Economic freedom in the states of India

What is economic freedom?

An index of economic freedom should measure the extent to which rightly acquired property is protected and individuals are able to
engage in voluntary transactions. James Gwartney and Robert Lawson have proposed a definition where individuals have economic freedom when property they acquire without the use of force, fraud, or theft is protected from physical invasions by others and they are free to use, exchange, or give their property as long as their actions do not violate the identical rights of others.

Measuring economic freedom across countries and time

Well functioning countries today are grounded in the yin and yang of political and economic freedom. Liberals like Milton Friedman and James Buchanan suggested that it is important to measure economic freedom across countries and across time. The Fraser Institute, based in Canada, put this idea into practice and has been working on measuring the levels of economic freedom across more than 140 countries since 1970. The annual reports of the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) are a valuable source of data on this crucial issue.

This database can be used to study the determinants of economic freedom, and its impact. As an example, we might like to examine the extent to which political freedom fuels economic freedom and economic freedom fuels political freedom (Milton Friedman’s `Capitalism and freedom’ hypothesis). Or, we might like to measure the extent to which an increase in economic freedom yields an acceleration in economic growth.

Many researchers have explored this dataset on such questions. Broadly speaking, the findings suggest that more economic
freedom is associated with greater wealth, lower poverty and higher growth. Greater economic freedom enhances civil and political
liberty.

How does India fare?

The Indian score went all the way down to 4.4 in 1975. From there, slow improvements have been obtained. The score had recovered to 4.9 in 1990 and rose sharply to 5.6 in 1995. However, as many observers have emphasised, India’s economic reforms has not been a big bang story. From 1995 onwards also, the economic freedom score has improved further to 6.6 in 2006.

In relative terms, India was at the bottom (58th out of 72) in 1975 and has recovered to roughly halfway in the world in 2006 (77th out of 141 countries). While this is an improvement compared with conditions in 1975, there is no reason why India should not continue to push on these issues, to get to the ranks of the top 20 countries of the world.

What about intra-India differences?

India is a continent-sized country, and there is considerable variation across various locations. Just as it is useful to compare
economic freedom across countries, it is useful to compare economic freedom across the states of India.

In the current political debate on stalled reforms, most eyes and hopes lie with the states. Intense political competition and
increasing political rewards for good governance are pushing states to explore and implement innovative economic, political and governance reforms. In this scenario, the Index provides an objective view on the positive and negative impacts of policy changes (or lack thereof) over a period of time.

Using the methodology adapted by the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World annual reports, the Friedrich Naumann
Foundation alongwith its partners, the Cato Institute and Indicus Analytics, recently released their report on Economic Freedom of the States of India 2011. The report follows earlier work done by two of the authors.

The report, which is authored by Bibek Debroy, Laveesh Bhandari and Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, ranks economic freedom in the 20 biggest states in India. This index is based on three parameters:

  1. Size of government
  2. Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights
  3. Regulation of Credit, Labour and Business

In summary, the findings are as follows:

State Score 2005 Rank 2005 Score
2009
Rank 2009
Tamil Nadu 0.57 1 0.59 1
Gujarat 0.46 5 0.57 2
Andhra Pradesh 0.40 7 0.51 3
Haryana 0.47 4 0.47 4
Himachal Pradesh 0.48 3 0.43 5
Madhya Pradesh 0.49 2 0.42 6
Rajasthan 0.37 12 0.40 7
Jharkhand 0.40 8 0.38 8
Jammu and Kashmir 0.34 15 0.38 9
Kerala 0.38 10 0.36 10
Maharashtra 0.40 9 0.36 11
Punjab 0.41 6 0.35 12
Karnataka 0.36 13 0.34 13
Uttar Pradesh 0.35 14 0.34 14
West Bengal 0.31 18 0.33 15
Chattisgarh 0.33 16 0.33 16
Orissa 0.37 11 0.31 17
Assam 0.30 19 0.29 18
Uttarakhand 0.33 17 0.26 19
Bihar 0.25 20 0.23 20

The report has a separate chapter on Andhra Pradesh, the state that registered the fastest improvement in economic freedom moving up from seventh position in 2005 to third in 2009. Andhra Pradesh reduced waste and corruption and implemented innovative reforms. Three factors — buoyant agriculture, rural infrastructure and the elimination of Maoism — boosted employment and attracted in-migration from other states.

