By The Gold Report, on February 6th, 2012
 Economics and politics. Accretion and repletion. Mergers and acquisitions. Joe Mazumdar, senior mining analyst with Haywood Securities, sees all of these as catalysts for a rebound in the junior gold space in 2012. In this exclusive Gold Report interview, he reveals the names of companies he expects to take off.
The Gold Report: What is the consensus among Haywood analysts on what 2012 will bring for mine commodities, particularly precious metals?
Joe Mazumdar: Last year, risk aversion was a common market theme. In 2012, some of the same global economic concerns, such as the ongoing Eurozone crisis and the future of the euro, will continue to draw attention. But we also believe there is potential for positive economic indicators, primarily from the U.S., where there have been upticks in manufacturing and GDP growth. Also, unemployment in the U.S. is down to 8.5%, generating some consumer confidence. Recently, GDP growth for Q411 came in at 2.8%, which was slower than consensus forecasts—3%—but still the strongest in over a year.
Political factors will play a role in 2012. There could be a change in leadership among four of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. The presidential election will be a key focus of the U.S. and global market. There are also presidential elections in Russia, France and Mexico. There also may be a changing of the guard in China in the latter part of 2012. The potential for changes in leadership in these key nations will generate a bid to market volatility in 2012.
Beyond gold and silver, our preferred commodity sectors include copper, iron ore and coal. Gold continues to be adversely affected by its own volatility, which continues to tarnish its reputation as a safe-haven asset. We note that during 2011, U.S. Treasury securities, the most liquid safe-haven asset, was a preferred recipient of capital investment, providing a ~10% return, its highest annual return since 2008 when it was 14%.
TGR: Will the strengthening American economy have an adverse effect on the gold price?
JM: Yes, the gold price quoted in U.S. dollars will be hindered by any U.S. dollar strength based on economic growth and increasing consumer confidence. In the current environment, gold, quoted in U.S. dollars, is still holding up well at price levels over $1,700/ounce (oz).
We note that the Federal Reserve said recently that it remains concerned about the “vigor” of U.S. economic growth and pledged to maintain low interest rates until at least 2014. The latter is a positive for gold prices.
In the medium to long term, increasing confidence levels in U.S. economic growth we believe will drive higher capital investments domestically and potentially raise inflation expectations, which would be a positive for gold.
TGR: What about silver and copper?
JM: We see copper on the brink of a rebound in 2012. The London Metals Exchange inventories are at low levels and Chinese imports of refined copper accelerated in the latter part of 2011. Copper is covered by Stefan Ioannou/Kerry Smith of Haywood Securities and they highlight a structural tightness in the copper market as supply growth remains constrained while a portion of future production growth resides in higher geopolitical risk jurisdictions. They note that the GFMS has estimated a deficit of 372 Kt copper in 2011 and forecast yet another deficit for 2012, 101 Kt.
Chris Thompson covers the silver sector for Haywood Securities and has commented that despite the growth in investment demand over the past five years, silver is still very much an industrial metal. Volatility, he believes, will be underpinned by potential contradictory moves by those who see silver as an industrial metal and others who seek it as an investment asset.
TGR: Did the junior mining sector hit bottom in 2011?
JM: Within the current cycle, I think it has hit bottom. For me, the question remains: What are the catalysts that will move individual stocks up within the sector?
For a number of the majors, growth has been increasingly difficult to achieve given the higher amounts of reserves they must replete on an annual basis. Companies such as Newmont Mining Corp. (NEM:NYSE) have been offering higher and more levered dividend payout structures to attract investors.
In 2012, we see the potential for more merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, specifically in the junior to intermediate sector, given the plethora of small-cap stories in the gold sector. Producers have performed better with respect to their paper in 2011, compared to development stocks, and boast healthier balance sheets. M&A activity will be driven not only by a desire for growth but also motivated by financing risk to capture any synergistic opportunities such as sharing infrastructure and the potential to merge critical skill sets. There is a paucity of people who can bring projects into production and operate them. Merging structures and management is very important right now in the junior and intermediate sector. Without it, a lot of these companies with development assets may continue to struggle.
TGR: Do you expect the Kinross Gold Corp. (K:TSX; KGC:NYSE, Not Rated) write-down to have an adverse effect on M&A?
JM: Large projects that are required to move the needle in the growth strategy of a large gold producer have a scale and scope that naturally expose them to significant execution risk. So, in a nutshell, escalating capital costs for projects of this magnitude are nothing new.
The M&A opportunities I refer to are at a scale that would be accretive to a junior to intermediate company from a growth perspective and offer opportunities to capture synergistic value. From a valuation perspective, many companies with development stage assets are trading well below their underlying asset valuations. M&A activity allows also for some consolidation in the junior sector given the plethora of small-cap gold plays.
TGR: Did you make any adjustments to your investment thesis following the dip in precious metals equities late in 2011?
JM: In our top picks, which we put out on Jan. 9, we focused on producers generating cash flow and developers with permitted or on a clear path-to-permitted projects in low geopolitical risk jurisdictions.
One pick was Midas Gold Corp. (MAX:TSX, Not Rated), whose flagship asset, the Golden Meadows project, hosts a global resource of 5.8 million ounce (Moz) in the Yellow Pine Stibnite area on a large land package (11,600 hectares) in west-central Idaho, a re-emerging gold district. The company is working toward an updated gold resource estimate before the end of Q112, leading to a preliminary economic assessment (PEA) by Q312.
TGR: Can you give us another name on your list?
JM: Yes, Midway Gold Corp. (MDW:TSX.V; MDW:NYSE.A, Sector Outperform, CA$3.25 Target Price). It has the Spring Valley gold project, an intrusive-hosted gold deposit with a global resource, we estimate at over 5 Moz, in a district close to Lovelock, Nevada, where Barrick Gold Corp. (ABX:TSX; ABX:NYSE, Sector Outperform, CA$61 Target Price), is earning in up to 70% by 2013 by cumulatively spending US$38M.
From a metallurgic perspective, the gold is free, not occluded in pyrite and potentially amenable to be economically extracted via a heap-leach process. Barrick, the joint-venture operator, is currently drilling the edges of the deposit to find out how big it could be. This means the near-term news flow will be linked to drilling results and less about a resource update in 2012.
Midway has a portfolio of projects that it is capable of bringing on-line. Its Pan project, a low strip open-pit, heap-leach gold project in Nevada, has submitted a completed bankable feasibility study and a plan of operations. Its Gold Rock project, only 8 kilometers from Pan, is in an earlier stage where we anticipate a resource by Q112 with additional drilling in Q2–Q312, leading to another resource update by Q412 and a PEA by 2013. Additionally, Midway is working a low-sulphidation, high-grade gold project in the Tonopah District.
Midway has a portfolio of projects and is assembling a team to build and operate them. Its COO, Ken Brunk, formerly with Newmont and Romarco, is very familiar with the permitting process and developing/operating projects in Nevada. I believe the company can manage this project pipeline of financeable projects in the low geopolitical risk jurisdiction of Nevada.
TGR: Your target price for Midway is $3.25, up $0.25 from your last report. With that many projects in the development stage, it seems that Midway would be a prime takeover target, especially given its joint venture with Barrick.
JM: Barrick is looking at a number of projects in Nevada, some of which are billion-dollar-plus projects that would add significant ounces to its production profile including Spring Valley, Goldstrike and an expansion at Turquoise Ridge. I believe that Spring Valley may be a target for Barrick going forward as it has potential to contain a +5 Moz global resource and lies in Nevada where Barrick has a significant infrastructure and asset base.
However, the other components of the company’s portfolio, which include smaller open-pit, heap-leach projects, such as Pan and Gold Rock, that could potentially produce between 70–90 thousand ounces (Koz)/year, would not move the needle for most majors. These smaller projects do generate cash flow and are more readily financeable by a company the size of Midway. They could also be attractive to an intermediate operating group looking at accretive transactions with junior developers.
TGR: You cover Orvana Minerals Corp. (ORV:TSX, Sector Outperform, CA$2.25 Target Price), which is in production at its Don Mario mine in Bolivia and its El Valle-Boinás/Carlés (EVBC) mine in Spain. From June to October 2011, gold grades there increased incrementally from 1.4 to 2.17 grams per tonne (g/t). Nevertheless, Orvana’s throughput at EVBC is below your forecast. Results at Don Mario in Bolivia also were below estimates. Is this a make-or-break year for Orvana?
JM: It is a critical year for the company. Bill Williams, formerly Orvana’s vice president of corporate development, is now the CEO. He is an ex-Phelps Dodge vice president and has been instrumental in generating the revised technical reports on both operations, EVBC and Don Mario Upper Mineralized Zone (UMZ), while advancing the Copperwood project. We believe his appointment reflects the company’s focus on getting the operations back on track.
Orvana is currently in the process of re-benchmarking both EVBC and Don Mario UMZ. For Don Mario—an open-pit mine with an upper mineralized zone containing a lot of copper, as well as gold and silver—Orvana has delivered a new life-of-mine forecast that addresses the difficulty of getting copper out using a leach precipitation flotation circuit on a much bigger scale than has been used before. The Don Mario operation also has been troubled by high costs of reagents for the circuit, which has raised the processing costs.
We had originally forecast an annual production profile of 10–15 Koz per year of gold and 10–15 million pounds (Mlb) of copper. We are now looking at a production profile of 9–10 Mlb copper and 8–9 Koz of gold, whereas Orvana is still signaling 13 Mlb of copper and 12 Koz of gold. In Q411, the Don Mario UMZ operation produced 2.5 Mlb of copper and 2.3 Koz of gold, which is a positive. Now, it has to consistently achieve its new benchmarks over the next few quarters so the market can gain confidence in its operational abilities.
At Orvana’s flagship, the EVBC gold-copper project in northwest Spain, the operational issues have been related to head grades. Underground bottlenecks have hindered the company’s ability to blend higher grade feed to the processing plant. We anticipate that a shaft will be in place by April/May 2012, which should alleviate some of the bottlenecks. We had originally forecast that the feed grade, at steady state levels, would be in the area of 5 g/t. However, revised guidance indicated that it would be lower, 3–3.5 g/t gold, which also conspired to lower our target. We anticipate a revised technical report for EVBC prior to March 2012 with updated life-of-mine forecasts.
Orvana’s Copperwood project in upper Michigan is a 50 Mlb/year copper project, now in bankable feasibility study, and Orvana is seeking to permit this year. Even with up to 800 Mlb of copper reserves, we believe that the Copperwood asset is not being valued at its current price levels as Orvana has been heavily discounted in the market due to poor operational performance.
TGR: Given the lower recoveries and production estimates at Don Mario UMZ released in late January, you lowered your target price by $0.15 to $2.25. Yet you still give it a sector outperform rating. Why?
JM: Due to the heavy market discounting related to disappointing results from both operations over the past few quarters, Orvana still provides about a 100% return to our target from where it is trading right now. I continue to believe that management can redeem themselves by achieving the revised benchmarks consistently over the next few quarters. As Orvana meets its goals, I believe the market will appreciate the cash flow being generated, worry less about its working capital position and give the company credit for its advancement of the Copperwood project.
TGR: Prodigy Gold Inc. (PDG:TSX.V, Sector Outperform, CA$1.20 Target Price) recently published an updated PEA on its flagship Magino gold project in northern Ontario. Your model for Prodigy, using the updated PEA, projects a 20,000-ton/day operation, producing 222 Koz of gold per year over 13 years at total cash cost of roughly $775/oz. That would generate annual earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization margin of more than 50%. Yet, your target price of $1.20 is only about 40% above where Prodigy is trading. Why so conservative?
JM: Given that gold indices provided a negative return in 2011 ranging from 13% to 20%, I think that a positive 40% return to target is probably not conservative in the current market environment. With respect to the valuation, I have adjusted for the technical and execution risk of the study level (PEA) and the fact that I have modeled a larger mineable resource base than that used in the December 2011 PEA. As a company derisks the project from PEA to a feasibility study, I revise the multiples applied to the asset valuation.
Prodigy is planning a significant drill program of 60,000m in 2012 to infill/upgrade and expand the resource base while condemning areas for locating site facilities. We also anticipate an updated resource by Q312 leading to a feasibility study by Q412.
