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	<title>Citizen Economists &#187; government debt</title>
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		<title>Gold Prices Driven Higher by Europe and China: Greg Weldon and Grant Williams</title>
		<link>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/02/09/gold-prices-driven-higher-by-europe-and-china-greg-weldon-and-grant-williams/</link>
		<comments>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/02/09/gold-prices-driven-higher-by-europe-and-china-greg-weldon-and-grant-williams/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Feb 2012 17:40:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>The Gold Report</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Financial Markets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[austerity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fiat currency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gold]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government debt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/?p=10960</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p> Preserving wealth in a volatile political and financial world is a job for gold. Greg Weldon, publisher of Weldon&#8217;s Money Monitor newsletter and Grant Williams, a portfolio advisor at Vulpes Investment Management in Singapore, will share their insights at the Cambridge House California Investment Conference Feb. 11–12. In this exclusive interview with The <span style="color:#777"> . . . &#8594; Read More: <a href="http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/02/09/gold-prices-driven-higher-by-europe-and-china-greg-weldon-and-grant-williams/">Gold Prices Driven Higher by Europe and China: Greg Weldon and Grant Williams</a></span>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="padding-top: 5px;" src="http://www.streetwisereports.com/images/Greg_Weldon2.jpg" alt="Greg Weldon" hspace="10" width="82" height="102" align="left" /> <img style="padding-top: 5px;" src="http://www.streetwisereports.com/images/Grant_Williams.jpg" alt="Grant Williams" hspace="10" width="82" height="102" align="left" /> Preserving wealth in a volatile political and financial world is a job for gold. Greg Weldon, publisher of <em>Weldon&#8217;s Money Monitor </em>newsletter  and Grant Williams, a portfolio advisor at Vulpes Investment Management  in Singapore, will share their insights at the Cambridge House  California Investment Conference Feb. 11–12. In this exclusive interview  with <em><a href="http://www.theaureport.com/" target="_blank">The Gold Report,</a></em> they answer the question: How low and high can gold go?</p>
<p><strong><em>The Gold Report: </em></strong>Recent headlines continue to focus on the  debt crisis in Europe as more countries are having their debt  downgraded. Greg, you have diagnosed the problem as credit addiction and  said that the European Union won&#8217;t be able to recover until leaders  take painful measures necessary to kick their addiction. What does this  mean for commodities and commodity equities?</p>
<p><strong>Greg Weldon:</strong> It&#8217;s critical for asset prices across the globe. It is a debt addiction,  debt refinancing and deficit financing problem, not only in Europe, but  also in the U.S. and Japan. Austerity is the real answer to the fact  that there is too much debt, and austerity measures in an economic sense  are not positive.</p>
<p>My fear is that it&#8217;s going to be very  difficult to see how economies in Europe, the U.S. and Japan can stand  on their own two feet without the assistance of central banks debasing  currency through debt monetization. I liken it to filling the sink  halfway up with water and pulling the plug out of the drain. Of course,  the water level will recede unless you turn the faucet on and start more  water pouring into the sink. The level of water represents asset  prices, the water flowing out of the faucet represents liquidity  provided by global central banks and the drain represents the real macro  economy, which has not been fixed.</p>
<p>At the end of the second  round of qualitative easing, when the Fed shut off the faucet, the water  level (asset prices) started to go down. But now the water is running  again—particularly with some of the measures instituted by the European  Central Bank, with its three-year loan program, the federal liquidity  swaps and the back-ended way that it&#8217;s managed to involve the  International Monetary Fund.</p>
<p>The problem with all of this is it  does nothing to fix the underlying problem, which is too much debt. This  is not sustainable. Central banks turning on the water faucet is good  for asset prices. The real solutions of fiscal austerity, which are  probably not palatable to most politicians in Europe, are the real  struggle as we go forward. This problem is not going to go away.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Grant, in your <em>Things That Make You Go Hmmm….</em> newsletter, you painted a picture of the final implosion of the euro  and U.S. municipal bond meltdown. What would this mean for resource  stocks?</p>
<p><strong>Grant Williams: </strong>That was part of a prediction  piece that I wrote at the end of 2011. It was semi-tongue-in-cheek. My  contention was that as volatile as 2011 played out, we didn&#8217;t actually  get any resolution. And it feels like 2012 will be the year those  resolutions start to take place. One of the primary ones is the European  situation. A Greek deal to solve the crisis seems to constantly be on  the horizon, but they can&#8217;t seem to come up with an absolute solution to  the public sector involvement haircut issue. When they do, I think it&#8217;s  going to be the start of a whole slew of legal action to try and either  trigger credit default swaps or negate any haircut from those who don&#8217;t  want to sign up. Greece has a big refinancing coming up in March. It  has to raise a little over €14 billion (B), and between now and then it  somehow has to get a $130B loan package approved from the Troika. It is  very hard to see how Europe can just keep pumping money into Greece.  It&#8217;s very likely we&#8217;ll see Greece exit the Eurozone then, and that&#8217;s  going to focus everyone&#8217;s attention on Portugal. I think Italy will be  OK. Spain worries me more than Italy because the economy there  structurally is in far worse shape. But if a bunch of countries pull  out, that leaves the question of how people unwind any obligations they  have in the current euro construct.</p>
<p>What this means for  commodities is that the money-printing presses are going to be turned up  to the max again. Despite adamant claims from politicians to the  contrary, money printing—even if by another name—will have to be  implemented at a magnitude much, much higher than ever before to meet  current demands. Cash is being given to banks basically for free through  the long-term refinancing operation on the quid pro quo that the money  finds its way back into the government bond market. The problem is that a  lot of this money is going to leak out somewhere other than where it is  intended and I suspect it&#8217;s going to leak into commodities and  equities. We are going to see stock markets float higher, not  necessarily on particularly good numbers from corporates, but from the  simple dynamic of a lot of freshly printed money looking for a home. We  have already seen it in gold and silver this year. They both had big  corrections in December, but they are two of the best performing assets  of the year so far and I suspect the more money they print this year,  the faster these things are going to go up.</p>
<p>People are starting  to understand that deflation is not an option for the central banks.  Once people realize that if we get a brief period of deflation, it will  be fought aggressively with inflation, they will start to look past any  deflationary period and position themselves for inflation. That is going  to mean higher prices in commodities.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> How high could gold and silver go in 2012?</p>
<p><strong>GWilliams:</strong> I think gold trades at $2,200 an ounce (oz) this year. I think silver  trades at possibly $60/oz this year, but they&#8217;re really just stepping  stones on the way to higher ground. This 11-year ascent in both precious  metals is only going to change when central bank policy surrounding it  changes. I just don&#8217;t see that happening in the foreseeable future until  they get this debt problem under control.</p>
<p>We are going to see  periods with crazy spikes. We are going to see corrections. Some will  view this as a collapse but the difference between a correction and a  collapse is your entry price. If you bought gold at $700/oz a few years  ago and you watched it go from $1,900/oz to $1,500/oz in December,  that&#8217;s a correction. If you bought it at $1,900/oz, it&#8217;s a collapse. I  think it&#8217;s important to try and take a longer view. The rationale for  owning gold and silver is still in place. In a world of printing presses  and fiat currencies, no one can manufacture gold and silver out of thin  air. I think they are both going to go a lot higher.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Greg, what are your predictions for 2012?</p>
<p><strong>GWeldon:</strong> There is a disconnect in the markets. Currencies really aren&#8217;t moving  much either. The dollar hasn&#8217;t appreciated much. This is why gold is  stuck in this range, capped just above $1,700/oz, with potential  downside toward $1,300/oz. People are liquidating commodities. My sense  is that there is more weakness to come in H112. Commodity prices in Q411  have already come down significantly, pumping some relief into margins.  There is a little window of opportunity here where equities and some of  the commodities markets could have some upside.</p>
<p>Debt could  become an issue again in H212 depending on how central banks deal with  that and whether we have a big downturn again in the stock and commodity  markets. My longer term view is that when push comes to shove and  central banks are staring into the abyss of a potential debt deflation,  they will choose to reflate at whatever cost. That is bullish for gold  long term. If banks can find the political will to do it, there will be  significantly higher prices for commodities across the board in the long  term.</p>
<p>China, in particular, has a bullish dynamic. Certain  commodities, such as copper, have their own supply-demand dynamics that  are detached from the dollar and monetary policies. The Chinese imported  copper at a record high in December. Copper stocks on the London Metal  Exchange have fallen by close to 30% since October. Copper is one of  these commodities that has upside potential regardless of what the  dollar is doing.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Grant, you are based in Singapore.  There was a lot of talk at the last Cambridge House Conference in  Vancouver about whether China is growing, shrinking, landing hard or  soft. What impact will China have on commodities and equities around the  world?</p>
<p><strong>GWilliams:</strong> China faces a lot of problems. A lot of  people think it is in for a hard landing. It is always difficult to  believe official Chinese statistics, but the message that the Chinese  government is sending through those numbers can be useful. For example,  the Chinese growth numbers last week showed an 8.9% increase in gross  domestic product. In a world of basically zero growth, that&#8217;s a pretty  good number, but it&#8217;s not the double-digit number we&#8217;ve been conditioned  to expect from China. Whether it was true or not, it shows that the  government is saying: things are OK. We are on top of this, we&#8217;re in  control. We are not going to slow to zero; we&#8217;re just going to grow a  little bit slower. The big problem China has is inflation. Roaring food  inflation in a society in which half the population lives in relative  poverty in rural areas would be a big issue. A lot of people talk about  property bubbles—and there are definitely bubbles in Chinese  property—but as long as the government can keep people fed, it is going  to find a way to get through this—at least for now.</p>
<p>China also  has vast currency reserves. The Chinese absolutely understand that paper  currency is being devalued incredibly quickly. So, until someone puts a  sell-by date on copper and iron ore, it will keep stockpiling the stuff  because it will need these commodities to continue growing. China will  continue to swap paper money for commodities. The Chinese are bringing  gold into the country as fast as they possibly can. Gold is in the DNA  here in Asia. It doesn&#8217;t take an awful lot to persuade the public to own  gold.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Greg, in your book, <em>Gold Trading Boot Camp,</em> you said gold is at the top of the macro-monetary pyramid. Why does it hold such an important position?</p>
<p><strong>GWeldon:</strong> It is a rare and unique mineral that has provided a store of value for  centuries that is not backed by any government. It is not subject to  anyone&#8217;s IOU. Gold stands alone in the level of security it creates in  people&#8217;s minds as a way to store wealth and protect it from governments  that are continually debasing the value of paper money.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> You put the dollar second on the pyramid, but said that could change  soon. What will be the catalyst for change and what will be the result  for investors?</p>
<p><strong>GWeldon:</strong> I don&#8217;t know what the catalyst for  change could potentially be. For me, the dollar stays as No. 2. There&#8217;s  been an interesting little sequence recently where the dollar has  rallied and gold has declined. But gold has not declined to the same  degree that the dollar has rallied. Gold is appreciating in a lot of  currencies outside of the dollar where it&#8217;s actually outperforming  dollar-based gold.</p>
<p>Investors have a greater degree of confidence  that the Fed will do what it has to do to circumvent a bigger issue.  Next to gold, the dollar still is the second place that people feel  comfortable.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Mining equities haven&#8217;t been able to keep pace with the price of gold. Do you see that changing?</p>
<p><strong>GWilliams:</strong> It continues to surprise me, frankly, that these stocks are on such  crazy valuations against the metal. I think once we start to get wider  acceptance that inflation is going to be the outcome rather than  deflation, people will start to look at these companies in a different  way. Mining companies will instantly become some of the most attractive  companies in the world.</p>
<p>I think there&#8217;s going to be a tremendous  wave of consolidation in the mining sector. When it comes is a tough  one to call, though. We&#8217;re going to see a lot of junior miners get taken  out because it&#8217;s going to become a battle for ounces in the ground. If  you have proven reserves, the majors are going to come looking for  you—particularly if you are in a safe political jurisdiction—and they  can afford to pay very, very good multiples of where the stocks are  trading now.</p>
<p>In the last 10 years, we have seen some tremendous  finds. We&#8217;ve seen some tremendous small companies that are very, very  well run with incredibly experienced geologists. It requires a lot of  due diligence to go through the sheer number of gold mining companies  and find the very valuable ones, but I think having ounces in the ground  and a good, proven management team are the two fundamental criteria  that you have to look for in these stocks. Once the consolidation starts  to take place and once the scramble for ounces of gold in the ground  begins, I think the resulting valuations will be quite spectacular.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> You are both speaking at the <a href="http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2011/5036/" target="_blank">Cambridge House California Investment Conference</a> Feb. 11–12. Based on all of these trends that you&#8217;ve laid out, how can  investors preserve wealth or even profit during volatile times like  these?</p>
<p><strong>GWeldon:</strong> Investors who are focused on preserving  wealth are best served by buying gold on the dip that is currently  taking place. The gold price has a chance to reach $1,450/oz—that&#8217;s a  sizable move downward.</p>
<p>There&#8217;s a chance that monetary  authorities would take gold coming off that hard as a sign that they  need to be more aggressive. It will be interesting to see how that plays  out. However, being long gold and silver is clearly the best play in my  mind to preserve wealth.</p>
<p>For investors who are looking to  appreciate wealth, the commodities markets offer tremendous upcoming  opportunities. That is because there is one thing that I can be certain  about: Volatility will remain high. We are not going back to a  low-volatility environment. It&#8217;s treacherous for individual investors  trying to do it themselves. We run a long-short commodity program that&#8217;s  non-leveraged. But there is a lot of talent in the commodities space  for individual investors looking to profit from this market environment.</p>
<p><strong>GWilliams:</strong> Preserving your wealth is absolutely the  right way to look at it at the moment. Trying to make a profit in  markets when there is so much uncertainty is a very dangerous thing to  do because things change midgame. So I think for the next several years,  using gold, silver and the platinum-palladium group metals as a store  of wealth fundamentally makes a lot of sense. I suspect you are going to  see outsized gains as a byproduct of using that strategy because I  think the prices will go materially higher despite low <em>headline</em> inflation numbers. Using gold and precious metals to hedge yourself as a  safety trade is the smart thing to do. By doing that, you will not only  protect your existing wealth but you can also generate increased wealth  through price appreciation in excess of inflation.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> When you say gold and precious metals, how would an individual investor  protect wealth using gold? Are you talking about holding the bullion,  buying gold exchange-traded funds (ETF) or buying equities?</p>
