afford to buy from us; while their commodities, on the other hand, became comparatively so cheap, that, in spite of all the laws which could be formed, they would be run in upon us, and our money flow out; till we fall to a level with foreigners, and lose that great superiority of riches, which had laid us under such disadvantages?” –David Hume, Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, 1752
What mainstream economists teach runs contrary to what David Hume taught us in 1752. Prevailing economic orthodoxy inverts the international cycle of trade. We are told that inflation mitigates the trade “deficit”. By inflating the money supply, dollars will become less attractive to foreigners. Thus, runs the argument, foreigners will follow by curtailing exports to the U.S. Somehow, domestic productivity will magically be increased, stimulating exports.
The genesis of this error is begotten by the underlying macroeconomic assumptions. Rather than using microeconomic principles to understand macroeconomic phenomenon, mainstream economics fragments microeconomics and macroeconomics into separate compartments. Macroeconomics then becomes myopic, by lopping individuals out of its paradigm. Myopic macroeconomics doesn’t consider individuals; it only considers aggregates.
Translated, the macroeconomic analysis is this: the country has dollars. If the country, or nation – or whatever aggregate you wish to use – decides to print more dollars, the country, or nation, isn’t going to refuse to use its own dollars. However, the country, or nation, of, say, France, being a different country, won’t like very much the devalued American dollar.
I guess we aren’t supposed to ask why both inflation and the trade “deficit” have risen in juxtaposition with one another. Sound economics gives us that answer. If inflation did mitigate a trade “deficit”, then one is boxed into the position of currency devaluation wars. Inflation vs. counter-inflation vs. hyperinflation.
The economy is made up of individuals making choices in exchanges. When the government devalues the currency, this doesn’t only make dollars less attractive to individuals abroad, but also to individuals right here at home. This is reflected with higher prices. It isn’t about aggregates printing more money for use by aggregates.
Consequently, inflationary stimulus interferes with the price mechanism preventing prices from falling to reflect wages. The market fails to clear, thus derailing an economic recovery. With mass unemployment, the last thing that will rise will be wages. The domestic cost of production goes up. Thus, to reduce costs, capital flight takes place. Inflation actually increases the dependence upon cheaper foreign markets to supply us with production.
As David Hume saliently articulated in 1752, inflation makes not only the currency less attractive abroad, but also the higher-priced goods. It also makes the higher-priced goods less attractive right here at home. Using inflation to remedy a trade “deficit” is akin to breaking a leg to make yourself more competitive.
The short-lived dollar rally in 2008 – thanks to central bank policy – was not the consequence of the declining trade deficit; it was the cause of the declining trade deficit. Everything denominated in dollars becomes cheaper. It shouldn’t take a genius to figure out that one doesn’t become more competitive by raising prices.
If inflation actually mitigated a trade deficit, Zimbabwe would be one of the world’s leading exporters. Inflation doesn’t lower real prices for anybody. But even if inflation did mitigate a trade deficit by lowering real prices for foreigners, while making things more expensive for Americans, why would that be a good thing? Why should American economic policy be calculated to make things cheaper for foreigners and more expensive for Americans? Economic growth – which is not measured by the GDP – engenders falling prices, which is a good thing.
Pro-inflationary stimulus has served one purpose: preventing prices from falling to reflect wages. The market then fails to clear. The real issue isn’t even the direction of nominal prices, but what prices would otherwise be absent central bank manipulation. Even if prices fall in nominal terms while wages fall much faster, then we’re still suffering from the consequences of inflation. We can be suffering from lost price deflation. Falling nominal prices engenders rising real wages.
Inflationary policy by the FOMC suppresses nominal interest rates by increasing the supply of loanable funds, but without a genuine expansion of savings to fund investment. Investment can only come out of savings since producers must be able to consume in order to sustain the process of production. Deploying printing press money (i.e. unearned income) transfers money away from producers and the process of production to consumers. Inflationary stimulus disconnects consumption from production, turning Say’s Law upside down. Thus inflation not only drives capital overseas, but begets capital consumption. Inflation is injurious to the process of production.
