Pension Purgatory

I just don’t have it in me to comment more than point out the pension purgatory we are in.. and at this rate will forever be in.  The current and soon to be re-identified WDUQ: Pension Valuation Could Take Months

I guess it is better than pension hell?

There are public pension doings in Philadelphia.  WHYY:  Nutter’s pension overhauls stalled in Philadelphia

Beware the Dotted Line

Really really wanted to end the year on a positive, maybe we will start the new year with something less negative. Anyway.. Trib follows up on the story of the Detroit pension system’s losing bet on our casino: Casino’s Struggles Felt in Detroit.

Here is the thing.  the story that came from sounds horrible. Risky bets cost Detroit pension funds $480 million.  Yet the Detoit pension system, which is made up of two big pension systems I presume for uniformed and nonuniformed employees were funded at 100% and 106% in their latest audits.  Granted those are from last year, but that is at least as current as our information here.

Go read the numbers yourself: See page 23 (per the pdf) of their General Retirement System audit, or the similar document for their Police and Fire Retirement system (page 25 per the pdf numbering).  I’d point you out to read the comparable documents for the pension system here… but, you know.

So even after its $480mil dollar loss (a big chunk of which coming from our casino) Detroit’s pension system is three times as well funded as Pittsburgh’s pension systems combined.  Maybe 4-5+ times as well funded as the Police pension fund (the worst-funded of our 3 pension funds) is here.  Detroit!?  Paragon of sound fiscal governance and transparency.

Might be intersting to look at an end of year news piece out of Detroit today. For them, their pension issues have truly become all consuming:

Another federal grand jury is probing potential problems with the city’s two pension funds. Subpoenas were issued to a top pension official and to the pensions themselves seeking records about investments, including a residential real estate development in Florida.

They’re mad that their pension fund is at or above 100% funding?  While we are so happy with how things are going here that we are doing anything conceivable (and the inconceivable) to make sure nothing changes here?

Still an interesting tale of how Detroit got caught up in it all.  Below is the ownership schematic and financing behind the reoarganization of the River Casino operation as of when Bluhm took it over from Barden.  I would suggest that whenever you are a bank and have dotted lineds connecting you in a diagram like this, you have things to worry about.  The multiple colors just for the Detroit pension folks is probably a red flag in itself.  I’m just guessing Bluhm is a financial genius that is befitting a billionaire. If the Detroit pension system, and I am presuming Key Bank along the way as well took such big hits in this… then I bet his controlling interest in the casino didn’t really cost him all that much in comparison.

fyi this must be all before the debt/equity was restructured.  Anyone have a similar diagram of the current, post reorg ownership structure of the Rivers Casino?  Must have a bigger like to the Detroit pension system I figure.  I wonder if one of their pension board folks gets expense paid trips to the casino here?

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Existential Fiscal Policy

Since several have asked, my general opinion of the latest news on the PPP front is that the latest plan reminds me of My Dinner With Andre.

Policy and philosophy are not really all that far apart.  Or maybe it’s finance and philosophy that are more akin than we think.  A promise to pay more into the pension fund is not exactly something new in the big picture.  Act 205 pretty much requires the city to pay more into the pension fund in the future.  So much more that the pension fund will get to a fully funded state eventually. That is what the law already says, no need for any less statutory ‘promises’. So if you step back from all the competing minutia of made up numbers all around, I don’t see what will be different on January 1st.  We will have traveled a long winding road to wind up at the status quo. If this promise is made that is, and the state accepts it to forgo the impending takeover by PERC…  we will be exactly where we would have been if none of this ever happened.  There will still be a large and growing unfunded pension liability and no state takeover. Like it was all a bad dream. Did it all really happen?

Something more substantive:  This plan as I understand it it is that somehow the state will accept a somewhat vague promise of future revenue from the parking authority and meters to meet the mythical 50% threshold in pension funding. Remember the 50% number is arbitrary and notional.  Come January 1 the new cycle of actuarial calculation will start and we will eventually learn the current state of the pension fund.  With lease payment or without, with notional promise of future parking revenue or not, the new calculation will show that the pension fund will never really achieved a 50% funding ratio.