Did improvements in economic freedom go with improvements in investment?

CMIE maintains a database named `Capex’, which tracks all outstanding investments in a state. We focus on the stock of investment that they define as being `under implementation’. For each state, the percentage share in overall Indian investment is computed, in December 2005 and December 2009.

This graph juxtaposes the change in economic freedom (from the table above) against the change in the share in investment (in units of percentage points):

This does show a positive relation. There is a rank correlation of 0.42. It seems to say that states which improved economic freedom
tended to improve their share in investment.

As an example, Andhra Pradesh got an increase in the share of investment of 2.87 percentage points from 2005 to 2009, and Andhra
Pradesh was also a state where the economic freedom score went up by 0.11.

We have to, of course, be careful about ascribing causality. Perhaps high economic growth caused improvements in economic freedom (reverse causality). Perhaps some other unrelated factor caused both. But it is still quite interesting to find a relationship between two distinct data sources.

Charter cities

The idea of charter cities, originally promoted by Stanford economist Paul Romer, sparked a lively academic debate in the field of economic development. The idea of charter city rests on the premise of creating special reform zones within countries. The reform zone would not be governed by the prevailing system of formal and informal rules within countries. The concept of charter city would serve as an intellectual laboratory of ideas in which governments would be let to quickly adopt innovative system of rules. The purpose of charter cities is the empowerment of incentives in world’s less developed countries to develop human capital skills, hence, to increase the level of productivity and real wages that could foster the increase in the standard of living. By and large, the core idea of building a charter city means building a city of about 1000 sq. kilometers in the unoccupied land of the host country and adopting an innovative system of formal and informal rules provided by the source country. The example of charter city include selling Guantanamo to Canada and turning the little piece of Cuban land into Caribbean Hong Kong by adopting a formal system of rules and governance based on limited government, strong rule of law and free market; and turning the new territory into manufacturing hub that could serve as a source of income for workers across Caribbean islands such as Haiti. The charter city would not only provide the opportunity for testing intellectual ideas and innovations but also migrational opportunities for individuals from world’s most impoverished countries such as Haiti. The coordination of the charter city is managed by a triangle. First, the host country would provide the piece of land. Second, the source country would provide the infrastructure, human capital and ideas. And third, the guarantor country would provide the assurance that the charter would be respected by both countries.

The concept of the charter city has gained significant attention by development experts in discussing developmental malaise in world’s least developed countries in Africa. The empirical evidence on Africa’s underdevelopment is striking. It suggests a blinking interplay of corruption, institutional fragility and state failure. According to African Development Indicators, about 75 percent of firms in Cote d’Ivoire identify corruption as the major constraint in doing business. In Ethiopia, less than 2 percent of females enroll tertiary education. Moreover, the average Ethiopian female can expect only 7 years of total schooling. In Liberia, about 11 percent of married women partake a contraceptive use by any method. Hence, one third of young Liberian women, aged 15-19. In addition, 60 percent of Liberians live below $2 per day. In Mozambique and Sierra Leone, only 45 percent of young women are literate. A female at birth in Sub-Saharan Africa can expect to experience no more than 8 years of total schooling throughout her life.

The perennial question in the establishment of charter cities is whether the idea can serve as a source of good rules, promoting good governance through low-cost contract enforcement. Institutional fragility of states across world’s least developed countries is largely the economic outcome stemming from wrong development diagnostics, mismatched policy choices and a rigid structure of formal and informal institutional arrangements which resulted in a myriad of bad rules and corrupt political leadership across the specturm of world’s poorest countries. The general conclusion from the lessons of development policy is that in the last century, development policy failed to facilitate meaningful prescriptions for a permanent rise of GDP per capita. In particular, the misdiagnosis of essential development dilemma is not a consequence of technical failure in delivering concrete solutions to applied issues of economic development but a consequence of mismatched theoretical foundations which supplied wrong assumptions. Theoretical models of economic growth and development in late 1950s and early 1960s rested on the assumption on output per worker as an increasing and diminishing function of the capital per worker. Although the validity of the neoclassical growth theory remains undisputed, development policy and international aid donors failed to recognize that increasing the amount of aid does not lead to better development outcomes. In fact, the majority of Sub-Saharan countries experienced the relative decline of GDP per capita in the 20th century. In 1913, the GDP per capita of Ghana (in 1990 international dollars) represented 42 percent of the average GDP per capita of European periphery. In 2008, Ghana’s GDP per capita represented merely 8 percent of the average GDP per capita of European periphery. By the available statistics, Algeria was the second wealthiest country in Africa, only after South Africa. In 1913, Ghana was the fourth richest society in Africa, only after South Africa, Algeria and Egypt. In 2008, Ghana’s GDP per capita was ranked 20th in Africa, in the same range as Angola, Lesotho and Nigeria.

