Random Shots - Is it Over Yet?

By Claus Vistesen, on October 17th, 2011

It was telling that just as the ECRI and other notable research outfits decided to push recession button on the US economy the data flow became notably more positive. This could be a sign of the times that the cycle is just too volatile for even capable analysts to call or it could simply be a blip to the otherwise fundamental issue that economic weakness is here to stay for now.

Risk asset markets however made no mince of the recent stabilisation of the euro land crisis as well as the better news flow from the US economy. Just take the following headlines from Bloomberg and you know exactly what kind of sentiment I am talking about.

Quote Bloomberg

U.S. stocks advanced, giving the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index its biggest weekly gain since July 2009, as retail sales beat economists’ estimates and the Group of 20 nations began discussions on Europe’s debt crisis.

(…)

U.S. 30-year bonds capped the longest weekly losing streak since January as concern eased that Europe is unable to curb its debt crisis and U.S. retail sales climbed, damping bets the country will fall into a recession.

The question is then whether it signals a decisive and lasting breakout or whether it was simply a rally to the top of a choppy range before we start another descend to test the lows. Recent weeks’ market movement will suggest that you sell the current levels as top of a post crash range and I, for one do not think we are out of the woods yet. It is important to emphasize two issues on the US economy when it comes to the likelihood of a recession.

Firstly, the US housing market has never recovered and inventories remain low. This means that there is not much room for the economy to slump even if it does enter a recession. Any recession is then likely to be relatively short. Secondly, all liquidity gauges we are watching are pointing strongly upwards which is likely to provide strong tailwinds for risky assets 9-12 months out. Excess global liquidity, US broad and narrow measures of money are all shooting up.

In addition, we should consider the slow but sure movements by all four major central banks to increase either the short term liquidity or simply re-starting QE.

The BOE put itself at the front of the pack with the recent addition of another bn 75 GBP worth of QE, but likewise at the ECB it was interesting to see that long term liquidity operations was re-instated together with an expansion of the covered bond purchasing programme. Additionally, the ECB has been and will continue to be more or less forced to support bonds in the periphery, particularly in Spain and Italy, in order to ring fence the periphery from the coming Greek default. In comparison, the Fed’s latest much debated Operation Twist looks almost modest since it is, by the letter of the theory, not quantitative easing but rather qualitative easing [1]. Of course, the market is fully expecting the Fed to act aggressively should the economy falter further with a joint financing programme with the Treasury for long duration mortgage products as the most likely initiative alongside the more technical move in the form of reducing interest rates on excess bank reserves to negative.

I think it is important to realise that the Fed, with its latest actions, have its gaze firmly fixed on stimulating a recovery in the US housing market which is seen as the most important missing leg in an already faltering US recovery.

In Japan, the BOJ’s situation is different in the sense that economic has been distorted by first the devastation of the earthquake and then obviously the technical recovery as supply side disruptions have eased off. I take note of the fact that the BOJ has verbally put a lot of promises on the table in terms of stimulating the economy not least, one would imagine, in relation to the ongoing strength of the JPY. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the BOJ’s balance sheet has actually expanded briskly in the past two months.

The main conclusion to draw here I think is that while it is certainly not over yet, developed market policy makers are starting to open the floodgates. The euro zone crisis will remain a severe drag and like an almost chronic illness will continue to flare up. A disorderly Greek default can still not be ruled out and as the euro zone policy makers seem to take comfort on even a second of calm it seems to me that the market will have to push harder before we get a realistic proposal for a Greek default.

The recovery in the periphery (or obvious lack thereof) is still not working. The internal devaluation in the European periphery is alive and well when it comes to nominal wage increases which is getting a beating but in the context of lingering inflation in core and headline it leads to a squeeze in real wages and further depresses the recovery. The problem is that a sharp reduction in living standards through a decline in real wages to restore competitiveness is needed but if it occurs without any form of nominal currency depreciation not to mention in the context of very sticky core inflation, it just becomes counterproductive. Absent a fiscal union to socialise the risks it is difficult to see how the euro zone policy makers will be able to come with a fudge that will satisfy markets. In that regard I agree with Chris Wood here.

Ultimately, GREED & fear’s view on all of the above remain the same. This is that the only coherent end game for Euroland remains a formal move towards collective fiscal responsibility, which would ultimately address the fundamental cause of the present crisis. This is the financial fault line represented by monetary union without fiscal union. Euroland either has to go down this path or it has to confront all the problems associated with a break up since in GREED & fear’s view there is no “middle way”

One positive development on Greece is that the private sector involvement (PSI) proposal originally envisioned seems to have been abandoned for a much more realistic haircut.

But more challenging issues remain.