But something I have wondered about in the past, but really might impact this plan more than others (though I wonder about the others as well).  Here is what the law actually states is allowable rationale for setting rates in the parking garages owned by the parking authority.

This is an excerpt of section  § 5505. Purposes and powers of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Parking Authority Law (Act of June 5, 1947, 53 P.S. § 341 et. seq.) that describes the valid factors such an authorities can use to set rates:

(d) Powers…….An authority has all powers necessary or convenient for the
carrying out of the purposes under this section, including:

……..

9) To fix, alter, charge and collect rates and other charges for its facilities at reasonable rates to be determined exclusively by it, subject to appeal under this paragraph, for the purposes of providing for the payment of the expenses of the authority; for the construction, improvement, repair, maintenance and operation of its facilities and properties; for the payment of the principal of and interest on its obligations; and for fulfilling the terms and provisions of agreements made with the purchasers or holders of such obligations or with the municipality. Any person questioning the reasonableness of rates fixed by the authority may bring suit against the authority in the court of common pleas of the judicial district where the project is located. The court of common pleas shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of the rates and other charges. This paragraph supersedes a contrary provision in any home rule charter, ordinance or resolution.

So absent some explicit obligation, as in a bond or loan, then it is permissible for the parking authority to raise rates to just fund the city’s pension obligations?  Begs the question of what rates are proscribed in any circumstances by that paragraph, but that is why we have lawyers I suppose.

Do I think it matters?  Not really.   The law seems to give all legal authority to the local court so who knows how that would turn out if there is not path to appeal.  It does seem to give a very broad definition of who would have standing in challenging the rates, something that is usually what trips up folks trying to litigate against tax issues.   My non-lawyerly reading of “any person” would imply that even just a rate payer could sue; that it need not even be a resident.  Plenty of disgruntled and underemployed suburban-living laywers around who would be more than happy to file something. Someone is going to sue is all I predict.   Something that would not be an issue if the PPA decided to sell all or some of its Downtown garages which they are certainly permitted to do.

So who knows where this will all wind up?   In my ideal world we would be thinking about these things strategically and not just making policy in this uber-reactive way.  There is nothing more reactive than what is going on now with this mad rush to do something, literally anything, to meet an arbitrary deadline based on notional numbers with a deadline now measured in hours.

Strategically to me would be to think through what assets the city should own and what assets it really does not want to own any more.  Then see if monetization of the former helps deal with the pension problem and go from there.   Anyone notice that the stadiumless authority lives this week.   More than a few assets over there on the North Shore nobody wants to talk about.   Assets you would think would soon be appreciating as the T extension comes closer to opening.

Hey, let’s start talking about GASB 45.

*****

Wait… I’ve got it.  This plan is all fundamentally one big huge TIF.  Not really a TIF, more Fee-Increment-Financing.  A FIF!

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To Parse the Imparseable Dream

Well… way up on the Ambien scale is the latest actuarial report on the City of Pittsburgh pension system.
Here is the much anticipated: Special Study on the Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement System’s Integration of Administrative Services. Such a boring piece of ephemera you would think. Never has so much rested on what so few can make sense of.   I will get around to adding it to  my policy documents page and also the iPension page for posterity’s sake if you ever need to find it in the future.

You really need to wade through a lot to get to the points that are buried in all of that. What are the crib notes?   I distill the whole thing down to two factoids.   One is that there is a scenario in there,  the likely scenario I think, that there will be a point in just a few years that the city’s minimum municipal obligation will rise from $38 million annually presently, to $127 million in 2017 and even rising to $159 million annually in 2030.

As incomprehensible as those numbers are, it gets worse.  There is a scenario, again the most likely scenario I think, that says this:

….the Systems will be in a high risk period for the potential of running out of money because of funding relief and delay in MMO application. (see bottom of page 15 per the page numbering, or page 19 per the PDF numbering)

What?  Huh?   Who said that?

