By Ajay Shah, on February 7th, 2012
The JEE used to serve India well
Many years ago, high school education in India worked in a twin track system: There were those who studied for the IIT JEE and there was everyone else who didn’t. The former studied good books (e.g. Resnick/Halliday (which is a college level book elsewhere in the world), solved physics problems from Irodov, etc.
In contrast, studying for the 12th standard (”board examination”) tended to emphasise rote memorisation, focusing on trivial questions where you had to plug numbers into a formula, emphasised accuracy of calculation and good handwriting. I vividly remember a textbook for 11th class physics used in Maharashtra, which said that Newton’s second law did not apply for living things and powered vehicles. The thoughtful author must have wondered how a stationary cat started walking without the action of an external unbalanced force, and resolved the problem by limiting the footprint of Newton’s second law. The less time that kids spend in studying for board examinations, the better.
I used to be optimistic that the footprint of the enhanced curriculum, and complexity of examination questions, lay far beyond the tiny number of people who entered IIT. Even if only 2,000 kids entered IIT, if 40,000 of them studied for the JEE, it gave them world class capabilities at high school. In each cohort, we got 40,000 people who were very good by world standards. In a country with pervasively low capabilities, it was very useful having this slice of high inequality of knowledge, for it gave a group of people who were able to learn modern technology, connect to globalisation, and create firms which generate a lot of high-paying jobs. It is fashionable to complain about inequality of knowledge, but given that you are in a LDC with a very low mean, would you really rather have very low variance??
With this old configuration, we also got a nice tool for inter-generational class mobility. The middle class got their kids into IIT, and almost all these graduated into upper class by the time they were 30.
More generally, a lot of countries have found that high stakes examinations are a good thing. High stakes examinations push the work ethic, grow the ability of young people to work hard in a sustained manner with high concentration, ensure foundations of mathematics and science, and encourage a meritocracy. They create a self-selected elite of young people who are not immersed in and defined by mass culture. All these are good things.
Problems of the JEE
I used to think like this for a long time. I have reluctantly been persuaded, over recent years, that the JEE isn’t working so well.
Too many young people are studying for the examination and not the subject. The obsessive focus upon coaching classes is producing a one-dimensional personality which isn’t so well suited to entering college. In the 1980s, the most interesting students in IIT were thinking people who read books, knew a lot about the world, and could also solve monkeys on pulleys. With brutal competition, and the coaching classes phenomenon, too often, all that’s left today is the monkeys on pulleys. There is a certain kind of parent who is willing to have a child go live in Kota at age 15. This screened out many families from the race.
Economists know about this phenomenon in agency theory. High-powered incentives are a problem because the agent only focuses on the incentive and tends to cut corners (or worse) on everything that’s not mentioned in the incentive contract. Andrade and Castro bring this generic idea in agency theory into the question of examinations, and find similar effects.
In the 1980s, there was substantial diversity of background, experiences and class amongst the students. This was a good thing, since students would then pick up the culture of people unlike them. In recent years, it appears that there is much greater homogeneity of background, experiences and class. The extent to which the person gets transformed in the four years has, as a consequence, gone down. When very few children of the elite go to IIT, this reduces access to the knowledge and networks of the elite for everyone who goes to IIT. This has reduced the ability of IIT to generate inter-generational class mobility.
Jishnu Das and Tristan Zajonc have found a nice bump in the upper tail of the distribution of skills in India. The pessimist sees this as being about class or caste: certain families bring up kids who know more. The optimist in me used to think this was the bunch studying for the IIT entrance. Also see Geniuses and economic development on the importance of the upper tail of the skills distribution.
It is increasingly difficult to be optimistic about how this is going. Narendra Karmarkar graduated from IITB in 1978, and went on to do truly important work in 1984. My optimism about the IITs peaked in 1984. This should have scaled up manifold in the following years. It has not. In the 1980s, I used to think that by 2010, we’d have atleast one Nobel laureate from the IITs. That has not happened. This tells us that the IITs are not delivering on their early promise; things haven’t worked out well in the following years. I think the JEE is a part of the problem.
One of the most disappointing features of the recent OECD PISA evidence was the absence of this bump in the upper tail. This new evidence shows a scary world of low inequality of skill, of a country with a terrible mean and no upper tail of an elite that can power the country out of mass poverty. I would conjecture two potential explanations for what has been found. One, it could be the case that this testing was done at age 15, at which time not much of the IIT JEE studying has as yet taken place. Alternatively, it could be the case that studying for the IIT JEE is not producing good knowledge.
But the solution being offered doesn’t seem to be the right one
There are two views on how these problems can be solved. The first alternative is to shift away from admissions based on a high stakes examination. Universities in the US screen applicants on many parameters, so this is generally thought to be better. But when we look back in history, universities in the US used to focus primarily on academic performance only, until a glut of Jews showed up in Harvard. The shift to asking for `well rounded personalities’ was a tool by the dominant anti-semetic elite to screen out Jewish kids who did not play football. So we should be cautious in respecting the undergraduate admissions process in the US. It is also important to remember that the quality of kids starting college in the US is quite weak by world standards. There are other countries (e.g. Japan) where large scale high-stakes examinations are used for university admissions, with much success.