<p><strong>GWilliams:</strong> It depends. I think <em>protecting </em>wealth  using highly geared gold mining companies is a dangerous thing to do.  Yes, if gold goes crazy, you are going to make some outsize returns,  assuming the asset in the ground is good, assuming the management is  good and assuming you don&#8217;t get any collapsed mines or any other  geological anomalies that sometimes are part and parcel of owning gold  mining stocks. Holding the bullion itself is absolutely the safest way  to do it. You have an asset free and clear with no claims on it. It&#8217;s  yours. But that&#8217;s not necessarily an easy thing to do from a logistical  perspective. A lot of people look at the ETFs as a good vehicle, and  they are a perfectly good gold proxy. You have a claim on some physical  metal there. But for pure safety&#8217;s sake, owning the bullion itself or as  close to pure bullion as you possibly can is the smartest way to go.</p>
<p>If  you&#8217;re looking for any kind of leverage or any kind of gearing, then  you need to start looking into the mining companies. But outside the  major miners, it&#8217;s a very dangerous place to be unless you have someone  very smart holding your hand, and you need to do an awful lot of work on  researching the particular stocks you buy. While the returns can be  extremely good, particularly at these low valuations, gold is a very,  very tricky thing to dig for and mines are very tricky things to operate  and to run. So you have to be aware of that.</p>
<p>Most important,  try to steer clear of government bonds. In a world of increasing  inflation, and a world where central banks have promised to try and  generate MORE inflation, to lend money to irresponsible governments at  0.23% for two years in the case of the U.S is just crazy to me. Over the  long term, you are absolutely guaranteed to lose money in real terms by  doing that.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Thank you for your advice.</p>
<p><em><a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/htdocs/expert.html?id=6410" target="_blank">Greg Weldon</a> started his Wall Street career working in the Comex Gold and Silver  Pits after graduating Colgate University. He progressed as an  institutional sales broker at Lehman and Prudential before joining Moore  Capital as a proprietary trader. At Moore, Weldon honed his systematic  trading methodology and risk management discipline before joining  Commodity Corporation where he became one of its top risk-adjusted money  managers. Today, he publishes </em>Weldon&#8217;s Money Monitor, The Metal Monitor <em>and </em>The ETF Playbook<em> in addition to operating his Managed Futures Account Program as a CTA.  He has a unique ability to define and forecast the market&#8217;s direction  through his proprietary dissection of fundamental and technical market  data. Weldon Financial is now a highly regarded and profitable  publishing company, having garnered some of the world&#8217;s most respected  fund managers as loyal and daily readers.</p>
<p>Weldon published </em>Gold Trading Boot Camp: How to Master the Basics and Become a Successful Commodities Investor,<em> in late 2006 in which he predicted the current global credit crisis and  discussed the impact on golf from intensified central bank debt  monetization. You are invited to participate in a &#8220;one-time&#8221; free trial  of Weldon&#8217;s research @ <a href="http://www.weldononline.com/" target="_blank">www.weldononline.com</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/htdocs/expert.html?id=6411" target="_blank">Grant Williams </a>is a portfolio and strategy advisor to <a href="http://www.vulpesinvest.com/" target="_blank">Vulpes Investment Management</a> in Singapore—a hedge fund running $200 million of largely partners&#8217;  capital across multiple strategies. Williams has 26 years of experience  in finance on the Asian, Australian, European and U.S. markets and has  held senior positions at several international investment houses.  Williams also writes the popular investment letter </em>Things That Make You Go Hmmm&#8230;.., <em>which is available to subscribers.</em></p>
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		<title>First Act of Greek Default Proceedings Drawing to a Close</title>
		<link>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/23/first-act-of-greek-default-proceedings-drawing-to-a-close/</link>
		<comments>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/23/first-act-of-greek-default-proceedings-drawing-to-a-close/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Jan 2012 15:00:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Claus Vistesen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[International Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bonds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Eurozone]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government debt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Greece]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[lenders]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[stocks]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/?p=10722</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Global stock markets are up about 10% since the beginning of the year, volatility has collapsed, US economic data continue to defy even the mild slowdown proponents and the ECB seems to have backstopped the European banking system.</p> <p>Yes, my dear reader. This is how quickly you move from away from the apocalyptic abyss <span style="color:#777"> . . . &#8594; Read More: <a href="http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/23/first-act-of-greek-default-proceedings-drawing-to-a-close/">First Act of Greek Default Proceedings Drawing to a Close</a></span>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Global stock markets are up about 10% since the beginning of the year, volatility has collapsed, US economic data continue to defy even the mild slowdown proponents and the ECB seems to have backstopped the European banking system.</p>
<p>Yes, my dear reader. This is how quickly you move from away from the apocalyptic abyss and back to normal. My base case is that we are close to excess complacency in equity markets and a sell off is overdue, but it is exactly also under these circumstances (where smart money start to hedge) that the market may deliver one final run up to get everyone and the postman in before hosing everyone.</p>
<p>In the short term, one of the only remaining stumbling block in the form of the ongoing default proceedings in Greece seem to be no match for the ongoing positive animal spirit of the equity market. Only a week ago, we got news <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-13/greece-bank-creditor-group-says-debt-talks-on-hold-amid-failure-to-agree.html">that talks in Greece had stalled</a>, but most recently we have been reassured that <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-13/greece-bank-creditor-group-says-debt-talks-on-hold-amid-failure-to-agree.html">talks are back on track</a>.</p>
<p>The main niggle on the first occasion appeared to be what kind of interest rate that investors would get on their new bonds and thus, ultimately, the loss of face value currently said to be 50% but also, by some, claimed to be as high 62.5%. Another issue would be whether Greece would pass legislation that forces investors to participate in the debt swap if a majority of investors agree to the PSI terms. This was specifically being discussed in the context of a particular group of investors holding both CDS contracts and the underlying bond and who would maximize their payout on the former by forcing through a hard default.</p>
<p>None of the terms seems have changed massively in the past week, but time is running out with March the 20th set as the final deadline as this is when Greece would otherwise have to make a payment of 4.5 billion-euro ($18.7 billion) on maturing debt. The general consensus is that if no agreement is reached, this date would mark the hard default. The reason for the optimism is then that we are very close to full surrender in the form of a 90% participation rate of creditors and, we are told, it is only a matter of time before the final 10% agrees.</p>
<p>The details reported so far are as follows;</p>
<p><em>Quote Bloomberg (21 Jan 2012)</em></p>
<blockquote><p>The parties are near an initial agreement under which old bonds would be swapped for new 30-year securities carrying a coupon that would begin at 3.1 percent, reach 3.9 percent and go as high as 4.75 percent, Athens-based newspaper Proto Thema reported on its website yesterday, without saying where it got the information.</p></blockquote>
<p>The desired macroeconomic outcome of all this is obviously well advertised. In 2020, Greece is supposed to have a government debt to GDP ratio of 120% and presumingly some form of growth that would allow this level of debt to stay stationary or perhaps even decline over time.</p>
<p>Let me be clear absolutely clear here. Within any conceivably realistic macroeconomic model, there is <em>no way</em> that Greece can reach a stable debt level with moderate growth under these conditions. Under the interest rate scenario noted above (let us with a average interest rate of 3.8% on the new debt) the nominal interest rate would still be substantially higher than the growth rate of the economy. The only way, the <em><strong>nominal</strong></em> debt level could then be kept stationary is by forcing the fiscal balance into surplus. However, the problem is that this affects the denominator in the debt/GDP calculation by sucking out demand (growth) from an economy already structurally impaired (within a currency union and all that).</p>
<p>The implications are clear. The promises of stability that the PSI currently holds (even if it comes with considerable pledges of IMF money) are bound to disappoint.</p>
<p><strong>First act of several to come</strong></p>
<p>First of all, let us be clear. Despite, politicians&#8217; mortal fright to use the D-word and the media&#8217;s acceptance of this fact on the basis that CDS contracts are not activated under the PSI, this is a stone wall default. Anyone, who bothered to take <a href="http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2007/spring/pdf/martinez.pdf">merely a</a> <a href="http://personal.lse.ac.uk/FOLEYFIS/Sovereign%20Debt%20Discussion.pdf">scant look</a> <a href="http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/chapters/0262195534chapm1.pdf">at the history of sovereign defaults</a> will see that the current Greek situation fits well within all the models. Indeed, the proposition that this is not a default because CDS contracts are not activated is ludicrous since in the vast majority of sovereign defaults, the debtor country begins negotiations with creditors well before the actual default is forced upon it. The fact that insurance contracts bought to protect a creditor involved in such negotiations have now been rendered useless says more about the nature of the our modern financial system than it does about the definition of a sovereign default.</p>
<p>Hence, we come to the real nature of this game.</p>
<p>The deal which now seems to be close to completed by no means closes proceedings. It is very likely in my opinion that private creditors who are currently the only ones being forced to take a haircut to seniority of the IMF and the ECB will face a near 100% loss on their holdings. The argument here is simple. Given the amount of debt held by the ECB and the IMF and the fact that these two institutions are senior debt holders the debt held by private creditors become something else than actual bonds. It becomes equity, i.e. the tranche which takes the first (and often complete) loss in the event of a default.</p>
<p>Of course, once we reach this point the issue of CDS contracts will rear its head yet again since if a 50-60% haircut can be considered voluntary anything beyond this becomes very difficult to characterize as such. Any rating agency would find it difficult not to classify further losses as a default and thus begins the fun in earnest. And then comes the ECB and IMF&#8217;s share. It will be politically dynamite if the ECB had to print on the liability side to cover losses on the asset side on Greek sovereign debt [1].</p>
<p>Finally, Greece only represents the starter here. Any deal agreed on in Greece will be ardently watched in Ireland and Portugal who will feel they are entitled to the same deal with their private creditors.</p>
<p>Most tragedies have several acts, twists and turns. Investors should expect no less from the one currently being played out in the European sovereign debt markets.</p>
<p>&#8211;</p>
<p>[1] &#8211; In practice the ECB could do nothing and see its balance sheet shrink with the amount lost on the asset side (i.e. reduce lending to the banking system (delevering) with the amount lost on the bonds). However, it is likely that it would &#8220;need&#8221; to credit reserves with the amount lost on Greek bonds (hence printing money). Mind you, only a central bank could do this as it is free to increase the assets of the banking system by creating its own liabilities.</p>
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		<title>Banking follies in the eurozone</title>
		<link>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/18/banking-follies-in-the-eurozone/</link>
		<comments>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/18/banking-follies-in-the-eurozone/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Jan 2012 20:05:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Claus Vistesen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[International Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[collateral]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ECB]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Eurozone]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government debt]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/?p=10662</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Edward Hugh has a brilliant analysis of recent events in the eurozone and especially how banks are leveraging the liquidity provided by the ECB to &#8220;cleanse&#8221; their balance sheet of bad assets and essentially exchanging these for freshly minted euro deposits at the ECB. I think we should be very clear what is going <span style="color:#777"> . . . &#8594; Read More: <a href="http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/18/banking-follies-in-the-eurozone/">Banking follies in the eurozone</a></span>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.economonitor.com/edwardhugh/2012/01/16/the-massendowngrade-effect/">Edward Hugh has a brilliant analysis</a> of recent events in the eurozone and especially how banks are leveraging the liquidity provided by the ECB to &#8220;cleanse&#8221; their balance sheet of bad assets and essentially exchanging these for freshly minted euro deposits at the ECB. I think we should be very clear what is going on here; this is essentially a covert recapitalisation of the European banking system and the ECB is in every sense of the word acting as a lender of last resort.</p>
<p>Here is the relevant part;</p>
<blockquote><p>Another area where the transfer of liquidity doesn’t show up as a change in aggregate excess liquidity is when banks offload their wholesale liabilities to other EuroArea banks and refund via the ECB. Here again, if they do it smartly, they can even earn a bit of “quasi carry” in the process, by buying back their debt at well below face value from those who are anxious to exit the periphery, and then refinancing at the ECB without writing down the underlying asset. This could be termed a liability “write down”, and again the procedure earns the bank a nice bit of income which can subsequently be used to help the recapitalisation process.</p>
<p>Take the Portuguese Bank BPI (the country’s fourth largest), which is making <a href="http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/0410V_-2012-1-5.pdf">public tender offers to buy back its debt</a>. If all concerned tender their bonds to BPI, BPI will pay something short of  €1.5bn cash to investors. Mortgages which were previously sitting in one of their SPVs will return to their balance sheet, and ECB money will now be on the other side financing them allowing significant profits (and capital) to be reported. In this particular tender the smallest discount is 35% and the largest is 65%. Investors may initially balk at the offer, since they will nurse a heavy loss (equal, naturally, to BPI´s profit) but ultimately they will probably be only too happy to be able to walk away from Portugal, and  with some cash in their pocket to boot.</p>
<p>Iberian banks were already aware of  the benefits of this kind of restructuring during the 2009-2010 liquidity wave, and went about quietly repurchasing their bonds (bank capital, securitizations, senior bonds) on a selective and private basis at a discount. Much of their reported profits in those years in fact came from either the ECB carry trade or this kind of  transaction.  So when we read that another Portuguese bank – Banco Espirito Santo – <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-08/espirito-santo-issues-3-year-debt-guaranteed-by-portuguese-state.html">has just had €1 billion of debt guaranteed by the Portuguese state</a> (a sovereign which can’t itself go to the markets) it isn’t hard to imagine that the process going on in the background is something similar to that seen in the BPI case, and that the debt is being guaranteed so it can  go over to the ECB to be posted as collateral.</p>
<p>The National Bank of Greece has been doing something similar. They recently offered to buy back some €1.5 billion in covered bonds and preferred securities,<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-03/national-bank-of-greece-announces-tender-for-covered-bonds.html">offering 70% of face value for the covered bonds and 45% for the preferred hybrids</a>. As the bank itself says, “The purpose of the offers is to generate core Tier 1 capital for the group and to strengthen the quality of its capital base….The offers would generate a gain for the group.”</p>
<p>And Italian banks would seem to be doing something similar, <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20111221-712909.html">since they issued around €40 billion in government backed bonds specifically to take to the ECB</a>. The bonds are held by the banks themselves and stay on their books to maturity, their only purpose being to provide collateral for use at the ECB. In fact <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/12/21/uk-ecb-italy-idUKTRE7BK1EN20111221?feedType=RSS&amp;feedName=everything&amp;virtualBrandChannel=11708">Italian banks took something like €116 billion</a> from the LTRO, or almost 25% of the total. Perhaps this is why <a href="http://www.blogger.com/goog_1095155813">Unicredit </a><span><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/16/us-unicredit-ecb-idUSTRE7AF1PH20111116">CEO Federico Ghizzoni and other European top bankers met ECB officials in Frankfurt</a> back in November, to discuss new rules for collateral.</span></p>