Remember, it is irresponsible to cry fire in a crowded room.

and apologies to Mitch Leigh… and I suppose Jim Nabors.

Public Pension Crisis in OECD Countries

The central aim of my bachelor’s thesis is to demonstrate the unsustainability of public pension system in OECD countries in the longer run through the lens of a rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis.

The origins of contemporary public pension schemes date back to 19th century when Bismarck Germany in 1881 first adopted a universal old-age public pension system based on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) funding principle. The principle itself captures full advantages of high (stationary) population growth rate. In the simplest form, PAYG pension scheme is based on the notion of generational solidarity upon which current generations pay mandatory social security contribution into the public scheme. Aggregate contributions are then paid out to current retirees. The cycle is then expanded through generations. However, PAYG funding scheme is sustainable as long as the population growth is high and above the marginal productivity of the capital. Back in 19th century, public pension schemes were adopted under unrealistic assumptions about future population prospects. In 19th century, advanced countries experienced high population growth rate, high fertility rate and an extremely low share of dependent old population that was receiving universal old-age support from PAYG pension schemes. These set of assumptions was crucial to the stability of government-provided old-age support embodied in the public pension schemes.

The sustainability of PAYG pension system requires the equivalence of population growth rate and real interest rate. In the early 20th century, the advanced world shifted towards aging population, declining fertility rates and lower labor market entry rate. In broad terms, a growing old-age dependency ratio led to the pure disequilbrium effects. In a theoretical framework, I re-examined the neoclassical framework of lifecycle hypotheses embodied in Samuelson and Cass-Yaari models of life-cycle utility maximization. The lifecycle hypothesis is based upon the assumption of the three-period model where individuals maximize the consumption in the course of a lifetime. In the first period, individuals do not discount the future consumption since, in this period, individuals acquire the human capital. In the second period individuals enter the working age and discount the future consumption. Hence, in the third period, individuals retire consume the output produced in the working-age period. Since future discounting is compounded, the lifetime consumption increases geometrically. In purely analytical terms, the individuals maximize the utility of consumption through time preference rate.

Considering the abovementioned equivalence between population growth rate and real interest rate, the stability of the equilibria requires the period discount rate to equal the population growth rate. If population growth rate decreases, the stability of the equilibria requires that individuals decrease the future discount rate by the same rate to keep the PAYG pension system within the theoretical limit. The rigorous theoretical formulation of the neoclassical model of lifetime consumption, which essentially captures the necessary conditions for equilibrium stability of public pension schemes, had been put forth by Paul A. Samuelson in his seminal contribution to the theoretical foundations of stationary “PAYG” public pension scheme .

In the course of the last decades, OECD countries have experienced a significant drop in fertility rates, population growth and, under the political climate of social democracy, a widespread adoption of early retirement schemes and generous social security benefits. In addition, labor market exit age dropped significantly, initiating a trend towards the unprecendent growth of generational indebtedness.

The OECD estimated that between 2000 and 2050, old-age dependency ratio is forecast to increase to the largest extent in Japan (193 percent), Spain (136 percent), Portugal and Greece (135 percent). The astonishing increase in the estimated old-age dependency ratio directly reflects the declining fertility rate in OECD countries from 1960s onwards. I estimated the ratio of fertility rate between 1960-1970 and 2000-2006 for OECD countries at around 2, which means that average fertility rate between 1960-1970 was twice the fertility rate between 2000-2006. The highest fertility ratios were found in Spain (2.23), Italy (1.96), Ireland (2.00) while the lowest ratios were found in Denmark (1.37), Netherlands (1.72) and the United States (1.46).

High and stable effective retirement age is the main assumption underlying the stationary stability of PAYG pension system. In the 20th and 21st century, OECD countries have experienced an unprecendent decline in effective retirement age. Blöndal and Scarpetta (2002) estimated the decline in labor market exit age for OECD countries between 1960 and 1995. The female labor market exit age had declined significantly in Ireland (10.7 years), Spain (9.1 years) and Norway (8.8 years). Male labor market exit age exerted persistent decline in all developed OECD countries except for Iceland. The exit age declined significantly in the Netherlands (7.3 years) and Spain (6.5 years).