I feel that the core problem that we have in India is just too few seats, which has generated a ridiculous extent of competition and distorted behaviour on the part of the kids. The solution lies in solving the policy problems in higher education, so that a large number of kids are taken into world class institutions every year. E.g. adding undergraduate programs at I I Sc, with recruitment through the JEE, was a move in the right direction. We need to grow the size of the entrant class in universities in India, that figure in the Times Higher Education Supplement ranking, by 10-fold. At present, we have only one university in that list – IIT Bombay.
Kapil Sibal is offering neither of the two solutions above: we are not being offered a modified admissions process based on looking at a fuller picture of the child, and we are not being offered a Japanese scale world of high stakes examinations with a lot of seats in world class universities. What we’re being offered is a scaling down of the role of the IIT JEE. A greater role for the 12th standard examination is just a recipe to emphasise rote memorisation, focusing on trivial questions where you had to plug numbers into a formula, emphasising accuracy of calculation and good handwriting. This seems wrong to me.


By Ethan Zuckerman, on December 12th, 2011
 
Robert Neuwirth is bringing new insights to familiar (for him, unfamiliar for most of us) territory in his book, “Stealth of Nations“. His previous work, “Shadow Cities” was a plea to take squatter cities and informal settlements seriously, rather than dismissing them as slums. (My review of Shadow Cities is here.) His mission in this new book is for us to reconsider the “informal economy”, which he rebrands “System D”.
“System D” is an abbreviation for “l’economie de la débrouillardise”, a tern coined in French-speaking Africa to refer to a system of “resourceful and ingenious” people who make their livings outside the formal, taxed and regulated economy. Neuwirth rejects the term “informal” because the coiner of that phrase, British anthropologist Keith Hart, included the criminal underground in his term, “the informal economy”. Neuwirth wants to celebrate the energy and ingenuity of people who make their living outside formal economic structure, but distinguish those he celebrates from those who are selling drugs or running prostitution rings. The heroes of System D may avoid taxes, smuggle goods or operate without permits, but Neuwirth sees them not as criminals but as hardworking people trying to make a living in systems that are broken and corrupt.
Neuwirth’s great strength is as a traveler and storyteller. Like “Shadow Cities”, “Stealth of Nation” is packed chock full with stories from the communities he’s visited in Brazil, Paraguay, Nigeria, China and the United States. We meet street merchants selling pens and cakes in São Paolo, a handbag manufacturer in Guangzhou and the baker of high-end (if unlicensed) olive oil cake in New York City. He takes a particularly deep dive in Lagos, a megalopolis he describes as “a System D city”, where virtually no infrastructures are provided by the state, and where basic services like power, drinking water and public transit are provided by private industry and workers’ collectives, who build systems that function with limited licensing, taxation or oversight.
This wealth of narratives helps make the case that System D is massive and pervasive. Working from numbers from the World Bank and using the insights of Austrian economist Friedrich Schneider, Neuwirth offers an estimate that System D is responsible for roughly $10 trillion in goods and services bought and sold annually. That makes “Bazaristan” the second largest economy in the world, behind the United States. He further argues that System D provides employment for a majority of adults in many developing nations. Whether or not we approve of the activities of System D, Neuwirth argues, we need to take it seriously because of the large number of individuals it impacts.
Neuwirth’s inquiry is extremely broad in scope, both in terms of the subjects he considers and the timescale he examines. Chapters look at phenomena like piracy and counterfeit goods, and smuggling across international borders, which Neuwirth examines primarily via Paraguay’s Ciudad del Este, a urban center that exists primarily so Brazilian citizens – and merchants – can avoid paying taxes. To provide a historical context for these sorts of trade, Neuwirth calls on classical economists, including Adam Smith, as well as histories from the 18th century to demonstrate the ongoing demonization and dismissal of System D merchants. For me, these excursions into the past are less enjoyable that the wealth of contemporary examples he provides, though they’re helpful in establishing that System D is a very old system as well as a new one.
The danger in both of Neuwirth’s books is that he loves his subject so much, he occasionally celebrates it uncritically. “Shadow Cities” occasionally read to me as a marketing brochure for Brazilian favelas, suggesting we abandon traditional urban planning and invite urban entrepreneurs to rewire the electrical grid to meet their needs. “Stealth of Nations” is more careful, and Neuwirth engages with the ways in which Lagos can be a nightmare for the people who live there, not just a creative laboratory for urban innovation. At the same time, he urges us to take seriously the miracle that Lagos works at all, a miracle that can be hard to see underneath the diesel smog, caught in an hours-long go-slow.
This appreciation for the complex systems that compose System D can push Neuwirth towards a sort of conservatism that’s familiar to readers of Jane Jacobs. Neuwirth’s Robert Moses is Lagos State governor Babatunde Fashola, who Neuwirth lambasts for clearing street merchants from busy intersections and setting up formalized markets in inconveniently located parts of the city. Neuwirth is right to point out that Fashola, and other urban planners, have a tendency to undervalue the contributions of street merchants, and tend to propose unworkable alternatives to current systems. But celebrating contemporary Lagos in the ways that Jacobs celebrated the Lower East Side seems to miss two critical points. First, to the extent that Lagos works right now, it just barely works – Neuwirth acknowledges as much when he points out that some of Lagos’s most impenetrable traffic jams are caused by the tendency of merchants to turn roadways into markets. Second, Lagos is growing at a ferocious pace, and Fashola seems to be taking seriously the challenge of allowing the city to continue functioning as a megalopolis, likely to soon be one of the world’s largest cities. One possible response to Neuwirth’s criticism is to point out that Fashola was just re-elected with 81% of the vote in a poll most observers saw as free and fair.