<p>In Spain securitised mortgages sitting on the balance sheets of the <a href="http://www.edt-sg.com/shareholders">bank-owned</a><a href="http://www.edt-sg.com/">Fondos de Titulizacion de Activos</a> could also be recycled in this way (<a href="http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/fvc/fvc_es.html">here’s a complete list</a>, although note that these Funds are regulated by Spain’s CNMV and not the Bank of Spain, which is why their presence is relatively unknown and people are able to accurately say that the central bank has been very strict on SIVs, since they weren’t their responsibility).</p>
<p>That something like this may be happening, with the ECB “buying into” public and private  Euro Periphery debt  while investors are discretely getting out is <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-15/euro-decoupling-as-draghi-rate-cuts-fail-to-restore-correlation-confidence.html">suggested by this report in Bloomberg</a>:</p>
<p>The euro is losing the relationship with riskier assets that underpinned the currency in 2011 as the deepening sovereign debt crisis reduces the creditworthiness of even the biggest economies in the region. The 17-nation currency has fallen 8.7 percent against the dollar since October, while the Standard &amp; Poor’s 500 Index has gained 3.4 percent, and the correlation between the two dropped to 58 percent from a record 91 percent in November, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The euro had moved almost in lockstep with investments linked to growth, including stocks and the Australian dollar, since January 2011.</p>
<p>This decoupling is taking place as European Central Bank President Mario Draghi cuts interest rates and promises banks unlimited cash for three years to rein in soaring borrowing costs for governments… Strategists also anticipate more losses as the US economy improves while the euro zone shrinks, driving international investors away from the region’s assets.</p>
<p>So if the first two objectives were to help the struggling sovereigns, and enable the commercial banks to refinance their debt, then to some extent these objectives have been met. But what about the third objective, moving credit on the periphery to get the real economy moving again? Well, here the ECB’s measures are likely to have far less effect, and indeed what effect they do have may be in some way a mixed blessing, since the banks seem far more worried about demonstrating they have an adequate level of core capital than they are about participating in solutions to real economy problems.</p></blockquote>
<p>While I would, in general, be hesitant in taking anything from Zero Hedge at full face value I think <a href="http://www.zerohedge.com/news/funny-thing-happened-way-ltro">the following story on Unicredit</a> adds flavor to this by providing further evidence on the points Edward mentions above.</p>
<p>The story is clearly speculative but gets backing from Edward&#8217;s accout above. The following seems to be a part of the general process which in itself is, in my view, absolutely mad.</p>
<blockquote><p>Banks in weak countries have been issuing debt, getting a government guarantee, and then posting them as collateral at the ECB. There are examples of this for Greek banks for sure, but my understanding is it has also been occurring in Portugal and Ireland. It is the only way banks in Greece (and the other countries) can raise money.</p></blockquote>
<p>The article then goes on to make this more alarming point (but really does not have evidence to back it up) that it appears that about €40 billion of the first LTRO was done by Italian banks (Unicredit?) that issued bonds to themselves and got a government guarantee, and then posted this asset as collateral for liquidity through the LTRO.</p>
<p>So, here is how I understand it.</p>
<p>Unicredit issues a 3m bill and gets a government guarantee so that whoever chooses to buy this bill knows that it will be backed by the sovereign (after all, this is still better than the bank even if the two are joined by the hip). The only problem is that it is being issued to <em>itself</em> with a permanent guarantee from the government.</p>
<p>From an accounting perspective this must be close to illegal in any meaningfully lawful jurisdiction, but I defer to experts here of course. The issue here is not then that the sovereign is guaranteeing a liability of a bank, we have seen this plenty of times and it is indeed the only way that some financials can issue debt, but rather that the bond never gets marketed to third party buyers.</p>
<p>It is absolutely astonishing that this 3m bill is then being posted as collateral at the ECB. But you must understand that it has to be posted as such as far as I can see since you can&#8217;t hold your own liabilities.  So, the banks posts a bond issued to itself and posts it at the ECB and get freshly minted fresh euros credited to its bank account at the ECB. After the process, Unicredit still has the bond as a liability but instead of the same bond on the asset side (which is impossible) it has a deposit asset with the ECB.</p>
<p>If this is true, and the ECB is agreeing to this I must admit that it amounts to a serious bout of banking follies in the European banking industry.</p>
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		<title>The perils of European debt crisis: divergence, retreat or decline?</title>
		<link>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/16/the-perils-of-european-debt-crisis-divergence-retreat-or-decline/</link>
		<comments>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/16/the-perils-of-european-debt-crisis-divergence-retreat-or-decline/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Jan 2012 12:20:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Rok Spruk</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[International Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bailout]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Eurozone]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[financial crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[GDP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government debt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[transfer of wealth]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/?p=10578</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Recent debacle at the summit of Brussels in the midst of the political intervention of the EU leaders to facilitate the institutional agreement between the European countries towards the formation of the European fiscal union has caused not only a long-standing dissolution of the “core countries” of the Eurozone and the UK but, more <span style="color:#777"> . . . &#8594; Read More: <a href="http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/16/the-perils-of-european-debt-crisis-divergence-retreat-or-decline/">The perils of European debt crisis: divergence, retreat or decline?</a></span>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recent debacle at the summit of Brussels in the midst of the political intervention of the EU leaders to facilitate the institutional agreement between the European countries towards the formation of the European fiscal union has caused not only a long-standing dissolution of the “core countries” of the Eurozone and the UK but, more importantly, a non-solvable puzzle on the end scenario of the European debt crisis that pervaded both the eurozone and the countries outside it ever since the beginning of the 2008/2009 financial crisis. The anatomy of the European debt crisis is a multifaceted process that is heavily interrelated with the economic principles of the process of European integration and the unintended consequences that erupted in the recent debt crisis.</p>
<p>The introduction of Maastricht criteria that stipulated fiscal prudence by obliging EU member states to adhere to the level of public debt below 60 percent of the GDP and low fiscal deficit boosted the expectations of stable macroeconomic environment, partly sustained by the European Central Bank which, since its inception in 1999, successfully maintained price stability. Despite an enviable achievement in the stabilization of inflation expectations, the EU Treaty did not stipulate stringent fiscal rules in case of the breach of treaty obligations on behalf of EU member states, neither has European Growth and Stability Pact (EGSP) provided selective mechanisms that would hinge on the EU member state in case Maastricht criteria were not fulfilled. On the other hand, the gradual enlargement of the European union did not finalize in the economic union characterized by the realization of four basic freedoms.</p>
<div>In 1977, Portugal and Spain were acceded into the European Union. Four years late, Greece was admitted as the 12th member of the European community. Over time, the EU grew from an integrated area of 15 Western European countries into a conglomerate of nations that did not impinge of the full-fledged liberalization of the internal market in 1988 but, moreover, has evolved into the spiral that accelerated the community toward the political union. In the mean time, member states of the Eurozone have continuously breached the rules laid out by Maastricht treaty. In bearing the fiscal consequences of the reunification, Germany repeatedly breached the Maastricht criteria both in public debt and fiscal deficit which postponed the introduction of the Euro, following a large shock from gigantic fiscal transfers from high-income West Germany into low-income East German regions. In a similar manner, until 2005, France did not manage to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio under the 60 percent threshold stipulated by the Maastricht criteria.</div>
<div>Nevertheless, peripheral countries such as Spain and Portugal entered the Eurozone at an overvalued exchange rate relative to German mark before the introduction of the common currency. In the following years, these countries, notably Spain, accumulated significant current account surpluses resulted from the inflows of direct investment from the core countries such as Germany and France. These surpluses were, of course, artificial in the sense that the downward convergence of interest rates in the peripheral countries stimulated the over-leveraging of the financial sector which triggered a balloon in the housing sector.</p>
<p>For years, Italy and Greece have repeatedly breached the Maastricht treaty in the fiscal sense. Prior to adjoining the European Monetary Union, Greece repeatedly experienced volatile inflation rates and default on its external obligations and subsequent Drachma depreciation. Italy’s macroeconomic stabilization hinged on the discretion of government spending which, after excessive rises under various transition governments, cumulated in one of the highest debt ratios within the EMU. How could EMU countries, despite a stringent set of rules delineated by the Treaty of Maastricht, pursued discretionary fiscal policies and jeopardized the macroeconomic stability of the national economies and the Eurozone?</p></div>
<div>Prior to the onset of the financial crisis by the end of 2007, little was known on the perils of excessively leveraged balance sheets which investment banks used to seek high rates of return on high-yield and relatively risky peripheral regions. Until 2007, the exposure of major German investment to over-leveraged financial sector in countries such as Spain and Greece generated sizeable spillover effect. Before the onset of the financial crisis, Spain enjoyed sizeable current account deficit resulted from excessively high and robust overall investment. In 2007, Spain’s investment-to-GDP ratio (31 percent) was roughly comparable to developing Asia. In such highly volatile environment where economic growth departed from its long-run fundamentals, even small-scale macroeconomic shocks can result in a substantial loss of economic activity, notwithstanding the spillovers in the banking system and labor market.</p>
<p>The asymmetry in political structures and underlying macroeconomic fundamentals across member countries casts significant doubt in the long-term stability of the Eurozone as an area with common monetary policy. The necessary condition for the inception of common monetary policy does not hinge on the political initiatives that pervaded the process of European integration but on the careful consideration whether adjoining countries adhere to the macroeconomic criteria as denoted by the Maastricht Treaty. The failure to adhere to the contours of fiscal prudence and budgetary discipline by the major EU member states, with few notable exceptions such as the Netherlands, Austria and Finland, lies at heart of the underlying reasons why significant asymmetry and non-coordination in fiscal policy resulted in the adoption of dispersed economic policies whereas the adverse outcomes were not foreseen neither by the politicians neither by policy advisers and academics.</p></div>
<div>To a large extent, as the recent debt crisis has succinctly demonstrated, the ultimate goal of the European monetary integration was the build-up of political union. But whereas European politicians were preoccupied with all-embracing design of the EU as unitary political union, they forgot to acknowledge that political union would require the full convergence of economic policies including the integration of the labor market which hardly any political initiative within the EU deemed feasible.</p>
<p>The non-coordination of fiscal policymakers was highly evident in the division of member states on the core countries and EU periphery. Considering the peripherical countries, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece repeatedly proved ill-disciplined in managing the levels of public debt and the magnitude of the budgetary imbalance. Portugal is often the case in point. Prior to the introduction of the Euro, Portugal experienced unprecedented economic boom. Between 1995 and 2001, economic growth averaged 4 percent per annum and the unemployment rate reduced from 7 percent to 4 percent by the end of 2001.</p></div>
<div>At the same time, nominal wages grew rapidly without the necessary productivity growth compensating for the increase unit labor cost. Alongside the overheating of economic activity, driven by construction boom, current account deficits increased significantly, lowering domestic savings rate. After the country experienced a mild recession in 2003 when domestic output decreased by 1 percent on the annual basis, the slowing of artificial economic growth driven by the Euro boom, turned from temporary into permanent. In the period 2002-2010, growth of domestic output averaged at the level of no more than 1 percent per annum with stagnating productivity and significant pressure on nominal wages. Since the size of the labor cost is the major deterrent on growth, the cure for Portuguese ailing economy is the structural adjustment in the public sector such as the reduction of public debt by generating substantial primary fiscal surpluses and the lowering of government spending. Similarly, the experience of Greece, Spain and Italy suggests the evolution of the same pattern evolving over time although Italy has been known as low-growing economy during the boom time.</p>
<p>However, fiscal policymakers in peripheral countries repeatedly produced ill-conceived fiscal mismanagement of public finances. In 2008, the level of budgetary deficit in Greece exceeded 13 percent of the GDP whereas the country has not adhered to Maastricht criteria ever since the introduction of the Euro. After the depreciation, the net debt as percent of GDP in Greece reached 85 percent of GDP and increased to 110 percent of GDP by the end of 2008. As IMF’s recent forecasts suggest, by 2012, Greece’s public net debt could reach 175 percent of GDP.</p></div>
<div>The failure to adhere to the common set of principles as delegated by the Maastricht treaty and EU Stability and Growth Pact in the peripheral countries stemmed largely from the mismanagement of public finances and structural rigidity of the public sector with resulting increases in the burden of the labor cost. In addition, the adoption of extraordinary measures embedded in the public sector such as very low effective retirement age and substantial bonuses for civil servants exacerbated the burden of the public debt with unforeseen net financial liabilities of governments which have not mitigated the persistent burden of public debt that grew substantially over time in the EU periphery.</p>
<p>A natural question is whether the exclusion of peripheral countries from the Eurozone might be feasible and whether Greece’s default on external obligations might help overcome country’s mountainous strain on public debt. First, the re-adoption of domestic currencies is hardly a solution to overcome the intricacies of debt crisis. If Greece re-introduced drachma, external obligations would be strained by a painful and enduring bank run since investors would withdraw the deposits from the portfolio and invest it into safer holding with less volatility and uncertainty ahead. Another argument in favor of Greece exiting the Eurozone is that a devaluation of drachma would boost inflationary expectations and consequently reduce the burden of the public debt but given junk score on government bonds, a rather immediate bank run would follow the devaluation of drachma rather than macroeconomic stabilization.</p></div>
<div>In addition, when Greece’s domestic output is growing far below the long-term potential, inflationary expectations is not a feasible tool to revive the economy from deflationary trap with 16 percent unemployment Moreover, the only feasible and meaningful short-term strategy to boost growth is the reduction of the size of the public sector including the privatization of inefficient state-owned enterprises to generate substantial fiscal surpluses since this is the only plausible measure to tackle the increasing burden of the public debt. As the history of financial crises suggests, the eruptions of banking crises occurred mostly when governments rested on currency devaluations as the ultimate tool to reduce the burden of external debt. In addition, if Greece defaulted on its external obligations, CDS spreads could indicate a snowball effect where Spain, Portugal and possibly Italy could follow the same track.</p>