Increasing the money supply tricks the loan market into consummating unjustifiable loans to non-credit worthy projects. That’s why malinvestment occurs and projects are halted midstream with the revelation of malinvestment. By allowing debtors to pay back creditors with devalued dollars, real interest rates are suppressed. There’s no right way for the loan market to extend credit at negative real rates, which is a negative ROR in real terms. That’s a calculus for the loan market to go bust as it did in 2008. See: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/hist/h3hist1.htm Check out the early months of 2008. That’s not psychological and that’s not a matter of consumer confidence.
The long end of the curve is most sensitive to market forces while the short end of the curve is most sensitive to FOMC policy. If the Fed stays loose to prop up the bond market, this will undermine the very bond market the Fed is trying to prop up. Investors/lenders will account for the inflation risk by tacking an inflation agio onto the curve. Eventually, the Fed will lose control over the short end, too. Under the scenario where the Fed stays loose, there will be no floor underneath the dollar nor any roof on interest rates. If the Fed tightens, the short end will collapse instantaneously, bringing the long end down, too.
Under the scenario where the Fed props up the bond market indefinitely, both the bond market and the dollar collapse. Dollars will hit par value with the par value of bonds. The Fed will be left with $15 trillion plus – in nominal terms – worth of bonds on its balance sheet, and we will be left with both junk bonds and junk dollars. The dollar itself will go bankrupt. What’s the par value of bonds? We don’t know, because the Fed has been propping up the bond market.
Under the scenario where the Fed tightens, the bond market will collapse, but the dollar will be saved. Dollars won’t hit par value with the par value of bonds. The only way to save the dollar is at the expense of the bond market.
Until the Fed is compelled to tighten, we won’t have an economic recovery. The loan market has to set interest rates pursuant to the true supply of savings. If interest rates were to hit, say, ten percent on the two-year with a $15 trillion national debt, do the math. The longer interest rates are artificially suppressed, the higher they will have to go in order to correct the imbalances in the economy.
By tightening sooner rather than later, this will not only allow the market to discover the natural rate of interest by letting interest rates rise, this will encourage capital inflow. Capital naturally gravitates towards cheaper, higher-yielding, more efficient economies. It’s called arbitrage. The Fed is waging an eternal struggle against…arbitrage. People naturally gravitate towards where capital gravitates. We should be talking about repatriating dollars to the domestic loan market rather than repatriating immigrants to their native land.
It makes no sense to close down the borders considering the fact that welfare states engender capital outflow and the natural flow of people is to follow capital. (4) Thus it’s hard for me to not imagine that closing down the borders could be used to trap people in rather keep keep people out. Interfering with the flow of capital will necessarily lodge capital where it ought not be. Interfering with the flow of people will necessarily lodge people where they ought not be.
If a person, firm, or institution is dependent upon inflationary credit expansion – as opposed to non-inflationary – for sustenance, that person, firm, or institution is – by definition – insolvent. Somebody or some institution (e.g. the government) is spending beyond their/its means. As a nation, we have spent beyond our means. Expenditures exceed earnings and we depend on foreign markets to supply us with production.
Inflation (i.e. the creation of money ex nihilo) is no substitute for income-generating investment, which inflicts further injury upon an already precarious economy. There’s no right way to invest in the U.S. economy. It’s error to conflate trading with investing. Buying real estate is not investment. I’ll draw the distinction between trading and investing. A trader buys and sells a particular asset class based on nominal price movements. An investor buys and holds a particular asset class based on returns from the underlying asset class itself. In the case of real estate, that would be rents.
The problem isn’t a lack of regulatory oversight. One can’t regulate away past mistakes. Insolvency can’t be regulated away. The only solution is to force up interest rates, prices fall, dollars that have accumulated in foreign reserves will flow back into the domestic loan market, which will then beget a lower natural rate of interest. Any other solution will lead to the destruction of the currency, in which case everybody’s savings get wiped out. Loose monetary policy to prop up a spending orgy engenders capital outflow (i.e. begets outsourcing).