Neuwirth is a journalist and documentarian, not an economist or an urban planner, and it may be unreasonable to ask him to solve the thorny problem of bringing System D and the formal economy into closer partnership. Neuwirth examines Hernando de Soto’s work on formalizing System D through property rights. De Soto’s most helpful intervention is the observation that the poor have wealth – homes, businesses, assets – but few ways to access them. By creating a paper trail, establishing ownership over houses and other real estate, de Soto argues that the poor can access their wealth, borrowing against their homes and using the loans to start new businesses. Neuwirth looks at de Soto’s native Peru and concludes that formalization hasn’t done much to help System D. The problem is the banks, who are perfectly willing to accept deposits from System D entrepreneurs, but unwilling to lend to them. Neuwirth’s anger is rightly placed, and his solution – that communities and governments need to demand that banks serve the communities they are located in, not just their shareholders – is timely and correct, even if difficult to implement.
The solutions Neuwirth offers for strengthening and legitimating System D are, by his own admission, modest in scope. Merchants should work together to regulate their activities, settling disputes within mediation mechanisms. They should take responsibility for the physical spaces they inhabit and work to make them clean and safe. They should consider systems that review product safety and ensure the quality of goods sold. Neuwirth isn’t opposed to regulatory involvement in this space – he looks closely at the “pure water” industry in Nigeria, where entrepreneurs drill wells, pump water and purify it under government standards before selling it in single-use sachets to thirsty customers. The system could be a health nightmare if minimum health standards are not enforced. The Lagos government can’t provide clean drinking water to its citizens, so it has found a way to work with System D to ensure that people have water and the water doesn’t kill them – for System D advocates, there’s potential in that story and a model other governments might follow.
But the pure water story also reveals the apparent limits of System D. “Pure water” usually won’t kill you, but it’s an environmental nightmare, as millions of nylon bags clog the Lagos sewers. It’s a wonderful thing that Lagosians can drink safe water, but a system where thousands of school-age girls sell sachets of water because you can’t drink the water out of the pipes isn’t a system any sane planner would advocate for. System D can get Lagos’s citizens to work, but it’s never going to build affordable and environmentally sound public transportation. If merchants follow Neuwirth’s advice, they may collectively buy bigger diesel generators, but they’re unlikely to fix Nigeria’s laughably inadequate power grid.
The people Neuwirth celebrates are – rightly – frustrated by their governments. They avoid paying taxes both because those taxes can be arbitrary and unaffordable, and because they see very few government services in exchange bought with those revenues. But governments need revenues to build infrastructures. And, as economist Paul Collier argues, they need taxes – and need to put those taxes to use in productive ways – in order to have legitimacy. System D seems like a local maximum in an equation – when it works well, it’s amazing what entrepreneurial people can accomplish against impossible odds. But the solutions created are convoluted and incomplete, and it’s reasonable to worry that System D may prevent more formal systems from providing more complete solutions to societal problems.
I don’t actually disagree with Neuwirth on this point – I wrote an essay some years back about incremental infrastructure, an idea I’d had from studying African mobile phone markets, that suggested that systems like power grids and roadways might be built by the cooperation of entrepreneurs when governments failed. My proposal suffers from the same weaknesses I’m criticizing Neuwirth for: it’s hard to see how a collective of merchants builds a railroad, and sometimes a railroad is what’s really needed for economic development.
But that’s an awfully big problem to demand that Neuwirth tackle – if you want to understand precisely how complicated that problem is, try this thought piece from Collier, proposing a possible solution to railroad construction in sub-Saharan Africa. Neuwirth’s job isn’t to solve the problems of System D. What he does – compellingly, readably, engagingly, and frequently, brilliantly – is give the reader a picture of how the world’s economies actually work, and a convincing argument that we need to respect and understand these economic systems. It’s a good read and an important book.
When you pick up Neuwirth’s new book, also consider grabbing a copy of Gordon Mathews’s “ Ghetto at the Center of the World”, a remarkable ethnography of a single building in Hong Kong, Chungking Mansions. Chungking Mansions is a nondescript and somewhat run-down tower block in one of the more crowded corners of Kowloon. Inside is a remarkable market, where Chinese, Pakistani and sub-Saharan African merchants interact with one another in a microcosm of global trade. Mathews refers to this economic phenomenon as “low-end globalization”, and his book unpacks the history, mechanics, personalities and motivations in a way that is absolutely fascinating.
Chungking Mansions exists because of a peculiarity of Hong Kong’s visa policies. Tourist visas to Hong Kong are easily obtained by citizens of many nations – residents of countries like Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya often have difficulty obtaining visas to Europe, the US or China, but are able to travel to Hong Kong for anywhere between 7 and 90 days, depending on the discretion of the immigration officer. As China became a major manufacturing power, Chungking Mansions became a critical interface between Chinese factories and developing world markets. The upper floors of the building feature low-cost guesthouses that cater primarily to traveling merchants, and restaurants that offer home cooking for the African and South Asian migrants who work out of the building.
