That Which Is Unseen

Some economic news:

This morning’s jobs report shows that the economy’s subsidized private sector (industries like health care services that receive big government subsidies) is back as a major source of new hiring.

If a stronger but sustainable U.S. recovery depends on reinvigorating industries not heavily dependent on government largesse, then this hiring out-performance by the subsidized private sector is a bearish indicator.

As Tonelson figures it, the subsidized private sector created 65,000 net new jobs in December, nearly 40% of total private-sector job growth, about the same as throughout the recovery. But is that a lot or a little?

One easy way to tell if an economist is shallow is to see how they analyze the role of government in the economy.  In this case, the assertion is that the government was responsible for about 40% of new net job creation.  But, I wonder, how much net job destruction the government was responsible for.

US Demographics – Glass Half Full or Half Empty?

First of all, I should apologize for readers for probably the longet hiatus ever on this blog. I am still trying to balance a busy day job with having time to pen blog posts. I am sure that I will manage to get a nice rythm going at some point.

As such, I thought that I would return to a topic that I actually do know a little about and this interesting piece in the WSJ by Carl Bialik on US fertility and the idea of a crisis driven birth collapse in the US.

A recent report said the U.S. birth rate has dipped to a record low level. But another measure of the nation’s fertility remains comfortably above its historic low. The mismatch shows that even in a country with comprehensive birth statistics, summarizing population trends is far from straightforward.

The article makes no judgement either way and essentially keeps to lining up the arguments without making a statement about which measures are most correct. The main debate is driven by reports that the US birth rate has plummeted since the financial crisis and that this negative shock could have a lasting impact on US population dynamics.

However, as the article suggests, measuring fertility is not straightforward and indeed while the article builds its discussion around the notion of total births per 1000 women (crude birth rate) and the total fertility rate (average children born to women in their childrearing age), no mention is given of total cohort fertility which is the completed fertility per cohort. Arguably, this last measure is the most important one, but also the most difficult one to observe since we can only see this after the fact (although we can make qualified guesses of where this is headed for a given cohort based on the interaction between tempo and quantum effects of fertility).

So, what is the story in the US? Well, the crude birth rate recently hit all time lows, but the total fertility rate remains stable and close to replacement levels and this latter point is, in my view, giving too little credence in relation to the most recent concerns raised on US fertility.

However, there is no doubt that the financial crisis appears to have had a noticeable impact on US fertility patterns. In theory, an economic recession should not have a lasting impact on completed fertility. This is mainly because a normal economic recession does not have a lasting impact of families’ life course trajectory and decisions to have children. It may lead to an increase in postponement, but that effect should be reversed once the recession ends.

The key question is whether this particular economic crisis is different and whether we can expect a lasting impact on fertility in the US (and perhaps elsewhere)?

I would venture a hesitant no here, but the jury is still out, and there is no doubt that the specific nature of the recent economic crisis as one of being associated with a structural level of too much debt is  a worry. A prolonged period of deleveraging which now appears to have begun the US and elsewhere in the OECD could lead to a permanent and irreversible postponement of fertility decisions in the US, but so far the fact that US fertility remains close to replacement levels (and never dipped below) is a definite positive that has, so far, received too little attention I think.

Grantham Lays Down the Gauntlet on US Growth and Demographics

If Carl Bilak’s article does little to come up with an argument for or against the notion of the sturdiness of US demographic fundamentals a recent piece from GMO by Grantham is much more vocal in its worry that the US economy may be headed for zero growth and that demographics are to blame.

First of all, Grantham is fundamentally pointing to falling trend growth in the US. This is the case not only in the US but across the OECD. Indeed, trend growth if measured with a very broad stroke is probably falling in all major global economies, developed as well as so called emerging economies. The reasons for this are pretty simple. All the things we use to calculate or account for growth are slowing down; demographics, capital formation and technology/productivity although this last bit is surrounded by a huge uncertainty and could surge or slump. Most economists would see productivity as a part of the process (i.e. it is endogenous) and thus something we can affect, but technological progress does tend to have an unpredictable and disruptive cycle which is difficult to account for.

Still, to take such a broad sweep at growth and apply equally across global economies is too general a narrative to hold up to closer scrutiny.

Enter US population dynamics and its coming “growth” effect.

On US demographics, I think Grantham focuses on long term trends of working age population growth which are obviously down in the US. However, they are down for all countries and over such a long time frame that it becomes meaningless to discuss them without some aspect of relativity. Retiring baby boomers are a drag on US growth and the lack of rising female labour force participation (because it has already happened) is also a minus, but this is also pushing the narrative a little bit.

Surely, a boost in growth from increasing female labour force participation can only happen once and is not strictly a “drag” on growth when it ends. Crucially however, Grantham interprets exhibit 1 depicting growth in the US working age population in a “glass half empty” kind of way. We are told to focus on the declining trend, but I would note the remarkable fact that the US working age population is set to enjoy positive growth beyond 2030. That is a major relative tailwind compared to the rest of the developed world and indeed emerging markets. All countries in the world have a large challenge in the context of the compatibility between ageing and a market economy with pension schemes and health care systems, but the US seems in a relatively good position to cope with this from the point of view of demographics.

Going back to the discussion on fertility, I am surprised that Grantham does not focus a bit more on the fact that it never slumped massively below replacement level in the US which augurs for strong tailwinds to household formation. If you combine this with intra-US labour mobility you get a strong foundation for growth I think. Or at least, you get a more nuanced view of the US compared to for example many other OECD economies (Japan and Europe) where demographics are much more decisively manifesting themselves in the form of headwinds.

Two charts from the GMO piece that should make us worry a bit though are ex 2 and 3. Working less hours and falling labour force participation (and it is falling not only for women) are poison for growth because it reduces the potential growth rate per unit rate of inflation. Popular speaking, it reduces the natural level of output before the output gap turns positive (and you get excess inflation and no real growth). This is a huge challenge in the US and the persistently falling labour force participation rate in the US in a post crisis is a worrying development which needs some sort of structural/reform response as it is completely unrealistic to expect the Fed’s quanto easing policies to lead to a structurally better labour market.

In the end, I would say that it is difficult to disagree with the overall narrative set out by Grantham because it really sticks to the straight and narrow and basically says what we already know, name that trend growth will fall.

Critically however, Grantham notes the concept of “zero growth” and thus refers to the idea that trend growth in the US may fall to zero. I don’t see that and this is an important qualifier.

I think there are a lot of economies in the OECD where “trend growth” as defined by conventional economic models and theories may be zero (Japan, Italy, Spain and some parts of Eastern Europe).  But I would not put the US in that group and demographics represent one of the main reasons for this. There may be many reasons why the US economy may slump to zero growth in the future, but demographics aren’t one of them.