Inflation is a tax. There’s no objective difference between the government taking the money you have in your pocket and duplicating the money you have in your pocket, thus devaluing the purchasing power of what you have in your pocket. Even if prices don’t rise in nominal terms, the real issue is what prices would otherwise be absent central bank manipulation.
Furthermore, if one is going to hold the position that inflation is synonymous with economic growth, then they’re boxed into advocating skyrocketing prices in order to have a fast economic recovery. The way to have a fast economic recovery under such a scenario would be to have prices rise fast. I believe there’s a term for that. It’s called hyperinflation. Who supports hyperinflation?
The only path to an economic recovery runs through monetary tightening by the Fed. Waiting until we have an economic recovery before tightening is a calculus to destroy the currency and the economy. Absent dealing with monetary policy, no candidate can pretend to offer economic solutions. The only candidate who offers real solutions is Ron Paul.
1) http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/10/content_11160595.htm
2) http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/us-trade-deficit-dive-may-ease-slide/story-e6frg8zx-1225697017588
3) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nj9KHJRRUbQ
The consequential portion of the video is around the 5:00 minute mark. Inflation is not rising prices. To say so implies that rising prices are caused by…rising prices. That contorts Irving Fisher’s own Quantity Theory of Money. Rising prices are the consequence of inflation, which is an expansion of the supply of money not redeemable in a fixed amount of specie. Prices could drop in nominal terms, yet prices could be too high in real terms. Falling nominal prices engenders rising real wages. We can still be suffering from inflation due to contortions in the price mechanism since prices remain higher than what they otherwise would be absent central bank policy.
By Bron Suchecki, on August 18th, 2011

Instead of focusing on how and why there are no productive investment opportunities, the cartoonist demonises the cash “hoarder”. Yes, you must spend your cash to help pull the debtors out of their problem. If you won’t, then next they will charge you to hold cash – see BNY Mellon’s negative interest rates. By the way, if that did come to pass it would be amusing because one of the (mis)criticisms of gold is that it costs to hold it and it doesn’t pay a return – well if more banks copy the BNY Mellon action then neither will cash.
Demonisation is what PM investors can expect as metal prices increases – you will be classed as rich hoarders. Hopefully it stays at that, rather than degenerating into a “super PM profits tax” or confiscation. However, one shouldn’t underestimate the politics of envy and thus keeping an eye on which category the majority of voters sit would be prudent (FOFOA’s The Debtors and the Savers worth a read in this respect).
By Mark Anderson, on August 16th, 2011
The key to an economic recovery does not rest in Washington. The key to an economic recovery is to put Washington through a recession. Any efforts by politicians to con you into believing they’re stimulating some kind of economic progress – again, bribing you with your own money – by promoting one form of energy or another should be detected as a ruse.
Some politicians have gone “green” in the name of curtailing “dependence on fossil fuels” and “foreign oil.” It’s a sham. Why not promote a certain type of underwear in the name of curtailing dependency on a foreign brand?
The fundamental problem is that most politicians and central planners view the economy as a blob to be manipulated, rather than a complex capital structure involving individuals making choices in exchanges, a process of production, and a price mechanism.
The reason why the United States is so dependent upon foreign oil is due to policies that have already been put in place. The solution, then, is to repeal and correct these policies – not creating new legislation.
Artificially low interest rates, brought on by loose monetary policy at the FOMC, drives capital overseas (by deploying unearned income from a printing press, disconnecting consumption from production, capital is also consumed). Capital naturally gravitates to cheaper, more efficient, higher-yielding economies. Rather than generating revenue and income, the nation spends beyond its means.
If a person, firm, or nation is dependent upon inflationary credit expansion (as opposed to credit expansion from savings), then that person, firm, or nation is insolvent and inefficient. We are spending beyond our means, which – yes – engenders dependence upon cheaper markets to supply us with production.
If you want to reduce dependence upon foreign “anything,” then the Fed has to lift interest rates and Washington has to abandon the spending orgy. Dollars that have been accumulating in foreign reserves will then come flowing back into the system.