On the ground floor, dozens of stalls feature Pakistani merchants selling Chinese-made mobile phones to African middlemen. Mathews documents the trade in intimate detail, explaining the ownership of the individual stalls (they are generally rented from Chinese owners who are rarely present in the building, but have a powerful owner’s association that governs the working on the market), the provenance of the phones sold (including the difference between original phones, 14-day phones – original phones returned to the vendor by dissatisfied customers, good fakes and bad fakes) and the economics of importing phones into sub-Saharan Africa. Mathews posits (without much data to back this claim) that up to half the mobile phones in Africa come through Chungking Market and enter African markets through the luggage of entrepreneurs.
I found Mathews’s account so compelling that Chungking Mansions was my first stop when visiting Hong Kong a few weeks ago. Based on his explanation of Chinese perceptions of the building (as a dangerous place filled with drug addicts and criminals), I expected a much shadier place than I actually found. Chungking Mansions is immediately familiar to anyone who’s bought electronics in the developing world – it’s cleaner and better organized than markets I’ve been to in Nairobi and New Delhi, but in some ways, functionally the same place. Walking through the stalls, I experienced a tesseract, a folding of space that let me move between Hong Kong, Pakistan and West Africa over the course of a few meters. I dropped into one of the few non-phone stores, a clothing store featuring street fashions, including a wide array of Yankee caps. I gave the merchant grief about not stocking Red Sox hats, quickly figured out that he was Ghanaian, greeted him in Twi, and was warmly embraced and invited upstairs for fufu and groundnut soup. It wasn’t at all hard to figure out why Mathews had fallen in love with the place – if you’re interested in how globalization is transforming economies, Chungking Mansions really is one of the centers of the world.
I had the chance to meet Mathews when we lectured together at the University of Hong Kong a few days later. He’s as wonderfully crazy as you’d imagine him to be, and told me that he’d written the book in a bar across the street from his research site. “The key is that the bar has roasted peanuts in the shell. I’d shell a peanut and think, then write a sentence, then sip my beer. That writing pace is just perfect as long as you remain under three beers.” Rarely have I learned so much from a single ethnographer – how to smuggle phones into Ghana in my luggage, the best strategies for overstaying my Hong Kong tourist visa, how to befriend Nepali heroin addicts, and how to pace my writing.
I’ve been pushing Mathews’s book on the ethnographers I know because it’s an amazing example of the power of the deep dive. It’s possible that no one on the planet understands Chungking Mansions as thoroughly as Mathews does based on his decade of research. But his insights are profoundly helpful not just for understanding this one wonderful and strange building, but for understanding globalization as it is actually practiced. Where Neuwirth takes a broad view, considering economies on four different continents, Mathews rarely leaves the confines of a single building and still manages to tell a story that’s global in scope and impact.
By Ajay Shah, on June 21st, 2011
By Ajay Shah, on April 19th, 2011
Ila Patnaik and I wrote a paper titled Did the Indian capital controls work as a tool of macroeconomic policy?
The abstract of this paper reads: In 2010 and 2011, there has been a fresh wave of interest in capital controls. India offers an interesting setting for assessing the usefulness of capital controls. It has a complex administrative system of capital controls, and it also had an unusually good economic performance during the Great Recession. This paper examines the claim that the capital controls induced this outcome; it analyses the extent to which the system of capital controls helped achieve India’s macroeconomic and financial stability policy objectives. It finds that India’s experience is inconsistent with the revisionist view of capital controls. Macroeconomic policy in India has moved away from the erstwhile strategies, towards greater exchange rate flexibility combined with capital account liberalisation.
This is interesting, in part, in the discussion on Indian economic policy. But this has also become surprisingly interesting on an international scale.
Many years ago, policy makers and academics had figured out capital controls. Capital account liberalisation was an integral part of the package of policies that made up a modern nation. Plugging into globalisation meant shedding autarkic policy, and being open to ideas, trade, services, capital, etc. All good countries had an open capital account. One by one, emerging markets started figuring out how to remove capital controls. This led to many blow ups along the way, where countries tried to violate the `impossible trinity’. So the path has been a turbulent one, but the destination is clear. Once capital account openness came in, it was no longer possible to control the exchange rate except for extremely hard pegs such as Hong Kong and the Eurozone.
Policy makers and academics did not come to this conclusion from deductive reasoning. They came to this conclusion by getting bloodied over and over. The capital controls that were attempted did not deliver the required results, and the capital controls that could deliver the required results imposed too high a cost on GDP growth. The lack of usefulness of capital controls became the working consensus of practical people.
In recent years, these questions have been reopened, most notably by the IMF. These questions are, hence, back in the global economic discussion.
Among the G-20 countries, only India and China have a large system of capital controls. In most other places, practical experience with capital controls is actually hard to find. The generation which fought those issues has faded away. It is, hence, particularly interesting to study the experience of India and China with capital controls. This makes our paper a useful component of this global debate.
And, on these issues, also see The IMF needs to find its voice again, by Sebastian Mallaby in the Financial Times. The Frank Warnock paper that he talks about is also worth reading.