TGR: Do you expect a takeover offer for Prodigy?
JM: I try not to work off the takeover model because it is highly uncertain but focus on the underlying valuation. While I do believe that the Magino asset would be a good takeover candidate for an intermediate, I think that there are opportunities for consolidation and capturing some synergies with Richmont Mines Inc. (RIC:TSX; RIC:NYSE.A), which has an underground operation that abuts Prodigy’s land package. Consolidation would probably be a good idea, given that Prodigy could have underground targets within the same host rocks as Richmont, which has a fully permitted and functional process plant.
TGR: In your last interview with The Gold Report, you talked about Revolution Resources Corp. (RV:TSX; RVRCF:OTCQX, Not Rated). You said it was looking for analogs of Romarco Minerals Inc.’s (R:TSX, Not Rated) Haile Deposit in the Carolina Slate Belt. What’s happening with Revolution now?
JM: Revolution still occupies a significant land package of 7,500 acres along a 25-kilometer corridor within the Carolina Slate Belt at its Champion Hills Gold project in North Carolina. It drilled 19,150m in 2011 and is working on a resource estimate in 2012. Currently, gold equity plays exploring in the Carolina Slate Belt are strongly tied to news flow from Romarco’s multimillion-ounce Haile gold development project in South Carolina and its ability to permit it. In an effort to diversify its portfolio, Revolution acquired a significant land package (~400,000 hectares) in two prospective regions in Mexico from Lake Shore Gold (LSG:TSX, Sector Outperform, CA$3.50 Target Price) in 2011. These assets host high-level low-sulphidation epithermal, gold and silver mineralization and we anticipate news flow from drilling results by Q1–Q212. The company wanted to present the market with multiple catalysts from a diversified asset base and this project has allowed it to achieve that goal.
TGR: In late December 2011, Eldorado Gold Corp. (ELD:TSX; EGO:NYSE, Sector Outperform, CA$19.00 Target Price), made a takeover bid for European Goldfields Ltd. (EGU:TSX; EGU:AIM), which has gold exploration and development properties in Greece, Turkey and Romania. Last year, you discussed Carpathian Gold Inc. (CPN:TSX, Sector Outperform, CA$0.90 Target Price) and its Rovina Valley copper-gold-porphyry project, which contains about 10.7 Moz gold equivalent in Romania’s Golden Quadrilateral. Does the proposed European Goldfields takeover make Carpathian Gold more attractive to larger suitors?
JM: Barrick’s private placement in August 2011 into Carpathian to fund additional drilling at Rovina Valley already speaks to the attractiveness of these gold rich porphyry systems to larger suitors. Mining activity in Romania is heavily linked to news flow on the permitting activities at Rosia Montana operated by Gabriel Resources Ltd. (GBU:TSX, Not Rated).
Eldorado Gold’s proposed takeover bid for European Goldfields does put in a bid for assets in Europe, however, the majority of European Goldfields’ assets are located in Greece (Olympias/Skouries) and less so in Romania (Certej). For me, the takeover trigger was related to the receipt of permits to develop its Greek projects in July 2011. Permitting of those projects took an extended period of time. A positive permitting environment in Europe bodes well for Carpathian at Rovina Valley and it will benefit from any positive news flow from Gabriel. The risks include royalty increases and potential free carried interest that the government wants to negotiate.
TGR: Royalties are going from 4% to 8%. That certainly is not positive, but to get those revenues the government has to permit the mines.
JM: Herein lies the rub. On Jan. 3, we lowered our target by $0.10 on Carpathian to $0.90 to accommodate an increase in the gold and copper royalties to 8% at Rovina Valley. However, on the positive side, by defining the mining royalty rates and the tax structure and negotiating a free carried interest, the Romanian government has shown its desire to have these companies invest in these projects and generate the revenue streams within a restructured rent-sharing framework. We note that the local government is also looking to privatize some state-owned mining assets to raise revenue.
TGR: What do analysts, investors and companies need to look out for in terms of geopolitical risk?
JM: I would highlight countries—emerging or developed—that are in economic dire straits with prospective geology whose mining sector is underdeveloped and has untested mining laws and poor infrastructure. Geopolitical risk carries a few facets including outright expropriation to creeping nationalism, which is linked inextricably to a company’s ability to develop/permit the project. These countries will continue to seek foreign direct investment to explore/develop these assets. Outright expropriation is difficult in countries where there is no mining history and a paucity of critical skill sets locally, unless of course it is looking to sell the asset to another bidder. Alternatively, the country may alter its mining laws to increase its share of resource rents derived from the exploitation of these assets. We have observed higher rent sharing globally via increased royalty payments, higher taxes and/or the introduction of windfall tax structures in countries such as Peru, Argentina and Romania, to name a few.
Assets in higher geopolitical risk jurisdictions must provide the investor a high return and quick payback commensurate with the elevated risk profile. Note that assets within higher geopolitical risk jurisdictions may be more difficult to finance and there may be a limit on potential takeover suitors, depending on their risk appetite. To properly risk adjust and quantify these uncertainties remains a challenge.
TGR: Is that because it is not going away?
JM: Let’s not forget that mining is a great way to get an injection of direct investment into an economy and generate employment. For example, high rates of unemployment in developed countries such as the U.S. and European countries are driving mining activity in places where permits have historically been difficult to attain.
TGR: Joe, thank you for your time and your insights.
Joe Mazumdar is a senior mining analyst with Haywood Securities in Vancouver. Previously, he served as director of strategic planning at Newmont Mining and was the senior market analyst for Phelps Dodge. He has held a variety of geologist positions with other mining companies including RTZ, MIM, North and IAMGold working in South America, Australia and Canada, rounding out ~20 years industry experience. He holds a Bachelor of Science in geology from the University of Alberta, Canada, a Master of Science in exploration and mining from James Cook University, Australia, and a Master of Science in mineral economics from the Colorado School of Mines, U.S.
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By Claus Vistesen, on January 23rd, 2012
Global stock markets are up about 10% since the beginning of the year, volatility has collapsed, US economic data continue to defy even the mild slowdown proponents and the ECB seems to have backstopped the European banking system.
Yes, my dear reader. This is how quickly you move from away from the apocalyptic abyss and back to normal. My base case is that we are close to excess complacency in equity markets and a sell off is overdue, but it is exactly also under these circumstances (where smart money start to hedge) that the market may deliver one final run up to get everyone and the postman in before hosing everyone.
In the short term, one of the only remaining stumbling block in the form of the ongoing default proceedings in Greece seem to be no match for the ongoing positive animal spirit of the equity market. Only a week ago, we got news that talks in Greece had stalled, but most recently we have been reassured that talks are back on track.
The main niggle on the first occasion appeared to be what kind of interest rate that investors would get on their new bonds and thus, ultimately, the loss of face value currently said to be 50% but also, by some, claimed to be as high 62.5%. Another issue would be whether Greece would pass legislation that forces investors to participate in the debt swap if a majority of investors agree to the PSI terms. This was specifically being discussed in the context of a particular group of investors holding both CDS contracts and the underlying bond and who would maximize their payout on the former by forcing through a hard default.
None of the terms seems have changed massively in the past week, but time is running out with March the 20th set as the final deadline as this is when Greece would otherwise have to make a payment of 4.5 billion-euro ($18.7 billion) on maturing debt. The general consensus is that if no agreement is reached, this date would mark the hard default. The reason for the optimism is then that we are very close to full surrender in the form of a 90% participation rate of creditors and, we are told, it is only a matter of time before the final 10% agrees.
The details reported so far are as follows;
Quote Bloomberg (21 Jan 2012)
The parties are near an initial agreement under which old bonds would be swapped for new 30-year securities carrying a coupon that would begin at 3.1 percent, reach 3.9 percent and go as high as 4.75 percent, Athens-based newspaper Proto Thema reported on its website yesterday, without saying where it got the information.
The desired macroeconomic outcome of all this is obviously well advertised. In 2020, Greece is supposed to have a government debt to GDP ratio of 120% and presumingly some form of growth that would allow this level of debt to stay stationary or perhaps even decline over time.
Let me be clear absolutely clear here. Within any conceivably realistic macroeconomic model, there is no way that Greece can reach a stable debt level with moderate growth under these conditions. Under the interest rate scenario noted above (let us with a average interest rate of 3.8% on the new debt) the nominal interest rate would still be substantially higher than the growth rate of the economy. The only way, the nominal debt level could then be kept stationary is by forcing the fiscal balance into surplus. However, the problem is that this affects the denominator in the debt/GDP calculation by sucking out demand (growth) from an economy already structurally impaired (within a currency union and all that).
The implications are clear. The promises of stability that the PSI currently holds (even if it comes with considerable pledges of IMF money) are bound to disappoint.
First act of several to come
First of all, let us be clear. Despite, politicians’ mortal fright to use the D-word and the media’s acceptance of this fact on the basis that CDS contracts are not activated under the PSI, this is a stone wall default. Anyone, who bothered to take merely a scant look at the history of sovereign defaults will see that the current Greek situation fits well within all the models. Indeed, the proposition that this is not a default because CDS contracts are not activated is ludicrous since in the vast majority of sovereign defaults, the debtor country begins negotiations with creditors well before the actual default is forced upon it. The fact that insurance contracts bought to protect a creditor involved in such negotiations have now been rendered useless says more about the nature of the our modern financial system than it does about the definition of a sovereign default.
Hence, we come to the real nature of this game.
The deal which now seems to be close to completed by no means closes proceedings. It is very likely in my opinion that private creditors who are currently the only ones being forced to take a haircut to seniority of the IMF and the ECB will face a near 100% loss on their holdings. The argument here is simple. Given the amount of debt held by the ECB and the IMF and the fact that these two institutions are senior debt holders the debt held by private creditors become something else than actual bonds. It becomes equity, i.e. the tranche which takes the first (and often complete) loss in the event of a default.
Of course, once we reach this point the issue of CDS contracts will rear its head yet again since if a 50-60% haircut can be considered voluntary anything beyond this becomes very difficult to characterize as such. Any rating agency would find it difficult not to classify further losses as a default and thus begins the fun in earnest. And then comes the ECB and IMF’s share. It will be politically dynamite if the ECB had to print on the liability side to cover losses on the asset side on Greek sovereign debt [1].
Finally, Greece only represents the starter here. Any deal agreed on in Greece will be ardently watched in Ireland and Portugal who will feel they are entitled to the same deal with their private creditors.
Most tragedies have several acts, twists and turns. Investors should expect no less from the one currently being played out in the European sovereign debt markets.
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[1] – In practice the ECB could do nothing and see its balance sheet shrink with the amount lost on the asset side (i.e. reduce lending to the banking system (delevering) with the amount lost on the bonds). However, it is likely that it would “need” to credit reserves with the amount lost on Greek bonds (hence printing money). Mind you, only a central bank could do this as it is free to increase the assets of the banking system by creating its own liabilities.
By Claus Vistesen, on January 18th, 2012
Edward Hugh has a brilliant analysis of recent events in the eurozone and especially how banks are leveraging the liquidity provided by the ECB to “cleanse” their balance sheet of bad assets and essentially exchanging these for freshly minted euro deposits at the ECB. I think we should be very clear what is going on here; this is essentially a covert recapitalisation of the European banking system and the ECB is in every sense of the word acting as a lender of last resort.
Here is the relevant part;
Another area where the transfer of liquidity doesn’t show up as a change in aggregate excess liquidity is when banks offload their wholesale liabilities to other EuroArea banks and refund via the ECB. Here again, if they do it smartly, they can even earn a bit of “quasi carry” in the process, by buying back their debt at well below face value from those who are anxious to exit the periphery, and then refinancing at the ECB without writing down the underlying asset. This could be termed a liability “write down”, and again the procedure earns the bank a nice bit of income which can subsequently be used to help the recapitalisation process.
Take the Portuguese Bank BPI (the country’s fourth largest), which is making public tender offers to buy back its debt. If all concerned tender their bonds to BPI, BPI will pay something short of €1.5bn cash to investors. Mortgages which were previously sitting in one of their SPVs will return to their balance sheet, and ECB money will now be on the other side financing them allowing significant profits (and capital) to be reported. In this particular tender the smallest discount is 35% and the largest is 65%. Investors may initially balk at the offer, since they will nurse a heavy loss (equal, naturally, to BPI´s profit) but ultimately they will probably be only too happy to be able to walk away from Portugal, and with some cash in their pocket to boot.