International financial centres: Peering into the future

I did the SIGFIRM Quarterly Lecture at the University of California in Santa Cruz recently:

Also see: Mumbai as an International Financial Centre, a project led by Percy Mistry.

You may like to subscribe to the NIPFP MF channel on youtube.

The new metro gazelles?

So if you want to see the gloomiest picture of Downtown used in an upbeat story see today’s headine.

Reuters: Only three major U.S. cities see economic recovery: study

What 3 you have to ask?  Lots of ink on this one from all over, but nary a mention locally? Even reverb over the pond of the story.  Curious.  Maybe the reference to ‘Brookings’ got confused with the bigger news today here about ‘Brooks Brothers.

Why Print Money?

Andrew Coyne:

They are probably right. It is telling that neither Obama nor his Republican opponent has offered much of a plan to spur the economy, at least in the short term. So far as anyone has any short-term impact on the economy, it is the Federal Reserve, and even it is limited in what it can do. As it has been said, the Fed can print money, but it can’t print jobs. [Emphasis added.]

Well, if all the fed can really do is add to the stock of currency (well, that and not enforce regulations), then pray tell what, exactly, is the point of having it?  If it’s not going to do anything save debase the currency and in so doing ensure that banksters get first dibs on the redistribution that inevitably accompanies each round of inflation, then why have a central bank?  Oh, wait…

To Fly

So I debated whether to point out the obvious here, but I wasn’t even sure if this was serious.  See the press release: Pittsburgh International Airport Celebrates 20 Years Of Service, Innovation And Growth In The Pittsburgh Region.

No hubris there.  I’m now half expecting the Nuttings to issue a press release highlighting 76 wins this season.

Now I hate to point this out, but Pittsburgh is the 22nd largest metropolitan area in the nation depending on how you want to benchmark it.  Yet the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport is of late the 45th largest airport when measured by passenger enplanements.  In fact it is on a trend to be kicked off the list of the Top 50 airports in the US when so ranked.

So when it comes to measuring competitiveness a basic metric is the Location Quotient (LQ).  I’ll skip the tutorial, but let’s just say that when it comes to economic impact I am pretty sure commerical air transportation in the Pittsburgh region has a LQ less than 1.0.  OK, skip that for now. No need to confuse anything with data or anything like that.

If you really want to read the tea leaves, consider what it means that virtually all of the nearby smaller regional airports are growing.  All while Pittsburgh traffic is trending down again.  For a time there was a bump up that sure seemed to result from the rush of shale development drove the demand for flights into the region. Was that really thought to be sustainable?

Recall also the multi-decade effort to make the airport into a center for air freight as well as passenger traffic.  Well, as best I can tell we are not even on that top 50 list today.

More troubling is what will happen in there is a merger of USAirways and American Airways as is being talked about because of the troubles at AA.   If you look at the top destinations of folks flying out of Pittsburgh you will see Charlotte is #2. Have to believe that is all flying into the USAirways hub they retained.  I really have to believe those numbers will come down if US Airways morphs with the AA network.

West End Story

PG has a story on the latest in immigrant attraction efforts in town here.  Certainly not the first of such efforts. More than a decade ago Pittsburgh’s immigrant attraction efforts were page A1 in the NYT with this:   To Fill Gaps, Cities Seek Wave of Immigrants. It has also been a nearly perpetual topic here in town for some time. From 2006 and the diaspora report: What’s stopping Pittsburgh from growing (hey, bring back the diaspora report!) or this also from 2006 in the PG: We need all the immigrants we can get.

Still, it may be a unique sentiment across the broader Western PA region.  Not too many years ago this also made the NYT: Altoona, With No Immigrant Problem, Decides to Solve It.

Most of those stories for Pittsburgh are more regional in focus.  The story today looks to be city-centric based on the Pittsburgh Promise and more focused on Hispanic immigration. One issue for Pittsburgh is that the broader recent immigration looks to be settling outside the city proper.

If you want to dig into all this more, a good starting point is former WSJ journalist (and now ASU journalism professor) Gregg Zachary’s white paper: Immigrants as urban saviors: When Immigrants Revive a City and When They Don’t – Lessons from the United States.

But where we are right now is that most new immigrants into the region are Asian with Chinese and Indian being the most common of new Pittsburghers.   It is a story that has reached back to India even.  I like that VOA report because the journalist was Kane Farabaugh who is born and raised in Sheraden no less.  I still think someone needs to write a meta-article on the vast army of diasporan journalists out there.  It is not a small number of Pittsburghers in media elsewhere.

and finally in what is mostly a pre-blog blog post in the Tribune Review see my commentary from over a decade ago: The Truth About Immigration.

Join the forum discussion on this post - (1) Posts

John Mauldin’s Prescription for Avoiding Economic Catastrophe

John Mauldin Best-selling author John Mauldin of Mauldin Economics says the EU is only left with choices that range from bad to disastrous. Meanwhile, Republicans and Democrats will have to hold hands and walk off the cliff together to solve U.S. economic problems. In this exclusive Gold Report interview, Mauldin expands on his comments at the Casey Conference, “Navigating the Politicized Economy.” Read more about the consequences of those choices and necessary compromises—and how he would reform the U.S. tax code.

The Gold Report: Back in January you said the European Union (EU) would have to make serious political decisions with “major economic consequences” in 2012. Is the EU making those decisions and what is your prognosis?

John Mauldin: It is doing its best to avoid making decisions, but is being forced to make them, ad hoc. The EU allowed the European Central Bank (ECB) to print money to monetize debt. The ECB is buying time for governments to achieve structural reform.

Structural reform, not the debt, is the problem. The debt is a symptom of bad policies, of a system set up for failure. The EU translated a theory into fact, and the theory did not work.

TGR: Is that theory the EU itself?

JM: The theory is the monetary union. If the EU had just left the trade union alone without trying to layer the monetary union on, it would have been just fine. But the EU wanted a single currency. It was part of the Europhiles’ dream. The EU thinks the monetary union is the sine qua non and it is not.

Today, computers do not care about lira, pesos, drachmas, pounds, marks or francs. Computers just say, this is what this unit is worth, click, click, done. Exchange rates become pointless in an age when we are moving to an electronic currency.

TGR: What is the structural problem as you see it?

JM: The structural problem is a fundamental difference in the labor markets of northern Europe and southern Europe. There is a 30% differential over the last 10 years in the productivity costs in Germany and the countries in the south of the EU. That creates trade deficits in the southern countries.

“The structural problem is a fundamental difference in the labor markets of northern Europe and southern Europe.”

If you want to balance fiscal government deficits, you have to have a trade surplus. That is the economic rule. Greece cannot balance its government budget until it balances its trade deficit. The Greek trade deficit is running at 10% because it does not produce enough goods to sell to the rest of Europe at reasonable prices. Before the monetary union, Greece could fix that by changing the value of its currency. That avenue is now closed, so it will have to reduce the relative cost of its labor.