By Ajay Shah, on January 31st, 2011
One of the many fascinating facts that you see in Economic History and Modern India: Redefining the Link by Tirthankar Roy (Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 2002) is about India’s trade/GDP ratio. The trade/GDP ratio rose dramatically from 1 to 2 per cent in 1800 to 20 per cent in 1914.
By 1970, the trade/GDP ratio had dropped to 8 per cent. It was only in the mid 1990s, the trade/GDP ratio had got back to
the 20 per cent value seen in 1914.
Most people in India today are not aware of the pre-War world, where goods and services flowed freely across the boundary, when
people in India diversified their portfolios across the globe, travelled freely within the British Empire, etc.
After the War, there was a big push worldwide to reduce trade barriers. Governments, then, made the call that agriculture was not
worth fighting for (since it was a fading share of world GDP but a large number of votes), and focused on manufacturing. By and large,
this worked. Trade in manufacturing is pretty free worldwide.
But world GDP shifted away from manufacturing. Today, world GDP is dominated by services. World GDP is now 5.8% agriculture, 30.8% manufacturing and 63.4% services.
Crudely speaking, if we have full free trade in goods, but zero trade in agriculture or services, then 69% of World GDP is submerged
in autarky.
Over the last 20 years, manufacturing trade liberalisation has continued, but the share of services in world GDP has risen. I suspect
that overall, this has made the world less hospitable to trade.
An interesting article on voxEU by Sebastien Miroudot, Jehan Sauvage and Ben Shepherd points out that in the aggregate, the costs of trade have dropped sharply for goods from 1995 onwards, but not for services.
We need to work harder on removing a variety of barriers to trade in goods. But we need to work much harder on removing the barriers to trade in services.
In this sense, the globalisation project is far from done. By and large, the world has done well on removing barriers to the movement of goods and capital (though India is as yet a laggard on both fronts). The two great frontiers are now trade in services and the movement of people. Given the huge footprint of services in world GDP, it is not even the case that we are exposing the world economy to as much global competition as was the case a few decades ago, when manufacturing was a big part of world trade and there was a lot of trade in it. 
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By Ethan Zuckerman, on October 25th, 2010
Six years ago, early in my tenure at Berkman, I wrote a blog post that tried to calculate the cost of shipping water from a bottling plant in Yaqara, Fiji to Cambridge, Massachusetts. I was interested in unpacking the everyday mystery of container shipping – how is it possible that we can sell a product for a couple of dollars a bottle despite shipping it 8,000 miles around the world – and in the odd idea that atoms might be more mobile than bits, as we get lots more Fiji water in the US than Fijian music, movies or news.
My estimate then was that a 40′ container filled with Fiji water would cost roughly $5000 to deliver from Suva, Fiji to Cambridge – I came up with the estimate based on a variety of statistics about international shipping that I bent and welded into a Fiji/Massachusetts estimate. At $5000 a container and 24,000 kilograms per 40′ box, it would cost $0.21 for a liter bottle of Fiji water to make the 8,000 mile journey. Not free, but a small fraction of the retail price of a bottle of “premium” imported bottled water.
I had occasion to return to this blogpost today – I’m working on a book, and this Fiji example features in it. So I decided to recalcuate the numbers and see if I could find an answer that’s more defensible and satisfying.
Turns out I got a few details wrong. First, the 24,000kg figure applies to smaller, 20′ containers – the limit for 40-footers is 30,480kg. And the price from Suva to Cambridge for a 40′ container is just slightly higher – $5,540.30. That comes out to $0.18 per liter, three cents less than I calculated six years ago.
These new figures come from my new favorite toy, Maersk’s online shipping rates calculator. The Danish superfirm A.P. Møller – Mærsk Gruppen is the largest shipping group in the world, with offices in 135 countries, 120,000 employees, and roughly 600 container ships, capable of carrying more than 2 million 20′ containers at any given time. They’ve also got a thoroughly badass IT system, which they’ve now made accessible to the general public.
Okay, it’s not exactly Amazon.com, or even Fedex. To use Maersk’s calculator, you need to register with the site, download a client browser certificate and accept three server certificates from Maersk before you can access their secure site. But once you do, it’s just a few short clicks before you can calculate the cost of shipping a 20′ container of “umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof” (yes, that’s one of the available categories, along with “bone and meal”, “ores, slag and ash” and “straw, esparto, other plaiting materials and articles of straw, esparto, other plaiting materials) from Auckland to Dubai: $2451.02
The main thing I’ve found playing with Maersk’s calendar: distance doesn’t matter as much as demand. Americans buy a lot of atoms from China. The Chinese don’t buy nearly as many from the US. A 40′ container filled with household goods, shipped from Shanghai to Houston, TX costs $6169.93. Reverse the trip and ship the same container from Houston to Shanghai and the cost is $3631.07. That’s because 60% of containers on ships coming from the US to China are empty, which means Maersk and other shippers are desperate to sell container space.
(The 2006 New York Times article that offers that 60% empty container statistic suggests that lots of full containers are coming to China from raw-materials rich countries like Australia, Brazil and the Middle East. That suggests we should see the opposite pattern – expensive containers from Sao Paolo to Shanghai and cheap ones in the other direction. Nope. $5101.70 from Shanghai to Sao Paolo, $1930.59 in the other direction. Perhaps containers from China to Brazil are riding the same ships as those to the US and paying the same premiums?)