The question surrounding the emergence of the charter city is whether it can serve as a treatment to the contagious sclerosis of fragile institutional structure in failed states, marred by poor governance and the lack of law and order, causing the failure to enforce private contracts as to ensure the rule of law and provide the institutional impetus for sound governance and better formal and informal rules. A notable criticism of the institutional fragility in world’s less developed countries pertains to the capture of the state by the political elites. The political elites in world’s poorest regions have provided sufficient conditions for the capture of government and judicial system by incorporating a system of powerful informal arrangements through bloated corruption which consequently impaired investment and ultimately resulted in the expropriation of private property rights. The institutional chaos in the most failed states of the world culminated into behavioral adaption to bad rules. The sequence of harmful economic policies eventually seized upon poor development outcomes such as high rates of poverty, stagnating income per capita, low life expectancy and poor health and education indicators.

The foremost task of the charter city should facilitate the institutional decency to enforce private contracts without transaction cost barriers and ensure a robust system of the rule of law since better rules nonetheless depend on how informal institutions such as culture, habits and behavior embrace the virtues of free markets, limited government and the rule of law. Aside from the essential infrastructural arrangements, the provision of institutional conditions for living under a different set of rules does not necessarily imply sufficient prerequisites for the productivity growth that could, in the long run, transform the charter city from low-wage pool of unskilled labor into high-wage urban agglomeration. What is needed for a charter city to flourish is the acceptance of informal institutions of the liberal society such as the freedom of contract and the freedom from corruption. One should not hesitate that economic and personal liberties in world’s poorest countries are plagued by predatory rent-seeking political behavior as well as contended against the principles of adherence to formal rules. Without a sensory adherence to these principles, it would be impossible to envisage the charter city as a solution to world poverty and underdevelopment.

For a charter city to provide a clear and cohesive framework of rules, it is essential to provide the credibility and predictability of rules. In early 1950s, Hong Kong was a small island chartered by the British who established a system of credibility over centuries. Hong Kong was the only place where Chinese workers were allowed to migrate from the mainland China. The credibility of the rules, emphasizing limited government over extensive government intervention, free markets over regulated command-and-control economy and the rule of law over political discretion and interest-group politics, proved vital in Hong Kong’s steady economic growth in the 20th century. In 1950, Hong Kong’s income per capita was around GBP 2,500. By 1997, the average income per capita rose to GBP 20,000.

The idea of building charter cities to boost income per capita by innovative framework of governance is a valuable alternative to the mainstream development policy. First, setting a charter city in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America would encourage seasonal and permanent migration flows from areas with low population density both on domestic and international scale. David McKenzie and John Gibson examined the impact of New Zealand’s Recognized Seasonal Employer program (link), aimed at encouraging seasonal migration from Pacific islands Tonga and Vanuatu to New Zealand, benefitting employers at home. The empirical evidence and policy conclusions suggest that seasonal migration is offering a triple win since a migrant, the sending country and the receiving country benefit from participating in seasonal migration program:

Nevertheless, there are several caveats to these conclusions. The first is that development is a long-term process, and some of the effects of the RSE may only materialize over many years of community involvement. These could include positive effects such as greater asset-building, investments and skill development if workers return for many seasons, as well as potential longer-term negative effects of continual absence of family members on family and community relations. Secondly, while the gains to households from this seasonal migration are large, they still pale in comparison to the gains from permanent international migration (McKenzie et al, 2010). A key policy issue is therefore the extent to which seasonal migration can or cannot eventually open up avenues for permanent migration. Finally, as with all evaluations, there is the question of how far the policy details and findings can be extrapolated to other settings and that it was developed drawing on lessons from experiences around the world should provide some external validity. As temporary migration programs are increasingly emphasized in policy discussions, there is likely to be plenty of scope for governments and researchers to work together in the future in assessing how well these lessons translate.