<p>The question is whether non-coordination between European fiscal policies helped facilitate over-leveraged financial sectors which asked for the bailout by central governments in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis. Over-leveraged financial sectors were attributed to the determinants of various extent. Some argued that over-leveraging is the outcome of innovative financial engineering where fancy mathematicians and physicists applied VaR models to calculate the probability of losses in the portfolio distribution of returns whereas the financial derivative schemes developed by advanced and complex mathematical models were so complicated that nobody, sometimes even mathematicians themselves, could understand sensibly.</p></div>
<div>On the other hand, the monetary policy perspective of over-leveraged financial sectors has been rather overlooked in policy discussions since periodically low interest rates encourage excessive risk-taking which further facilitated the construction of portfolios with excessively volatile returns that increasingly relied on VaR assumptions whilst fundamentally ignoring the instability of returns from over-leveraged investments. But a more intriguing question pertaining to the banking perspective of financial crises is whether more prudent financial regulation as envisaged from recent stress tests by European Banking Authority can be achieved by raising capital adequacy standards. Unfortunately, the history of Basel accords demonstrates that the banking sector has been prone to search alternative channels to avoid raising capital adequacy ratios through innovative accounting tricks whereas neither Basel I and II envisaged the adverse outcomes from excessive risk-taking. As stress tests indicated, capital adequacy ratios should be increased substantially but, moreover, the regulatory framework should not only build on increasing criteria on Tier I capital and common equity but also on the safeguard despositary insurance of contingent liabilities to mitigate liquidity risk that led to the systemic crisis.</p>
<p>The solution to revive the Eurozone economy and revive it from a decade of flawed political imperatives should not exclude multiple options. The focal point of the Eurozone’s recovery from debt crisis should be to help peripheral countries establishment fiscal prudence, discipline and soundness of the public finances. In fact, the recovery from the debt crisis will endure for more than a decade. The structural adjustment does not rest on the ability of the EU to provide financial assistance to peripheral countries but on the principled and coordinated action to reform inefficient public sectors which are at the heart of the debt spiral since years of generous entitlements to civil servants have tremendously raised the net present value of public debt to the point that peripheral countries are on the brink of default on its external obligations. Without generating substantial fiscal surpluses, there is no feasibility and no realistic scenario under which public debt level would be brought under the control in the near-term perspective. Hence, recent discussions of the consequences of debt crisis in Europe have simply overlooked the importance of growth-enhancing measures as the real cure for growing debt-to-GDP ratio where the measures do not apply to peripheral countries only.</p>
<p>First, in the wake of fiscal insolvency of public pension systems, effective retirement age should be raised substantially for men and women alike. The studies have shown that under the increase in effective retirement age to 65 years, long-term fiscal obligations would reduce and consequently an important step towards long-term macroeconomic stability would be achieved. Nearly every European country is facing low-fertility trap followed from increased affluence and generous early-retirement policies from 1970s onward. Consequently, European government have amounted a mountain of net financial liabilities that exceeded the size of GDP by several times, respectively. Decreasing the size of net liabilities to contemporary and future generations of retirees, requires a robust increase in effective retirement age. Higher retirement age threshold would substantially increase working-age population by encouraging labor market participation among the elderly. Current levels of effective retirement age are unsustainable in the long-run since a growing burden of pension obligations can seriously threaten the stability of the public finance and increase the probability of fiscal insolvency.</p>
<p>Second, European countries suffer from low productivity growth. In some countries, such as Italy productivity growth has remained stagnant over the course of recent two decades while elsewhere productivity growth is to slow to compensate for the increase in nominal wage rates. The evidence, in fact, overwhelmingly suggested that high tax rates are the prime obstacle to greater labor market participation, particularly among the elderly who face high implicit tax rates on work. In particular, to facilitate the channels of productivity growth, marginal tax rates should be decreased substantially. At current levels, marginal tax rates restrain labor supply significantly. In the Netherlands, the top marginal income tax rates reached 52 percent in 2011 which is a serious hinder on the working activity.  In this respect, bold tax reforms should be complemented with more flexible labor markets which remain saddled with employment regulations and distort labor supply incentives. Less regulated labor market to supplement greater labor force participation, especially among women, elderly and the youth is vital to enhance productivity growth since living standards by the end of the day are determined by productivity improvements.</p>
<p>Ultimately and most importantly, peripheral countries should be given a free choice whether to withdraw from the EMU since recent financial crisis has shown that Eurozone is a suboptimal currency area which emerged from non-cooperative fiscal policies among its member states that caused adverse outcomes and asymmetric adjustment where macroeconomic stabilization outcomes are mutually exclusive among member states. Asymmetry adjustment that currently threatens the existence and stability of Eurozone lies at the heart of Eurozone’s debt crisis. As a general matter, economic policies have failed to recognize that structural measures in the labor market and fiscal policy regime could facilitate growth enhancement and provide the necessary impetus to stabilization of crisis-impeded monetary union. Recent suggestions by France and Germany for EU member states to form a fiscal union have led to sustained resistance from the UK which dissolved from the fiscal pact.</p></div>
<div>The ultimate grain of truth in the fiscal union is that a monetary union necessarily requires the coordination of fiscal policies to prevent adverse and asymmetric policy outcomes within the union. The fateful conclusion from recent EU debt crisis is that without the integration of the labor market on the EU level, the monetary integration cannot exist in coherence with asymmetric fiscal policies. In the future, stricter adherence to budgetary discipline will be necessary through budgetary authority. In this respect, countries that fail to adhere to Maastricht criteria and deviate from the fiscal discipline either marginally or substantially should be condemned and pay for their actions of fiscal imprudence by withdrawing from the monetary union.</div>
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		<title>Look for End of Debt Supercycle: Thoughts from the U.S. Global Investors 2012 Forecast</title>
		<link>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/11/look-for-end-of-debt-supercycle-thoughts-from-the-u-s-global-investors-2012-forecast/</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Jan 2012 15:00:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>The Gold Report</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Financial Markets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[GDP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government debt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government spending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Japan]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/?p=10507</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p> What do investors need to be watching out for in 2012? More Eurozone drama? Record gold highs? A hard landing in China? The U.S. Global Investors team addressed these questions with Endgame: The End of the Debt Supercycle author John Mauldin in a Jan. 5 Outlook 2012 webinar. The Streetwise Reports editors highlight <span style="color:#777"> . . . &#8594; Read More: <a href="http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/11/look-for-end-of-debt-supercycle-thoughts-from-the-u-s-global-investors-2012-forecast/">Look for End of Debt Supercycle: Thoughts from the U.S. Global Investors 2012 Forecast</a></span>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="padding-top: 5px;" src="http://www.streetwisereports.com/images/John_Mauldin.jpg" alt="John Mauldin" hspace="10" width="82" height="102" align="left" /> <img style="padding-top: 5px;" src="http://www.streetwisereports.com/images/FrankHolmes_rev.jpg" alt="Frank Holmes" hspace="10" width="82" height="102" align="left" /> What do investors need to be watching out for in 2012? More Eurozone drama? Record gold highs? A hard landing in China? The <a href="http://www.usfunds.com/index.cfm" target="_blank">U.S. Global Investors</a> team addressed these questions with <em>Endgame: The End of the Debt Supercycle</em> author John Mauldin in a Jan. 5 Outlook 2012 webinar. The Streetwise Reports editors highlight some of the expert insights.</p>
<p><strong>John Mauldin:</strong> Instead of doing an annual forecast, I&#8217;m going to  look out about five years, which may be five times more foolish. What I  want to do rather than try and figure out where the stock market is  going to be at the end of 2012 or what gold is going to do, is look at  the choices we have around the world.</p>
<p>In most cases, political  events don&#8217;t change the economic world all that much. It&#8217;ll probably  annoy partisans on both sides, but if Clinton had lost to George Bush  senior the first time, we would have still had a bull market. We were  already in recovery. Yes, we would have had different Supreme Court  Justices, but that&#8217;s not the economic world. We were set on a path. If  Gore had beaten Bush 2, economically I don&#8217;t think much would have  changed. We still would have had the end of a bull market and a  recession in 2001. We would have had a housing bubble. Greenspan would  have probably been reappointed either way. We would have had a credit  crisis because we were in the process of building up debt that started  in the &#8217;50s. Europe was building its debt up. Japan was building its  debt up. That is the reality.</p>
<p>Now the private sector is  deleveraging, but sovereign debt is in a bubble. The air is coming out.  My view is that the wheels are going to fall off Europe this year. I  have been researching the Mayan codes and I have determined that the  ancient Mayans were not astrologers; they were economists. They weren&#8217;t  predicting the end of the world; they were simply predicting the end of  Europe. That is a humorous way of saying this is the year Europe is  going to have to make some very difficult choices. Greece gets to choose  what kind of depression it wants, hard and fast or slow and long. It  can&#8217;t avoid depression completely. It has borrowed too much money. The  government is too big. It has come to the end of the ability to raise  money at low rates. Italy and Spain are well on that path along with the  rest of Europe. So, they have to make a decision, a political decision  that is going to have major economic consequences.</p>
<p>Does Europe  want to be a political union that looks more like the United States,  where the individual entities have to run balanced budgets and can&#8217;t  print their own money and have some kind of fiscal controls or they go  back to a two-tiered Europe with multiple currencies. One way or  another, this is the year that Europe is running out of road to kick the  can.</p>
<p>Fortunately, in the U.S. we are not there yet. We have  some room to make a decision. That decision is going to be made in 2012  because by 2013 we are going to have to decide how we deal with the  deficits and debt. After 2014, the bond markets will start to raise  rates. Total U.S. debt is continuing to grow because governments are  growing debt faster than private citizens are decreasing debt. The bond  markets are starting to rebel long before you would think they would for  a country that&#8217;s the world reserve currency. The key is whether debt is  excessive relative to income. If you can make your debt service, people  will still lend you money. When they don&#8217;t think you can, they will  stop. That&#8217;s when you have a crisis. It&#8217;s a debt super cycle. And, when  you reach the end, you have to deal with the debt. You can pay it down.  You can default on it. You can print the money, extend it out with lower  rates or financial repression, which are all other ways to look at  default. But, nonetheless, that debt is there.</p>
<p>The problem we  are facing in the U.S. is that gross domestic product (GDP) is  consumption plus investment plus government spending plus net exports.  If we decrease government spending over time, we decrease GDP. That&#8217;s  the problem that Greece is going through right now. It has to decrease  government spending by 4.5%, thus shrinking the economy. But it can&#8217;t  increase government spending without increasing debt or taking taxes  away, which decreases consumption. Nothing the government does will make  things better. The U.S. is on the same path. We can become Greece by  continuing to borrow or be proactive and say we are going to get our  deficits under control over a period of five or six years. The economy  is still going to be slower than we would like and unemployment higher  than we would like. That&#8217;s just the rules. We&#8217;re at the end game. We are  at the end of the debt super cycle and that&#8217;s what happens.</p>
<p>Printing  money doesn&#8217;t increase the GDP in actual real terms, but it makes  everyone holding gold happy because the value of natural resources goes  up. That is why I buy gold every month. I take those coins, I put them  in a vault and I hope I never need them. I quite frankly hope gold goes  back to $300/ounce (oz) because that means the economy is in wonderful  shape. I&#8217;m actually afraid that gold is going to go up in value, which  means we are not getting our act together.</p>
<p>That leads to  questions about fault. Did the banks do things they shouldn&#8217;t have? Yes.  Were they the cause of it? No. Was Greenspan the cause of the bubble?  No. He was part of the cause. I mean, we did a lot of things as a  country that weren&#8217;t good choices. Should we have allowed our banks to  go to 30 and 40 to 1 leverage? No. Should we have repealed  Glass-Steagall? No. The problem is that real median household income  hasn&#8217;t moved for 15 years because real private GDP hasn&#8217;t changed. The  only thing that has grown is government spending.</p>
<p><strong>John Derrick: </strong> In 2011, the European financial crisis moved from the periphery to the  core. Central bank policies were big drivers of the decline. The  European Central Bank and China raised rates early in the year and again  in July as fears of a China slowdown grew. That early tightening to  fend off inflation had a big impact on the course of events throughout  the year. The other big events were the U.S. credit downgrade in August  and currency intervention, particularly in the Japanese yen.</p>
<p><strong>Frank Holmes:</strong> There is a huge amount of borrowing around the world in Japanese yen  because it is so inexpensive. That includes investing in commodities,  resources and emerging markets. And, every time we see this huge signal  move by the yen, you get this rippling effect that takes about six weeks  to resolve itself with commodities being sold down. Therefore, a lot of  fund managers borrowing in Japanese yen are long energy stocks,  resource stocks and emerging markets, which leads to a lot of selling.</p>
<p><strong>JD: </strong>The  second half of last year was very volatile, but the market ended  essentially flat. In fact, much of the volatility was concentrated in  the last month, which made for a very difficult psychological  environment, as the market has been somewhat schizophrenic with weekly  rallies and selloffs.</p>
<p>Spikes in the yen caused market selloffs.  This hit commodities especially hard. So the secret for 2012 is to use  the volatility. Buy on the volatility spikes. Unfortunately, what most  people do is just the opposite. Another thing to look for in 2012 is a  positive fourth year of the presidential election cycle as the  government tries to implement policies that will get them reelected.</p>
<p><strong>Brian Hicks:</strong> There has been a lot of concern about money supply growth in the  emerging markets, particularly in China, which reduced bank reserve  requirements last year. A reacceleration of global money supply can be  particularly constructive for commodities going forward as there has  been a high correlation between money supply growth and commodities.</p>
<p>If  you were to take all the global money and back that by gold, the price  of gold could go to $10,000/oz. If you just use half of the global money  supply, gold would trade at about $5,000/oz, up from approximately  $1,600/oz right now. The more U.S. dollars in circulation, the higher  the price of gold. This has been the main factor increasing the price of  gold since 1998 and will continue to be the case in the years to come.  Gold has a lot of running room to go.</p>
<p>Another driver for the  price of gold has been federal deficits. Government spending is way  above revenues. We hit a point in 2000 where spending as a percentage of  GDP greatly exceeded taxes as a percentage of GDP. This could be a  point of no return and could potentially drive the price of gold even  higher. There has been a large bifurcation between the price of gold and  gold equities, particularly in the last couple of years as risk  aversion has prompted many investors to buy the bullion as opposed to  gold equities. This is creating opportunity. We feel like there&#8217;s going  to be a catch up in gold equities, many of which are trading at very low  multiples to cash flows and earnings. Stocks such as <a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/co/457" target="_blank">Newmont Mining Corp. (NEM:NYSE)</a> look like value stocks now paying high dividend yields and trading at  sub 10-times price to earnings ratios. This could really present an  attractive opportunity in 2012.</p>