In a large part, declining labor market exit age has confluenced the rapid growth of unemployment and disability benefits and early retirement incentives from the second half of the 20th century onwards. As the OECD correctly contemplated, in a number of countries, disability pensions and unemployment benefits can be used as de facto early retirement schemes. In a large part, widespread growth of early retirement schemes and implicit incentives for moral hazard in retiring too early via unemployment and disability schemes is held responsible by generous welfare states in the aftermath of the World War II.

When I examined various features affecting early retirement choices, I came across an interesting finding. I regressed labor market exit age and marginal tax rate in a cross section of 23 OECD countries in 2007. I estimated the relationship between exit age and marginal tax rate using a classical OLS linear regression model. The estimate suggests that, holding all other factors constant, if marginal tax rate increases by 1 percentage point, average labor market exit age decreases by 1.88 months. Surprisingly, 51.74 percent of sample variation is explained by marginal tax rate alone. The sample constant is statistically significant, suggesting that if the hypothetical marginal tax rate were zero, the average labor market exit age in randomly chosen country from OECD sample would be 69.65 years. The sample constant is consistent with a prior theoretical expectations since it concurs with the “substitution effect” hypothesis that higher marginal tax rate leads to lower labor supply and fewer working hours.

The cost of early retirement in OECD countries
Source: T.T. Herbertsson & J.M. Orszag, The Cost of Early Retirement in OECD, 2001. OECD, Pensions at Glance, 2009.

Fiscal imbalances arising from unsustainable PAYG public pension systems in OECD countries cannot be assessed without a sufficient estimate of economic costs of unfunded pension liabilities. I approximated the cost of early retirement using Auerbach-Kotlikoff-Gokhale (1999) methodology that directly estimates the size of generational imbalances created by public social security systems. Large and rapidly unsustainable net pension liabilities occured in late 1980s. Van den Noord and Herd (1993) estimated the size of net pension liabilities in seven major OECD countries. The results suggest that continental European countries have had the largest net pension liabilities in terms of GDP. The size of pension liabilities in France and Italy had been about 2.5 times the size of their respective GDPs and twice the stock of the public debt.

Gokhale (2008) directly estimated fiscal imbalances arising from unfunded pension liabilities to current and prospective generations. The size of generational fiscal imbalance, as a share of the GDP, is extremely large and rapidly unsustainable in all OECD countries. In fact, the size of the imbalance is the most severe in Greece (875 percent of the GDP), France, Finland and the Netherlands (500 percent of the GDP) while it is more than twice the size of the GDP in all OECD countries except for the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Fiscal imbalance in OECD countries
Source: J. Gokhale, Measuring Unfunded Obligations of European Countries, 2009.

I built the econometric model of public pension expenditure for a cross section of 23 OECD countries in 2007 to assess which variables might explained the cross-country variation in public pension expenditures. I’ve been aware of the possible drawbacks of choosing a cross-section model since it might be vulnerable to specification errors and the unbiasedness of regression coefficients. To account for possible specification bias, I conducted Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Shapiro-Wilk and Jarque-Bera normality tests. By performing normality tests, I have examined whether the normality assumption of normally distributed error terms is valid in the studied sample of 23 OECD countries considering error terms as identically and independently distributed.

In the set of explanatory variables that might yield consistent and robust estimates of regression coefficients I chose 10 various demographic, economic and institutional independent variables. Apart from demographic and economic variables, institutional variables are dichotomous since the institutional features can be captured by binary modes of choice. The dependent variable is the size of public pension expenditures in the share of the GDP.