Iberian banks were already aware of the benefits of this kind of restructuring during the 2009-2010 liquidity wave, and went about quietly repurchasing their bonds (bank capital, securitizations, senior bonds) on a selective and private basis at a discount. Much of their reported profits in those years in fact came from either the ECB carry trade or this kind of transaction. So when we read that another Portuguese bank – Banco Espirito Santo – has just had €1 billion of debt guaranteed by the Portuguese state (a sovereign which can’t itself go to the markets) it isn’t hard to imagine that the process going on in the background is something similar to that seen in the BPI case, and that the debt is being guaranteed so it can go over to the ECB to be posted as collateral.
The National Bank of Greece has been doing something similar. They recently offered to buy back some €1.5 billion in covered bonds and preferred securities,offering 70% of face value for the covered bonds and 45% for the preferred hybrids. As the bank itself says, “The purpose of the offers is to generate core Tier 1 capital for the group and to strengthen the quality of its capital base….The offers would generate a gain for the group.”
And Italian banks would seem to be doing something similar, since they issued around €40 billion in government backed bonds specifically to take to the ECB. The bonds are held by the banks themselves and stay on their books to maturity, their only purpose being to provide collateral for use at the ECB. In fact Italian banks took something like €116 billion from the LTRO, or almost 25% of the total. Perhaps this is why Unicredit CEO Federico Ghizzoni and other European top bankers met ECB officials in Frankfurt back in November, to discuss new rules for collateral.
In Spain securitised mortgages sitting on the balance sheets of the bank-ownedFondos de Titulizacion de Activos could also be recycled in this way (here’s a complete list, although note that these Funds are regulated by Spain’s CNMV and not the Bank of Spain, which is why their presence is relatively unknown and people are able to accurately say that the central bank has been very strict on SIVs, since they weren’t their responsibility).
That something like this may be happening, with the ECB “buying into” public and private Euro Periphery debt while investors are discretely getting out is suggested by this report in Bloomberg:
The euro is losing the relationship with riskier assets that underpinned the currency in 2011 as the deepening sovereign debt crisis reduces the creditworthiness of even the biggest economies in the region. The 17-nation currency has fallen 8.7 percent against the dollar since October, while the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index has gained 3.4 percent, and the correlation between the two dropped to 58 percent from a record 91 percent in November, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The euro had moved almost in lockstep with investments linked to growth, including stocks and the Australian dollar, since January 2011.
This decoupling is taking place as European Central Bank President Mario Draghi cuts interest rates and promises banks unlimited cash for three years to rein in soaring borrowing costs for governments… Strategists also anticipate more losses as the US economy improves while the euro zone shrinks, driving international investors away from the region’s assets.
So if the first two objectives were to help the struggling sovereigns, and enable the commercial banks to refinance their debt, then to some extent these objectives have been met. But what about the third objective, moving credit on the periphery to get the real economy moving again? Well, here the ECB’s measures are likely to have far less effect, and indeed what effect they do have may be in some way a mixed blessing, since the banks seem far more worried about demonstrating they have an adequate level of core capital than they are about participating in solutions to real economy problems.
While I would, in general, be hesitant in taking anything from Zero Hedge at full face value I think the following story on Unicredit adds flavor to this by providing further evidence on the points Edward mentions above.
The story is clearly speculative but gets backing from Edward’s accout above. The following seems to be a part of the general process which in itself is, in my view, absolutely mad.
Banks in weak countries have been issuing debt, getting a government guarantee, and then posting them as collateral at the ECB. There are examples of this for Greek banks for sure, but my understanding is it has also been occurring in Portugal and Ireland. It is the only way banks in Greece (and the other countries) can raise money.
The article then goes on to make this more alarming point (but really does not have evidence to back it up) that it appears that about €40 billion of the first LTRO was done by Italian banks (Unicredit?) that issued bonds to themselves and got a government guarantee, and then posted this asset as collateral for liquidity through the LTRO.
So, here is how I understand it.
Unicredit issues a 3m bill and gets a government guarantee so that whoever chooses to buy this bill knows that it will be backed by the sovereign (after all, this is still better than the bank even if the two are joined by the hip). The only problem is that it is being issued to itself with a permanent guarantee from the government.
From an accounting perspective this must be close to illegal in any meaningfully lawful jurisdiction, but I defer to experts here of course. The issue here is not then that the sovereign is guaranteeing a liability of a bank, we have seen this plenty of times and it is indeed the only way that some financials can issue debt, but rather that the bond never gets marketed to third party buyers.
It is absolutely astonishing that this 3m bill is then being posted as collateral at the ECB. But you must understand that it has to be posted as such as far as I can see since you can’t hold your own liabilities. So, the banks posts a bond issued to itself and posts it at the ECB and get freshly minted fresh euros credited to its bank account at the ECB. After the process, Unicredit still has the bond as a liability but instead of the same bond on the asset side (which is impossible) it has a deposit asset with the ECB.
If this is true, and the ECB is agreeing to this I must admit that it amounts to a serious bout of banking follies in the European banking industry.
By Rok Spruk, on January 16th, 2012
Recent debacle at the summit of Brussels in the midst of the political intervention of the EU leaders to facilitate the institutional agreement between the European countries towards the formation of the European fiscal union has caused not only a long-standing dissolution of the “core countries” of the Eurozone and the UK but, more importantly, a non-solvable puzzle on the end scenario of the European debt crisis that pervaded both the eurozone and the countries outside it ever since the beginning of the 2008/2009 financial crisis. The anatomy of the European debt crisis is a multifaceted process that is heavily interrelated with the economic principles of the process of European integration and the unintended consequences that erupted in the recent debt crisis.
The introduction of Maastricht criteria that stipulated fiscal prudence by obliging EU member states to adhere to the level of public debt below 60 percent of the GDP and low fiscal deficit boosted the expectations of stable macroeconomic environment, partly sustained by the European Central Bank which, since its inception in 1999, successfully maintained price stability. Despite an enviable achievement in the stabilization of inflation expectations, the EU Treaty did not stipulate stringent fiscal rules in case of the breach of treaty obligations on behalf of EU member states, neither has European Growth and Stability Pact (EGSP) provided selective mechanisms that would hinge on the EU member state in case Maastricht criteria were not fulfilled. On the other hand, the gradual enlargement of the European union did not finalize in the economic union characterized by the realization of four basic freedoms.
In 1977, Portugal and Spain were acceded into the European Union. Four years late, Greece was admitted as the 12th member of the European community. Over time, the EU grew from an integrated area of 15 Western European countries into a conglomerate of nations that did not impinge of the full-fledged liberalization of the internal market in 1988 but, moreover, has evolved into the spiral that accelerated the community toward the political union. In the mean time, member states of the Eurozone have continuously breached the rules laid out by Maastricht treaty. In bearing the fiscal consequences of the reunification, Germany repeatedly breached the Maastricht criteria both in public debt and fiscal deficit which postponed the introduction of the Euro, following a large shock from gigantic fiscal transfers from high-income West Germany into low-income East German regions. In a similar manner, until 2005, France did not manage to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio under the 60 percent threshold stipulated by the Maastricht criteria.
Nevertheless, peripheral countries such as Spain and Portugal entered the Eurozone at an overvalued exchange rate relative to German mark before the introduction of the common currency. In the following years, these countries, notably Spain, accumulated significant current account surpluses resulted from the inflows of direct investment from the core countries such as Germany and France. These surpluses were, of course, artificial in the sense that the downward convergence of interest rates in the peripheral countries stimulated the over-leveraging of the financial sector which triggered a balloon in the housing sector.
For years, Italy and Greece have repeatedly breached the Maastricht treaty in the fiscal sense. Prior to adjoining the European Monetary Union, Greece repeatedly experienced volatile inflation rates and default on its external obligations and subsequent Drachma depreciation. Italy’s macroeconomic stabilization hinged on the discretion of government spending which, after excessive rises under various transition governments, cumulated in one of the highest debt ratios within the EMU. How could EMU countries, despite a stringent set of rules delineated by the Treaty of Maastricht, pursued discretionary fiscal policies and jeopardized the macroeconomic stability of the national economies and the Eurozone? Prior to the onset of the financial crisis by the end of 2007, little was known on the perils of excessively leveraged balance sheets which investment banks used to seek high rates of return on high-yield and relatively risky peripheral regions. Until 2007, the exposure of major German investment to over-leveraged financial sector in countries such as Spain and Greece generated sizeable spillover effect. Before the onset of the financial crisis, Spain enjoyed sizeable current account deficit resulted from excessively high and robust overall investment. In 2007, Spain’s investment-to-GDP ratio (31 percent) was roughly comparable to developing Asia. In such highly volatile environment where economic growth departed from its long-run fundamentals, even small-scale macroeconomic shocks can result in a substantial loss of economic activity, notwithstanding the spillovers in the banking system and labor market.
The asymmetry in political structures and underlying macroeconomic fundamentals across member countries casts significant doubt in the long-term stability of the Eurozone as an area with common monetary policy. The necessary condition for the inception of common monetary policy does not hinge on the political initiatives that pervaded the process of European integration but on the careful consideration whether adjoining countries adhere to the macroeconomic criteria as denoted by the Maastricht Treaty. The failure to adhere to the contours of fiscal prudence and budgetary discipline by the major EU member states, with few notable exceptions such as the Netherlands, Austria and Finland, lies at heart of the underlying reasons why significant asymmetry and non-coordination in fiscal policy resulted in the adoption of dispersed economic policies whereas the adverse outcomes were not foreseen neither by the politicians neither by policy advisers and academics. To a large extent, as the recent debt crisis has succinctly demonstrated, the ultimate goal of the European monetary integration was the build-up of political union. But whereas European politicians were preoccupied with all-embracing design of the EU as unitary political union, they forgot to acknowledge that political union would require the full convergence of economic policies including the integration of the labor market which hardly any political initiative within the EU deemed feasible.
The non-coordination of fiscal policymakers was highly evident in the division of member states on the core countries and EU periphery. Considering the peripherical countries, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece repeatedly proved ill-disciplined in managing the levels of public debt and the magnitude of the budgetary imbalance. Portugal is often the case in point. Prior to the introduction of the Euro, Portugal experienced unprecedented economic boom. Between 1995 and 2001, economic growth averaged 4 percent per annum and the unemployment rate reduced from 7 percent to 4 percent by the end of 2001. At the same time, nominal wages grew rapidly without the necessary productivity growth compensating for the increase unit labor cost. Alongside the overheating of economic activity, driven by construction boom, current account deficits increased significantly, lowering domestic savings rate. After the country experienced a mild recession in 2003 when domestic output decreased by 1 percent on the annual basis, the slowing of artificial economic growth driven by the Euro boom, turned from temporary into permanent. In the period 2002-2010, growth of domestic output averaged at the level of no more than 1 percent per annum with stagnating productivity and significant pressure on nominal wages. Since the size of the labor cost is the major deterrent on growth, the cure for Portuguese ailing economy is the structural adjustment in the public sector such as the reduction of public debt by generating substantial primary fiscal surpluses and the lowering of government spending. Similarly, the experience of Greece, Spain and Italy suggests the evolution of the same pattern evolving over time although Italy has been known as low-growing economy during the boom time.
However, fiscal policymakers in peripheral countries repeatedly produced ill-conceived fiscal mismanagement of public finances. In 2008, the level of budgetary deficit in Greece exceeded 13 percent of the GDP whereas the country has not adhered to Maastricht criteria ever since the introduction of the Euro. After the depreciation, the net debt as percent of GDP in Greece reached 85 percent of GDP and increased to 110 percent of GDP by the end of 2008. As IMF’s recent forecasts suggest, by 2012, Greece’s public net debt could reach 175 percent of GDP. The failure to adhere to the common set of principles as delegated by the Maastricht treaty and EU Stability and Growth Pact in the peripheral countries stemmed largely from the mismanagement of public finances and structural rigidity of the public sector with resulting increases in the burden of the labor cost. In addition, the adoption of extraordinary measures embedded in the public sector such as very low effective retirement age and substantial bonuses for civil servants exacerbated the burden of the public debt with unforeseen net financial liabilities of governments which have not mitigated the persistent burden of public debt that grew substantially over time in the EU periphery.