<p><strong>JD: </strong>Just a comment on all  the takeovers. We were seeing 6% premiums on takeovers in &#8216;06. Now we  are talking 60+ premiums. That&#8217;s another reflection of how undervalued  the stocks are relative to commodities.</p>
<p><strong>BH: </strong>That&#8217;s a great point. We have seen tremendous value creation based on mergers and acquisitions.</p>
<p>Shifting  gears a little bit, crude oil and refined product inventories ended the  year at the lowest level on record (about 685 million barrels). That&#8217;s  6% below the prior year. It&#8217;s particularly interesting when you consider  some of the geopolitical factors that have arisen with Iran talking  about blocking off the Strait of Hormuz. This is a primary factor behind  oil price supports despite the tenuous economic environment. Many  investors don&#8217;t realize that Russia is very important for non-OPEC  (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) supply, a key factor in  containing oil price spikes. Russia is increasing production while other  non-OPEC production in Mexico or in the North Sea have been declining  significantly, which has helped to bolster OPEC&#8217;s market share. It has  also limited the ability of oil markets to increase production out of  the Middle East due to the inability to invest in those troubled areas.  In fact, Russian production has been quite steady since 2006, increasing  anywhere from 100 to 400,000 barrels per day (bpd), mid-single digit  growth. But, forecasters predict in 2012 we will see flat production  growth, which is troubling given the fact that we continue to see demand  increase in other areas of the world, mainly out of China. This will be  a driving factor going forward for crude oil prices.</p>
<p><strong>Evan Smith: </strong>Oil  supply threats include geopolitical problems at a time when oil supply  and spare capacity at OPEC is rather low—a little over 2 million bpd.  Nearly 40% of global supply is under autocratic rule. Iran has  threatened to disrupt the supply of crude oil and products through the  Strait of Hormuz where about a third of global oil supply passes. So,  any disruption, even temporarily, would cause a severe spike in oil  prices. We think oil prices could support $100/barrel. One of the things  we like in 2012 is higher exposure to master limited partnerships  partly because of their steady cash flows. They are becoming a growth  business now. The capital expenditures here in the United States have  grown from $3.5 billion (B) in 2005 to nearly $16B this year. This is  partly because of the growth in many of the shale plays, which require  increased infrastructure. We think this is an excellent investment  opportunity. We also see a big opportunity for the global oil services.  We can see that capital expenditures have been rising. We expect them to  rise from about $500B to nearly $.5 trillion this year, an increase of  15%. So, we see tremendous opportunity for some of the oil services  contractors and equipment providers. Another key driver is the  impressive amount of money that has been invested in North America. Just  over the last three years nearly $129B in mergers, acquisitions and  joint ventures has occurred. Global companies are coming to North  America to invest in these shale plays because the economics are so  attractive due to improved technology. They want to learn that  technology and take it home. So, we think there is continued opportunity  for investors in the resource play here in North America.</p>
<p>Shifting  gears, one of the base metals we will target is copper. It is our  favorite base metal. The demand side is holding up relatively well  compared to some of the other base metals. Even in China, which is the  largest market for copper growth, the build out of the grid is really a  key driver. That is holding up quite well. On the other side of the  supply/demand equation, supply has been a problem. Through most of the  boom in copper prices, mine output has lagged forecasts. Causes included  weather, labor strikes and just poor grade. The bottom line is that  supply has not kept up with demand. We have not solved that problem so  we think 2012 should be a relatively good year for copper prices.</p>
<p>Another  theme we like is the agricultural space. Global population continues to  grow. The emerging middle class continues to consume more grains,  principally through the production of more meat as people consume more  protein in their diets. There has been a huge surge in the need for the  production of grains, yet no more land is being created. One of the key  ways we&#8217;re seeing increased yields out of croplands is through higher  applications of fertilizers. That has created a fairly tight situation  for potash, specifically. But, other fertilizers such as nitrogen and  phosphate are also benefiting from this trend.</p>
<p><strong>FH: </strong>I  would just add that the world&#8217;s population has doubled from the &#8217;70s  when we had rising commodities. There&#8217;s a very different factor and  China and India have a global footprint that they didn&#8217;t have.</p>
<p><strong>Xian Liang: </strong>China  remains the biggest driver of world demand for energy due to a rising  middle class, but it is in a very early stage when it comes to  discretionary spending. Take for example passenger cars. Despite a  tremendous growth in auto consumption in the last decade, only 18% of  Chinese households own a car. Car ownership in China is just one-tenth  of U.S. levels or the same level it was in the U.S. in 1914. Air travel  remains at the U.S. equivalent of the 1950s. This illustrates a great  growth potential going forward. Urbanization is one of the most  significant trends driving consumption. In 2011, the number of urban  residents in China exceeded rural residents for the first time in  Chinese history. But, China won&#8217;t stop at this 50% urbanization rate if  the historical trajectory of its richer neighbor, South Korea, is any  guide. We could have another 30% of growth by the year 2013. South Korea  outgrew its urbanization rates in a 40-year time span. And, if China  continues to urbanize, there will be about 200 million new urban  households in China, which creates enormous demand for consumer staples,  durable goods and housing.</p>
<p>China&#8217;s government policies signal  the trend will continue. China raised reserve requirement ratios 12  times since January 2010. We view that as an early signal for the next  easing cycle. The last time China eased reserve ratios in October 2008,  that triggered a big market rally in Chinese stocks. This should bode  well for stocks. We don&#8217;t think the Chinese auto boom is over. Actually,  in the last couple of days, officials in China hinted that new measures  may be introduced to support auto and home appliance sales.</p>
<p>Outside  of China, we see government policies remaining very positive in  southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia and Thailand. The money supply  in the past two years has not deteriorated in these two countries, in  fact, it is growing at a healthy 16% year over year. This is part of the  reason why we remain positive on southeast Asia. Indonesia is rich in  natural resources, but it doesn&#8217;t depend as much on exports. In fact  two-thirds of its GDP is driven by domestic consumption, which is how it  managed to escape a recession in 2008 and 2009. Favorable demographics  is a factor. It is a very young country. More than 45% of the population  is under 24 years old and 2 million people a year are joining the work  force. Second, urbanization is creating new consumer demand. Just like  China, Indonesia&#8217;s household debt is low. Total mortgage loans  outstanding account for only 3% of GDP. Consumer credit is still at a  very early state. I see tremendous growth potential going forward.</p>
<p><strong>FH: </strong>The  money supply is growing very rapidly in the entire region. I think it&#8217;s  not just a China story. It&#8217;s a whole emerging market. And, I like to  characterize it as the American dream trade as all these countries want  the American dream. They all want a house. They want a car. They want  all the lifestyle that we have.</p>
<p><em><a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/htdocs/expert.html?id=5834" target="_blank"> John Derrick</a> joined U.S. Global Investors Inc. in January 1999 as an investment  analyst for the U.S. Global Investors money market and tax free funds.  In March 2004, he was promoted from portfolio manager to director of  research and now manages the day-to-day operations of the investment  team. Prior to joining U.S. Global Investors, Derrick worked at Fidelity  Investments. He has appeared on CNBC and Bloomberg TV and has also been  a guest on Marketwatch Radio and NPR. Derrick has been featured in  stories for </em>BusinessWeek, The New York Times, the <em>Associated Press and </em>USA Today.<em> A graduate of The University of Texas at Arlington, Derrick earned a  Bachelor of Arts in finance. He sits on the board of directors for the  CFA Society of San Antonio.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/htdocs/expert.html?id=5028" target="_blank">Brian Hicks</a> joined U.S. Global Investors Inc. in 2004 as a co-manager of the  company&#8217;s Global Resources Fund (PSPFX). He is responsible for portfolio  allocation, stock selection and research coverage for the energy and  basic materials sectors. Prior to joining U.S. Global Investors, Hicks  was an associate oil and gas analyst for A.G. Edwards Inc. He also  worked previously as an institutional equity/options trader and liaison  to the foreign equity desk at Charles Schwab &amp; Co., and at Invesco  Funds Group, Inc. as an industry research and product development  analyst. Hicks holds a Master of Science degree in finance, and a  bachelor&#8217;s in business administration from the University of Colorado.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/htdocs/expert.html?id=2317" target="_blank">Frank Holmes</a> is CEO and chief investment officer at U.S. Global Investors Inc.,  which manages a diversified family of mutual funds and hedge funds  specializing in natural resources, emerging markets and infrastructure.  In 2006 Mining Journal, a leading publication for the global resources  industry, chose him as mining fund manager of the year. Holmes  coauthored </em>The Goldwatcher: Demystifying Gold Investing<em> (2008). A  regular contributor to investor-education websites and speaker at  investment conferences, he writes articles for investment-focused  publications and appears on television as a business commentator.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/htdocs/expert.html?id=5835" target="_blank">Xian Liang</a> is an Asia research analyst at U.S. Global Investors Inc. and a Shanghai native.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/htdocs/expert.html?id=2226" target="_blank">John Mauldin</a> is the author of New York Times Best Sellers list four times. They include </em><a href="http://www.johnmauldin.com/research/books/bulls-eye-investing/" target="_blank">Bull&#8217;s Eye Investing:</a> Targeting Real Returns in a Smoke and Mirrors Market, <a href="http://www.johnmauldin.com/research/books/just-one-thing/" target="_blank">Just One Thing: </a> Twelve of the World&#8217;s Best Investors Reveal the One Strategy You Can&#8217;t Overlook <em>and </em><a href="http://www.johnmauldin.com/research/books/endgame/" target="_blank">Endgame:</a> The End of the Debt Supercycle and How it Changes Everything. <em>He also edits the free weekly e-letter </em><a href="http://www.johnmauldin.com/outsidethebox/" target="_blank">Outside the Box</a>.<em> Mauldin also offers </em><a href="http://www.mauldincircle.com/" target="_blank">The Mauldin Circle</a>, <em>a  free service that connects accredited investors to an exclusive network  of money managers and alternative investment opportunities. He is a  frequent contributor to publications including </em>The Financial Times<em> and </em>The Daily Reckoning,<em> as well as a regular guest on CNBC, Yahoo Tech Ticker and Bloomberg TV.  Mauldin is the President of Millennium Wave Advisors, an investment  advisory firm registered with multiple states. He is also a registered  representative of Millennium Wave Securities, a FINRA-registered  broker-dealer.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/htdocs/expert.html?id=5836" target="_blank">Evan Smith</a> joined U.S. Global Investors Inc. in 2004 as co-portfolio manager of  the Global Resources Fund (PSPFX). Previously, he was a trader with Koch  Capital Markets in Houston where he executed quantitative long-short  equities strategies. He was also an equities research analyst with  Sanders Morris Harris in Houston where he followed energy companies in  the oil and gas, coal mining and pipeline sectors. In addition, he was  with the Valuation Services Group of Arthur Andersen LLP. Smith holds a  Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering from the University  of Texas in Austin.</em></p>
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		<title>Today&#8217;s Inquiry into English Usage and Basic Mathematics &#8230;</title>
		<link>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/09/todays-inquiry-into-english-usage-and-basic-mathematics/</link>
		<comments>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/09/todays-inquiry-into-english-usage-and-basic-mathematics/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Jan 2012 14:55:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Thomas Knapp</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Politics and Government]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense spending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government debt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government spending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[spending cuts]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/?p=10462</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>This one&#8217;s from the New York Times &#8230;</p> <p>And as the Pentagon confronts the prospect of cutting its budget by about 10 percent over the next decade &#8230;</p> <p>&#8230; but you can probably find it in just about any newspaper article discussing the upcoming &#8220;budget cuts.&#8221;</p> <p>So, just how deep are these horrendous, army-killing <span style="color:#777"> . . . &#8594; Read More: <a href="http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/09/todays-inquiry-into-english-usage-and-basic-mathematics/">Today&#8217;s Inquiry into English Usage and Basic Mathematics &#8230;</a></span>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/us/a-hidden-cost-of-military-cuts-could-be-invention-and-its-industries.html" target="_blank">This one&#8217;s from the New York <em>Times</em> &#8230;</a></p>
<blockquote><p>And as the Pentagon confronts the prospect of cutting its budget by about 10 percent over the next decade &#8230;</p></blockquote>
<p>&#8230; but you can probably find it in just about any newspaper article discussing the upcoming &#8220;budget cuts.&#8221;</p>
<p>So, just how deep are these horrendous, army-killing cuts?</p>
<p>Well, if &#8220;sequestration&#8221; goes as forecast, <a href="http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=13989" target="_blank">the federal government&#8217;s non-war military spending will only increase by 10% instead of by 18%</a> between 2013 and 2021.</p>
<p>No, that is not a typo. The &#8220;cuts&#8221; are not cuts in actual spending, they&#8217;re cuts in the previously projected <em>growth rate</em> of that spending.</p>
<p>Most federal government spending proceeds on rails due to something called &#8220;baseline budgeting.&#8221; The &#8220;baseline&#8221; is the previous year&#8217;s spending. Under &#8220;baseline budgeting,&#8221; that previous year&#8217;s &#8220;baseline,&#8221; plus an increase based on a formula, happens <em>automatically</em> unless Congress decides to tinker with it.</p>
<p>This &#8220;sequestration&#8221; thing &#8212; triggered by Congress&#8217;s inability to agree on &#8220;deficit reduction&#8221; targets last year &#8212; imposes across-the-board reductions in that rate of automatic growth of spending, <em>not</em> in spending as such.</p>
<p>Neat trick, huh? Your congressman can brag to you that he&#8217;s cutting spending at this morning&#8217;s town hall, then &#8212; this afternoon, over cognac and cigars &#8212; brag to your local defense contractor or other corporate welfarist that he&#8217;s increasing that same spending.</p>
<p>Hint: He&#8217;s lying to one of you. And it&#8217;s not the guy pouring the cognac and lighting the cigars.</p>
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		<title>ECB/Fed Support for the European Banking System &#8211; 750 billion USD, and counting &#8230;</title>
		<link>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/05/ecbfed-support-for-the-european-banking-system-750-billion-usd-and-counting/</link>
		<comments>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/05/ecbfed-support-for-the-european-banking-system-750-billion-usd-and-counting/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Jan 2012 17:40:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Claus Vistesen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Monetary Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bailout]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ECB]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Eurozone]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Federal Reserve]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government debt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Greece]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[inflation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[lending]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/?p=10425</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>One point that I have been shouting from the proverbial roof tops in my research, to partners and colleagues is that 2012 may well be the year when all major central banks will be conducting both conventional and unconventional monetary easing at the same time. I think this is a very strong testament not <span style="color:#777"> . . . &#8594; Read More: <a href="http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2012/01/05/ecbfed-support-for-the-european-banking-system-750-billion-usd-and-counting/">ECB/Fed Support for the European Banking System &#8211; 750 billion USD, and counting &#8230;</a></span>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One point that I have been shouting from the proverbial roof tops in my research, to partners and colleagues is that 2012 may well be the year when all major central banks will be conducting both conventional and unconventional monetary easing at the same time. I think this is a very strong testament not only to the severity of the ongoing debt crisis in the developed world, but also to the propensity of central banks to choose inflation as the  desired route to recovery. We need not initially discuss whether they are deploying the proper set of policies or even whether such policies represent moral hazard or a ponzi scheme on government debt.</p>