The results suggest that public pension expenditures are positively correlated with the share of population aged 65 and older (0.746**), difference in life expectancy after age 65 between 1960 and 2005 (0.477*) and dichotomous variable for continental European countries (0.697**) where * and ** indicate the statistical significant of the sample correlation coefficient at the 5% and 1% level. The estimates suggests that the probability of higher pension expenditures in the share of the GDP is likely to occur in a continental European country known for a relatively large share of older population and a high difference in life expectancy after age 65 between 1960 and the present. On the other hand, public pension expenditures are negatively correlated with average effective retirement age (-0.475**), private pension funds as a share of GDP (-0.658**), labor market exit age (-0.523**), dichotmous variable for Anglo-Saxon countries (-0.544**) and a dichotomous variable for private pension system (-0.672**), where ** denotes the statistical significant of the sample correlation coefficient at the 1% level. Again, the estimates suggest that the probability of lower pension expenditure is likely to occur if a randomly chosen country from the OECD sample is Anglo-Saxon and has a high effective retirement age, large private pension funds as a share of the GDP, high labor market exit age and a mandatory private pension system. The coefficients suggest that in repeated sampling, the estimated sample correlation coefficient will include the true or correct population value in 99 percent of cases.

I conducted the econometric model which consisted of 8 regression specifications. I chose double-logarithmic model which yields direct elasticities as regression coefficients. However, I added two exceptions. In regression specifications 5 and 6, I chose a mixed specification mostly due to the inclusion of private pension funds (assets) variable in the regression specification. Unfortunately, but the share of private pension funds in Greece in 2007 equals 0 percent of the GDP which does not enable the researcher to apply double-logarithmic model as the basis of regression specification.

The estimates suggest that the share of population aged 65 and older is statistically singificantly positively related to the share of public pension expenditures in the GDP. Hence, the elasticity of public pension expenditures with respect to effective retirement age ranges from -1.465 to -4.935, suggesting that an increase in effective retirement age by an additional year leads to per unit increase in public pension expenditures by more than a unit increase in the share of the GDP. The coefficient of private pension funds is highly statistically significant. The elasticity of public pension expenditures with respect to private pension funds (as a share of the GDP) ranges from -0.34 to -0.38 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The elasticity suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of private pension funds reduces the share of public pension expenditures in the GDP, on impact, by 3.4-3.8 percent, holding all other factors constant. In addition, the estimates of coefficients for dichotomous variables suggest the following: the probability of higher public pension expenditures (as a share of GDP) is likely to occur in continental European countries with mandatory private pension system. Five estimates of dichotomous coefficients are statistically significant at the less than 10% level.

The significance of dichotomous (dummy) coefficients has been tested by beta coefficient analysis to rank the magnitudes of separate effects of explanatory variables on public pension expenditures as dependent variable. The results suggest that continental European countries are significantly more likely to face higher public pension spending in the share of GDP compared to Anglo-Saxon countries.

Earlier I mentioned the necessity of normality assumption in yielding robust, consistent and unbiased estimates of regression coefficients. The assumption has been questioned by conducting Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S), Jarque-Bera test (J-B) and Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) normality test. The aim of the testing the normality assumption is to observe whether error terms distribute normally so that estimated test statistics, standard errors and confidence intervals are reliable. In setting test statistic, I set the normality assumption as null hypothesis. The results from K-S, J-B and S-W tests show that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 5% level, suggesting that the normality assumption is valid in the studied sample. Hence, test statistics, standard errors and confidence intervals are both valid and reliable.

The meaningful question to evaluate the prospects of the coming public pension crisis is how to reverse the growth of fiscal imbalances and reform public pension system as to avoid erratic generational indebtedness. Aging population and the growth of old-age dependency ratio trigger an enormous future burden on public finances in OECD countries. Lower fertility rate and population growth shall place an incurable burden on the stability of PAYG public pension systems. The estimates suggest that life-expectancy after the age of 65 is likely to increase by 2050 and gradually approach the age of 90 for both male and female. Assuming the effective retirement age is 65, the remaining life expectancy is 25 years or almost one-third of the average lifetime. As Alemayehu and Warner (2004) suggest: “Old-age health care costs thus will impose increasingly severe pressure on private finances and government coffers. Indeed, applying our age-specific estimates to the age distribution anticipated for the year 2030, we find that if nothing is done to alter current patterns of health care, per capita health care expenditures will rise by one-fifth due to population aging alone.