I know “clean” energy sounds so nice, so attacking it is very “environmentally-incorrect.” I will put everything I possibly can into layman’s terms. Let’s start with the following axiom: we consume energy in everything we do. If you’re that environmentally-conscious, you shouldn’t be online reading this right now because you’re using electricity which is consuming energy.
Solar energy sounds so nice. After all, it comes from the sun. But let’s not forget that there is a process of production here. Take, for example, the solarization of a house. Solar energy requires panels, charge controllers, batteries, inverters, etc. And then let’s not forget capital asset depreciation. Energy is consumed during the process of production.
If “clean” energy has a positive yield, then it will be profitable and private enterprise will pony up the capital. The government need not encourage this. If “clean” energy has a negative yield, then this means that it is unprofitable and dependent on so-called “dirty” energy for its sustenance. It would be akin to consuming 1,000 blueberries for every 500 you’re growing – nobody in their right mind would pursue that course absent government subsidies. Somewhere, you have to make up the difference.
This leads me to the following axiom: the most profitable and economically-efficient form of energy, within the construct of the unhampered market, is also the cleanest form of energy.
The best ecological hygienist is the unhampered market. Suppose a logging company owns a forest. That logging company can clear-cut the forest, say, tripling immediate income. However, this must be weighed against diminishing future income, or the capital value of the forest as a whole. Suppose, however, this is government property. This calculation no longer needs to be made, and the objective is going to be rapid extraction of resources.
No shocker, then, that government is the biggest abuser of the environment and waster of resources. Look at the atomic weapons tests done in the Nevada desert – and right on top of our own military service members.
The government does not sustain itself by satisfying consumer demands, but through compulsory taxation. Government subsidies to, and control over, industry diminishes the need to set prices pursuant to supply vs. demand. Why? Because sustenance is no longer dependent upon having to satisfy consumer demands. Sustenance is disconnected from the satisfaction of consumer demands.
It’s the price mechanism that ensures resources are allocated and managed efficiently. The price mechanism can only function within the construct of the unhampered market, allowing for producers to set prices pursuant to supply vs. demand (i.e. market-clearing prices). The scarcer the supply, the greater the demand, the higher the price. Consumption runs inversely with prices.
Government subsidies distort prices, interfering with the price mechanism, and cause prices to be set above, or below, market-clearing prices. There is a paradox in government policy in that the government encourages consumption without production (in the name of economic stimulus), tells us that we should conserve resources, while simultaneously punishing “price gouging.” Within the construct of the unhampered market, there can’t be price gouging any more than there can be wage gouging, since vendors can’t short inventories at prices beyond what consumers are both willing and able to pay.
Prices send signals to entrepreneurs, telling them where to deploy capital. Prices tell consumers what to buy and what not to buy. The price mechanism can only function within the construct of an unhampered market. There’s no need for the government to encourage or discourage the use of any kind of energy. And let’s not forget that tax credits are subsidies camouflaged as tax cuts. A tax credit merely allows a person to use a portion of income for a specific purpose (i.e. indirect subsidy). (See: http://www.businesstaxrecovery.com/articleupdates/definition-tax-credit)
I write as a native-Minnesotan. Minnesota is one of the first states that employed the use of ethanol-blend fuels. Let me say that if I see anything with ethanol in it, I avoid it like the plague. It’s “cheap” for a reason; it’s inefficient.
Only can politicians get away with turning efficient food into inefficient fuel. If politicians keep at it, we will soon be filling our automobiles up with corn and drinking motor oil. Maybe after installing those solar panels, the government can begin shooting those pollution particles (See: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange/5128109/Shoot-pollution-particles-into-atmosphere-to-cool-Earth-says-Obama-adviser.html) – which supposedly ”clean energy” is designed to prevent – into the atmosphere in order to block the sun and “save” us from “global warming.” Sounds like the perfect plan. It’s a plan only a politician in D.C. could dream up.
Soon, we will not only be dependent upon foreign sources of “fossil fuels,” but also so-called “clean energy.” Unless you get out and support Ron Paul for president.