Indeed, when you look at the data, the Greeks work longer hours and harder than Germans; they just do not produce as much at the price the Germans do. There are some reasons for that. Germany restructured its labor force early in the last decade to allow for “mini-jobs.” Companies can hire workers without having to keep them on the books. You can hire him at €400/week without paying any benefits. When you no longer need them, you can fire them. Mini-jobs released excess labor; it gave German industry an outlet, and it is part of the German productivity miracle.

Mini-jobs would be politically unfeasible in Spain, Italy or Greece. Those governments believe people should get full wages for their work. Fine, but nobody is going to buy what you are making. There are consequences to solidarity with the workers.

TGR: What strong governmental decisions need to be made?

JM: The southern European countries must restructure their economies. Simply buying their debt and allowing these governments to borrow more money only means more debt owed to European taxpayers, debt that will be defaulted on.

Now, the EU countries are talking about a European banking authority that looks like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. The Germans hate the idea of the ECB telling them how to run their landesbanks, their regional banks, because those regional banks are really under water.

TGR: Structurally changing the labor force could take years, no?

JM: It could take years or it could change overnight.

Change can happen overnight when you have a currency. If we went back to the peso or the lira, Spain and Italy could restructure their relative labor costs immediately by dropping their currency 10–20%.

“The choices now are between very bad and disastrous.”

The countries remain productive, trade does not stop. Italians could then buy less because their currency would be worth less and the Germans could buy more Italian goods because their currency is worth more.

TGR: Why is that option not being discussed?

JM: Breaking up the monetary union is horrendously expensive. It’s a major—insert your favorite expletives here—disaster for everyone involved.

TGR: But the Eurozone countries lose even if they continue down the path they are on.

JM: That is the second disaster. You just have to choose which disaster you want.

The choices now are between very bad and disastrous. The northern countries want a true, full-on political union, but only if the rules clearly state that the European central authorities can take over the budgetary rules for what are now sovereign states if the states cannot get their budgets together.

The northern countries want to give Brussels the power to tell Spain, for example, how many government workers to lay off, how much to raise taxes and reduce spending to achieve a balanced budget. And the Spanish would have to sit there and take it because it agreed to those rules.

TGR: Turning to the U.S., in your speech today (Sept. 10) you inferred that politicians’ knowledge that the U.S. will hit the wall unless they do the right thing has become the catalyst to do the right thing. You also said you did not like all the solutions the politicians are proposing. What solutions would you propose?

JM: We all have our own economic fantasy. Mine is more academic than philosophical. When you study the literature, consumption taxes are less damaging to the economy than income taxes. I would like to see a value-added tax created, and I would like to reduce the income tax. This can increase the total amount of taxes collected and reduce the top rates.

“Over the next four to five years, I like dividend plays and income plays, income-producing real estate, farmland if you can get it—including outside the U.S.”

I would eliminate most deductions: mortgage interest, charity, subsidies. If you make $100,000 and the top tax rate is 20–24%, you will pay that rate. I would drop the bottom rate to 7–8%, and I would make the threshold for paying that rate pretty low.

I would like to see the corporate tax rate taken to 15% or 12%, and get rid of every flipping deduction.

TGR: The deductions for mortgage interest, charitable deductions and some subsidies are pretty emotional. What is the probability they will be eliminated?

JM: I think it is pretty high because it is the only way to reach a compromise. The Simpson-Bowles compromise is one of the worst proposals I have read but I would vote for it in a heartbeat because it solves the problem.

That compromise eliminated a lot of deductions and dropped the total top tax rates. Dropping the top marginal rate is actually very bullish for the economy because it allows businesses and entrepreneurs to keep more of what they make.

TGR: Will politicians who vote to eliminate those emotionally charged deductions pay for those votes when they are up for re-election?

JM: A lot of things are emotional. That is why both parties have to hold hands and walk off the cliff together.

TGR: And you are optimistic they will do that.

JM: I think they will be looking into such an abyss that it will be impossible for one party to force the other party to make all the decisions and do all the heavy lifting.

TGR: Would you also change the capital gains tax?

JM: Academically, it is preferable to get rid of the capital gains tax, but I do not think that is politically feasible, so I would leave it where it is.

TGR: Meaning no taxes on capital gains?

JM: I would get rid of capital gains period, if you go out and create something, invest in something and do something.

However, a capital gains tax of 15% will not change anybody’s economic motive for investing. Same thing for a 20% top income tax rate. People will not try to avoid taxes; they will just pay them.

I would have a 12% to 15% rate for corporations, with no deductions. General Electric made $6–8 billion and paid no taxes. I read a list of 20 corporations whose CEOs earned more in compensation than the corporations paid in taxes. This is just wrong.

I would tax foreign earnings at the same rate. Bring the money back, invest it here or do whatever makes sense for the company. This will have the added advantage of making our corporations far more competitive. It will allow us to become an export machine and it will create jobs.

TGR: How do lower corporate tax rates make the U.S. an economic export engine?

JM: By dropping to lower rates we will collect more in taxes from corporations because there would be fewer, or no, deductions. Instead of giving corporations tax deductions for certain investments or for using green technology, let the market sort it out.

By and large, the government has shown itself to be incredibly bad at trying to pick technology winners and losers. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and a few others are the exception, where funding pure research and cutting-edge development makes sense.

TGR: Your remarks today included a warning that your optimism would change to pessimism if a solution were not developed in the first half of 2013.

JM: Very pessimistic; Spain and Greece-type ugly.

TGR: How does your optimistic side look at investment?

JM: On the optimistic side, I think the technological changes Alex Daley talked about in his remarks are real. Gross domestic product is growing at 2–3% and there are companies out there compounding it at 25–30%, in the biotech space for example.

Over the next four to five years, I like dividend plays and income plays, income-producing real estate, farmland if you can get it—including outside the U.S. There is a whole world of potential investments in companies doing cool stuff: traders, hedge funds, alternative funds. Do not limit yourself to buying a few, large-cap index funds and hoping for the best.

It will be a slower-growth economy for a while. Once we get to the other side of this, we will see a fabulous bull market start in the latter part of the decade. It could be a 15- or 20-year run. The last secular bear market is getting long in the tooth. It could be over in four to five years, maybe earlier.

TGR: What does your pessimistic side say?

JM: Investors must become more defensive; more fixed income, putting more money outside the U.S. and in gold. Look for investments that produce an income and a yield no matter what happens.

Investors should still look at technologies, but should be more conservative. You almost have to see how it will unfold.

In a disaster scenario, you have to start looking at what you will do when rates go up and the U.S. has its “bang” moment. No U.S. investor has experienced that so far. We do not know what this road looks like because it is around the curve.