The long-term pension reform that aging societies of the West should undertake is a complementary measures of three key policy features of the reform.

First, the transition to fully-funded retirement savings accounts is the only viable and sound pension reform that can alleviate the damage generated by the growing fiscal imbalances. The theoretical foundation of the transition from public pension systems to fully-funded pension system has been laid down by Feldstein and Liebman (2001). The authors derived an algebraic solution which suggests that keeping a PAYG public pension system does not attenuate the persistence of a growing demographic pressure on the stability of public pension system. As I discussed earlier, PAYG system crucially depends on three key assumptions: high fertility rate, very low share of population older 65+ and high population growth. These assumptions are incompatible with actual demographic parameters and, hence, OECD countries should undertake a drastic transition towards fully-funded pension systems based on individual savings accounts. Otherwise, the growing demographic pressure will inevitably result in the exponential growth of generational debt, creating an enormous deadweight loss for current and prospective generations.

Fully-funded pension system is based on the premise of investing pension contributions into the capital market, earning a compound interest over time. The stock of individual’s lifetime earnings is paid in the form of annuities upon individual’s withdrawal from the labor market. In addition, there is a growing disparity between the implicit return of PAYG public pension system and real rate of return in the capital market. Under realistic assumptions, such as that the marginal product of capital (MPK) is below the welfare-maximizing level and the real rate of return exceeds the implicit return from PAYG system, fully-funded pension system would not create a deadweight consumption loss to the working-age population. In fact, Feldstein and Liebman (2001) derived an analytic solution for the transition to fully-funded pension system in which the transition induces a short-term consumption loss in the next period while, at the same time, it creates a geometrically-growing future consumption for both retired and working-age population.

The only remaining question is whether the real rate of return would compensate the consumption loss of working-age population and, hence, increase the stock of future consumption to all generations. According to Feldstein and Liebman (2001), assuming 6.5 percent inflation-adjusted rate of return, the payroll cost of fully-funded pension system would represent only 27 percent of the payroll cost incured under PAYG public pension system. Tax rate, required to bear the cost of current stock of pension liabilities is 12.4 percent respectively.

According to Congressional Budget Office, the average real rate of return for large-company stocks between 1926 and 2000 is 7.7 percent, 9.0 percent of small-company stocks and 2.2 percent for long-term Treasury bonds. Feldstein (1997) estimated that PAYG implicit rate of return is 2.6 percent.

Assume an individual wants to maximize the lifetime earnings in the capital market. An individual is offered 2.6 percent implicit return from PAYG system. The individual enters the labor market at certain age, say 25, and intends to retire upon the age of 65. Assume he invests $10.000 annually in the capital market to create retirement annuities upon labor market withdrawal. Assuming the implicit rate of return (2.6 percent), the stock of overall annuity would be 10 times the initial investment in 90 years. Assuming the average long-run real rate of return from large-company stocks (7.7 percent), the the overall annuity would be 10 times the initial stock of investment in 31 years. Therefore, the individual would reach the desired level of lifetime earnings at the age of 56 or 9 years before the targeted retirement age.

I assumed the distribution of lifetime investment portfolio is weighted average of availible asset types: large-company stocks (33 percent), small-company stocks (19 percent), long-term corporate bonds (20 percent), long-term Treasury bonds (20 percent) and 3-month Treasury bills (8 percent). According to the average annual real rates of return in the United States (1926-2000), I calculated the weighted average real rate of return (5.247 percent). Investing $10.000 annually at the age of 25 would buy $100.000 annuity at 5.247 real rate of return in 45 years (the age of 70) compared to 90 years (the age of 115) under the PAYG implicit rate of return (2.6 percent). Of course, the time to buy the annuity would shift alongside the changing composition of portfolio.