A natural question is whether the exclusion of peripheral countries from the Eurozone might be feasible and whether Greece’s default on external obligations might help overcome country’s mountainous strain on public debt. First, the re-adoption of domestic currencies is hardly a solution to overcome the intricacies of debt crisis. If Greece re-introduced drachma, external obligations would be strained by a painful and enduring bank run since investors would withdraw the deposits from the portfolio and invest it into safer holding with less volatility and uncertainty ahead. Another argument in favor of Greece exiting the Eurozone is that a devaluation of drachma would boost inflationary expectations and consequently reduce the burden of the public debt but given junk score on government bonds, a rather immediate bank run would follow the devaluation of drachma rather than macroeconomic stabilization. In addition, when Greece’s domestic output is growing far below the long-term potential, inflationary expectations is not a feasible tool to revive the economy from deflationary trap with 16 percent unemployment Moreover, the only feasible and meaningful short-term strategy to boost growth is the reduction of the size of the public sector including the privatization of inefficient state-owned enterprises to generate substantial fiscal surpluses since this is the only plausible measure to tackle the increasing burden of the public debt. As the history of financial crises suggests, the eruptions of banking crises occurred mostly when governments rested on currency devaluations as the ultimate tool to reduce the burden of external debt. In addition, if Greece defaulted on its external obligations, CDS spreads could indicate a snowball effect where Spain, Portugal and possibly Italy could follow the same track.
The question is whether non-coordination between European fiscal policies helped facilitate over-leveraged financial sectors which asked for the bailout by central governments in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis. Over-leveraged financial sectors were attributed to the determinants of various extent. Some argued that over-leveraging is the outcome of innovative financial engineering where fancy mathematicians and physicists applied VaR models to calculate the probability of losses in the portfolio distribution of returns whereas the financial derivative schemes developed by advanced and complex mathematical models were so complicated that nobody, sometimes even mathematicians themselves, could understand sensibly. On the other hand, the monetary policy perspective of over-leveraged financial sectors has been rather overlooked in policy discussions since periodically low interest rates encourage excessive risk-taking which further facilitated the construction of portfolios with excessively volatile returns that increasingly relied on VaR assumptions whilst fundamentally ignoring the instability of returns from over-leveraged investments. But a more intriguing question pertaining to the banking perspective of financial crises is whether more prudent financial regulation as envisaged from recent stress tests by European Banking Authority can be achieved by raising capital adequacy standards. Unfortunately, the history of Basel accords demonstrates that the banking sector has been prone to search alternative channels to avoid raising capital adequacy ratios through innovative accounting tricks whereas neither Basel I and II envisaged the adverse outcomes from excessive risk-taking. As stress tests indicated, capital adequacy ratios should be increased substantially but, moreover, the regulatory framework should not only build on increasing criteria on Tier I capital and common equity but also on the safeguard despositary insurance of contingent liabilities to mitigate liquidity risk that led to the systemic crisis.
The solution to revive the Eurozone economy and revive it from a decade of flawed political imperatives should not exclude multiple options. The focal point of the Eurozone’s recovery from debt crisis should be to help peripheral countries establishment fiscal prudence, discipline and soundness of the public finances. In fact, the recovery from the debt crisis will endure for more than a decade. The structural adjustment does not rest on the ability of the EU to provide financial assistance to peripheral countries but on the principled and coordinated action to reform inefficient public sectors which are at the heart of the debt spiral since years of generous entitlements to civil servants have tremendously raised the net present value of public debt to the point that peripheral countries are on the brink of default on its external obligations. Without generating substantial fiscal surpluses, there is no feasibility and no realistic scenario under which public debt level would be brought under the control in the near-term perspective. Hence, recent discussions of the consequences of debt crisis in Europe have simply overlooked the importance of growth-enhancing measures as the real cure for growing debt-to-GDP ratio where the measures do not apply to peripheral countries only.
First, in the wake of fiscal insolvency of public pension systems, effective retirement age should be raised substantially for men and women alike. The studies have shown that under the increase in effective retirement age to 65 years, long-term fiscal obligations would reduce and consequently an important step towards long-term macroeconomic stability would be achieved. Nearly every European country is facing low-fertility trap followed from increased affluence and generous early-retirement policies from 1970s onward. Consequently, European government have amounted a mountain of net financial liabilities that exceeded the size of GDP by several times, respectively. Decreasing the size of net liabilities to contemporary and future generations of retirees, requires a robust increase in effective retirement age. Higher retirement age threshold would substantially increase working-age population by encouraging labor market participation among the elderly. Current levels of effective retirement age are unsustainable in the long-run since a growing burden of pension obligations can seriously threaten the stability of the public finance and increase the probability of fiscal insolvency.
Second, European countries suffer from low productivity growth. In some countries, such as Italy productivity growth has remained stagnant over the course of recent two decades while elsewhere productivity growth is to slow to compensate for the increase in nominal wage rates. The evidence, in fact, overwhelmingly suggested that high tax rates are the prime obstacle to greater labor market participation, particularly among the elderly who face high implicit tax rates on work. In particular, to facilitate the channels of productivity growth, marginal tax rates should be decreased substantially. At current levels, marginal tax rates restrain labor supply significantly. In the Netherlands, the top marginal income tax rates reached 52 percent in 2011 which is a serious hinder on the working activity. In this respect, bold tax reforms should be complemented with more flexible labor markets which remain saddled with employment regulations and distort labor supply incentives. Less regulated labor market to supplement greater labor force participation, especially among women, elderly and the youth is vital to enhance productivity growth since living standards by the end of the day are determined by productivity improvements.
Ultimately and most importantly, peripheral countries should be given a free choice whether to withdraw from the EMU since recent financial crisis has shown that Eurozone is a suboptimal currency area which emerged from non-cooperative fiscal policies among its member states that caused adverse outcomes and asymmetric adjustment where macroeconomic stabilization outcomes are mutually exclusive among member states. Asymmetry adjustment that currently threatens the existence and stability of Eurozone lies at the heart of Eurozone’s debt crisis. As a general matter, economic policies have failed to recognize that structural measures in the labor market and fiscal policy regime could facilitate growth enhancement and provide the necessary impetus to stabilization of crisis-impeded monetary union. Recent suggestions by France and Germany for EU member states to form a fiscal union have led to sustained resistance from the UK which dissolved from the fiscal pact. The ultimate grain of truth in the fiscal union is that a monetary union necessarily requires the coordination of fiscal policies to prevent adverse and asymmetric policy outcomes within the union. The fateful conclusion from recent EU debt crisis is that without the integration of the labor market on the EU level, the monetary integration cannot exist in coherence with asymmetric fiscal policies. In the future, stricter adherence to budgetary discipline will be necessary through budgetary authority. In this respect, countries that fail to adhere to Maastricht criteria and deviate from the fiscal discipline either marginally or substantially should be condemned and pay for their actions of fiscal imprudence by withdrawing from the monetary union.
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By Claus Vistesen, on January 5th, 2012
One point that I have been shouting from the proverbial roof tops in my research, to partners and colleagues is that 2012 may well be the year when all major central banks will be conducting both conventional and unconventional monetary easing at the same time. I think this is a very strong testament not only to the severity of the ongoing debt crisis in the developed world, but also to the propensity of central banks to choose inflation as the desired route to recovery. We need not initially discuss whether they are deploying the proper set of policies or even whether such policies represent moral hazard or a ponzi scheme on government debt.
The main thing is to realise that this is an unprecedented global monetary experiment.
My message to investors in 2012 would then be not to underestimate this inflation bias by part of global central banks. Inflating your way out of too much debt won’t work in the long run without considerable defaults and/or economic stress (hyper inflation). Events since 2008 are ample evidence of this, but the simultaneous inclination to create inflation and debase your currency (to generate more inflation and exports) by all major central banks will continue to exert a profound effect on asset prices and the global economy.
In so far as goes the idea that an investors’ interest in asset prices is conditioned on return and volatility we can say that central bank policy will affect both. Financial assets will certainly benefit from excess liquidity, but the unravelling of too much debt through inevitable defaults and the central bank policies themselves will generate volatility. Whether the combination of such volatility and return means that you should stay out of the market entirely is a question for the individual investor. I believe that
From a macroeconomic point of view, the downbeat assessment remains however that it is difficult if not impossible to paint a picture of where sufficient growth is going to come from and on the investment side of things, the higher level of volatility will tend to shake the foundation of investors even if money is to be made for short periods of time.
Most attention has been centered on the ECB, whether the 3y LTRO represent QE and whether the continuing rejection to buy government bonds outright means that the ECB is a laggard among global central banks (see this excellent report by Hinde Capital for additional analysis relative to the points below).
750 Billion USD, and counting …
Europe remains the center of the global debt crisis, a role the continent has now decisively taken over from the US which stood at the forefront in the initial phases of the crisis in 2008. Apart from the almost endless summits and meetings among government officials the significant measures continue to be the ones coming from the ECB.
In my view, the European interbank market is virtually dead and dusted, and the ECB and the Fed are now effectively the only thing between Europe’s banks and large scale failures. Since early September 750 billion USD worth of liquidity has been provided to the European banking system of which 100 billion sits on the Fed balance sheet through USD swap lines.
Who will bet against the final 3y LTRO auction to take this beyond one trillion USD?
Spanish and Italian curves are now nicely steep again after a brush with inversion which obviously was one of the main objectives even if it was always debatable whether banks would buy government bonds with the liquidity taken up at the ECB.
The question is; how do you unwind all this? 750 billion USD to roll short term liabilities with the ECB and the Fed seems to me to be one of the biggest gamble in monetary history.
While the BOE and the Fed have been transparent in their QE efforts and the BOJ never really having left the zero bound the ECB has been more covert. However, it is my contention that with the expansion of the securities market programme (SMP) in 2011 to buy considerable amounts of government bonds (1) as well as the 3y LTRO the ECB is now fully engaged in quantitative easing.
I base this on two points.
- The ECB has acted as a sovereign debt buyer of last resort in times of crisis. It is common knowledge in the market that the ECB has been Italian and Spanish bonds in times of particular stress on the notion that these two economies in particular could not be allowed to fatally succumb to the debt snowball dynamics.
- ECB support for the banking system in the form of collateralised liquidity and wholesale funding is not temporary but structural and permanent in nature. The interbank market in Europe is not working and has not been working since the crisis started in 2008.
The ECB will of course vehemently deny this but investors should understand that such denial is mainly out of political reasons. When Draghi unveiled the ECB’s attempt to backstop the crisis in Europe by offering full allotment liquidity on a 3y basis, the market was disappointed because the central bank president also reiterated that the ECB would not step up its purchases of government bonds.
I think that the ECB will be forced into a much more direct and active role where unsterilized purchases in the primary market (monetisation) will be needed, but I fully appreciate the political issues. We are currently in a delicate situation where new governments in most of the involved countries are saddled with forced mandates to impose austerity. It is very difficult for all parties involved to push this agenda if the ECB had stepped up a full backstop. Moral hazard risks are consequently paramount here.
As such, investors must content with the ECB’s attempt to shore up the European banking system which is no little feat given the bank rollover schedule in 2012 as well as new Basel II regulation which will further impair already shaken balance sheets. The ECB’s initiatives then follows the steady deterioration of conditions in the European (indeed global) banking system which initially culminated in the coordinated action by global central banks to supply dollars through Fed swap lines and which found its European answer in the ECB’s decision to provide unlimited liquidity yet again.
The problems look ominous for European banks and the global financial system in general. No matter what, European financial institutions will have to delever significantly which will spread its tentacles wide and far due to the high penetration by European banks in emerging markets (Eastern Europe in particular).
Behind the scenes however, significant ink has been spilled to debate and speculate on to the exact significance of the ECB’s liquidity operations.
John Hempton for example suggests that the ECB’s policy move is an open invitation to play the carry trade game using almost free liquidity to buy higher yielding government bonds.