My pessimist side sees more disruptions in the market, more Lehman-type events, bond markets deciding one morning that they want higher interest rates.

TGR: Your pessimistic scenario included buying gold as insurance not as a moneymaking asset. Can gold protect against these disruptions?

JM: Sure. Gold will have buying power in a disruptive society. If we cannot get our collective deficit act together, I will start increasing my gold allocation.

TGR: In a diversified portfolio, what is a healthy percentage of gold in both an optimistic and a pessimistic scenario?

JM: Optimistic scenario, I would say 5% or maybe a little bit more in physical gold. In a pessimistic scenario, I would double that.

TGR: You used a technical term, saying that “yield is a bitch,” and noted that 5–6% is a good number. In which industries or sectors do you find those percentages?

JM: There are companies that will pay 8–10% yields all over the board, all over the world. If you narrow your focus to U.S. companies, you will not find all of them.

Their stock price might have collapsed, even though they are in solid industries such as beer or liquor; very few countries are going to outlaw alcohol and beer. A company will not pay a 10% dividend for very long, because people catch on and buy the stock. Soon, the dividend returns to rates that are more normal. You have to be opportunistic.

TGR: In your pessimistic scenario, is that 5% or 6% yield erased?

JM: Some of it is. You will have to look for more defensive or more bond-type plays.

People reading this who are investing $100K, $500K, $1M, $2M can look at small, viable targets. If you are looking only at where the big boys are investing, you are limiting your world.

TGR: You are already widely published, why did you decide to start a subscription newsletter?

JM: People have been asking me to do it for 10 years, and I finally found the right people to do it with.

I realized that I could not write a newsletter, do the research that I am doing and run a publishing company. I needed a partner who gets the investment process the way I do. David Galland and Olivier Garret are the right people and I am enjoying our relationship.

TGR: How did you choose Yield Shark as your first newsletter?

JM: That is where the demand is, and I have been overwhelmed by the response.

We will launch Bull’s Eye Investor with Grant Williams in a month. Within the next 18 to 24 months, we will have eight or nine different publications.

TGR: I like that kind of optimism.

JM: The newsletters will give me a certain amount of freedom in the way I write and research and structure my life. This will simplify my life a great deal. I am only doing stuff that I want to do.

My Thoughts from the Frontline will always be free. It will always be written on the weekend, with one major change. I will write it on Sunday night so I can have a real weekend.

That may mean the newsletter will show up in readers’ boxes Monday morning instead of Saturday afternoon.

TGR: Getting your weekends back is a good plan, John. Thanks for your time and insights.

Hear the recommendations of all 28 experts at the Casey Research “Navigating the Politicized Economy” Summit with the audio collection.

John Mauldin is chairman of Mauldin Economics, an investment newsletter publisher, and is the author of four New York Times Bestseller books. They include Bull’s Eye Investing: Targeting Real Returns in a Smoke and Mirrors Market, Just One Thing: Twelve of the World’s Best Investors Reveal the One Strategy You Can’t Overlook, and Endgame: The End of the Debt Supercycle and How it Changes Everything. Mauldin’s free e-letter, Thoughts From the Frontline, is sent to over 1 million people every week. He also offers The Mauldin Circle, a free service that connects accredited investors to an exclusive network of money managers and alternative investment opportunities. He is a frequent contributor to publications including The Financial Times and The Daily Reckoning, as well as a regular guest on CNBC, Yahoo Tech Ticker and Bloomberg TV. Mauldin is the president of Millennium Wave Advisors, an investment advisory firm registered with multiple states. He is also a registered representative of Millennium Wave Securities, a FINRA-registered broker-dealer. Mauldin is a spokesman for the Hard Assets Alliance.

Join the forum discussion on this post - (1) Posts

The widget illusion

The Economist runs a discussion forum titled The Economist By Invitation. In this, they recently setup a discussion about an opinion piece by Dani Rodrik about the future of manufacturing-led growth in emerging markets. I wrote a response there which is reproduced here.

The role of manufactures

I agree with a small element of Dani Rodrik’s argument, but mostly for different reasons. Rodrik says:

Except for a handful of small countries that benefited from natural-resource bonanzas, all of the successful economies of the last six decades owe their growth to rapid industrialization.

I have seen this kind of thinking among some policy makers in India also: that industrialisation is somehow special and good when compared with services. I would question this proposition, that I term `the widget illusion’. What matters to a country is having sophisticated firms that have a high marginal product of labour. We should not care whether this happens in services or in manufacturing. If anything, the opportunity to do it is perhaps better in services.

India is a good example of a country which embarked on its catchup by connecting into globalisation late: from 1991 onwards. It was probably the last country in the world to shed autarkic policies. This has given a remarkable growth acceleration. Sustained growth of 7 per cent is pretty good by world standards. These achievements have been significantly driven by services production in India within global supply chains (whether within production facilities owned by global MNCs who are operating in India, or contracted-out by global MNCs to Indian firms). If your null hypothesis was that industrialisation is essential to growth, then you would not have predicted what happened in India, where manufacturing was hobbled by an array of policy mistakes.

This illustrates the limitations of manufacturing-focused thinking, which seems a bit out of date in today’s world economy where most output is services. Agriculture and manufacturing have wilted away in the consumption of the global representative agent: to succeed in the world economy today requires prime attention upon services.

Rodrik says:

Consider India, which demonstrates the limitations of relying on services rather than industry in the early stages of development. The country has developed remarkable strengths in IT services, such as software and call centers. But the bulk of the Indian labor force lacks the skills and education to be absorbed into such sectors. In East Asia, unskilled workers were put to work in urban factories, making several times what they earned in the countryside. In India, they remain on the land or move to petty services where their productivity is not much higher.

As Rodrik points out, there are important gaps between the skills of the great unwashed masses in India versus China, where elementary technical training reached a larger mass of humans. In addition, China did better on core economic policy choices about (a) Removing protectionism; (b) Removing barriers to FDI; (c) Building hard infrastructure; (d) Labour law and (e) Rationalising taxation.

What policy advice would flow from this? India should not have have made these six mistakes in economic policy (low training for the masses, protectionism, barriers to FDI, weak investments into infrastructure, labour law and mistakes in tax policy). At the same time, this does not recommend a bias in favour of manufacturing. It is hard to discern a meaningful choice about emphasising services versus manufacturing in Indian economic policy. Participation in all global production is good. Governments should remove all barriers that inhibit global integration whether in goods or in services – e.g. the six mistakes in Indian policy sketched above.

A paragraph earlier, Rodrik says:

To be sure, some modern service activities are capable of productivity convergence as well. But most high-productivity services require a wide array of skills and institutional capabilities that developing economies accumulate only gradually. A poor country can easily compete with Sweden in a wide range of manufactures; but it takes many decades, if not centuries, to catch up with Sweden’s institutions.