In addition, OECD countries should immediately increase the effective retirement age. I believe the solution suggested by Gary Becker is both meaningful but sustainable in reversing the growth of generational debt. Becker (2010) suggestedOne simple and attractive rule would be to raise retirement age by an amount that makes the ratio of years spent in retirement to years spent working equal to the ratio that existed at the beginning of the social security system.

When President Roosevelt signed the notorious Social Security Act in 1935, the normal retirement age was 65. However, life expectancy after the age of 65 was significantly lower than is today. In 1940, average life expectancy after 65 in the U.S was 13.7 years. In 2006, it stood at 18.6 years, according to OECD. In 1935, the average life expectancy at birth in the United States was 61.7 years. We assume that individuals in 1935 worked for 35 years and spent 12 years in retirement. The ratio is thus 0.4 (12/ 35=0.34). Today, if individuals retire at the age of 65, they can expect further 18.6 years in retirement. To equalize the ratio to the 1935 level, (18.6/x=0.34), individuals should spend 54.7 years working. The estimate time is an equivalent measure of years required to spend working if PAYG public pension system is left intact. Assuming the individuals enter the labor market at the age of 25, then the expected effective retirement age is the age of 80.

In the long run, PAYG public pension system is unsustainable since demographic parameters do not suffice the assumptions under which the PAYG system is possible without distortions of labor supply incentives. The future of OECD countries will be marked by aging population, lower fertility rates and a growing demographic pressure on public finances. Without bold and decisive pension reform, OECD countries will experience increasing pension deficits and, hence, an explosive growth of generational indebtedness.

Parametric pension reforms are not a substitute for the postponement of paradigmatic pension reform. Thus, implementing the transition to fully-funded pension system essentially requires higher effective retirement age. A comprehensive pension reform cannot be made possible without these measures. At last, but not least, the major challenge in the systematic pension reform in OECD countries to address the burden of global aging, is whether political courage will withstand the pressure of interest groups to maintain the status quo of early retirement incentives. Nonetheless, eliminating early retirement incentives is the essential step towards creating retirement system without perverse incentives to retire too early. Unless political leaders encourage a transition to fully-funded pension system, OECD countries will be unable to withstand the deadly consequences of an enormous generational indebtedness.

Pension Parking Parsing

I had a big long rambling post on general parking/pension issues, but it just isn’t in me to post.  Reading about the latest round of rumblings on the fifth floor had be wondering how we wound up in this state.  Council-mayor relations have occasionally been bad in the past. Intra-council relations have sometimes gone off the deep end with members swearing at each other in session.  So maybe things today were sedate in comparison.

Two things really need commenting on though.  Bram tweets that the administration presented some idea that if a bond was issued against future parking revenues, that there was a potential for the parking authority to default with a result of the bond holders taking possession of city parking assets.  If Bram passed that on accurately, then folks should know that that is basically false.  Default on a revenue bond really can’t result in foreclosure against public assets like that.  Skipping legal wonkery, it just isn’t the way things work. Purchasers of a revenue bond have claims against future revenue streams, not the underlying assets. It would be extraordinary, and certainly not required for the bonds to have a mortgage pledge in their prospectus. The concept of wall street types winding up as owners of the garages is just not an option.

Beyond that.. like I said I don’t have it in me.  We are again down the rabbit hole Downtown and who knows where we will emerge when all is said and done.

OK, I can’t resist one really fundamental comment.  Seems to me that the whole presentation today by the mayor was that this bond issue plan wouldn’t work and it was based on some math saying a bond would be issued at 5.5% if tax-exempt and 7.5% if not tax-exempt.  Are those rates for real?  I don’t think any muni bond rates are that high these days are they?  Would make for some very different math if those rates are incorrect.    I really need my Bloomberg box back.

Speaking of bond rates… us 3 public finance wonks may have noticed that bond  insurer Assured Guarantee had its bond rating dropped today… Methinks a few big public bonds locally have bond insurance issued by Assured Guarantee.  Oh, nevermind.

Yeah… my original post was still longer than all of that.