Second, charter cities would nevertheless spur the diffusion of knowledge into the countries of poor regions in the world. In its most distinctive form, charter cities would be similar to the role of small states in the global economy. For instance, consider Mauritius. Back in 1968, when the island gained the political independence from the United Kingdom, the economic prospects of the country were undermined by rapid population growth, rachitic productivity and overdependence on sugar as the only export industry. In addition, trade policy imposed high tariffs and import quotas to protect sugar manufacturers. Since it was impossible to dismantle the barriers to trade, the government of Mauritius responded by creating a virtual special export zone. Any foreign and domestic company could enter and exit the export zone by retaining the profits earned. Companies within the export zone operated under different rules with no trade restrictions such as tariffs, import quotas, voluntary export restraints etc. Hence, the only entry requirement for locating in the special zone was that companies manufacture only for exports as not to compete with domestic markets. The special export zone proved to be a success story. Productivity and employment rates increased sharply, boosting income per capita and standard of living. In 2010, Mauritius’s GDP per capita ($15,500) is the second highest in the region, only behind Gabon ($14,600). The experience of Mauritius with the special export zone and its consequent impact on the economic prosperity of the island, suggests that institutional competition ultimately rewards the institutional structure with better economic outcomes. The entire concept of the charter city is based on encouraging the institutional competition between charter cities and politico-economic systems in poorer countries where charter cities would be most likely to settle. Low initial level of income per capita in charter cities would encourage low-wage employment with unskilled labor. The experience of countries such as Mauritius, Singapore and Hong Kong suggests that favorable institutional features at the beginning stage of development result in better economic policies, ultimately leading to stable economic growth, higher standard of living and better education and health indicators. In Mauritius, the judicial independence from political influence has been enhanced by delegating the highest court of appeal to the British Privy Council, a royal judicial committee (link), full powers of judicial authority.

Many smaller countries in the 20th century, known for good development outcomes, have adopted roughly similar institutional impetus for economic growth and development. In Africa, countries with the highest level of economic freedom and the lowest perception of corruption, such as Mauritius, Botswana and Namibia, enjoy the highest level of GDP per capita in the African continent. In spite of the abundance of natural resources, Botswana adopted market-friendly economic policies in the second half of the 20th century, conducive to private enterprise and investment. According to World Bank, it takes 152 hours to pay taxes in Botswana compared to Sub-Saharan average of 315 days. In addition, a claimant in Botswana can expect to recover 63.7 cents per $1 from an insolvent firm compared to 8.4 cents per 1$ in Angola, 16 cents per 1$ in Niger and 0 cents per 1$ in Madagascar.

And third, charter cities would vastly improve the infrastructure of the residents, choosing freely to enter and exit the city. Households in countries such as Guinea still lack the access to electricity, forcing students to do the homework under streetlights and use the car park lights to review school notes (link). Despite being one of the largest receivers of aid per capita, Guinea still suffers from the lack of widespread access to electricity. One could hardly believe that the efforts pledged by international aid donors to reduce poverty and improve the standard of living across the African continent, were not sufficient. What created the black hole, such as the above in Guinea, is the institutional structure plagued by persistent corruption, political cronyism and bad governance, creating bad rules and wrong incentives. Charter cities would ingeniously cure the widespread persistence of misrule and political misconduct since the system of rules would be defined by the founding charter of the city. Good prospects of charter cities would require free entry and exit from the city as well as transparent and honest oversight of the respect for rules by independent judicial authority, managed by a guarantor country such as the United Kingdom, U.S. or Canada. In the proposed form, a typical charter city would become a manufacturing hub. In particular, it would enable access to low labor costs and significant economies of scale to technology entrepreneurs from rich countries as well as transparent contract enforcement, law and order and the security of private property rights. On the other hand, cities would enable millions of people from poor countries to migrate to chartered cities and seek employment opportunities in an environment, safe from corruption, political restraint, violence and bad governance. Hence, charter cities would provide a necessary input to the intellectual competition of ideas in economics, law and political philosophy and elsewhere to be implemented in chartered cities.