I would point out the contradiction: “A poor country can easily compete with Sweden in .. manufactures” but earlier it was asserted that the gaps in Indian skills inhibited India’s ability to compete with Sweden in manufactures.

Doing things that push skills and institutional capabilities

I would go further to say that it is good to go after fields which require a wide array of skills and institutional capabilities.

I am reminded of Ricardo Hausmann’s `Good Cholesterol’ argument about financial globalisation as opposed to mere FDI. When a poor country operates in an institutional vacuum, foreign investors are uncomfortable, and the only thing that can happen is FDI. To obtain financial flows, the country has to build institutions: laws, regulators, property rights, and so on. This is a good thing! A country that gets to FDI and gets stuck there should ponder what is going wrong. In similar fashion, no country aspires to have low-wage production; every country wants to understand the secret sauce through which a part of the labour force can earn high wages by world standards.

As a country rises out of poverty, it is essential to build up skills and institutional capabilities. If policy makers hinder services and/or favour manufacturing, there is a greater chance of being stuck in low skills and low institutional capabilities. I am not proposing industrial policy in favour of services. I am only proposing the absence of industrial policy; we should avoid a `widget illusion’ and foster more global integration without trying to push towards one industry or another.

In India, with 7 per cent growth, GDP doubles every decade. As a thumb-rule, I feel that a comprehensive transformation of skills and institutions is required across each doubling of GDP, which is roughly each decade for India. A country that is stuck in low-skill manufacturing will find it difficult to achieve the reinvention of this `soft infrastructure’ of the mind. If policy makers tried to push a country towards doing low end grunge work, it would be harder to obtain these repeated transformations of institutions and the furniture of the mind, which would lead to growth decelerations.

As an example, in the article New wave of deft robots is changing global industry, John Markoff says:

Foxconn has not disclosed how many workers will be displaced or when. But its chairman, Terry Gou, has publicly endorsed a growing use of robots. Speaking of his more than one million employees worldwide, he said in January, according to the official Xinhua news agency: “As human beings are also animals, to manage one million animals gives me a headache.”

The project of economic development requires sophisticated interactions between firms and workers. The laws, human rights and management practices that are required when dealing with humans are different from those required when running a firm with `one million animals’. I would hence argue that it is limiting for a country to focus on the political, legal and institutional requirements to produce a la Foxconn. It is better to confront the complexities of high skill, high wage production, and to build the environment for this to happen: in the political and legal system, in management practices of firms, and in the power structure embedded in a conversation between two citizens who are co-workers within a firm. Services production is a valuable learning ground where the complex management practices that involve high skill humans can be learned.

The new world of manufacturing

Rodrik correctly points out that manufacturing has become more sophisticated in recent years. This has some fascinating dimensions:

  • The rapid improvements in capabilities and declining costs of robots.
  • The rise of open source design coupled with 3-d printers. If a 3-d printer in the US fabricates a part close to its usage in an assembly line, while the labour-intensive design work (”services”) that controls the 3-d printer is done in India, does this entail manufacturing or services work in India?
  • The world economy is likely to be in a low interest rate environment for a long time, which will encourage capital intensity worldwide (robots, 3-d printers), thus blunting the value of low wages.

Momentous changes are afoot, which challenge our traditional notions of manufacturing versus services. To some extent, we are even seeing some manufacturing go back to the US.

Things that might `go wrong’

Finally, Rodrik talks about reduced willingness in the West to tolerate unfair tactics like the Chinese exchange rate regime. I would generally consider this to be a good thing, both for developing countries and for the world. In any case, the Asian `Bretton Woods II’ episode seems to be subsiding. As an example of the disenchantment with exchange rate distortions: From 2004 to 2007, India debated exchange rate rigidity, and walked away from it. The links between undistorted exchange rates and growth have not been adequately emphasised in the discourse. A developing country builds up inferior skills and institutional capabilities by exporting under a subsidised exchange rate: it is better to force firms to confront the market price and achieve the productivity required to participate in globalisation when facing an undistorted price vector.

He worries about a rise in protectionism in the West, but we have to admit that the 2008-2012 experience has been pretty good in this regard: by and large the West has not succumbed into protectionism. In 2008, all of us worried about Smoot-Hawley. Today, things seem to be be going well.

Conclusion

In summary, I would argue that we should avoid a `widget illusion’. There is nothing special about manufacturing or industrialisation: as long as people in India get high wage jobs, this is good. Getting there requries deep integration into the world economy, which includes policy battlefronts such as:

  • Openness to the Internet
  • Use of English
  • Inbound and outbound FDI
  • The array of cross-border financial services that are the enablers of complex globalised production of both goods and services
  • Globalisation-compatible tax policy on both trade and finance
  • The absence of either protectionism or mercantalism
  • Fostering high quality human skills, and
  • Infrastructure.

To the extent that globalised production of goods and services happens in areas which involve high skills and complex institutional development, this is a bonus, since any high growth country needs a rapid pace of reinvention of laws and institutions.

Most of this is the old orthodoxy. Policy makers worldwide are generally focused on these issues, as they should be. From the 1960s onwards, dirigisme has generally subsided, with the twilight of policies like fixed exchange rates, industrial policy, capital controls, protectionism, etc. These key lessons remain intact in the 21st century.

Harry Dent’s Formula for Surviving the Great Bust Ahead

Harry Dent With a perfect storm brewing on the horizon, investors should be building their cash cache and running for cover, warns Harry Dent, author of The Great Crash Ahead. In this exclusive interview with The Gold Report, Dent explains how central bank stimulus programs are fighting a futile battle because a huge army of aging baby boomers has reached the stage in their economic lifecycles when they curb spending. How is Dent preparing for the gathering storm? Read on. . .

The Gold Report: Your considerable research over many years indicates that the size and age of its citizens drive a country’s economic growth or decline. Because people have predictable consumption patterns throughout life, you can predict well in advance national economic growth or decline. How does that work?

Harry Dent: We’ve identified a peak spending wave indicator that correlates strongly with the stock market and the economy. It doesn’t apply so much to emerging countries, where we look at urbanization rates, which greatly affect incomes, and workforce growth because emerging nations don’t have a middle-class curve where typical consumers earn $60,000 a year at the peak of their careers.

In developed countries, though—countries with higher-tech infrastructures and a solid middle class—this spending wave indicator peaks at around age 46. People slow in spending way ahead of retirement, from 46 on. That is basically when the average person’s kids are leaving the nest. In fact, the greatest slowing comes from age 50 on. That’s the correlation, that people earn and spend more money dramatically as they approach midlife. On average, they enter the workforce at about age 20, marry at 26, have their first child when they’re 28, and hit 46–50 when that child gets out of school. Then their spending drops like a rock. Part of that is because they’re saving for retirement but, more importantly, they don’t need bigger houses and don’t drive their cars nearly as much. It’s just a natural life cycle in developed countries. It’s the ultimate leading indicator.