Well the Euro fix is in. Whether it works – that is another question. But the fix is this: European banks can borrow unlimited amounts for three years to buy Euro government debt. The debt often yields 5 percent. The money costs 1 percent.
I agree that the incentives are certainly there for the banks to play this game especially in the context of government bonds as zero risk weighted assets. The problem is that many European banks have spent more than a year and two stress tests to get rid of substantial amount of peripheral government debt (which do not count as zero risk weighted assets according to Basel III) and as such weak governments are unlikely to benefit from this.
The flip side of this is that most of the liquidity taken up by banks go straight back to the ECB at the deposit facility which is now standing higher than at any time between 2008 and 2010.
Quote Reuters
The euro zone banking system starts the new year awash with record levels of liquidity but few signs that institutions are prepared to lend to each other, leaving money markets frozen.Most of the near half trillion euros of three-year funds borrowed from the European Central Bank in the last week of 2011 have made their way back to the ECB’s overnight deposit account.
The Reuters piece goes on to argue that most of the liquidity will probably go to aid the large refinancing need banks face in 2012 and thus effectively as a replacement for a non-functioning interbank market that would normally be able to roll this financing. If this does nothing to solve the problem of sovereign insolvency and illiquidity it will work wonders through the fact that banks won’t act as a drag on their respective sovereign’s balance sheet as long as the ECB is involved.
I would note though that even though the liquidity is mainly reflected in reserves held at the ECB, it still represents excess liquidity as noted by Danske Bank.
Some market commentators have argued that the first 36 months long-term refinancing operation (LTRO), in which banks took EUR490bn in total, has so far not worked as planned because the extra liquidity has simply been placed on the deposit facility at the ECB. However, this argument is false.The sharp increase in outstanding open market operations (MRO+LTRO) increases excess liquidity (defined as open market operations plus recourse to the marginal lending facility minus autonomous liquidity factors minus reserve requirements) and this excess liquidity shows up as deposits at the ECB in just the same way as it did in 2008-10.
However, nothing is easy and despite the fact that collateral can be posted for liquidity the sovereign is still on the hook as my friend Edward Hugh points out.
Banks are being encouraged to keep rolling over what are basically NPLs by financing them at 1% at the ECB (foreclosing on them in Spain and keeping the property on the books may cost something like 8% in comparison). But the ECB isn’t assuming the risk here, the national sovereign implicitly is, and is getting in deeper by the day.
This is certainly true by the letter of the law but one has to wonder whether the ECB will ever get paid back here. I mean 3 years is an awful lot of time. The ECB can roll these loans as long as need be (it has already effectively been rolling bank funding since 2008) while maintaining the figue leaf that it is not funding sovereigns. This may be true, but it is effectively funding the sovereign’s banks and postponing the day of reckoning which is bank failures or nationalisation or both.
If the ECB is then forced take a hit on the collateral or the loans themselves, it will need to create the money to pay for these loans by printing euros. This sounds as a plan to me except that it does not solve the funding risks of governments which may or may not be able to ask their banks for help. The likely answer is that they won’t be unless the ECB and EU decide to wield the ultimate weapon of financial oppression which would be to penalise reserves over a given level with negative interest rates at the same time as banks would be forced, through regulation, to hold government bonds.
But Edward makes another interesting point;
Looking at the Greek PSI, what they would try and do (if all this gets that far, I mean if the Euro holds together long enough in this Byzantine world) ) is load up the private sector share of the haircut, and keep the ECB as untouchable official sector. At the limit they can use ELA to keep the banks afloat while the sovereign restructures and then recapitalises.
(…)
Why would any ex Eurozone third party want to be counterparty to anything which might end up being subordinated to ECB exposure later on down the line. The more I think about it the more it seems to me that the 3 yr LTROs might end up choking the European banking system to death.
It is difficult to disagree on the gist of this point, namely that the ECB is digging itself a very big hole. If banks can exchange under water assets at the ECB for a deposit asset at the ECB (albeit with a negative carry) the ECB is running the risk that it becomes the sole counterparty of bad assets in the euro zone in which case seniority will mean very little.
The Greek situation is a good example. Private creditors face an almost certain 100% wipeout exactly because they represent such a small tranche of the total stock of debt. In such a situation the asymmetric relationship between subordinate and senior debt holders mean that the latter essentially become equity holders. But once subordinate creditors are wiped out the turn comes to the senior debt tranches and the further the ECB goes along the road of providing full allotment liquidity the higher will be its implicit direct claim on assets of all sorts of qualities.
In conclusion, it is my view that the ECB is now the only thing between the economy and widespread bank failures, but I also concur that the consequence of this is a permanent outsourcing of the interbank market in Europe to the ECB’s balance sheet and, quite possibly, Fed’s USD swap lines.
–
(1) – Even if such purchases have been fully sterilised.
By The Gold Report, on December 6th, 2011
 Investors focused on picking the next ailing economy have reinforced gold as the ultimate refuge if all the financial juggling fails. In this exclusive interview with The Gold Report, Chen Lin talks about the effects of risk aversion on the performance of gold stocks. While it has been a tough year for precious metals stocks, there are some very promising stories smart investors should be looking at as others decide to clean house for tax purposes.
The Gold Report: When you last spoke with The Gold Report in August, the gold:silver ratio was about 40:1. Today it’s about 53:1. In August, you were looking for a lower gold:silver ratio that you thought would probably be more reasonable under the circumstances. Yet it seems to have gone the other direction. What do you think has happened here? Was silver drastically overpriced or not able to keep up with the gold?
Chen Lin: In the last interview, I was pretty evenly bidding between gold and silver. I don’t have a particular preference. At that time, there were some major funds buying silver. Historically it has been lower—as low as 10:1 a very long time ago. But, right now, it’s in a reasonable range. So, I’m not saying that one is overvalued and the other is undervalued. Silver has some industrial components to it while gold is mainly monetary. I’m personally looking for the silver:gold ratio to go lower over the long run. Right now, the financial crisis has pushed central banks to actually start buying more gold in the past quarter. So, that’s probably keeping the gold price higher.
TGR: So, what you’re saying is the European debt crisis is the thing that’s really driving the gold price higher.
CL: Two or three of the central banks have put a historical amount of gold on their books, which tells you there’s more focus on gold because of the European crisis.
TGR: What do you think is going to happen with metals prices if this Eurozone situation deteriorates further?
CL: That’s a hard question. I think it’s in the hands of the policymakers. When Greece said we’re going to do the referendum and that Greece could be kicked out of the Eurozone, the Greek people were rushing to their banks to get the euro out. If the euro starts falling apart, I think gold could be one of the hard assets people in Europe will try to get their hands on. That could be very positive for gold. I can see Germany give in to the other euro countries and basically agree to use the European Central Bank to print money. That’s probably the most likely outcome. That would delay the crisis and investors would focus on other countries such as Japan and the United States. Then Europe may quiet down a little bit. But, that would be very positive to gold as well. Gold can potentially have a very explosive move on the announcement.
TGR: You’ve had pretty spectacular performance since you started your portfolio with about $5,000. In August, it was down about 10% for the year. What’s happened here in the last three or four months?
CL: It’s been down between 10% and 15% so far, it has been quite flat this year. Considering that I own a lot of junior stocks, those stocks can be very volatile.
TGR: It’s been a tough year for everybody and not easy to show any spectacular gains in 2011. How about some of the individual stocks in your portfolio; do you have some nice winners that you’d like to talk about?
CL: Prophecy Platinum Corp. (NKL:TSX.V; PNIKD:OTCPK; P94P:Fkft) was a spectacular winner. The rest have been holding on. However, I’m quite optimistic because some of the stocks have some major news coming in the next few months.
TGR: You mentioned platinum, which always used to trade at a pretty substantial premium to gold. It’s obviously a lot rarer than gold. Yet somehow, it’s faded into obscurity in the last few years. Do you have any opinions on why that might be the case?
CL: In fact, I was out telling everybody that I’m loading up on platinum. Platinum is less than 10% of the global production of gold. Some 75% of global production comes from South Africa, which is having problems with electricity, labor disputes and other issues. Right now platinum is trading at a discount to gold. It’s almost unheard of. It used to be platinum was twice as much as gold. There could be hedge funds that may be long platinum and short gold and are having some problems and may be unwinding some positions. Over the long run, I think platinum is probably a very good investment.
TGR: Tell us more about Prophecy Platinum.
CL: This stock has been a spectacular winner for me this year. It’s up from less than $1/share to over $6/share in quite a short time. Now it’s pulled back to about the $3/share range. Prophecy just completed a private placement, of which 25% was participation by the insiders. That’s very strong insider participation. The price right now is at around the private placement price. Prophecy has a huge platinum group metals (PGM) deposit in the Yukon. It’s 12 million ounces in the NI 43-101. Prophecy just had some very nice drill holes. When the next update comes out, it will probably have more PGM and the gold. So, that’s looking very good. It has a sister company called Prophecy Coal Corp. (PCY:TSX; PRPCF:OTCQX; 1P2:Fkft), which owns about 45% of Prophecy Platinum. If you deduct its cash and the value of its Prophecy Platinum holdings, you get the coalmine in Mongolia for free. Plus you have leverage to this platinum play.
TGR: The platinum price situation is just hard to believe—the way it has fallen back. Maybe it has something to do with less industrial demand.
CL: The industrial demand will slow down a little bit. But, it’s not this dramatic. I feel it’s like when silver dropped to $10/ounce in 2008. The price dropped so low that I think it’s an opportunity for investors to buy platinum and platinum stocks on the cheap.
Another platinum producer I like is Stillwater Mining Company (SWC:NYSE). That’s the largest platinum producer in North America.
TGR: Stillwater. That’s the only producer in the U.S. that I’m aware of.
CL: Right. It fell very hard recently and lost two-thirds of its market cap. It now has a little bit of a rebound. I bought it pretty close to the bottom and I’m still holding it.
TGR: You recently returned from a visit to Haiti where you went to take a look at the Majescor Resources Inc. (MJX:TSX.V) gold property. What kind of report do you have on that?
CL: Oh, I was very excited about that. The property has a huge potential and Newmont Mining Corp. (NEM:NYSE) is also in the area. Newmont has been very interested in Majescor’s drilling program and even invited Majescor’s company executives to its office when I was there. That tells you how much focus it has on this drilling program by Majescor. It will have drilling results coming out in December. First, it was targeting copper and copper-gold and then it will drill out the area with some very high gold intercepts. In a previous release, Majescor showed 10 meters of something like 70 grams per ton. It will drill that next year. Basically, it’s a gold and copper or copper and gold project, depending on where you focus on it.
TGR: So, we’re going to wait for results next month and see how that goes, correct?
CL: Exactly. Its market cap is only $15 million and it could have a world-class deposit. Plus all the majors are looking at the drilling results.
TGR: So there may be a good chance that it will get taken out pretty quickly if the stock doesn’t go crazy.
CL: Majescor has been working on this project for two or three years and finally the drilling starts. It’s a pretty exciting time for shareholders.
TGR: Back in August you were also pretty positive on Pretium Resources Inc. (PVG:TSX). The company has a couple of properties that look pretty interesting at Snowfield and Brucejack. What’s been going on with those properties since last August?
CL: I visited its property and it was very, very exciting. The high-grade gold intercept was fantastic. Right now, the market is in a holding mode and we haven’t seen much movement in the past few months. Once people see how good a deposit it is and recognize how undervalued it is, I think we should see some good upside movement on this stock.
TGR: You also visited the Romios Gold Resources Inc. (RG:TSX.V; RMIOF:NASDAQ; D4R:Fkft) and the NovaGold Resources Inc. (NG:TSX; NG:NYSE.A) properties up in Northwestern B.C. last summer. What’s going on there?
CL: Romios started releasing drilling results and you can see it has some pretty good intercepts. It is still looking for the sweet spot and will probably need to take more time to drill out this area to find the center of the deposit.
TGR: When do you expect some significant news?
CL: Depending on the next round of drilling results, it could mean Romios needs to come back next year to do more drilling. It already released a few rounds of results and I think it has maybe one or two rounds of results left.
TGR: Romios is near NovaGold. Do you think there’s some possibility that NovaGold may try to take a run at Romios?