The concept enables social scientists and development experts a real-world experiment of ideas. Hence, charter cities could provide a safe haven for prosecuted individuals in poor countries, suffering from judicial errors, physical and military violence or illicit property expropriation. The UN estimates that, over the next few decades, 3 billion people will move to cities. The inflow exerts a growing pressure on urban agglomerations. The lack of basic infrastructure and the continuity of predatory misrule could cause a rapid growth of slums in larger cities which, by and large, are the main source of infectious diseases, HIV prevalence and youth crime since the absence of access to clean water, electricity and education are the major impediment to the improvement of development outcomes in poor countries. A charter city could flourish to become an impulsive alternative to the current state of overdependence on foreign aid. However, it should be unambiguously clear that adherence to good rules and governance requires a bold and decisive change in the set of informal behavior; in which corruption, crime and nepotism are doomed to the fullest possible extent by the full enforcement of private contracts and the rule of law.

Where does the greatest challenge to liberty come from?

‘If respect for individual rights were to be shown to lead, not to order and prosperity, but to chaos, the destruction of civilization, and famine, few would uphold such alleged rights, and those who did would certainly be held the enemies of mankind. Those who can see order only when there is a conscious ordering mind – socialists, totalitarians, monarchical absolutists, and the like – fear just such consequences from individual rights. But if it can be shown that a multitude of individuals exercising a set of “compossible” rights … [rights that can exercised at the same time without entailing conflicts] … generates, not chaos, but order, cooperation, and the progressive advance of human well-being, then respect for the dignity and autonomy of the individual would be seen to be not only compatible with, but even a necessary precondition for, the achievement of social coordination, prosperity, and high civilization’ – Tom G Palmer, ‘The literature of liberty’.

I wish I had written that paragraph. It captures a lot about the relationship between freedom and flourishing that I have been writing about on this blog for the last couple of years. My personal conviction is that individual liberty is necessary to individual flourishing because individual flourishing is an inherently self-directed process. While I seek to persuade others to adopt that view, I recognize that the course of public policy depends much more strongly on public perceptions of the consequences of alternative courses of action.

Much of the discussion in my blog has been about the consequences of freedom or lack of it. I discussed the strong positive relationship between freedom and objective measures of well-being (income, longevity etc) in an early post. The general conclusion from my posts discussing measurement of subjective well-being is that claims sometimes made that the findings of happiness research conflict with these conclusions are simply wrong. Not only do people in countries with relatively high levels of freedom have higher material living standards, they also tend to have higher life satisfaction.

However, even though the existence of a positive general relationship between liberty and well-being now seems to be disputed less frequently, freedom is still under challenge from several different directions. First, there is a challenge to economic freedom associated with the global financial crisis (GFC). The GFC has raised important economic issues about the role of monetary and fiscal policy, the effects on the financial system of the failure of large financial institutions and the effects of different regulatory regimes on behaviour of large financial institutions. Economists will probably still be debating some of these issues in 50 years time, but at this stage it looks to me as though the extent of additional regulation likely to be seriously contemplated will be relatively minor and confined to the financial sector. Not many people are suggesting the nationalization of industry and the introduction of Soviet-style economic planning to prevent future financial crises.

The second challenge to freedom is associated with action to deal with alleged externalities, particularly global emissions of greenhouse gases. Some restriction of freedom is of course justified to discourage activities that impinge on the rights of others. Some of the ways the ‘problem’ of greenhouse gas emissions is being tackled in many countries, however, involve greater than necessary restrictions of economic freedom. This stems from rent-seeking activities of industries, including those favouring particular technologies. The challenge is serious, but probably easier to deal with than previous challenges that many countries have dealt with successfully, including, for example, overcoming opposition to reductions in barriers to international trade.

The third challenge to freedom seems to me to be more fundamental and more serious. It stems from the collectivist idea that governments are responsible for the happiness of citizens, rather than for protecting their rights – including their right to pursue happiness as they think fit. Many people have come to expect governments to act as guardians of their well-being, not only giving financial support in times of need, but also protecting them from making bad decisions. In relying on governments to perform such a role they infringe the liberty of other people who do not want or need such protection.

This challenge to individual liberty seems to come mainly from people who do not mean anyone any harm – people who live among us who want us all to have happier lives. As I write this I am conscious that at times I have actually supported government regulations to protect people from making bad decisions that might adversely affect their well-being. You might have similar memories. Sometimes we may have had reason to be concerned that if people were not compelled to act in what we perceived as ‘their interests’ they would end up imposing a burden on the welfare system or on private charity. That just underlines the point I am making – the greatest challenge to individual liberty comes from people who do not mean anyone any harm.