We saw the spending slowdown we’re experiencing now coming 20-some years ago, when we came up with this tool. We said baby boomers’ spending would peak around 2007 and slow down from 2020–2023.

TGR: Is the pattern the same across the globe, or do slowdown years differ from country to country?

HD: There’s some degree of variation, but the post-World War II baby boom pretty much happened around the world. Birth rates in most developed countries peaked in the late 1950s to early 1960s, so the whole developed world is pretty much synched on this baby boom, all peaking together. Japan is the one exception, where births peaked twice, once in 1942 and again in 1949.

TGR: So you’ve gone back through history and now can predict that every 40 years or so a country’s economy slows as waves of babies come through. Is the age-related consumption pattern the only demographic you use to evaluate what influences economies?

HD: Another cycle comes into play as well. It’s an 80-year economic cycle consisting of two generational booms and busts, like the Bob Hope generation that drove the U.S. economy up from 1942–1968 and then down from 1969–1982, and then the baby boomers who drove it up again from 1983–2007 after that 46-year lag, and now down again from 2008–2023. Additionally, these boom-and-bust pairs go through a pattern we relate to the four seasons.

“We’ve identified a peak spending wave indicator that correlates strongly with the stock market and the economy.”

If you think of the consumer price index (CPI) in temperature terms, a high CPI is hot, or inflationary, and a low CPI is cold, or deflationary. A deflationary period or depression, as we’re going into now, is the winter season. A spring boom follows, with a new generational spending pattern and the modest inflation that comes with it.

In the summer, with that generation entering the workforce, inflation continues to rise. We do a lot of research to demonstrate that young people are inflationary. They have more to do with inflation than any other factor, and nobody has a clue of this in economics. The last summer in the U.S. occurred when the baby boomers entered the workforce in large numbers, basically from the late 1960s through the early 1980s.

The fall boom brings bubbles and the resulting expansion of debt. Stocks, real estate and so on bubble up and when that boom ends, those bubbles burst. Winter sets in again, with restructuring and deleveraging of debt, which create deflation.

The 1970s was a difficult recession time, but it was inflationary, not deflationary, and not similar to the downturn that the Federal Reserve is trying to prevent now. The Fed is actively and constantly inflating the economy to prevent deflation to avoid a replay of the Great Depression. But it won’t be able to hold it off indefinitely.

TGR: Let’s talk a bit about the debt issue.

HD: In the U.S., most people focus on government debt. Under George Bush, the national debt grew from $5 trillion (T) to $10T in 2000–2008. At the same time, the banking system, financial systems and shadow banking—in the private sector—created $22T in debt. That was the greatest debt bubble in history, and it occurred in developed countries all around the world. So we have this global debt crisis and this debt has to deleverage. Everybody is in too much debt—financial institutions, consumers, businesses and governments, with central banks propping them up and bailing them out. Obviously, this can’t go on forever.

If the demographics weren’t working against the Fed and the other central banks, it might be different. But they’re fighting a battle they can’t win because the baby boomers are working against them. How do you stimulate an economy when the largest part of its workforce, the aging baby boomers, wants to save and not spend, to pay down debt?

“How do you stimulate an economy when the largest part of the workforce, the aging baby boomers, wants to save and not spend, to pay down debt?”

That’s the problem. The money the Fed creates gooses up the markets, but doesn’t do much for the economy, and banks aren’t lending. It’s crystal clear in history. Every time you see a big debt bubble in a fall boom—as in the 1860s and 1870s—a depression follows. We saw this from 1873–1877 and into the early 1880s. We saw the next big bubble into the roaring 1920s, followed by the Great Depression and debt deleveraging after that. In short, debt bubbles ultimately burst and then deleverage. Deleveraging debt destroys money, so there’s less money in the system and it means deflation in prices.

That’s very important for investors to understand. In a deflationary crisis—whether in the 1930s or what started in 2008—everything goes down: commodities, stocks, real estate, even gold and silver in many cases. In deleveraging an asset bubble, all assets go down and there’s nowhere to hide. Investors have to be in the U.S. dollar and very safe bonds and cash and wait for the crash, and then buy at the bottom. That’s the trick. Cash is king—cash and cash flow.

In contrast, in an inflationary crisis such as the one we had in the 1970s, commodities, gold and silver were booming. Japan was in a positive demographic cycle. Emerging countries benefited. Real estate loves inflation. In that environment, a lot of things go up, but stocks and bonds go down. In this environment, though, there’s nowhere to hide.

So people just have to get out of the way. Even with all the stimulus, the Fed has no way to restore normalcy with this debt level and this demographic downturn. The stimulus has merely created bubbles in stocks and commodities, and commodities are already going down pretty fast. We think stocks are next, so we expect another stock crash within the next few years. And the next crash will be worse than in 2008–2009 because the Fed has pumped everything up and stretched the system to the max.

This is what happens in the winter season. It’s a survival-of-the-fittest struggle for businesses to see who will dominate their industries for decades to come. So it’s a huge payoff for the companies that simply survive and it deleverages the whole debt and asset cycle and brings things back to affordability. So it’s a difficult season, but it’s necessary and actually good in the long term. Lower prices in general will increase the standard of living.

The government is trying to skip winter. It keeps heating things up, pouring the money into the economy so the banks don’t deleverage debt and the banking system doesn’t collapse as it did in the 1930s. The truth is, it’s only keeping us in high debt and maintaining a bubble that’s not sustainable. Sooner or later, this stimulus will result in a crash that takes down the economy.

The top 10% of consumers are the only ones still spending. We know from demographics that wealthier people marry and have kids a little later. Their kids go to school a little longer, so their spending peaks four to five years after the average person’s. After these folks’ spending peaks, which will be by the end of this year, we’ll have a second demographic drag on the economy.

TGR: So we’re basically just getting into this 2008–2023 winter depression. How deep will the trough go? Will it bottom at the midway point? What should consumers expect over the next 20 years?

HD: A winter season lasts from 13 to 15 years or so. The worst collapses in stock prices and real estate hit when the banking system deleverages. In the 1930s, that happened early on. In this case, the government took a lesson from the 1930s and decided to keep pouring money into the banking system to prevent its meltdown. But it can’t be done. There’s a limit to how much you can stimulate. It’s like a drug. It takes more and more of the drug and it has less and less effect until it has almost no effect, and then the drug itself kills you.