 
Maersk also offers a set of maps that help you get a sense for how these trade routes actually work. It’s a four day trip from Suva to Auckland on the Pacific Islands Express, and then the bottles of Fiji water are transfered to OC1, the Oceania Americas Service. The Pacific crossing is a long one – 18 days to the Panama Canal, a quick stop in Cartagena, and we’re in Philadephia 25 days out of Auckland. It’s a truck ride from Philly to Cambridge, and that short hop is responsible for $950 of the total transit cost.
As I poke through these maps, schedules and tariffs, I feel like I’m glimpsing a secret world. Part of it may come from the sheer poetry of the names. Shipping routes include “The Boomerang” and the “The South China/Australia Yo-yo” and connect ports like Tin Can Island (Apapa, Nigeria, the main port for Lagos). And part comes from the sense that these routes and rates, the infrastructure that supports an economy where transPacific bottled water is possible, are the ley lines of globalization, radiating a mysterious and sinister power.
By Ajay Shah, on September 14th, 2010
On VoxEU, there is a fascinating article titled China and India: Those two big outliers by Jesus Felipe, Utsav Kumar
and Arnelyn Abdon.
The interesting fact that they highlight is that both India and China are wise beyond their per capita GDP when it comes to the
sophistication and diversification of their exports.
The evidence that they show, on the change in export diversification, is quite striking:
|
China |
India |
| 1962 |
105 |
71 |
| 2007 |
265 |
254 |
| Change (times) |
2.52x |
3.58x |
In India’s case, in 1962, in the depth of India’s autarky, there were 71 commodities exported with `revealed comparative advantage’. By 2007, this number had gone up by 3.58 times. Both China and India are outliers (with excessively high values seen for export
diversification) when compared with other countries at the same level of per capita GDP on a PPP basis.
Explaining the unusual export diversification
One element of the explanation of diversification is sheer size. Continental India has a diverse array of locations. Coastal
Gujarat is a good location for processing crude oil for export, and Bihar is a good place for growing Litchis for export. By aggregating
both places into a single country, we get high levels of export diversification. A casual examination of their graph (Figure 2) makes
me think there is some support for this conjecture – positive outliers in the graph are big countries like the US and Germany; negative
outliers are small countries like Ireland and Finland.
Explaining the unusual export sophistication
Why does India do sophisticated export, well beyond what one would expect for its level of per capita GDP?
- Sheer size matters. Consider the distribution of a certain specific kind of knowledge across individuals in the country. Suppose
you set a high cutoff for the minimum knowledge required of that field in order to assemble a large sized firm. So if you want to build a large sized firm in that field, you need to recruit 1000 people who have this specialised knowledge in excess of this cutoff. In a country of 1.2 billion people, you have more draws from the same distribution. So even if the lay of the land is quite bad in the sense that most people have bad knowledge, the sheer size of the country enables the establishment of firms which require building groups with high end specialised knowledge.Consider the distribution of IQ. One in a thousand people have an IQ of above 146. To help fix your intution, it appears that GRE V+Q of 1450 is roughly IQ=146. In India, with a population of 1.2 billion, we have 1.2 million of them. These 1.2 million very smart people in the country can serve as a core around which extremely high quality firms can be built. These effects are accentuated by increasing returns to scale, and the operation of Metcalfe’s Law, in the gains from interaction and competition between these people within a country.
- There is an odd upper tail in Indian human capital. Looking back 100 years ago, there has been a bizarre upper tail of very highly skilled people in India. Think Ramanujan: by rights, you would have never expected that kind of incredible knowledge to be found in a place like India. But pre-independence India managed to have incredible geniuses like Ramanujan, C. V. Raman, S. N. Bose and C. R. Rao — well before the post-independence push that created the IITs. Is this merely about size (a lot of draws) or was there actually a bizarre upper tail? On this subject, see India shining and Bharat drowning: comparing two Indian states to the worldwide distribution in mathematics achievement by Jishnu Das and Tristan Zajonc. Some fascinating estimates are shown in Producing superstars for the economic Mundial: The team in the tail by Lant Pritchett and Martina Viarengo, who estimate the number of 15 year olds in a country with a OECD PISA score of above 625, which is a
pretty good number. The US is estimated to have between 240,000 and 270,000 individuals in this rarefied zone. India has (a) A lot of people, (b) An abysmally poor mode, and (b) A strange upper tail. Putting these together, they estimate India has 100,000 and 190,000 individuals in this rarefied zone – which is incredibly impressive considering that the Indian per capita GDP is one-thirtieth of that seen in the US. This also tells me that we need to scale up the universities in India so that atleast 200,000 individuals each year are able to start a world class undergraduate education: it’s a real shame underutilising these kids. Aside: PISA > 625 is a much weaker condition than IQ > 146.
Some people bemoan the inequality of human capital that is found in India, i.e. the huge gap between this upper tail and the modal
value. But given that we have a low per capita GDP, would we rather have equality where everyone has low skills, or would we rather have an incredible upper tail in the distribution of knowledge, that is able to learn new technology, plug into globalisation, and power the country along?