<p>The main thing is to realise that this is an unprecedented global monetary experiment.</p>
<p>My message to investors in 2012 would then be <em>not</em> to underestimate this inflation bias by part of global central banks. Inflating your way out of too much debt won&#8217;t work in the long run without considerable defaults and/or economic stress (hyper inflation). Events since 2008 are ample evidence of this, but the simultaneous inclination to create inflation and debase your currency (to generate more inflation and exports) by all major central banks will continue to exert a profound effect on asset prices and the global economy.</p>
<p>In so far as goes the idea that an investors&#8217; interest in asset prices is conditioned on return and volatility we can say that central bank policy will affect both. Financial assets will certainly benefit from excess liquidity, but the unravelling of too much debt through inevitable defaults and the central bank policies themselves will generate volatility. Whether the combination of such volatility and return means that you should stay out of the market entirely is a question for the individual investor. I believe that</p>
<p>From a macroeconomic point of view, the downbeat assessment remains however that it is difficult if not impossible to paint a picture of where sufficient growth is going to come from and on the investment side of things, the higher level of volatility will tend to shake the foundation of investors even if money is to be made for short periods of time.</p>
<p>Most attention has been centered on the ECB, whether the 3y LTRO represent QE and whether the continuing rejection to buy government bonds outright means that the ECB is a laggard among global central banks (see <a href="http://www.hindecapital.com/docs/hil_reports/HindeSight%20Investor%20Letter%20December%202011%20-%20Should%20I%20Stay%20or%20Should%20I%20Go.pdf">this excellent report by Hinde Capital</a> for additional analysis relative to the points below).</p>
<p><strong>750 Billion USD,  and counting &#8230; </strong></p>
<p>Europe remains the center of the global debt crisis, a role the continent has now decisively taken over from the US which stood at the forefront in the initial phases of the crisis in 2008. Apart from the almost endless summits and meetings among government officials the significant measures continue to be the ones coming from the ECB.</p>
<p>In my view, the European interbank market is virtually dead and dusted, and the ECB and the Fed are now effectively the only thing between Europe&#8217;s banks and large scale failures. Since early September 750 billion USD worth of liquidity has been provided to the European banking system of which 100 billion sits on the Fed balance sheet through USD swap lines.</p>
<p>Who will bet against the final 3y LTRO auction to take this beyond one trillion USD?</p>
<p>Spanish and Italian curves are now nicely steep again after a brush with inversion which obviously was one of the main objectives even if it was always debatable whether banks would buy government bonds with the liquidity taken up at the ECB.</p>
<p>The question is; how do you unwind all this? 750 billion USD to roll short term liabilities with the ECB and the Fed seems to me to be one of the biggest gamble in monetary history.</p>
<p>While the BOE and the Fed have been transparent in their QE efforts and the BOJ never really having left the zero bound the ECB has been more covert. However, it is my contention that with the expansion of the securities market programme (SMP) in 2011 to buy considerable amounts of government bonds (1) as well as the 3y LTRO the ECB is now fully engaged in quantitative easing.</p>
<p>I base this on two points.</p>
<ul>
<li>The ECB has acted as a sovereign debt buyer of last resort in times of crisis. It is common knowledge in the market that the ECB has been Italian and Spanish bonds in times of particular stress on the notion that these two economies in particular could not be allowed to fatally succumb to the debt snowball dynamics.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>ECB support for the banking system in the form of collateralised liquidity and wholesale funding is not temporary but structural and permanent in nature. The interbank market in Europe is not working and has not been working since the crisis started in 2008.</li>
</ul>
<ul></ul>
<p>The ECB will of course vehemently deny this but investors should understand that such denial is mainly out of political reasons.  When Draghi unveiled the ECB’s attempt to backstop the crisis in Europe by offering full allotment liquidity on a 3y basis, the market was disappointed because the central bank president also reiterated that the ECB would not step up its purchases of government bonds.</p>
<p>I think that the ECB will be forced into a much more direct and active role where unsterilized purchases in the primary market (monetisation) will be needed, but I fully appreciate the political issues. We are currently in a delicate situation where new governments in most of the involved countries are saddled with forced mandates to impose austerity. It is very difficult for all parties involved to push this agenda if the ECB had stepped up a full backstop. Moral hazard risks are consequently paramount here.</p>
<p>As such, investors must content with the ECB’s attempt to shore up the European banking system which is no little feat given the bank rollover schedule in 2012  as well as new Basel II regulation which will further impair already shaken balance sheets. The ECB’s initiatives then follows the steady deterioration of conditions in the European (indeed global) banking system which initially culminated in the coordinated action by global central banks to supply dollars through Fed swap lines and which found its European answer in the ECB’s decision to provide unlimited liquidity yet again.</p>
<p>The problems look ominous for European banks and the global financial system in general. No matter what, European financial institutions will have to delever significantly which will spread its tentacles wide and far due to the high penetration by European banks in emerging markets (Eastern Europe in particular).</p>
<p>Behind the scenes however, significant ink has been spilled to debate and speculate on to the exact significance of the ECB’s liquidity operations.</p>
<p><a href="http://brontecapital.blogspot.com/2011/12/future-joseph-jett-traders-get.html">John Hempton for example suggests</a> that the ECB’s policy move is an open invitation to play the carry trade game using almost free liquidity to buy higher yielding government bonds.</p>
<blockquote><p><span>Well the Euro fix is in. Whether it works &#8211; that is another question. But the fix is this: European banks can borrow unlimited amounts for three years to buy Euro government debt. The debt often yields 5 percent. The money costs 1 percent.</span></p></blockquote>
<p>I agree that the incentives are certainly there for the banks to play this game especially in the context of government bonds as zero risk weighted assets. The problem is that many European banks have spent more than a year and two stress tests to get rid of substantial amount of peripheral government debt (which do not count as zero risk weighted assets according to Basel III) and as such weak governments are unlikely to benefit from this.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/03/markets-money-idUSL6E8C31DD20120103">The flip side of this</a> is that most of the liquidity taken up by banks go straight back to the ECB at the deposit facility which is now standing higher than at any time between 2008 and 2010.</p>
<p><em>Quote Reuters</em></p>
<blockquote><p>The euro zone banking system starts the new year awash with record levels of liquidity but few signs that institutions are prepared to lend to each other, leaving money markets frozen.Most of the near half trillion euros of three-year funds borrowed from the European Central Bank in the last week of 2011 have made their way back to the ECB&#8217;s overnight deposit account.</p></blockquote>
<p>The Reuters piece goes on to argue that most of the liquidity will probably go to aid the large refinancing need banks face in 2012 and thus effectively as a replacement for a non-functioning interbank market that would normally be able to roll this financing. If this does nothing to solve the problem of sovereign insolvency and illiquidity it will work wonders through the fact that banks won&#8217;t act as a drag on their respective sovereign&#8217;s balance sheet as long as the ECB is involved.</p>
<p>I would note though that even though the liquidity is mainly reflected in reserves held at the ECB, it still represents excess liquidity as noted by Danske Bank.</p>
<blockquote><p>Some market commentators have argued that the first 36 months long-term refinancing operation (LTRO), in which banks took EUR490bn in total, has so far not worked as planned because the extra liquidity has simply been placed on the deposit facility at the ECB. However, this argument is false.The sharp increase in outstanding open market operations (MRO+LTRO) increases excess liquidity (defined as open market operations plus recourse to the marginal lending facility minus autonomous liquidity factors minus reserve requirements) and this excess liquidity shows up as deposits at the ECB in just the same way as it did in 2008-10.</p></blockquote>
<p>However, nothing is easy and despite the fact that collateral can be posted for liquidity the sovereign is still on the hook as my friend Edward Hugh points out.</p>
<blockquote><p><span>Banks are being encouraged to keep rolling over </span><span>what are basically NPLs by financing them at 1% at the ECB </span><span>(foreclosing on them in Spain and keeping the property on the books </span><span>may cost something like 8% in comparison). But the ECB isn&#8217;t assuming </span><span>the risk here, the national sovereign implicitly is, and is getting in </span><span>deeper by the day. </span></p></blockquote>
<p>This is certainly true by the letter of the law but one has to wonder whether the ECB will ever get paid back here. I mean 3 years is an awful lot of time. The ECB can roll these loans as long as need be (it has already effectively been rolling bank funding since 2008) while maintaining the figue leaf that it is not funding sovereigns. This may be true, but it is effectively funding the sovereign&#8217;s banks and postponing the day of reckoning which is bank failures or nationalisation or both.</p>
<p>If the ECB is then forced take a hit on the collateral or the loans themselves, it will need to create the money to pay for these loans by printing euros. This sounds as a plan to me except that it does not solve the funding risks of governments which may or may not be able to ask their banks for help. The likely answer is that they won&#8217;t be unless the ECB and EU decide to wield the ultimate weapon of financial oppression which would be to penalise reserves over a given level with negative interest rates at the same time as banks would be forced, through regulation, to hold government bonds.</p>
<p>But Edward makes another interesting point;</p>
<blockquote><p><span>Looking at the Greek PSI, what they </span><span>would try and do (if all this gets that far, I mean if the Euro holds </span><span>together long enough in this Byzantine world) ) is load up the private </span><span>sector share of the haircut, and keep the ECB as untouchable official </span><span>sector. At the limit they can use ELA to keep the banks afloat while </span><span>the sovereign restructures and then recapitalises.</span></p>
<p><span>(&#8230;)</span></p>
<p><span><span>Why would any ex </span><span>Eurozone third party want to be counterparty to anything which might </span><span>end up being subordinated to ECB exposure later on down the line. The </span><span>more I think about it the more it seems to me that the 3 yr LTROs </span><span>might end up choking the European banking system to death.</span></span></p></blockquote>
<p><span>It is difficult to disagree on the gist of this point, namely that the ECB is digging itself a very big hole. If banks can exchange under water assets at the ECB for a deposit asset at the ECB (albeit with a negative carry) the ECB is running the risk that it becomes the sole counterparty of bad assets in the euro zone in which case seniority will mean very little. </span></p>
<p>The Greek situation is a good example. Private creditors face an almost certain 100% wipeout exactly because they represent such a small tranche of the total stock of debt. In such a situation the asymmetric relationship between subordinate and senior debt holders mean that the latter essentially become equity holders. But once subordinate creditors are wiped out the turn comes to the senior debt tranches and the further the ECB goes along the road of providing full allotment liquidity the higher will be its implicit <em>direct</em> claim on assets of all sorts of qualities.</p>
<p><span>In conclusion, it is my view that the ECB is now the only thing between the economy and widespread bank failures, but I also concur that the consequence of this is a permanent outsourcing of the interbank market in Europe to the ECB&#8217;s balance sheet and, quite possibly, Fed&#8217;s USD swap lines. </span></p>
<p>&#8211;</p>
<p>(1) &#8211; Even if such purchases have been fully sterilised.</p>
<div></div>
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		<title>Risk of depletion: the vacation from pension angst is over before it began</title>
		<link>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2011/12/15/risk-of-depletion-the-vacation-from-pension-angst-is-over-before-it-began/</link>
		<comments>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2011/12/15/risk-of-depletion-the-vacation-from-pension-angst-is-over-before-it-began/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 15 Dec 2011 14:50:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Christopher Briem</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[U.S. Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government debt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government pensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pittsburgh]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/?p=10147</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Yunz thought I forgot.  That or lost interest?  Boiler has been building up steam is all.  That and there seems to be quite a confluence of news in the nexus here: pensions, assessments, redistricting even migration. Damage Control teams being spread thin just trying to keep up. But let&#8217;s poke in on pensions for a minute. </p> <span style="color:#777"> . . . &#8594; Read More: <a href="http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2011/12/15/risk-of-depletion-the-vacation-from-pension-angst-is-over-before-it-began/">Risk of depletion: the vacation from pension angst is over before it began</a></span>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span>Yunz thought I forgot.  That or lost interest?  Boiler has been building up steam is all.  That and there seems to be quite a confluence of news in the nexus here: pensions, assessments, redistricting even migration. Damage Control teams being spread thin just trying to keep up. But let&#8217;s poke in on pensions for a minute. </span></p>
<p>Let&#8217;s recap:  we all <a href="http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/11263/1175996-53-0.stm?cmpid=newspanel4">declared victory just a few months ago it seemed</a>.  We &#8217;solved this for the city&#8217; was one quote.<br />
<span><br />
</span><br />
<span>So last week we learn that the </span><a href="http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/11343/1195647-53.stm"><span>city pension funding is down to 54%</span></a><span>,  Note that is 54% <em>with</em> the notional asset of pledged future parking revenues that is still hard to define and as council is learning even harder yet to extract from the Pittsburgh Parking Authority.  Let&#8217;s just agree that it is not cash on hand in any form, nor fungible in any extant market.  I still want to know what the real cash horizon is for the pension fund.  You think others would care as well. </span><br />
<span><br />
</span><br />
<span>What really ups my distemper over the whole notional asset is how if confused the public.  Maybe the asset makes sense, maybe it doesn&#8217;t.  But read the news coverage and tell me if you walk away with any appreciation for how much in $$ is really there to pay pension bills? No real appreciation that a large part (soon to be the majority) of all pension assets are no more than a promise from the city to itself to pay money in the future to the pension account.  It is a promise that I am pretty sure existed long before last December mind you. </span><br />
<span><br />
</span><br />
<span>So it is conincidence that <em>Governning</em> had a column last week on the public pension problems everywhere to a degree. </span><a href="http://www.governing.com/columns/public-money/pension-plans-run-out-money.html"><span>Will pension plans run out of money?</span></a><span> It talks of the &#8220;risk of depletion&#8221; for pension funds.  &#8220;depletion&#8221; isn&#8217;t quite a euphemism, but sure sounds a lot tamer than the what it would mean if it were to come true. </span><br />
<span><br />
</span><br />
<span>So what does it all mean here?   Here is what we know as to the state of the city&#8217;s collective pension fund. Forgive me for any errors in the decimal points, the city does not mail me the detailed pension accounting. </span><br />
<span> </span></p>
<div><span>Total liability Jan 1, 2011<span> <em>$</em></span><em>1,012,027,241</em><span> </span></span></div>
<div><span>Funding as of Jan 1, 2011<span> said to be 62% which gives me   <em>$627 mil</em></span></span></div>