We’re seeing that in Europe already. The last round of stimulus there—Qualitative Easing (QE) 2—was massive and came well after QE2 in the U.S., but Europe’s already back in trouble again and is having to implement all sorts of emergency procedures. There’s no bailing out Spain. It has one of the biggest real estate bubbles in the world and a rapidly aging population. The Spanish people won’t be buying housing for decades.

TGR: What do you see in terms of stocks?

HD: The worst is likely to hit in the next two years. It’s a matter of when the stimulus stops working or when governments throw in the towel. At some point, for example, German citizens may just say they won’t bail out another country. They’ve been doing it to protect exports and avoid defaults on all of the money they’ve loaned out already, but considering the demographics, it’s a losing game.

We’ve studied all of the major debt bubbles and depressions in history, and this one is different because Keynesian economics, which came out of the Great Depression, wasn’t adopted as economic policy until the 1970s recessions. So now, for the first time in history, central banks around the world—the European Central Bank (ECB), the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of China and the Bank of Japan—are actively fighting deflation. When banks start to deleverage or when deflation starts to step in, they just push money into the system. The question is: Do they lose control?

Japan has been through all of this before, but when it came into its crisis in the 1990s, it had budget and trade surpluses. The rest of the world was experiencing the greatest boom in history, which we’d predicted. There was mild inflationary pressure and everybody thought Japan was about to take over the world when it was about to collapse. We were among the few who predicted that ahead of time in the late 1980s.

Japan continued to push money into the system and never let private debt deleverage at all in either consumer or financial sectors. Japan is still carrying very high private debt, and its government debt has risen from 60% of gross domestic product (GDP) to 230% and still climbing. So Japan didn’t really go through a depression. It was more an on-and-off mild deflationary recession because the stimulus eased the pain. But now Japan’s debt is much larger than before the crisis and deleveraging still looms ahead. Japan has been a lost economy for 22 years now. Real estate is down 60% and stocks are still down nearly 80%, 22 years later.

Demographics say the Japanese economy will weaken even further after 2020. The interest on its debt will go up in a spring boom with rising inflation worldwide, and it will be bankrupt immediately because its debt is so high. It’s only because it’s borrowing at 1% or less that it can handle its deficits now. Sooner or later, this game has to end.

TGR: So Japan’s QE has raised government debt to more than 200% of GDP but only managed to postpone a depression?

HD: Yes, it kicked the can a couple of decades down the road. It’s like trying to resuscitate a patient with a defibrillator. You keep hitting the chest, clear, boom. At some point, the patient dies. If the bond markets allow the U.S. to keep putting in money like Japan, we’d end up with a balance sheet on the Fed at $5–6T and up with QE of $4–5T before this is over. We’ve only gone about $2T so far. The Fed stimulus pushes money into the banking system, but the banks don’t lend it to fuel economic growth. They cover their losses and reserves, and then turn around and reinvest the rest in government bonds and stocks. They’re speculating. The money ends up in the stock markets. It’s like crack in the markets, and the markets just want more crack. But the markets can’t continue to go up when demographic trends are pointing down.

TGR: Your earlier mention of losing control brings to mind the people of Greece out in the streets rioting because demands for further sacrifices and more fiscal austerity have become unbearable.

HD: It is true. One of our financial advisers who was there recently reported every third store is closed or boarded up. Greece is in a depression and Spain’s headed there. The ECB has already pumped $270 billion into Spain and Greece just to cover its bank runs, which may happen faster than the governments can fend them off. In the U.S., the vulnerability is much more in real estate, as in Spain. We have a backlog of close to 4 million foreclosures already in the system. At some point, the banks will realize that home prices are not coming back. That they haven’t come back in Japan after 21 years gives us a hint. But if the banks start dumping these millions of foreclosures that aren’t on the market, it would kill the housing market and trigger a bank crisis that the Fed couldn’t stop with stimulus.

China also is vulnerable. Exports, which drive most of its economy, are declining rapidly while government spending on vacant buildings and empty cities has created a real estate bubble. If that bubble begins to seriously break down, Chinese consumers with disposable income, the top 10% of the population, own the real estate that will lose its value.

TGR: A while ago, you said businesses that manage to survive the winter would dominate their industries for decades to follow. What advice do you have for those running companies to help them come out the other side of a depression?

HD: First, those who are running a company and thinking about retirement within five years should sell their companies and retire now. Those who want to keep their companies and hand them down to the next generation or continue to grow them should hunker down, cut costs, cut overhead and put off capital expenditures. Rent your building; don’t own it. Sell real estate. Sell marginal product lines. In fact, sell everything you don’t need. Do everything to raise cash because, as I said before, cash and cash flow are king. Be lean and mean. Office space, real estate, factories, warehouses, anything you want to invest in your company will be a lot cheaper after deleveraging. Even if your business weakens, if your competitors weaken more rapidly, you’re winning. At some point, a lot of your competition, just like a lot of banks, will fail.

“Investors should be looking to invest more in emerging countries because they’re going to outperform.”

We saw this phenomenon after the Great Depression. There was a big payoff for the companies that survived; they dominated their industries for decades to come. Everybody thinks the market leaders were born in the technology revolution in automobiles and electricity in the early 1900s and into the roaring ’20s. Certainly, the race was on then, but the shakeout of the Great Depression decided who was left standing. General Motors survived and absolutely dominated the automobile industry from the 1930s through the 1970s. In electronics, it was General Electric.

TGR: You’ve also emphasized the importance of cash and cash flow for investors, advising them to either exit the equity markets or greatly reduce their exposure to stocks.

HD: Yes. Take advantage of the fact that the Fed has revived stocks and sell when the market is high. Reinvest when the prices are low. Joseph Kennedy made his fortune in the early 1930s, getting out at the top of the market when his shoeshine boy was giving him advice. When stocks were down 87%, he was buying at $0.10–0.20 on the dollar.

TGR: What are you doing personally to preserve or grow your wealth during this winter?

HD: I moved from Miami to Tampa in 2005, at the top of the real estate bubble and I’ve been renting, so I avoided a huge loss. Real estate in my neighborhood is down about 50%, and probably will fall another 20–30% before it’s over. I’m just looking at investments to actually be short stocks. I’m looking at ProShares Ultra Short MSCI Europe (EPV), which is an exchange-traded fund (ETF) at two times short the MSCI Europe index. The ProShares UltraShort Financials ETF (SKF) is another good one, two times short financials, because the financials in Europe are tending to get hit the worst. I think there’s a rising chance in Europe in the next few months of either a mini-crash, about 20% off the top, or a major crash like 2008–2009, where Europe just blows up. One way or the other, you need to either be out of stocks or you need to bet on things going down.

TGR: Any other insights?

HD: We’re buying natural gas, which seems to be going up since it bottomed out at $2. We’re buying agricultural commodities because that’s the last thing to go down in demand, and emerging market demand is still strong. Apart from natural gas and agriculture, though, pretty much everything else we see going down.