By Christopher Briem, on August 15th, 2011
This article from Friday just is killing me. The title is “Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority counts on $1 million in savings“
OK.. the ‘savings’ is at best relative to the huge costs the bond in question has cost the PWSA over the years. So they are moving a small bit back toward normalcy from what was a major major problem… and still is in many ways. So maybe it will cost less in the future, but ’savings’ in this case has to be a euphemism too far no matter how much a half-full glass kind of person you are. Gotta be a good water pun in that somewhere.
Those types of bonds were such problems that a lot of other (I emphasize other since I have heard of no attempt to recoup costs here by similar means) public entities who were advised into similar loans have been suing the banks that foisted the deals on them. Of late the SEC, along with some Federal and state attorneys, have been coming in and suing a lot of financial folks who sold public entitites like the PWSA on screwey bonds they should not have been involved with; or for some shady shenanigans on some deals remarkably similar to ours.
I personally would love to have someone go in and audit this PWSA bond (the same bond which was caused everyone such fits) to see what part of it actually finally made it to expenditures on actual infrastructure and to quantify just how much went to unanticipated financial costs, fees and and legal work that all ballooned. It won’t be a small number. Worth it for posterity’s sake for when you know someone tries some similar scheme in the future. Won’t look the same of course, but someone will think they have a great idea for something that really is not any better a deal than that bond seemed at the time.
But I am not done with Friday’s article yet. I really love this quote near the end.. I almost feel the Trib editors left it in there just for me.
….the board would consider fixed-rate bonds when interest rates drop. “It’s just the cost of credit, and our costs of maintaining this credit was less this year than it was last year. There’s an element of risk involved no matter what you do.”
I mean…. “when interest rates drop”?? From where they are now?? This may supercede what I thought was the greatest example of doublespeak from the PWSA from earlier in the year if you remember that. Just makes me wonder again who is in charge down there and why is it taking so long to fill the top spot down there? It is getting to be almost as long as the time it is taking to find a permanent BBI head for the city as well.
But waiting for lower intrest rates? I am waiting for my variable rate mortgage to send me a check for the interest part at the rate things are going. Open the business page or any news anywhere. Financial markets are pricing in the end of the world almost and virtually all interest rates in all markets are at or near all time lows. On top of that, municipal bonds have seen a lot of recent gains (meaning that interest rates in new issues are going down) as investors seek out something… anything… that appears relatively safe. Bottom line: it might be true that interest rates will go lower, but if that is something you yourself are actually planning on then you are likely also someone who is building a cave and stocking it with provisions and ammunition.
OK.. I admit none of that is as much fun to talk about as some of the PWSA’s travails with the Iron City Brewery (now itself officially a diasporan… if Jim R. counts corporate entities among the list of diasporans that is)… but I try to make the esoteric readable.
By Bron Suchecki, on August 8th, 2011
Some blogs that caught my eye last week. First is The Burning Platform with Edward Gibbon’s five marks of Rome’s decaying culture from his book The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire:
1. Concern with displaying affluence instead of building wealth.
2. Obsession with sex and perversions of sex.
3. Art becomes freakish and sensationalistic instead of creative and original.
4. Widening disparity between very rich and very poor.
5. Increased demand to live off the state
I think it would be fair to say we are close to ticking all of them. Second is Steve Keen on the RBA’s setting of the cash rate:
The graph shows an almost 100% correlation between the cash rate and the 90-day bank bill rates. However the data also shows that in almost every instance the RBA cash rate FOLLOWS the 90-day bank bill rate, rather than leads it. … This analysis raises a number of interesting questions:
1. Why do we have the RBA as an interest-rate setting body at all when all they do is follow the market?
2. Why does the RBA shroud itself in such mysticism when their actions are so transparent to all?
3. What is the quality of our economists, politicians and financial commentators that we have to go through the “Will They or Won’t They” pantomime each month?