<div><span> </span><span>Funding as of Sept 30, 2011<span> said to be 54%  so <em>$549 mil</em></span></span></div>
<div><span>Value of notional asset<span> said to be valued at $239 million which gives a net value of <em>$307 mil</em></span></span></div>
<div><span><span>That in itself would give you <em>30%</em> funding ratio.  It has been worse.    Still,, after all the extra $$ piled in and all the other machinations, in reality we are in my calculation below the <a href="http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/10056/1038627-100.stm">32% we were just about two years ago</a>. No thanks to <a href="http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/print-edition/2011/08/26/pittsburgh-pension-loses-out-on-millions.html?page=all">some big losses due to massive market timing bets</a>.  I really wonder if they have really gotten all the cash back into the market in a portfolio that make sense.  Something tugging at me makes me wonder what is up with the investment. Anyone know more? </span></span></div>
<div><span><span><span>If this is how we define success, you have to wonder what failure looks like?  The only thing different today than a year ago is that an IOU was passed from one part of city government to another.  The truth is that IOU existed legally, morally, and in the accounting </span></span></span>long before the latest accounting trick.  So what really is any different?</div>
<div><span>It really is worse than that. Realize also that there was what by definition was a one time transfer of the cash that was sitting in the not so locked &#8216;lock box&#8217; built up from past budget surpluses.  So just before the end of the year..  or so everyone is agreeing to even if the banks were closed, was the transfer of $45 million I believe it was to the pension fund.  When thinking about trends, you really have to think about that as the one-time opportunity it was. No such surplus will be there for a long time again.  If you were to net that out the city would most likely have been at ~$262 mil or less, or just under<em> 26%</em> funding ratio. </span></div>
<div><span><span>I won&#8217;t pile on and say another year has gone by and while the rate of increase in the calculated total liability has slowed a bit, it would still seem an obvious projection that the total liability is higher as well which would push that % lower. That or that parts of the system are less well funded than these cumulative averages would imply.  But success.. keep saying it.. it all succeeded last year. </span></span></div>
<div><img src="http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/wp-content/plugins/wp-o-matic/cache/3c96d_28045666-5674414015066531005?l=nullspace2.blogspot.com" alt="" width="1" height="1" /></div>
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		<title>A Taxing Proposition</title>
		<link>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2011/12/14/a-taxing-proposition/</link>
		<comments>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2011/12/14/a-taxing-proposition/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 14 Dec 2011 17:40:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Simon Grey</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Economic Theory]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deficit spending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government debt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[inflation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Newt Gingrich]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[taxation]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/?p=10142</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Newt Gingrich, alleged genius, has an imbecilic tax plan: <p>The tax plan proposed by Republican presidential candidate Newt Gingrich would add $1.3 trillion to the U.S. budget deficit in 2015 alone, a new analysis shows, complicating his goal of balancing the government’s books. [That’s an understatement, to say the least. –ed.]</p> <p>The analysis by <span style="color:#777"> . . . &#8594; Read More: <a href="http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2011/12/14/a-taxing-proposition/">A Taxing Proposition</a></span>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>Newt Gingrich, alleged genius, has an <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-12/gingrich-plan-yields-deep-tax-cuts-for-top-earners-study-finds.html">imbecilic tax plan</a>:</div>
<blockquote><p>The tax plan proposed by Republican presidential candidate Newt Gingrich would add $1.3 trillion to the U.S. budget deficit in 2015 alone, a new analysis shows, complicating his goal of balancing the government’s books. [That’s an understatement, to say the least. –ed.]</p></blockquote>
<blockquote><p>The analysis by the nonpartisan Tax Policy Center compares the federal government’s take under Gingrich’s proposal with projected U.S. revenue if current tax law ran its course and existing income tax cuts expired as scheduled after 2012.</p></blockquote>
<p>Here’s the thing:<span> </span>Federal expenditures are always paid for by productive people.<span> </span>Always.</p>
<p>The options for funding are direct taxation, inflation, and debt.<span> </span>The taxing effects of direct taxation are obvious and well-known.<span> </span>The taxing effects of inflation, however, are a little more pernicious because they aren’t felt right away.<span> </span>In fact, some even find inflation to work as a subsidy.<span> </span>However, inflation causes the nominal price of goods to rise, generally before most people see their income rise at a corresponding rate, and the difference between increased prices and increased income is effectively a tax.<span> </span>And then debt is simply taxation deferred, wherein bonds are sold under the implicit promise that the government will pay them later, generally by direct taxation.</p>
<p>The key to actually reducing taxes, then, is to first reduce real spending, elsewise taxes will never truly go down.<span> </span>At best, they will simply be time-shifted.<span> </span>Thus, Gingrich’s tax proposal is nothing more than a farce because tax cuts are not accompanied by spending cuts.<span> </span>And, until taxes and spending are cut in tandem, Gingrich should be viewed only as a slimy charlatan, and nothing more.</p>
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		<title>How to Make Money in a &#8216;Fugly&#8217; Stock Market: Bob Moriarty</title>
		<link>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2011/12/08/how-to-make-money-in-a-fugly-stock-market-bob-moriarty/</link>
		<comments>http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2011/12/08/how-to-make-money-in-a-fugly-stock-market-bob-moriarty/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 08 Dec 2011 15:00:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>The Gold Report</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Financial Markets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bankruptcy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gold]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government debt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mining]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[stocks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[unemployment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US dollar]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/?p=10066</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p> Despite the &#8220;fugly&#8221; future that Bob Moriarty, founder of 321gold.com, talks about in this exclusive interview with The Gold Report, he&#8217;s downright bullish on the U.S. dollar for the time being. He says it&#8217;s not only a safe haven but &#8220;the best investment to be in for the last six months.&#8221; As for <span style="color:#777"> . . . &#8594; Read More: <a href="http://www.citizeneconomists.com/blogs/2011/12/08/how-to-make-money-in-a-fugly-stock-market-bob-moriarty/">How to Make Money in a &#8216;Fugly&#8217; Stock Market: Bob Moriarty</a></span>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="padding-top: 5px;" src="http://www.streetwisereports.com/images/MoriartySmall_rev.jpg" alt="Bob Moriarty" hspace="10" width="82" height="102" align="left" /> Despite the &#8220;fugly&#8221; future that Bob Moriarty, founder of 321gold.com, talks about in this exclusive interview with <em>The Gold Report,</em> he&#8217;s downright bullish on the U.S. dollar for the time being. He says  it&#8217;s not only a safe haven but &#8220;the best investment to be in for the  last six months.&#8221; As for equities, Moriarty makes it clear that he takes  no pleasure in watching a company lose 25% of its value in a week when  there is nothing wrong with the company. At the same time, he&#8217;s alert to  bargains. Any time you have the opportunity to buy cash at a discount,  he advises, &#8220;throw money at it.&#8221;</p>
<p><em><strong>The Gold Report: </strong></em>Since the last time we chatted in <a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/na/10335" target="_blank">July</a>, Bob, a lot has happened. Congress raised the debt ceiling, as you predicted.</p>
<p><strong>Bob Moriarty: </strong>Right.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong>Then the Super Committee failed to produce an agreement so we can look forward to the automatic debt reduction of $2.2 trillion.</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> The Super Committee was totally illegal and unconstitutional in the  first place and it was totally ineffective. They couldn&#8217;t reduce  spending by $1.5 trillion over a 10-year period. Give me a break.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Okay. Moving on. . .Unemployment remains at about 9%.</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> You say 9%? I don&#8217;t think so. How about 23%?</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> The list goes on. Occupy Wall Street protests have sprouted up all over  the country. And of course, Newt Gingrich is the leading Republican  candidate.</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> That anyone could even consider Newt Gingrich for anything above the role of dog catcher is pretty terrifying.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> There&#8217;s more. We&#8217;ve seen riots in Europe, with the epicenter in Greece. We&#8217;ve got a weak German bond market.</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Weak? It was a total failure; 39% coverage is a disaster. Germany is  the bedrock of the EU, and if they can get bids for only 39% of bonds  it&#8217;s over—over—for the EU.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> The Italian bonds coming up should test that theory.</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Italian bonds are paying 8% or something like that. It can&#8217;t do it. The  Greek two-year bond is paying 160%. The one-year bond is paying 270%.  Greece has defaulted. Italy, Spain and France are going to default. It  will be a series of cascading bank defaults. Dexia Bank failed a month  ago. The banking system is under water. I&#8217;ve been saying that for years.  It&#8217;s true.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> So looking at this whole developing  picture, from the crisis in Europe to the U.S. debt debacle, from  stubborn unemployment, protests and riots to the upcoming presidential  election—what do you make of all of this?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> The piece I wrote in early October captured it. I said things were about to get &#8220;fugly&#8221; and it&#8217;s time to head for the bunker.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> In your Nov. 11 article, you stated specifically that you&#8217;d climb out  on a limb and suggest that 2012 will go down in history as the year of  bank failures. How do you see that scenario playing out?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Okay. Here&#8217;s what&#8217;s important to understand and very few people  understand this. If you start off with $1 million and loan it from one  institution to another to another to another, you may have a net of $1  million. But if somebody defaults and that $1 million asset disappears,  you get cascading defaults of every institution that had that $1 million  asset. It&#8217;s really simple. The Greek default—and Greece has defaulted  even though they won&#8217;t admit it—will cause a default in Spain and Italy,  and that&#8217;s going to cause a default in France and that&#8217;s going to cause  a default in the U.S.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> And what happens when they default?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> The banks close. What can we do? We have more debt in the world than  assets, so we have to write off the bad debt. Unfortunately, no  government in the world is talking about that. The only people talking  about it are Gerald Celente, Kyle Bass and me.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> But bank foreclosure is more than writing off bad debt. That creates catastrophic. . .</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> It&#8217;s a good thing if a business fails, because that means somebody who  is efficient comes along and picks up the slack. We do not need to  reward failure in the banking system. We need to reward success.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Could the banking system write off a portion of the debt?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Nah, they are under water now. It&#8217;s a zombie banking system and has  been since about the middle of September 2008. Just a while ago, at the  end of November, the Federal Reserve disclosed $13 billion in profits to  the banks from the trillions in loans they made back in 2008 that  they&#8217;ve been lying about ever since. They were bailing out Barclays,  Royal Bank of Scotland and lots of other banks that had nothing to do  with the United States.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Is there a banking system that will survive these cascading defaults?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> The question should be: &#8220;Can you have a banking system that is sound  and secure?&#8221; And the answer is yes. The Canadian banks are in a lot  better shape than the U.S. banks. A sound, secure bank cannot have those  zombie assets, such as the mortgages that we know people are not paying  off. Half the mortgages in the United States are under water, with 25%  in default. Those mortgages must be written off.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Couldn&#8217;t a component of the banking system—some of the regional banks in  the U.S., particularly those that have written off some of those  mortgages and are really more about loaning to local businesses and  local communities—survive a banking system failure?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> The banking system in the United States is a network of giants and the  regional banks really don&#8217;t exist anymore. I don&#8217;t have specific numbers  but I think the big five banks probably represent 90% of the banking  system. That leaves no fallback, really.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> When the U.S. banks close, you&#8217;re in the Cayman, but what happens to the rest of us?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Since Bretton Woods in 1944, governments have been spending money they  don&#8217;t have and it&#8217;s time to pay the piper. A lot of people&#8217;s  &#8220;assets&#8221;—Social Security, pensions, Medicare, Medicaid—will evaporate.  They&#8217;ll disappear. We need to go back to a real world economy where  people produce things of value. We need reasonable taxes. And we need a  reasonably sized government that doesn&#8217;t spend beyond its means. This is  true of individuals as well as governments.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> How do people waiting in line for pensions, Social Security, Medicaid, etc. . .</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> That money has to come from somewhere. Anything the government gives  one group has to be taken from another group. The net is it costs you  money to have the government provide healthcare, Medicare, Social  Security. We would be far better off if the government didn&#8217;t provide  these things. We didn&#8217;t have Social Security 100 years ago and people  were fine. When I started working 40 years ago, people still had  pensions from their employers. By and large they don&#8217;t have much of that  anymore.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Unless they&#8217;re government employees.</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Yeah. Then you are going to get paid twice what the private sector is getting paid.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Your November article also said what you have been suggesting for  months that cash is the best investment people can hold. In fact, you  concluded with these words: &#8220;It&#8217;s time to stay in cash and head for the  bunker.&#8221; As you mentioned before, &#8220;times are about to get fugly.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Right.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Do you include cash equivalents such as gold or precious metals under that &#8220;cash&#8221; umbrella?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> No, I mean cash. The best investment to be in for the last six months  was cash, U.S. dollar cash. Even Gerald Celente had a six-figure account  with MF Global and the money simply evaporated. Without cash, people  who go to bed wealthy will wake up poor.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> All the goldbugs say that will happen if you keep your money in fiat currencies too.</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> That&#8217;s not necessarily true. At times, investing in fiat currencies is a  good deal. If you were investing in U.S. dollars in March 2008, you  would have been better off that fall than you would with any other  single investment. Gold went from about $1,200/ounce (oz) to $700/oz,  while silver went from $21/oz to $9/oz. The stock market crashed. The  gold juniors crashed. Sometimes being in cash, U.S. dollars, is a good  investment. It&#8217;s been a particularly good investment for the last three  or four months.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Because your analogy goes back to  2008, when we had a severe crash, is it fair to extrapolate that you&#8217;re  predicting another severe crash?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> We are going through a crash right now.