TGR: What about gold?

HD: I think gold has another run in it. It’s trending down right now, but I’d expect gold to benefit from the early stage of this crisis. If we have one more big QE coming in the U.S. and Europe—especially in Europe—gold is likely to rally. We told people to sell silver when it hit $50/ounce (oz) in April of last year. Now we’re suggesting selling gold if we see a good rally, say, $2,000/oz or higher.

Ultimately, there’s a natural instinct to expect gold to go up in a crisis, but if you look at 2008, gold and silver went up in anticipation of a financial crisis. But when the crisis actually hit and debt started deleveraging and money supply started contracting, which happened in the second half of 2008 and early 2009, gold went down I think 32% and silver went down 50%.

TGR: Everything went down.

HD: Exactly. That’s the point. The only thing that went up was the U.S. Dollar Index and Treasury bonds. This time, I think Treasury bonds may turn around. People act as if German, U.S. bonds and United Kingdom bonds are risk free. They are not. These U.S. and UK governments are in terrible debt, and Germany is holding the bag for Europe. People are throwing money at negative yields just because they don’t know where else to go. A better bet might be to go long the dollar or, even better, short the euro. That would be a good hedge.

TGR: What’s the best investing advice you ever received, Harry?

HD: Basically, I think you have to think contrarian, because it’s just human nature for people to pile into something, especially in these bubbles we’ve seen. They pile into tech stocks or real estate, thinking they can’t go down, and then the bubbles burst. I learned early on to think contrary to the crowd, something like Joseph Kennedy. Right now, most investors think these markets can’t go down because the Fed won’t allow them to. They call it “the Bernanke Put.” Well, if everybody’s thinking that, I don’t think that.

TGR: Whom do you view as the best investors?

HD: The classic ones are Benjamin Graham back in the good old days and Warren Buffett these days, although I think Buffett’s off base now that he’s become a cheerleader for the U.S. government.

TGR: You’re speaking at the MoneyShow in San Francisco in late August. What major themes will you cover?

HD: Basically three things: debt, demographics and deflation. People who argue that hyperinflation is ahead are dead wrong. Japan had zero inflation for the last decade despite massively more QE than we’ve done relative to its economy. It would have been a deflation if it hadn’t stimulated so much and the world hadn’t been in an inflationary mode. Debt deleveraging leads to deflation, and aging societies are deflationary. Old people are deflationary, young people are inflationary. The inflation of the 1970s had nothing to do with monetary policy. It was the baby-boom generation partying in college, spending their parents’ money. It’s expensive to raise kids, who don’t contribute economically until they get into the productivity curve in the workforce. At that point, productivity drives down inflation.

TGR: Do you expect the U.S. to fare better than Europe over the next two decades because of the echo boom, as the millennial generation gets into a serious spending cycle?

HD: Yes. The echo boom kicks in from about 2023 forward in the U.S. and in a lot of countries. It’s nowhere near the size of the baby boom generation, but enough to create growth again. But there’s no echo boom in Southern Europe or in China, where the workforce will start shrinking like Japan’s after 2015. Japan’s little echo boom runs out by 2020, and because Japan never deleveraged its economy, it’s not even benefiting much from it.

But, yes, there should be a worldwide boom with the stronger developed countries—Northern Europe, North America and Australia—doing fairly well, though as I say, not as strong as the boom we saw in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s. Excluding the developed countries of East Asia—Japan, Korea, China—the emerging world will really dominate in terms of demographics and workforce growth. Investors should be looking to invest more in emerging countries because they’re going to outperform. I would look first at India and Southeast Asia.

TGR: Should we be doing that now?

HD: Not yet. I’d wait until after the shakeout. China’s slowdown is hurting emerging countries, which depend on exporting resources, and so are the collapsing commodity prices. By the way, the 29–30-year commodity cycle has nothing to do with the 40-year demographic cycle, but they happened to peak in the same timeframe, around 2007–2008.

TGR: Other than going to cash, what else should people be doing to prepare for the depression/deflationary period ahead?

HD: Cut expenses and high-interest debt. I wouldn’t cut a mortgage if I’m paying 4–5% tax deductible on it, but get rid of credit card debt with interest at 22%. Don’t make any big capital expenditures. Don’t buy a house and don’t let your kid buy a house. If you’re more aggressive, you can bet on markets going down. For example, you actually can make money in the downturn if you short the euro, European stocks and U.S. financial stocks. But for most people, it’s just better to be safe.

TGR: Easier said than done these days.

HD: Unfortunately, the government is making it very difficult. The stimulus programs are knocking down interest rates on safer, long-term bonds so people can’t get yield anymore. If they go after yield, if they rush into bonds, stocks, commodities or especially dividend-paying stocks—which are the most popular thing now—they’ll get creamed when the stock market crashes. The alternative is to give up the dividends and low yields. Just be safe. You’d be crazy to buy a 10-year Treasury at 1.4% yield or a 10-year bond at 1.3% yield. All the countries are going to be in trouble.

TGR: Thank you, Harry, for your time and your insights.

Harry Dent will be a keynote speaker at the upcoming MoneyShow in San Francisco on August 24–26, 2012. Click here to register for free.

Harry S. Dent, Jr. is founder and CEO of the economic research and forecasting organization that bears his name and publisher of the HS Economic Forecast and the HS Dent Perspective. During the early 1980s, while a strategy consultant for Fortune 100 companies and new ventures at Bain & Co., Dent recognized the force that baby boomers exerted on the trends of the time, which led to his development of The Dent Method, a long-term forecasting technique based on the study of and changes in demographic trends and their economic impact that financial advisers and individual investors use via Dent’s Monthly Economic Forecast, Economic Special Reports, Demographics School and The Financial Advisors Network. HS Dent also provides two newsletter services. Former CEO of several entrepreneurial growth companies and a new venture investor, Dent also is a sought-after speaker and best-selling author. Since 1988 he has been presenting to executives and investors around the world, appearing on Good Morning America, PBS, CNBC, CNN and FOX and featured in Barron’s, Investor’s Business Daily, Entrepreneur, Fortune, Success, US News and World Report, Business Week, The Wall Street Journal, American Demographics, Gentlemen’s Quarterly, and Omni. Dent’s books include The Great Crash Ahead (2011), The Great Depression Ahead (2009), The Next Great Bubble Boom (2006), The Roaring 2000s Investor (1999), The Roaring 2000s (1998), The Great Jobs Ahead (1995), The Great Boom Ahead (1993) and Our Power to Predict (1989). Dent received his Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of South Carolina, graduating first in his class, and his Master of Business Administration from Harvard Business School, where he was a Baker Scholar and was elected to the Century Club for leadership excellence.

Join the forum discussion on this post - (1) Posts