It was hardly surprising that the S&P downgraded Spain last week which only serves to underline the issue that while Greece may be the imminent worry the real problem lies in Spain and quite possibly Italy. There is a limit to the amount of Italian and Spanish bonds that the ECB can buy as long as it is evidently clear that growth prospects continue to remain difficult.

In emerging markets and touching on the theme I dealt with in my last installment the recent inflation data from India indicate why I continue to think that investors may hold too high expectations for easing in big emerging markets.

Quote Bloomberg

India’s inflation exceeded 9 percent for a 10th straight month in September, maintaining pressure on the central bank to extend its record interest-rate increases.The benchmark wholesale-price index rose 9.72 percent from a year earlier after a 9.78 percent jump in August, the commerce ministry said in New Delhi today. The median of 21 estimates in a Bloomberg News survey was for a 9.75 percent increase.

Elevated inflation in India and China are crimping room for policy makers to ease monetary policy and support global growth amid Europe’s debt crisis and a faltering U.S. recovery. India’s central bank Governor Duvvuri Subbarao said yesterday that a more than 9 percent inflation is above “comfort level.”

Of course, the picture is not uniform here with notable economies such as Brazil and Indonesia already lowering interest rates but all eyes are currently on China (and secondarily India) and here I think that we will have to see stronger signs of a hard landing or a relapse into a more severe global slowdown we can expect policy makers to actively stimulate.

In summary, I think that we are indeed nearing an inflection point at which money printing in the developed world will once again provide relief to risky asset markets but the problem is that the underlying economic backdrop has not improved much. In particular, the ongoing lack of resolution in the euro zone represents an issue but Eastern Europe as well as a housing bubble in Australia (and perhaps even in Denmark) are also potential sources of uncertainty not to mention the unravelling of credit excess in China. As such, “it” is far from over but a tradable bounce in risky assets which goes beyond the current choppy range may soon represent itself.

–

[1] – The distinction between quantitative and qualitative easing is simple. The former refers to an expansion of the balance sheet through the central bank increasing its liabilities and adding a corresponding amount of assets. The latter refers to changing the composition of the asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet and as I am reading the gist of OT the Fed has committed to keep its balance sheet unchanged by selling short term bonds and buying long term bonds. Try this one for a good recap of what QE is and isn’t.



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Bad bonds, bad bonds, watcha gonna do

By Christopher Briem, on February 18th, 2011

So I saw the notice that some Port Authority debt was being rated and didn’t think much of it.. Of course, the way this works is that new debt ratings like that don’t normally happen spontaneously, but reflect some new debt offering or other big change.  So it comes as no big surprise that the Port Authority is paying a big penalty to get out from some variable rate debt.

$39 million bucks… I wonder what it would have cost if they dealt with it earlier?    No biggie.

Something I should have caught…  or maybe I did?  I think it is the same debt mentioned here in 2008.  If it is the same debt, then the story today is far less interesting than it could have been.  There is, or was, at least the theoretical possibility of foreclosure on some “T” cars somewhere woven in there.  I have this image in my head of the cars being loaded onto barges for shipment down river and then shipped to Belgium or something.

I also don’t get the line about this debt becoming “unpredictable” and thus the reason they had to shell out nearly 40 mil.  I think there are innumerable ways to hedge a debt instrument to make your budgeting less volatile.  Makes no sense as transcribed.  They basically chose to borrow in a highly risky way and chose not to hedge it in any way.

Alas…  water under the bridge and I like the general theme that this was all just a problem others have gotten into.  No, many many places never got into these binds.  But let’s ask the rhetorical question again and ponder what other variable rate, auction rate or ’swaption’ debt is still out there looming ready to hit someone’s bottom line.  Say large public agencies with big debt outstanding.  Some others with letters of credit about to expire?

Bueller?



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The Verdict on US Bond Yields?

By Claus Vistesen, on January 5th, 2011

Just before we turned the clock on 2010 I commented on the recent increase in US yields and noted the following simple issue;

How investors perceive and interpret this will [rising yields] determine great many things; is it a reflection of higher growth in the future and thus a sooner than expected normalisation by the Fed. Or is it a result of supply concerns and the continuing double digit budget deficit by the Fed and thus the bond vigilantes attempt to go for the biggest prey in the park.

Obviously, interpretation, animal spirits and sunspots can never be entirely disconnected from real economic activity on the ground, but the underlying point is important.

If rising yields are seen as a reflection of growing concerns over the US authorities’ ability and willingness to control to the deficit it could hamper ability to maneuver for the Fed and the Treasury. If on the other rising yields are seen as a reflection of policy makers’ success in reviving back growth through QE and an extension of tax cuts, it goes together with an altogether more benign narrative about how the deficit will pay for itself as higher growth leads to higher income and more leeway in managing public finances.

So which is it?

Well, a recent piece by Bloomberg’s Daniel Krueger suggests that the latter discourse is emerging and thus that whoever playing the part as bond vigilante these days, he or she has failed in their attempt to drive the conversation (so far).