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> If that&#8217;s the case, why should anyone be in equities?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> You can&#8217;t ever invest 100% in anything. No one can guarantee the  future. All you can do is hope you get it right 55% of the time. Cash,  U.S. dollar cash, has been a good investment since this past April, and  it&#8217;s still a good investment. Europe is about to blow up and the dollar  is a safe haven. There is a lot of deleveraging going on. And, as in  2008, the U.S. dollar is a good place to be. And cash is better than  having the money in T-bonds, with a negative interest rate.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> You are expecting the banking system to collapse, and banks typically hold cash. What value is the cash if the banks fold?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> You can buy things with it.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> So you&#8217;re saying people should physically hold their cash in their homes?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> I do. I have some money in the banks to pay bills, but mentally I have  written off every cent in the bank. I accept the fact that I will go  down to the bank one day and the ATM won&#8217;t work anymore and the bank  will be closed. You can have cash sitting in the bank, too, but at the  same time you have to understand the great danger with the banks. While I  wouldn&#8217;t sit on a half million dollars in cash at home, if I had it in a  bank I would be prepared. I think everybody should keep three to six  months in liquid assets, and that certainly would involve cash and gold  and silver. Cash and gold and silver will be very valuable when the  banking system collapses.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> If the banking system collapses, how long will it be before new banks emerge to take over the fundamental role of banking?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> It&#8217;s not &#8220;if&#8221; the banking system collapses; &#8220;when&#8221; would be more  accurate. You simply cannot justify the banking system today. The sooner  we get to whatever comes next, the better off we&#8217;ll be. My opinion is  that all fiat currencies will crash, and when they do, we&#8217;ll go back to a  gold standard.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> How quickly can we develop a gold standard from the annihilated banking system?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> It depends on how big the riots are. Governments never act. They only  react. If we have riots in every major city in the United States and  hundreds or thousands of people a day are being killed, the government  may actually take some action that would make sense. That would be to  say, &#8220;We have a financial system that doesn&#8217;t work. We need to go to a  financial system that does work.&#8221; Gold and silver work and they have  worked for 5,000 years.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Do you see a situation where the government would start a national bank?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> God, I hope not. That would be adding fuel to the fire. I think that  &#8220;unlimited stupidity&#8221; and &#8220;government&#8221; belong in the same sentence. But  if the government started a national bank, that wouldn&#8217;t be unlimited  stupidity―that would be infinite stupidity.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Earlier  you made a point about having to be right only 55% of the time to move  forward with a balanced portfolio. Let&#8217;s assume that an investor has  some hard assets now, in safe havens, with some at home. At that point,  does this investor turn to the market?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Yes. I just  bought 100,000 shares of a company that did a financing at $0.80 in  April. It now has $0.46 per share in cash and its stock is selling at  $0.23. If I can buy cash at $0.50 on the dollar, I&#8217;ll do it.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> So you are looking for opportunities with a company&#8217;s value below its cash balance.</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Any time you can buy at a discount, that&#8217;s a good deal. If you can buy a  dollar for $0.50, the upside is $0.50. We see this happening every 10  or 15 years. In the summer of 2001, a number of stocks that were selling  for less than the cash they had on hand doubled or tripled or  quadrupled when the market turned around. In September and October of  2008, something like 200 companies were selling for less than their cash  on hand. A Russian silver company was selling for $0.20 on the dollar.  You simply cannot get a more favorable environment than buying cash at a  discount. Any time you have that opportunity, you should throw money at  it.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> So, what companies are you finding that have cash at a discount?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> People are going to have to look for them themselves. All the figures are available to everybody. I use <em>Stockhouse</em> and <em>StockWatch </em>and look at the ratios.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> We&#8217;re hearing that capital is so hard to come by, yet we found at the  San Francisco Hard Assets Investment Conference at the end of last month  quite a number who were getting capital.</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Those deals  had actually been set up for months. The last few weeks the financings  literally just stopped. Everybody is in a total panic now. I watched  stocks drop 25% and I have to tell you, it was pretty scary even though I  was one of the guys forecasting it. When a company loses 25% of its  value in a week and there is nothing wrong with the company, it&#8217;s scary.  A lot of times I see things happening that scare me and I don&#8217;t want  them to happen. I talk about them because I have an obligation to talk  about them.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Could you talk about the kinds of companies that are actually building their value?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> In August 2008 the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index, which is a  measure of pure psychology, went to the lowest level it had ever been in  history. Stocks were cheaper in August, September and October 2008  relative to gold than they had ever been. But gold was $700/oz. Silver  was $9/oz. And they got clobbered. So it&#8217;s natural that big gold and  silver shares got clobbered too.</p>
<p>Now, we have $1,700/oz gold and  $32/oz silver, and stocks are cheaper today than in 2008. That is  totally irrational. Those kinds of circumstances do not continue for  very long. In 2008 platinum came down to the same price as gold.  Platinum is $210/oz cheaper than gold today and that has never before  occurred in my lifetime. I don&#8217;t think it&#8217;s occurred in history. That&#8217;s  an example of something that would be a very good opportunity.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> So if the juniors are on sale, are the majors also on sale?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Yes.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> How should investors begin looking at the whole plethora of mining companies to decide which ones really create the value?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> My priority would be junior production stories. You&#8217;ve got <a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/co/623" target="_blank">Timmins Gold Corp. (TMM:TSX.V; TMM:NYSE.A)</a>, <a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/co/546" target="_blank">Fortuna Silver Mines Inc. (FSM:NYSE; FVI:TSX; FVI:BLV)</a>, Endeavour Silver Corp. (EDR:TSX; EXK:NYSE; EJD:Fkft), First Majestic Silver Corp. (FR:TSX; AG:NYSE; FMV:Fkft; FRMSF:OTCQX), <a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/co/331" target="_blank">Great Panther Silver Ltd. (GPR:TSX; GPL:NYSE.A)</a> and Rio Alto Mining Ltd. (RIO:TSX.V; RIO:BVL; RIOAF:OTCQX). There are  dozens, dozens of good production stories. Nobody quite knows where the  price of gold and silver will go, but anybody in production now is  literally minting money. You would have to be profitable. You couldn&#8217;t  possibly not be profitable.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> You wrote about <a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/co/3745" target="_blank">Meadow Bay Gold Corp. (MAY:TSX.V; MAYGF:OTCQX)</a> back in October. Is that still an interesting story to you?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> It&#8217;s a really funny story. It totally screwed up its drill program. It  was drilling for an epithermal vein system and hit a porphyry system.  The significance of that is that porphyries are really big, so instead  of having potentially 1–2 million ounces (Moz), literally overnight it  went to having 3–4 Moz potential.</p>
<p>When I made that same comment  about screwing up the drill program with Meadow Bay&#8217;s chief geologist,  he laughed, because if you&#8217;re going to screw up by finding a much bigger  deposit than you thought you had, that&#8217;s a really good deal.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> You&#8217;d called it a no-lose drill program. Did you know it was going to come out the way it did?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> It had announced one hole—a porphyry hole. As soon as I knew it was  porphyry I understood the future was bright indeed. That&#8217;s a really good  company and it is doing a really good job.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Do you have a preference toward production of gold versus silver?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Silver has attracted a lot of attention with people who simply don&#8217;t  know what they are writing about. And they attract all the nutcases. You  can make a lot more money shorting silver than you can going long  silver because people get totally irrational. There is no shortage of  silver. We are not about to run out of it. The ratio over 100 years has  been 47:1—47 ounces of silver per ounce of gold. In a financial  collapse, the ratio actually goes higher. I could see silver going to  100:1 before it goes 30:1. But, the primary factor in the price of  anything is the cost of production. Silver costs $6–8/oz to produce, so  $32/oz silver is pretty expensive.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> So you would want to look at junior production companies that would still be profitable with silver at $10/oz?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> The silver companies would still be extraordinarily cheap even if silver went to $15/oz.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Do you have any other companies with no-lose drill programs or other nice surprises in store on your radar?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Dozens of companies have done exceptionally well. I just came back from  two weeks in Colombia, where virtually everything is a slam-dunk. <a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/co/2783" target="_blank">Sunward Resources Ltd. (SWD:TSX.V)</a> is going to be announcing really extraordinary results. It already has  about 8.6 Moz. That&#8217;s an extraordinary amount of resources for a company  only two years old.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> If Sunward is still drilling, how big might that get?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> A lot bigger.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Double?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Could be.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> In what timeframe?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Two years.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Any others you&#8217;d care to mention in Colombia?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Colombia Crest Gold Corp. (CLB:TSX.V; EAT:Fkft), <a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/co/3653" target="_blank">Red Eagle Mining Corp. (RD:TSX.V)</a>, <a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/co/819" target="_blank">B2Gold Corp. (BTO:TSX; BGLPF:OTCQX)</a>, Bellhaven Copper and Gold Inc. (BHV:TSX.V), Solvista Gold Corp. (SVV:TSX.V) and <a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/co/2406" target="_blank">Continental Gold Ltd. (CNL:TSX)</a>. But, there are 36 listed companies in Columbia, and I don&#8217;t think you could go wrong investing there.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> So Colombia as a region is a good play.</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> It&#8217;s a phenomenal play.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> You&#8217;re also big on Africa.</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> I used to be, but Africa is getting really stupid. Tanzania&#8217;s come up  with suggestions and changes to the mining laws. Ghana&#8217;s started getting  greedy. In every business cycle when the cost of the commodities goes  up countries start thinking, &#8220;You know, we hate to see these guys making  all this money so we need to make sure it won&#8217;t happen.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> So Africa&#8217;s fallen out of favor.</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> Australia, Peru and Argentina are also getting stupid.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Do you hold better hope for the U.S. on the mining front?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> The U.S. has some really wonderful properties in Arizona, Nevada, Idaho  and Oregon. The western part of the country was wealthy due to mining  and we are going to go back to that. I think the U.S. will split up into  a series of five or six nation states. Florida has nothing in common  with California and California has nothing in common with New York. But  again, the U.S. as we know it might not exist a year from now.</p>
<p>Take  a look at what I said a few years ago about riots in the United States.  Occupy Wall Street started in September. It was a peaceful  demonstration. There was no crime. There was no violence. The police  started it by barricading young women behind the net and then spraying  them in the face with pepper spray.</p>
<p>Occupy Wall Street hit a  nerve in Americans and spread all over the country. When it got to  Oakland, the police decided they needed to up the ante, so they started  firing teargas grenades in the face of an Iraqi War veteran from 10 feet  away. If I did that, I&#8217;d be in jail for attempted murder. Since a  policeman did it, he got away with it. They beat another protester so  severely with batons they put him in the hospital in critical condition  with a damaged spleen. They have pepper-sprayed priests, 84-year-old  women and pregnant women. And these are all peaceful protesters.</p>
<p>The  key to understanding what is going on is the police continue to  escalate the violence. The next thing will be something similar to Kent  State, where they plant an agent provocateur who will fire a gun into  the air and the police will take that as permission to start shooting  protesters. When that happens, it will literally start a civil war—and  it could happen any day.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> That&#8217;s not like citizens of one state going against citizens of another state because they have fundamental differences.</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> No, it would be a civil war of peaceful citizens against a violent,  corrupt, out-of-control government. We have every bit of that now. The  police are the ones doing the escalation, and sooner or later Americans  will start defending themselves. If it had been my son or daughter who  was shot in the face, I don&#8217;t know what my reaction would be. Those  protestors all have parents and brothers and sisters and friends. I&#8217;m  shocked at the willingness of police to escalate violence against people  who are no threat to them at all. It could get really bloody really  quickly.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> Why do you think this is Occupy Wall Street and not Occupy Pennsylvania Avenue?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> The term should be AWA—Americans with an Attitude. I think that these  protests are underway in 113 cities, so obviously a lot of Americans in a  lot of locations are angry.</p>
<ul>
<li>23% of Americans are angry because they&#8217;re unemployed.</li>
<li>46 million Americans are angry because they are on food stamps.</li>
<li>50% of mortgage holders are angry because their mortgages are under water.</li>
</ul>
<p>Everyone  knows they have been raped by Wall Street and the government. The  common theme is anger. We are angry at big business and we are angry at  government.</p>
<p>Big business owns government. You have to go after  big business. Barack Obama and this administration are totally  controlled by external forces. They are controlled by Israel, Wall  Street and the media. But we do not have an activist government that&#8217;s  actually doing anything. It&#8217;s totally corrupt, bought and paid for.  Everyone in Congress, with the exception of Ron Paul, has turned into a  pimp.</p>
<p><strong>TGR:</strong> That&#8217;s why congressional approval is as low as what―18%?</p>
<p><strong>BM:</strong> 7%. The devil does better than that. Someone did a survey a week or so  ago comparing Congress to Satan and Satan came up with an 8% approval  rate.</p>
<p><em>Convinced that gold and silver were at their bottoms, and wanting to give others a foundation for investing in resource stocks, <a href="http://www.theaureport.com/pub/htdocs/expert.html?id=3">Bob</a> and Barb Moriarty brought <a href="http://www.321gold.com/" target="_blank">321gold.com</a> to the Internet 10 years ago, and later added <a href="http://www.321energy.com/" target="_blank">321energy.com</a> to cover oil, natural gas, gasoline, coal, solar, wind and nuclear  energy. Both sites feature articles, editorial opinions, pricing figures  and updates on relevant current events. Before his Internet career,  Moriarty was a Marine F-4B pilot and O-1C/G forward air controller with  more than 820 missions in Vietnam. A captain at age 22, he was the  youngest naval aviator in Vietnam and one of the war&#8217;s most highly  decorated. He holds 14 international aviation records, and once flew an  airplane through the Eiffel Tower&#8217;s pillars &#8220;just for fun.&#8221;</em></p>
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