CL: NovaGold has a new CEO and plans to sell this Galore Creek deposit. Last time I think I was hoping it would have fantastic drilling results and then we would have a takeover situation. But, now it looks like it has found a deposit and needs to drill more. So, you probably need a little bit more patience to see how it develops, probably into next year.
TGR: What about NovaCopper?
CL: NovaGold wants to spin copper projects off and potentially the name could be NovaCopper. We’ll have to see what kind of deal it has and what direction that property goes.
TGR: What about other companies in your portfolio? Any developments there that our readers should be aware of?
CL: I’m still holding a lot of OceanaGold Corp. (OGC:TSX; OGC:ASX). The company is a producer in New Zealand and is starting up its new gold mine in the Philippines. It’s probably one of the cheaper gold producers you can find. I also own Coeur d’Alene Mines Corp. (CDM:TSX; CDE:NYSE). That’s a big silver producer and just had a management change. The company has two new silver mines going and half a billion dollar cash flow each year. It’s building up a third mine, which is a gold mine, and a fourth mine, a silver mine. It doesn’t have much in capital requirements coming and I hope will end up paying a dividend. I’ve been holding the stock for a while and expect to keep holding it.
TGR: What are your expectations as far as market performance in the last weeks of the year? Then what happens next year with the precious metals and mining stocks?
CL: A lot depends on the European solution. I think the most likely result would be a massive money printing in the Eurozone. That would be very positive for gold. As far as gold mining, we have seen the general lack of capital in mining stocks. That’s why I try to stay with companies with a strong cash flow. Many exploration companies and emerging producers are trading at very low valuation. Still, the market doesn’t give them recognition. If we have any solutions in the Europe situation, these stocks can have a huge run.
TGR: Are there any other parting thoughts you might want to leave with our readers as far as how they should be playing this market?
CL: Gold stocks are extremely undervalued right now versus the gold price. I personally believe that gold will go much higher. How high will gold stocks go? I think this depends on market conditions. Gold stocks have two faces. One is related to gold. The other is related to the capital markets. Mining companies need to raise money to produce gold. It’s a very capital-intensive industry. So, if the capital market doesn’t improve, gold mining stocks may lag behind gold for some time. But, once we have some stabilization, I can see some extremely undervalued gold stocks out there. Another idea to think about is to try to follow what the majors like. A company like Majescor clearly has the interest from majors. Majors are flooded with cash and can afford to pay a reasonable market price for a property. So, I think it’s probably a good time to follow the trades of the majors.
TGR: You’ve given us some good information and food for thought. Thanks for joining us today.
CL: Thanks for having me.
Chen Lin writes the popular stock newsletter What Is Chen Buying? What Is Chen Selling?, published and distributed by Taylor Hard Money Advisors, Inc. While a doctoral candidate in aeronautical engineering at Princeton, Lin found his investment strategies were so profitable that he put his Ph.D. on the back burner. He employs a value-oriented approach and often demonstrates excellent market timing due to his exceptional technical analysis.
By Trace Mayer, on December 6th, 2011
The demand for gold is vastly underestimated. About 18 months ago I wrote about Euro Gold and the Euro Zone and Euro Evaporation Leading To Credit Default Swaps and IMF Gold. One key excerpt was:
The Euro is broken. This was its destiny. This is the destiny of all fiat currencies. These bureau-rats cannot stop this anymore than Cnut the Great could command the tide to halt.
And here we are.
THE GREAT CREDIT CONTRACTION
The Great Credit Contraction has been in relentless advance for years. This is a massively deflationary period as capital, both real and fictitious, burrows down the liquidity pyramid into safer and more liquid assets. The fictitious capital that does not move fast enough evaporates. Poof goes trillions of wealth!
In the Information Age bank runs happen with the click of a mouse and not lines outside the physical branches.
FRACTIONAL RESERVE BANKING
Fractional Reserve Banking is the banking practice in which banks keep only a fraction of their deposits in reserve (as cash and other highly liquid assets) and lend out the remainder while maintaining the simultaneous obligation to redeem all these deposits upon demand.
Fractional reserve banking occurs when banks lend out any fraction of the funds received from demand deposits. Despite being a form of embezzlement and fraud this practice is universal in modern banking.
This mismatch between time, borrowing short-term and lending long-term, is what creates the potential for a bank run. But an even larger looming problem lurks in ‘cash and cash equivalents’. Yes, those pesky Tier I, II and III distinctions.
 As a bank’s assets evaporate their ability to make new loans, even extremely short-term loans like overnight, becomes impaired. When an entire banking system knows that all the major players have assets on their balance sheets, assets which are not accurately priced or accounted for, then there is an extreme reluctance to lend.
This is what happened when Lehman Brothers evaporated. The credit markets seized up. People acting in their own self-interest according to principles of praxeology moved into safe and liquid assets and refused to lend.
Liquidity dried up overnight. Mortgage backed securities, auction rate securities and plenty of other assets which had for decades been treated as ‘cash equivalents’ were suddenly shunned. The bid evaporated from a loss of confidence, the prices plunged, investors were snookered and bank balance sheets were massively damaged.
The gears of industry are seizing up.
EUROPE’S WORTHLESS BANK DEPOSITS
The European banks have balance sheets with trillions of Euros in value recorded but assets which every rational non-ignorant person knows are severely impaired. The credit markets are freezing, trust is evaporating and as a result liquidity is drying up.
Sure, the central banks of the world have joined in a massive illegal effort to lubricate the system but it will fail. Years ago when QE1 was announced I wrote The Federal Reserve Will Fail With Quantitative Easing. They are still failing just on a grander scale.
 To recapitalize and lubricate the European banking and financial system would take at least €25 trillion and maybe upwards of €100 trillion. The failure is a mathematical certainty. The gears of industry are seizing up.
The Greek and Italian democracies were assassinated by banksters Lucas Papademos, Mario Monti and Mario Draghi who will attempt to prolong the failed banking and financial system by privatizing the gains and socializing the losses with inflationary tactics and bailouts in a vain attempt to prevent the credit liquidation. They will only succeed in prolonging and exacerbating the necessary correction.
What holders of capital should understand is that European bank balance sheets are caught in an unrecoverable credit contraction spin, the appropriate emergency maneuver is to Run To Gold and only a few will make it with their purchasing power intact.
The vast majority of assets will become charred wreckage as their purchasing power evaporates into worthlessness. Sure, there may be a few near miss recoveries between now and the ultimate failure but why take the risk?
LATENT GOLD DEMAND
There is massive latent gold demand as a ‘cash or cash equivalent’ asset. Why should a holder of capital store their wealth in bank deposits with counter-party risk when they can completely eliminate it by moving into unencumbered physical gold bullion?
Plus, by moving into physical gold bullion they eliminate the risk associated with fiat currency becoming worthless through the deflationary event called hyperinflation. Really, hyperinflation is just the next step in The Great Credit Contraction after capital has moved almost entirely down the liquidity pyramid.
The money managers allocating trillions of FRNs, Euros, Yen, etc. have not even begun moving into the monetary metals. In most cases it is only beginning to become acceptable to speak of them. Some fallaciously argue there is not enough gold to go around.
Sure, there is enough gold for it to be used as the world reserve currency but it is only a matter of price. A price that Jim Rickards argues the case for in Currency Wars of being between $8,000 and $54,000+ per ounce.
 CONCLUSION
The European banking and financial system is imploding before our eyes in a massive credit contraction which is just the latest wave in The Great Credit Contraction. The European banks are in an unrecoverable deflationary spin. There is only one acceptable emergency recovery procedure and that is to Run To Gold.
Because so few have, therefore, the real gold demand is completely hidden and obscured from view. It will come when people lose confidence in the current banking and financial system by turning to and using alternatives that do not possess the same kinds of risks. In the Information Age bank runs happen with the click of a mouse and not lines outside the physical branches.
DISCLOSURES: Long physical gold, silver and platinum with no interest in DOW, S&P 500, the problematic SLV ETF, gold ETF or the platinum ETFs.
By The Energy Report, on December 2nd, 2011
Attention Shoppers: There are some amazing values currently available at bargain prices in the energy department. That’s pretty much what Chen Lin told us in this exclusive interview with The Energy Report. The current level of risk aversion by most investors has left the doors wide open for those who are willing to see real values and major potential in oil and gas producers.
The Energy Report: You last spoke with us in early June. What has transpired in the oil and gas markets since, and has it altered your investment thesis?
Chen Lin: The oil price has been going up and down because a lot of traders are mispositioned and are scrambling around. That makes the market very volatile. However, WTI is around $100 again, which is quite surprising because we are still in the middle of a recession. World oil demand is still there, and whenever there’s a drop in the oil price there’s a lot of buying. I’m quite surprised that oil is still around the $100 mark. Personally, I would like to see it in the $80 to $90 range. That’s actually good for the oil consumers. If gasoline is below $3.00 that really helps the U.S. consumer.
TER: Domestic natural gas prices, on the other hand, have been in a continuous downtrend since June. It seems shale gas has created a glut. What’s your assessment of that situation?
CL: There’s so much natural gas being produced in the U.S. that we can’t consume it and, then there are no facilities to export it. The oil/natural gas price ratio may go up further. It really depends on how much gas is produced. If you want the market to really work you need to create more natural gas demand with export facilities or a policy to make cars run on natural gas. Then drivers can enjoy $1/gallon equivalent in gas. That would be a huge demand boost and would make natural gas prices go higher. Without those on the horizon, the natural gas price may come down further.
TER: So, what do you think would happen to the oil market if the Eurozone situation deteriorates further?
CL: It would be negative for the oil market; that’s for sure. Globally, investors must take into account the demand disruption in Europe versus the demand increase in developing countries, which is still an ongoing trend. If there is a depression in Europe, of course oil will go down, probably as far as it did in 2008. If Europe can avoid a depression, we may see an even higher oil price.
TER: How has your energy stock portfolio performed since we spoke in June?
CL: Last June, I was in the process of reducing energy stocks because of the European crisis threat. In the past few weeks, I started to increase oil exposure substantially because there are a lot of very cheap energy stocks. You can buy your oil stocks for pennies on the dollar. Also, energy stocks, even though they are very capital intensive, are not as capital dependent as mining stocks. Energy companies can drill a well and then pump the oil and sell it. Then they can use the capital to finance the next well, whereas mining companies need to keep raising money to maintain production. That is why I like oil producers. With $70 -$80 oil, they can make good money, and $100 oil is really great money. They will have a lot of capital to deploy and enjoy a lot of cash flow.
TER: You get a pretty immediate payout and don’t have to sit around for years waiting for approvals and licenses and building. So, there’s definitely that advantage.
CL: Exactly.
TER: In June you mentioned that your biggest holding, at that point was Mart Resources Inc. (MMT:TSX.V). Is that still the case? What’s been going on with the company since then?
CL: That’s still the case. I’m holding a lot of Mart Resources. During the summer when the market turned south, I was still holding the stock because I really believe in this project. I heard the company was making presentations at conferences where it was talking about the potential for very large dividend payouts, starting next year. Right now it’s trading about one times after-tax cash flow, according to the management. So, it can basically pay out any dividend it wants. It will probably start low—maybe $0.05 or $0.10. A $0.10 dividend is almost a 20% yield at the current share price. Then it will start going higher because it is going to accumulate so much cash from its oil drilling program. Every well in this year’s drilling program is a successful well—every well! I think two are around 10,000 bpd. One is 6,000–7,000 bpd. In North America, if you have 600 or 700 barrels, it’s a very good well. These are much bigger. So, Mart is just waiting to reach a deal with the pipeline company so it can start pumping more oil out. It’s supposed to be very soon. Once it reaches that stage, it will be cash-flowing at one times market cap. That will be a huge catalyst. Plus, the dividend payout will be another big catalyst. I’m looking for a much higher stock price.
TER: This is Umusadege Field in Nigeria you’re talking about, is that right?