This is also related to Albert Hirschmann’s theme of unbalanced growth: he had argued that growth involves developing an
`unbalanced’ capability (e.g. India and the software industry led by a small core of high end capabilities), and then harnessing the
benefits of the catchup by the rest of system (e.g. telecom reforms, mass scale computer programming education, broad business skills in running globalised firms out of India).
In a recent NBER working paper, Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann offer interesting evidence about the tradeoff between `rocket scientists or basic education for all’. They say:
Both the basic-skill and the top-performing dimensions of educational performance appear separately important for growth. From the estimates in column 3, a ten percentage point increase in the share of students reaching basic literacy is associated with 0.3 percentage points higher annual growth, and a ten percentage point increase in the share of top-performing students is associated with 1.3 percentage points higher annual growth….
the effect of the top-performing share is significantly larger in countries that have more scope to catch up to
the initially most productive countries (col. 5). These results appear consistent with a mixture of the basic models of human capital and growth mentioned earlier. The accumulation of skills as a standard production factor, emphasized by augmented neoclassical growth models (e.g., Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)), is probably best captured by the basic-literacy term, which has positive effects that are similar in size across all countries. But, the larger growth
effect of high-level skills in countries farther from the technological frontier is most consistent with technological diffusion models (e.g., Nelson and Phelps (1966)). From this perspective, countries need high-skilled human capital for an imitation strategy, and the process of economic convergence is accelerated in countries with larger shares of high-performing students.
Many countries have focused on either basic skills or engineers and scientists. In terms of growth, our estimates suggest that developing basic skills and highly talented people reinforce each other. Moreover, achieving basic literacy for all may well be a precondition for identifying those who can reach “rocket scientist” status. In
other words, tournaments among a large pool of students with basic skills may be an efficient way to obtain a large share of high-performers.
On a related note, it is very, very hard to create high end skills when starting from scratch. Witness the difficulties faced by China
which had to start from scratch after destroying the elite in the Cultural Revolution. When the economy is ready with demand for a
particular set of specialised skills, it may take decades to fill these gaps. As an example, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was
obvious that there is a giant opportunity for India in software exports and in BPO. But it took 10 years for the education system to
re-engineer itself to produce these skills in large quantities, and then make possible large numbers for IT/ITES exports. In similar
fashion, the NDA got going on raising expenditure on infrastructure by 2003, but last month, Vikas Bajaj has an article in the New York Times about shortages of civil engineers. It is convenient, in economic development, to have a pre-existing base of high-end skills ahead of time, before the phase of high growth arrives.
Size and economic development
The argument in this blog post has emphasised size. There are many other good things about size, such as economies of scale in the
domestic economy, and paying for the fixed costs of global firms in learning about a country in order to do business in it.
If size is such a good thing for economic development, why has it failed so far: as of 2010, why are India and China far behind OECD
levels of per capita GDP?
One key story lies in globalisation. Big countries feel they can get away with autarkic policies. They feel self-sufficient and are
prone to cut themselves off from the world. Policy makers in small countries don’t think they have a choice in trying to create a
domestic car industry, but their counterparts in places like Brazil or India or France feel they can experiment with industrial policy. Once this problem is solved — as seems to be partly the case with India and China where trade liberalisation has arrived though capital account liberalisation has not — big countries are no longer held back by autarkic policies. In addition, plugging into globalisation, by itself, yields world scale, and thus boosts certain dimensions of size.
Another story, emphasised by Lant Pritchett, lies in the extent to which India is not a single common market, and has thus squandered these potential gains from size. Conversely, as we strip away the legal and tax impediments against intra-India movement of goods, services, capital and labour, and as we bulk up on the infrastructure of transportation and communications, we will obtain returns to size which were not visible in the pre-2000 Indian GDP data.
Finally, on the role of size and sophisticated technological civilisation, see Insufficient data on Charlie’s Diary.
I am grateful to Lant Pritchett, Jishnu Das, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and Josh Felman for comments and improvements on this post.

By Winton Bates, on April 16th, 2010
Having just finished reading Gregg Easterbrook’s new book, ‘Sonic Boom’, I think he would say that we should welcome globalization. He sees fantastic potential for social progress, but improved living standards are likely to be ‘wrapped with ribbons of stress, anxiety and dissatisfaction (p.34). His bottom line seems to be that globalization is inevitable and that we just have to learn to live with it.
Easterbrook expects the forces of globalization to grow stronger. That means that the insecurity that people often associate with globalization is likely to accentuate:
‘Job turmoil, the economic roller-coaster, financial bedlam, media superficiality, celebrity inanity, political blather, targeted advertising, scream-and-shout discourse, the paving over of nature – they’re all going to get worse. A lot worse in some cases. Most likely, global economics will be blamed for whatever about coming decades we don’t like.’
He also suggests, however, that much of what people tend to like about life will get better:
‘Prosperity will increase, especially in the less affluent nations where improvement is most needed. Democracy will flourish on five and perhaps six continents … . Information and knowledge will proliferate as never before, while art and culture become available to everyone. Many aspects of this evolving sonic boom will be really terrific.’
Then comes the recommendation:
‘The terrific aspects and the anxiety inducing aspects will be intertwined and we’re just going to have to live with this’ (p. 209).