Quote Bloomberg

The worst performance by Treasuries since the second quarter of 2009 reflects prospects for faster U.S. economic growth rather than concern that rising budget deficits will drive investors away from government debt.

(…)

Even as deficits remain at almost record highs, the bond market is giving the U.S. time to address structural budget imbalances. A Bloomberg News survey of the 18 bond dealers that serve as counterparties to the Federal Reserve in its open market transactions show they forecast the 10-year Treasury yield to rise to 3.65 percent from 3.30 percent on Dec. 31, below its average of 4.33 percent since 2000. Two-year yields will climb to 1.05 percent from 0.59 percent, holding below the average of 3.03 percent since the beginning of 2000.

(…)

“The market is starting to believe the Fed will be successful in creating growth,” said Ray Humphrey, who manages inflation-indexed bond portfolios in Hartford, Connecticut for Hartford Investment Management Co., which has $161.7 billion in assets. “Nominal bonds are frankly reflecting those higher growth rates.”

This is interesting for a host of reasons. First of all, with an estimated budget deficit of 10-11% of GDP in 2011, it seems that the old adage that the US economy is indeed different still holds true. Consequently, and local government debt/muni ghosts notwithstanding it appears the US economy is getting all the leash other economies in the OECD are not.

Looking at the charts, I would not hold it against you if you thought that this was much ado about nothing though.

(click for larger image)

In general, the US yield curve has steepened considerably since the infamous March-09 low in risky assets mainly as a result of the fact that although short term yields have been kept tightly in check by the Fed’s policies, yields on longer dated bonds slowly crept upward in 2009 with both the 10y2y and 20y2y increasing notably. This in turn, albeit with a lag, has sparked comment from both Fed officials and prominent analysts that the Fed would use additional QE measures to massage the long end of the yield curve especially as it is the long end which determines the rate on mortgages which is  a gauge strongly watched by the Fed.

In 2010 and much contrary to the talk about rising yields; both long term and short term yields have actually declined on the year. From December to January it is pretty much status quo on the yield curve measured by the 2y10y though with 2 year nominal yield declining 31.3 basis points and 10 year nominal yields declining 44 basis points.

The action and talk on rising yields come from the fact that in Q4 yields have increased across the board with longer dated bonds taking the worst hit as the curve steepened across all spreads. 10 year yields rose the most from October to December rising 75 basis points while 2 year yields increased by a mere 24 basis points in comparison. As such, what turned out to be a good year for bond investors has turned sour right at the end.

The real important thing going forward is how long US policy makers can benefit from the win-win discourse of rising yields and a strenghtening economy. One would be tempted to say that if only the Fed came out openly and targeted a level of the SP500 then the world would be much more transparent. What I am basically saying is that one key part of the Fed’s current policies is the explicit targeting of equity prices and the subsequent positive wealth effect perceived as well as real.

Fundamentally, it is bit of tighthrope walk since the main condition for the good days to continue is a very fine balance epitomized by the notion of a “mild-goldilocks” scenario. In short, yields can go up as long as they want except if it translates into the actual expectation of an interest rate hike by the Fed. As such, the economy should continue growing but not so strong as to force the Fed’s hand into a more hawkish discourse.



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Treasury Assists with $90B in Bonds: Saves States $12B

By Eldon Mast, on April 13th, 2010

Last year’s stimulus package included a program for states and municipalities entitled “Build America Bonds.”

The U.S. Treasury announced that so far it is on target to save those local governments $12.3 billion in borrowing costs with federally subsidized taxable bonds already sold during the first year of the program.

Since the stimulus passed last April, the Treasury has helped state and local governments sell $90 billion of these bonds to assist their jurisdictions with new liquidity to fund their local projects.

While most government agencies traditionally issue tax-exempt bonds, the Build America Bonds are taxable bonds with a 35 percent federal subsidy on interest costs. This means that a jurisdiction ultimately pays much less in interest to provide the same capital improvements or service upgrades to their constituents.

Denver Water which was one of the first agencies to take advantage of the program in order to effect need upgrades to the Denver water system. Chips Barry, manager of Denver Water stated that they were “pleased to be able to sell bonds at a very reasonable rate in the current market environment. For ratepayers, this means we are able to keep costs as low as possible while providing us the funding to improve our system.”

California issued seven of the top 10 bond deals according to analysis of Treasury Department data. The state also issued roughly one-quarter of the $90 billion worth of bonds since last April. Most of the bonds issued by the sunshine state are now in the midst of funding transportation and educational improvements.

“People originally said it would eliminate the issuance of municipal bonds,” says John Cummings, who is head of muni-bond investments at money-management firm PIMCO. “Instead they have stabilized the market and helped to create jobs.“



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