CL: Right. Mart just found an amazing amount of oil. Its well production in the past 2–2 ½ years has shown no decline. In North America, after a month or two it could drop in half, like in the Bakken. The steady production means the company is sitting on a much larger pool than people can imagine. The next catalyst will be its reserve calculation. With all the production it’s had and all the successful drilling, this year’s reserve will be much higher than last year’s. With last year’s reserve, if I remember correctly, the 3P net asset value (NAV) of 2010 is way over $1.00 per share. This year it could easily double that, maybe even more. Meanwhile the stock is still at $0.64. That tells you how much upside it has just from the NAV. Then you can look at it from cash-flow side and the dividend side and you can see that the stock is very, very undervalued.
TER: So, what’s the market cap for the company at this point?
CL: I think it’s about $200 million (M) and they will probably cash-flow more than $200M.
TER: Boy, that is a real bargain, isn’t it?
CL: I’ve been holding this as my largest position because I feel so compelled. It’s been undervalued for a long time. Partly it’s because the market was very bad this year. Nobody really paid attention. In the meantime, the company has had one drilling success after another. Not just successful but very successful. The market has shown no response to that. But the company can immediately sell the oil and get into cash-flow. So, if the market doesn’t respond now, it will respond later. That’s why I was holding it as my largest position throughout the turmoil this year.
TER: Do you think is the project’s location in Nigeria might make some investors wary?
CL: That could be the case. The Nigeria situation is a little bit volatile. But, again, this is an OPEC nation and Mart exports through its standard pipeline. It has some interruptions from time to time, but management has already factored that into its cash-flow calculations.
TER: What do you think the chances are that the company will get bought out by a major with this kind of production?
CL: It could be. There was another Nigerian company that was bought out by a Chinese company for $7 billion (B) last year. Mart will likely be producing at that level in a year or so. Right now it only has a $200M market cap. So, you can see the upside is huge. Furthermore, the company does not need to come to the market to raise money. That’s why it’s in an ideal situation and why I like it.
TER: Another one that you were quite positive on last time was Harvest Natural Resources (HNR:NYSE). You said that you thought that it might be up for sale. What has transpired with that one?
CL: Its Venezuelan project is still for sale. That project is actually generating very nice cash flow. The company has about $3–$4.00 cash on its balance sheet. So, it’s pretty well cashed up. It is producing oil from its oil field in Venezuela and it is paying dividends. It uses the money to drill wells elsewhere. The stock had a little bit of a setback when the company hit a well in Indonesia and the first part of the well was not as good as people expected. But it hit a very good well off of Gabon in Africa and then it will drill another well in Oman. Plus, it is continuing to drill in Indonesia. So, it has a lot of excitement coming. The company is still trying to find a buyer for its Venezuelan asset and probably a Chinese or Russian company that is closer to the government that might buy it.
TER: So, the upside still looks pretty good for that one as far as you’re concerned.
CL: Yes, the upside is big. It’s just that the market has not put all the pieces together yet and calculated how much the company’s assets are potentially worth.
TER: Maybe that’s because Harvest is spread out geographically and people have a hard time understanding it versus if it were all in one country or one location.
CL: Exactly. That’s also a big issue.
TER: Another one you talked about last time was Porto Energy Corp. (PEC:TSX.V). It had a new gas discovery in Portugal. At that point, the value of that was much greater than the price of its stock. What’s going on with that one and where do you think it is going?
CL: Right now the market is so afraid of risk that investors seem to be getting rid of any company that’s associated with risk. Porto is a perfect example. It already has a natural gas discovery and is trying to expand and bring that into production. The natural gas pipeline runs through its property. The company was IPO-ed earlier this year at $1/share. Right now it’s about $0.25. It’s getting close to the cash it has on hand and it can generate immediate cash-flow. The Portuguese government is extremely supportive of what the company is doing because the nation wants the tax revenue and the jobs. Portugal’s government is trying to help Porto anyway it can so production can come online.
TER: So that one is definitely undervalued, compared to where it was in June, with a lot more upside potential.
CL: Exactly. There are a lot of companies, both in energy and in mining, that have been hit hard. If you are willing invest with a little bit of risk appetite, you can find a lot of very undervalued stocks that can go up very significantly once the market stabilizes. I’m still trying to stay with companies that have strong cash flow, and good balance sheets so that they don’t need to come to the market to raise money. That can help you weather the storm.
TER: Are there any other companies that you might want to mention at this point?
CL: I’ve been taking a position in quite a few energy companies, some quite aggressively. One is Pan Orient Energy Corp. (POE:TSX.V). I had the stock before. It’s at $2 recently from $6 earlier this year. The company raised money at more than $6 earlier this year, so it has a very strong balance sheet with about $1/share on its balance sheet. It drilled two wells in Indonesia. One was a failure. The second one was non-conclusive. The company couldn’t finish it. So, it stopped and tried to find another driller. It will start drilling, I believe, this month. In the meantime, the market hit the stock hard. Pan Orient has a producing oil field in Thailand, which is producing a lot of cashflow (It is trading at about 2 times cashflow). It also has an oil sand property in Canada. In addition, it will be drilling this big potential well in Indonesia. Can the stock go lower? It’s possible. But, I feel it’s so undervalued that I started buying it quite aggressively.
Another stock I bought quite aggressively recently is PBN, PetroBakken Energy Ltd. (PBN:TSX). It is paying a 10% dividend right now and the stock is less than $10.00. You get a monthly $0.08 per share dividend. The stock was hit very, very hard because it missed its earning guidance in the past few quarters. In addition, it has a sizeable debt. So investors are worried about that, which has caused rounds of selloffs. It sold down to where it was paying a 15% dividend. So, I picked it up not long ago at a slightly lower price. It had very good production in the recent quarter and seems to have hit its targets. Management has indicated it has no problem paying all the dividends as long as the oil price doesn’t crash. So, basically you’re getting paid a 10% dividend while you wait for the stock to appreciate, which it is.
TER: How do you think energy investors should plan for the coming year, given the turmoil in Europe, the world and domestic economic situations and the 2012 elections?
CL: I’m just looking at global production, supply and demand. Investors should know that India has no strategic oil reserves and it is a very important oil user right now. China is still expanding and building its strategic oil reserves. Last time I checked, China’s oil reserves can last only one-third as long as U.S. reserves. China will likely fill up more of its tanks on any dip in the oil price. There should be good demand for oil in the current market unless we have a complete breakdown of the euro.
On the investment side, I like to invest in land-based oil producers because sea-based oil production has high capital requirements. I also prefer oil producers versus natural gas producers in North America because these kinds of companies tend to perform better in this market.
TER: Do you expect the year-end tax loss selling season to present some good buying opportunities?
CL: Oh, yes, absolutely. For example, on Pan Orient, one of my plans was to wait until tax-loss selling in December to buy, but in November it already dropped to below $2.00. I said, “Okay, let’s buy it right now, right here.” There could be more tax-loss selling coming, but these are very good opportunities to buy—especially companies with very strong balance sheets and good cash flow, which don’t need to raise money. The dip will, most likely, be temporary and there will be very good buying opportunities for a lot of these stocks.
TER: So, we’ve got another few weeks to pick up some bargains before the end of the year.
CL: Yes. I do want to mention that, generally, the oil market bottoms in the winter and then goes up in spring all the way to summer. So, we’re coming to a very strong part of the seasonal oil price cycle.
TER: That’s a great suggestion. Thanks for taking the time to talk to us today.
CL: Thank you for the opportunity.
Chen Lin writes the popular stock newsletter What Is Chen Buying? What Is Chen Selling?, published and distributed by Taylor Hard Money Advisors, Inc. While a doctoral candidate in aeronautical engineering at Princeton, Chen found his investment strategies were so profitable that he put his Ph.D. on the back burner. He employs a value-oriented approach and often demonstrates excellent market timing due to his exceptional technical analysis.
By Claus Vistesen, on November 28th, 2011
The rumour mill is grinding particularly fast at the moment. Germany and France seem to be working on the famous nuclear solution, Spain plays tough on outsiders, the IMF is rumoured to be preparing an aid package for Italy not to mention Hungary and Austria (just like Belgium) has entered the rating agencies’ cross hair.
So, what to believe?
I don’t know, but it is interesting that Reuters are now reporting France and Germany to be in an agreement on a fast track move towards fiscal union as well as allowing the ECB to aid sovereigns more forcefully (i.e. unsterilised intervention).
I want to see this before I believe it. Germany is certainly sending conflicting signals. Yet, this may be because they are truly unsure how long they can play this game of chicken with the rest of Europe. Clearly, Merkel has a point in refusing to issue euro bonds and/or letting the ECB step in since the periphery needs to put their house in order or at least show a credible plan to balance the budget. This is essentially quid pro quo as Merkel knows that Germany needs to pay in the end.
But there is a rub. One issue is surely the fact that public finances across the eurozone are unsustainable but another is how these economies are going to achieve anything near the growth needed not to collapse (default) anyway.
We keep on coming back to two main points.
1) It was clear for all that pain was coming in the periphery already in 07/08 and that this would be a substantial period of negative growth/deleveraging consolidation.
2) But the question was always whether such pain could be administered from within the euro zone. We are steadily coming to the conclusion that this is not possible and Germany knows this. But the solution is not clear since jettisoning the euro would have grave implications for the EU too and therefore there is a very strong lock-in mechanism here which it is difficult to get out of.
Finally, there is always the risk that one or many of the Southern European economies will simply “get” enough and make some quick and devastating decisions. It is important to understand my point on this.
I am sure it would be catastrophic for Greece or another country to leave by their own accord and do a messy default, but at some point the rest of Europe and the market will simply corner whatever government that might be in place and they will start taking their own independent decisions.
I note that there are calls for the new government in Spain to play “hardball” with Germany. In this situation, Germany has a distinct interest in just letting the market squeeze the periphery, but of course the rest of the “core” is getting dragged down too and the whole banking system is now at risk of a major liquidity/solvency crisis. In this sense, I only agree conditionally with Felix Salmon:
El-Erian is very good at explaining the problem which needs solving:
“Europe must still stabilize its sovereign debt situation. But this is now far from sufficient. Policymakers must also move quickly to contain banking sector frailties, and do so using a more coherent approach to the trio of capital, asset quality and liquidity.”
It seems to me, though, that sequencing matters here. Liquidity is — always — more important than capital/solvency. Give an insolvent bank enough liquidity, and it can live indefinitely. Remove liquidity from a bank, and it dies immediately, no matter how solvent it might be or how high its capital ratios are. And as for asset quality, we’re pretty much talking a zero-sum game here: when the banks’ dubious assets are the sovereign’s liabilities, the real solution is inflation, not nationalization.
I agree that liquidity is a key issue at the moment in the euro zone banking system, but let us not kid ourselves. Europe has not had a functioning interbank market since 2008 and we are just now seeing the accumulated effect of this.
I just read a big and very detailed BC report on deleveraging among EZ banks and I am extremely concerned. It is clear to me that not only sovereigns are battling with solvency issues but so are many banks and the extent to which they are fighting it means that they will have to cut lending and asset growth substantially. As such, I am afraid that the problems in the euro zone are beginning to resemble a widespread solvency problem both amongst banks and sovereigns, a combination which, to boot, will feed off each other. Especially Eastern Europe are going to have big problems in 2012. They are going to see an almost complete stop of credit flows through the banking system due to parents cutting cross border lending.
I think that we will see a wholesale and government driven process of bank nationalisations and restructuring in the next 6 months in the euro zone. I also think that most southern european economies are ultimately facing both public and private insolvency issues which will need balance sheet write-offs to get solved. It seems to me that, as so many times before, euro zone politicians are once again getting caught out by reality.
By Ajay Shah, on November 18th, 2011
How did it happen?
The worst financial crisis in the western world for nearly 80 years broke in September 2008.
It required banking/financial systems to be supported and recapitalised by governments across the EU and in the US.
In June 2009 it became apparent that the peripheral countries of the Eurozone (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland) were grossly over-indebted.
Yet in some instances (Spain) their public debt to GDP ratios happened to be lower than those of the US, France, the UK and Germany.
The continued viability of their public finances depended entirely on markets being willing to refinance them with cheap money.
But, when markets scrutinised the sustainability of their fiscal positions, they baulked from refinancing except at punitive rates.
CDS spreads (against Germany as a benchmark) of peripheral Eurozone countries (PIGS or Club Med) debt began widening relentlessly.