Why is globalization inevitable? I think Easterbrook discusses this in several places but I have noted one place in particular. (I’m glad I made notes as I read the book because there are few clues offered in the contents page about where to find stuff and the index doesn’t seem to be as helpful as it could be. But I digress!) Easterbrook suggests that we can’t stop global change because it is associated with the spread of freedom – ‘most of the world’s nations are acquiring the same core structures (democracy, free-market economics, emphasis on education) that makes the United States the current world leader … . The more America-like the world becomes, the faster the pace of economic change will be’ (p. 192).
I think Easterbrook is basically right about this. It would probably take a world war to stop globalization and there doesn’t appear to be one of those on the horizon. Perhaps some people said similar things around 1900 – prior to a few decades of disruption in global trade and investment. Even so, the main point is that the forces shaping the future of the global economy are beyond the control of any individual, firm or government. At a national level it is possible to shield some groups from the forces of global change but only by reducing the opportunities available to others.
Easterbrook acknowledges that it is possible for governments to provide a safety net that will provide citizens with some degree of security, particularly in relation to health care. He argues that people in the U.S. suffer more stress than do people in western Europe because of problems associated with the U.S. health care system (pp. 200-202). I don’t know whether or not this is a valid point. Evidence from the Gallup World Poll suggest that people in the U.S. tend to experience more stress than do people in western European countries and Australia. But Mexicans report experiencing a lot less stress than Americans and less stress than Europeans and Australians – so there is probably more involved than health care.
My main reservation about this book, as with Easterbrook’s earlier book ‘The Progress Paradox’ (discussed here), is that I think he overstates the insecurity that people actually feel as a result of the forces of globalization. The book seems to be full of colourful phrases to describe this insecurity. For example, Easterbrook writes of ‘change-based anxiety’ (p.34), ‘Multiple Media Personality Disorder’ which he defines as a ‘a universal low grade nervous tension from which there may be no realistic escape’ (p.70), ‘the Super Bowl of stress’ (p. 72) and ‘collapse anxiety’ (p. 168).
I acknowledge that job insecurity has increased. Easterbrook makes a strong case that each year it gets easier for someone to come along with a superior idea and put an established firm out of business (p. 134). He could be right that in future there will be a greater risk that people who have risen to the middle classes will ‘fall back’ down the economic ladder and end up bitterly unhappy (p. 196). I also acknowledge that the insecurity of modern life is a popular topic of conversation, particularly in the media. But I don’t think insecurity is having a large impact on behaviour and the way people feel about their lives. If a lot of employed people were feeling a high degree of insecurity about their jobs I think they we would see more precautionary saving and less willingness to go into debt than we have seen in recent years. Survey evidence suggests that the vast majority of people in high-income countries feel that they have a great deal of control over their lives.
My conclusion is that there must be a huge gap between the fears that a lot of people express when they talk at a superficial level about the challenges and insecurity of modern life and the deeper feelings that they have about opportunities and threats in their own lives.
By David Barr, on September 29th, 2009
I recently came to a rather obvious, yet remarkable insight. The 20th century was a truly unique and remarkable moment in human history. There is not a single aspect of human civilization that changed less during the 20th than in any of the centuries that came before. Population, economic output, life expectancies, oil consumption, meat consumption and international travel are just a few of the countless factors that changed more between 1900 and 2000 than in any other prior hundred years.
Expectations for the future are with few exceptions rooted in this period of explosive change. Some scholars have traced a variety of trends back into the more distant past, but these works are largely viewed as curiosities on the fringe of economic and social thought. For better or worse most of us are happy to assume the order of things that emerged after the Second World War will hold steady throughout ours and our children’s lives.
Economic growth has been both the great cause and great consequence of the recent pasts explosive change. By rapidly expanding the total available wealth, this expansion has allowed the general population to enjoy unheard of prosperity, without threatening the comfort of the elites.
Growth can be broken into two pieces; basically more people consuming more stuff. Population growth has obviously been the major driver of the first component of growth. From 1900 to 2000 the number of people on the planet rose nearly 4- fold to approximately 6 billion. Just as dramatic was the increase in the number people actively engaged in the globalized economy.
For all the wonders of the Pax-Britannica, world trade really only impacted a small percentage of humanity, in Europe North America and a handful of aristocrats scattered around the rest of the world. Today, only a small number of subsistence farmers are cut off from globalization.
If population growth were the primary driver of economic expansion, we would be living in Malthus’s world. The miracle of the 20th century was the dramatic rise in living standards that accompanied population growth. I don’t have time to recount all the ways in which living standards have improved since 1900. Look around you, the growth is obvious.
Is the 20th century repeatable? In 2100 will our heirs see 2000 through the same eyes that we see 1900? Our entire understanding of the future depends on the answer to this question. It is clear, that attempts to preserve the rate of growth for the next hundred years will smash into the physical limitations of the planet.
Technology is frequently cited as the magical solution to square this circle. Yet, there has never been a major innovation that has shrunk humanities lust for resources.
Adapting to a world of limited growth will be the profound challenge of the next hundred years. The impacts will be both positive and negative, but will shake the very core beliefs of society. This post is the first in a series that I will publish laying out the implications of a limited growth world on our expectations.
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