4. How could any economist get their forecasts wrong, particularly on the up-side?
Very much Wizard of Oz man behind the curtain. Third is Mark Tier at economics.org.au with two takeways on small/no government, which speak for themselves:
“… when the income tax was introduced in 1913 no one in his right mind would have suggested a top rate of 90 percent. In fact, there was considerable support for capping the income tax at 4 percent. This was shot down by those who argued that specifying such a maximum rate would mean the income tax would rapidly rise to that (then) horrific level. Can you imagine living in a world where an income tax of 4 percent is unthinkable!?”
“On January 24, 1848, the California gold rush began. But it took eighteen years for the U.S. Congress to enact a mining law to regulate such discoveries. Meanwhile, gold production in California boomed. How could that have happened without a governmental framework to recognize mining claims, register titles, and regulate disputes?
The miners created their own. They established districts, registries, procedures for establishing and registering a claim and buying and selling claim titles, and a system for resolving disputes. Officers were usually elected, including the recorder of claims.”
Finally, we have a report by Mineweb that I think few PM commentators will pick up, but which I think is a good signal that gold is on the move into the mainstream. Mineweb reported on Thomson Reuters buying GFMS which “will enable Thomson Reuters to offer clients analysis of metals markets alongside its news and prices”. This is a sign to me that smart money is moving into gold, as they are the only ones who can afford a Reuters feed. The mass market (dumb?) money follows much later, which is when we’ll see a real bubble.

By Christopher Briem, on July 27th, 2011
The city of Pittsburgh is refinancing some bonds. Blah, blah. Fitch has rated the bonds that will hit the market today or tomorrow. Given low interest rates, it is the type of thing they should at least be considering so no big deal in itself. Still, Infy seems to be casting some aspersions on the deal, but is lacking specifics. I can’t tell where he is heading with his comments. Maybe we can crowdsource this and figure what has has face down. Here is the preliminary official statement for the new bonds. At least in my quick look, I don’t see anything too untoward, but the devil would be in the details. The whole issue of openness and transparency in municipal bond world is a big big deal these days and impending changes could portend a very different way of doing business. Would have a big impact locally as much as anywhere.
One thing I do see.. and it is not the biggest of shenanigans in context, but I take the public description is that this is entirely a refinancing and not a new debt issuance. I guess that is mostly true, but there is a note (page 2, pdf page that says they are using bond proceeds to pay the fall 2011 quarterly bond payments on a series of bonds. That is effectively new debt to me, but hey, it’s marginal enough to not be worth the argument.
So if anyone sees something I am not, I am sure they will let us know. However, there is a fascinating section on the pension imbroglio in the verbiage of the POS. (no… that means Preliminary Official Statement). I was going to copy a few pages whole here, but you can read yourself. On page 19 (page 25 per the pdf numbering) is a whole section titled ‘municipal bankruptcy’ that is fascinating for its existence in itself. But it is on page 20 (page 26 of the pdf numbering) that the pension issue is discussed explicitly. Every single sentence deserves parsing from political, financial, actuarial and legal angles, but I don’t want to bore anyone. They do seem to making a gratuitous point that the transfer of city reserves into the pension fund happened before the end of 2010, but let’s not delve into the esoteric no matter how crucial it is to the big picture.
Elsewhere, all sorts of funny factoids in the ephemera. Height doesn’t matter: The US Steel building is now the 6th most valuable property in the city based on assessments and some assessment appeals I presume. Not really talked about much, but the potential impacts of the pending county reassessments may be larger for the big building owners Downtown than most anyone else.
On page A-10 (pdf page 50) is some demographic info I can’t pass up. There seems to have been a massive outbreak of Zombie-ism between 2009 and 2010.
On Page A-7 is this verbatim “The County and Judge Wettick agreed to a reassessment schedule, to be complete by January 1, 2012, which is anticipated to provide a boost in future revenue“. One, do they read the newspaper coverage of changes in the reassessment progress and two, do they read the state laws on revenue neutrality??
Page A-13… 10K city residents work for Walmart? Really? I’m not disputing it, just news to me. Lots of Walmart employees in the region for sure, but just not many Walmarts in the city proper so I am fascinated by the reverse commuting angle.
Join the forum discussion on this post - (1) Posts
|
|
Most Popular Posts