Global financial markets began to price in an escalating risk of partial/full voluntary/involuntary default on PIGS bonds since December 2009.
Contrary to first impressions, except for Ireland, that was a result not just of the financial crisis and bank recapitalisation demands on the fiscus.
It became apparent instead that bank recapitalisation demands on public finance were only the last straws that broke the camel’s back.
Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, as a direct consequence of joining the Eurozone, had been running up unsustainable fiscal deficits since 2000.
Ireland had not. It suffered because the bailout of its disproportionately large banking system caused its public debt to rise astronomically.
PIGS became over-indebted despite the supposed self-imposed discipline adopted by the Eurozone of prohibiting fiscal deficits >3% of GDP.
That discipline was violated by almost all Eurozone members, beginning with France and Germany, but more egregiously by the PIGS.
To make matters worse, however, the PIGS were also running increasingly large current account deficits (with Germany, France, China).
Though countries like France (and to a lesser extent) Germany were fiscal sinners, they were at least running current account surpluses.
PIGS had access to excessively cheap public and private money available on terms totally inappropriate to their economic circumstances.
Given their inherent risks, which markets mispriced completely, their borrowing costs should have been 300-500 bp higher than Germany’s.
Instead, they were virtually the same for nearly a decade. That relieved market-induced pressure on PIGS’ governments to behave responsibly.
Consequently, their public expenditures after 2000 ballooned out of all proportion to their intrinsic capacity to fund them from tax revenues.
Such expenditures became almost wholly dependent on access to increasing amounts of cheap public borrowing from capital markets.
In response to access to excessively cheap money, wages in the PIGS rose across the board as did growth in public sector employment.
With the financial crisis triggering bank recapitalisation needs, on top of this unsustainable structure, the edifice began to crumble.
The first early warning signals became apparent in December 2009 but the dam broke in mid-2010 with the first Greek bailout.
How has the Eurozone crisis been handled?
Extremely ineptly; indeed very foolishly, by sophisticated Eurozone authorities (political, fiscal and monetary) that should have known better.
Eurozone leaders learned nothing from the preceding debt crises in Latin America (1982-87, 1994-95) and Asia (1997-2000).
They went through avoidable phases of serial denial that there was a structural debt (solvency) crisis that could spread via contagion.
They treated it as a liquidity crisis that could be dealt with by temporary patch-ups of additional money combined with fiscal restraint.
They reiterated their commitment to ensuring there would be no default – partial or full, voluntary or involuntary – by any Eurozone member.
They believed that their remedial measures would stop the crisis from ballooning beyond the first bailout package for Greece.
They were totally wrong. That package did nothing to convince markets that Eurozone leaders understood the nature/severity of the problem.
In fact, the inadequacy of that first bailout package — which did not provide enough money for sufficiently long – became quickly apparent.
Eurozone leaders were fixated on debt-affected PIGS being forced to live within their means through indefinite austerity without end.
Debt recovery/sustainability models did not provide sufficient new money, or permit debt restructuring, in ways that would restore stability.
Least of all were bailout packages designed to restore growth in a conscionable period of time that would be socially/politically acceptable.
Without financial system (and borrowing cost) stability, and absent growth, debt problems can never become better. They can only worsen.
Instead, as a result of poor design, all the bailouts did (except for Ireland) was to add new debt to bad debt and reduce growth prospects.
To exemplify: In mid-2009 the debt/GDP ratio for Greece was 115% of GDP and the debt service ratio about 11% of GDP.
But, by October 2011 the debt/GDP ratio for Greece was 161% of GDP and the debt service ratio nearly 20% of GDP.
It is projected with the third bailout to rise to 185% of GDP (although debt service will be lowered to 16%) before it comes down again.
In the meantime, over the last 32 months, the Greek economy has shrunk in size by almost 17% in nominal terms. It will be 1/5 th less in 2012.
Such inane ‘remedies’ do not solve debt problems. They only aggravate and exacerbate them.
While behaving in this absurd fashion Eurozone leaders repeatedly asserted for two years that they would do everything in their power to:
- Maintain the credibility of the Euro while ensuring that every member stayed in the Eurozone
- Not allow any default of publicly issued bonds to occur; and
- Do everything possible to avoid contagion spreading beyond PIGS (even as it became clear that markets were worried about Italy.
Instead they achieved the exact opposite of all three objectives through their inability to understand the implications of what they were doing.
Though now contrite and claiming to have learnt a few lessons from their serial bungling over 30 months Eurozone leaders have no solution.
The EFSF facility they created is woefully underfunded. It can barely deal with financing the third Greek bailout.
The idea of leveraging it or using it as a partial guarantee facility is absurd since it would add to risk and uncertainty not resolve them.
Yet over-indebted governments (including France and Germany) would have to issue more public debt in order to fund the EFSF properly.
That would simply mean requiring their fragile, near-bankrupt, banking systems (or the ECB) or global markets to buy more Eurozone debt.
Except for Germany (and even that will be in doubt soon) the market has no appetite for taking on more Eurozone debt given its risks.
Contagion has spread from the periphery and now lodges at the core of the Eurozone economy in which Italy is the third largest member.
What could have been resolved with about 300 billion euro in additional financing in mid-2010 is now a problem that may require 2 trillion euro.
Where are we now?
Over 35 EU/Eurozone summits in 30 months have resolved nothing. They have made matters worse; despite Herculean exertions!
Right now Greece is in ‘effective’ default; though markets are overlooking that because of the implications of CDS contracts being triggered.
Its borrowing costs for refinancing its debt would exceed 30% if it had any access to private markets; which it does not.
Any refinancing of, or addition to, Greek debt can now only be financed by the ECB; which the Germans will not permit the ECB to do.
Meanwhile the Greek banking system is bankrupt. Indeed the entire Eurozone banking system’s credibility/stability/solvency is in doubt.
Today an outstanding portfolio of about 11-12 trillion euro in Eurozone debt – of which about 80% is held by EU firms – is souring relentlessly.
About 7 trillion euro of that portfolio is sufficiently affected by contagion to require provisioning (France and Belgium may soon be added).
About 5 trillion euro of Eurozone high-risk-debt is currently held by EU banks, insurance companies, pension funds and individuals.
That sovereign debt, which is supposed to constitute the ’safest’ component of any asset portfolio, now constitutes perhaps the riskiest element.
That reality inverts the whole basis of banking/financial system soundness and stability across Europe (including the UK).
It compounds the problem of calculating capital adequacy requirements for these banking systems and puts regulators in a quandary.
Ireland’s bailout programme is working but could be derailed by what is happening in the rest of Europe.
Portugal’s programme is not working as intended. But nobody is talking about it because it pales in comparison with Italy and Greece.
Italy’s outstanding public debt will soon cross 2 trillion euro (120% of GDP) and its debt service payments amount to around 300 billion euro per year.
That is made up of about 120 billion euro in interest payments and 180 billion euro in principal repayments. Average duration is 5 years.
Public debt service in Italy now amounts to around 17% of GDP and will rise to 20% unless Italy’s debt is dramatically restructured.
Italy now needs to borrow about 40 billion a month euro (gross) and about 28 billion euro a month net in private markets to refinance its debt.
The world is holding its breath with every auction of Italian public debt (3-8 billion euro per week) any of which could trigger accidental default.
The cost of refinancing Italy’s public debt has risen from around 4% a year ago to around 7% now. That adds 20 billion euro a year to
its debt.
Meantime the Italian economy is flat-lining and its capacity to service additional debt is diminishing despite its running a primary balance.
Banks around the world are dumping their holdings of Italian public debt but there is no buyer other than the ECB because of the risk.
The ECB’s capacity to refinance Greek, Italian and Portuguese debt is limited and constrained by Germany’s unwillingness to consider
that.
Contagion from Italy is now beginning to affect Spain and France which is supposed to be a bulwark for the EFSF’s borrowing capacity.
The resulting gridlock is pushing the entire Eurozone system toward a catastrophic denouement with a binary outcome. Either:
- Crisis-induced progress toward fiscal union with national sovereign bonds being replaced by a single Eurozone bond with a joint/several guarantee, or
- Sudden disorderly collapse of the Eurozone with unimaginable fallout and consequences that would trigger a global double-dip
recession.
Such a recession would last for a minimum of 2-3 years and would probably be quickly followed by a similar debt crisis in the US.
The resulting fallout of disorderly Eurozone break-up could trigger a break-up or restructuring of the larger EU as well.
So where do we go from here?
With the foregoing in mind it seems absurd that the world is waiting with bated breath to see what the new technocratic governments
in Greece (Papademos) and Italy (Monti) will actually achieve by way of structural reform and increased debt servicing capability in coming months.
These technocratic governments inject new credibility but lack political and social legitimacy. They have been appointed not elected.
It remains to be seen how long their technocratic legitimacy holds out without the backing of gradually earned political/social legitimacy.
The risk is that if the ministrations of these technocratic governments (which their societies believe have been imposed on them
from the EU above) do not work and bear fruit relatively soon (the probability is that they won’t), public patience with them will melt.
Will they be able to convince electorates to accept the inevitability of austerity without growth for the indefinite future?
The next Greek crisis is perhaps 10-12 weeks away.
The next Italian crisis could be triggered by any one of the upcoming weekly auctions of Italian government debt.
Despite these rather obvious realities, global markets deem to be reacting in dream-like hope and optimism that all will be well.
There is of course a solution at hand; and the only one that will work because all the other options seem to have been exhausted.
That option requires Germany to reconsider its refusal to bear its large share of the fiscal burden that will come with Eurozone fiscal
union.
It requires political/social willingness on the part of rich northern Eurozone members to finance fiscal transfers to poorer
southern members through an exponential expansion of structural funds, currently applied to help develop more rapidly the poorer regions of the EU.
Reciprocally, it requires other Eurozone countries to relinquish fiscal, and a great deal of political, sovereignty immediately; in
order to assure global markets of their commitment to structural reform, restoration of competitiveness, and relentless pursuit of fiscal/monetary discipline.
It requires all unwanted national sovereign bonds of Eurozone members to be replaced by a single Eurobond that is jointly and
severally guaranteed and underpinned by the weight and ability of the ECB behind it to print money if necessary to ensure that such bonds are honoured.
This solution would resolve both the over-indebtness problem of the Eurozone and the problem of banking system collapse at a single stroke.
If it were adopted the need to provide for risky Eurozone debt and recapitalise (yet again) the EU banking system would disappear.
Yet, this is the one solution that keeps being discarded because of legitimate German constitutional, judicial and political constraints.
They inhibit movement in such a direction regardless of the consequences for the Eurozone, the EU, and mostly Germany itself.
It is like witnessing a repeat of 1939; not of conquest but of mindless destruction. But, this time with money rather than tanks being involved.
If that only workable solution continues to be discarded, the other possibility that will manifest itself is the disorderly break-up of
the Eurozone; simply because its orderly break-up defies contemplation and imagination.
Talk of Greece being ejected from the Eurozone, or of Germany departing from it voluntarily, is fanciful simply because neither can
afford to bear the costs of the consequences that will follow, regardless of what their populations and political leaders may believe
or think (though ‘thought’ seems to be conspicuously absent from the process just now). Neither can their neighbours, regardless of what they may think.
Yet it is not unimaginable that a break-up will be forced on Eurozone members by global markets if the only workable solution
continues to be ruled out as it seems to be repeatedly by the German Chancellor. But she has changed her mind so often the hope is she will yet again.
A disorderly break-up may result in a reversion to national currencies; which would be better than members trying to retain some
semblance of the Euro through separate residual monetary unions of more compatible economies.
That would probably require four different Euros (for the super-efficient Northern economies a Baltic Euro, for the relatively efficient middling economies a Franco-Euro; for the newly acceding countries an Eastern-Euro and for the inefficient, uncompetitive Club-Med economies, a PIGS-Euro). Other than the first, none of the others would be credible for holding as reserves, or for trading significantly in global currency markets.
Finally, bear in mind that we have spoken of only the public debt problem in the Eurozone.
Should the unthinkable (but increasingly likely) disorderly break-up happen, the public debt problem will be accompanied by an unresolved private debt problem throughout the Eurozone of equally monumental proportions! That really will break the system and the banks!
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