In modern democracies the choice between liberty and paternalism rests ultimately in the hands of our fellow citizens. The course of public dialogue about such matters turns most crucially on public perceptions of the consequences for human well-being of the policy choices that governments are making. While each public policy decision to restrict liberty and relieve individuals of responsibility for their own actions may seem relatively benign when considered in isolation, that doesn’t mean that the cumulative impact of many such decisions will be benign.

When Does Greater Economic Freedom Promote Distrust?

There are some fairly obvious reasons why societies characterized by low levels of inter-personal trust tend to be highly regulated. In a society where people tend not to trust each other there is likely to be less adherence to social conventions and there is likely to be more political pressure for the use of government regulation to deter anti-social behaviour. Causation can also be expected to work in the other direction. In a society where it is impossible to conduct market transactions without breaching some regulation it is only to be expected that many people will wonder whether those with whom they are dealing can be trusted not to dob them in to the authorities. Regulation promotes low trust.

So, what is likely to happen to levels of inter-personal trust following substantial deregulation in a highly regulated, low-trust society. As a general rule I think it would be reasonable to expect that greater reliance on market disciplines would generally promote more trustworthy behaviour. Individuals and firms would find that it pays to develop a reputation for trustworthiness and this would result in higher levels of inter-personal trust. Such attitudes could be expected to be associated with public support for deregulation policies.

However, evidence presented in a paper by Philippe Aghion et al, entitled ‘Regulation and Distrust’, suggests that an opposite tendency was more common in countries undergoing transitions away from socialism in the 1990s. Data from the World Values survey indicates that levels of inter-personal distrust increased in most of these countries during that period. There were also substantial increases in distrust of civil servants, justice systems and business. Most households perceived that corruption had increased. The surveys suggested that there was also an increase in tolerance of corruption (bribe taking) and a reduction in the proportion of the populations who considered tolerance and unselfishness to be important attributes to teach children. Not surprisingly, there was also an increase in the proportion of the populations who disliked competition and private ownership of firms.

The authors suggest that those findings are a consequence of low levels of social trust prior to transition. Their model predicts that in a low trust society entrepreneurs will tend to be less civic-minded (because they need to pay bribes in order to enter the business) so liberalization of entrepreneurial activity will tend to result in an increase in negative externalities (e.g. pollution) and an increase in corruption. They conclude: ‘Liberalization of entrepreneurial activity starting from a low level of social capital has increased corruption, invited a demand for greater state control of economic activity, and reduced trust’. At the end of their paper the authors suggest that public education might provide a way forward for transition economies by leading the way toward greater ‘civicness’, lower regulation and higher productivity.

One of the merits of the model put forward by Aghion et al is that it is capable of explaining why many people in countries with bad governments may want more government intervention. The benefits of liberalization of entrepreneurial activity are perceived to be outweighed by the costs.

I am not convinced, however, that the poor outcomes of reforms in transitional economies should be attributed to low levels of social trust prior to transition. An alternative explanation is that the reform process was poorly managed so that instead of a transition from socialism to competitive markets – permitting mutually beneficial exchange that had previously been prevented – these countries underwent a transition from socialism to crony capitalism following the collapse of communist governments. The evolution of attitudes to business may reflect the rent-seeking entrepreneurship to which people were exposed. Under the prevailing circumstance it may not have been possible for the reform process to have been better managed in the transitional economies, but this means that their experience may not be of much relevance to other low trust, high regulation countries.

Rather than focusing on the transitional economies as a group it might be interesting to consider whether different reform strategies adopted in different countries (including other countries such as China and India in the analysis) have had different effects on levels of social trust.

Can the Industrial Revolution be Attributed to Economic Freedom?

Before reading Eric Jones book, ‘Locating the Industrial Revolution’, I had thought that the reasons why the industrial revolution began when and where it did would have a lot to do with relative levels of economic freedom in England in the 18th and 19th centuries. The book seems to me to reinforce that view, even though it does not argue strongly in favour of it. The message I get from the book is that the political forces favouring greater economic freedom prevailed over opposing forces in those areas of economic policy that were most critical to economic growth at that time.
Locating the Industrial Revolution: Inducement and Response

My prior view that the industrial revolution would have had a lot to do with relative levels of economic freedom was associated to some extent with dissatisfaction with alternative explanations such as that offered by Gregory Clark (discussed here). I admit, however, that my prior views were most strongly influenced by contemporary econometric evidence that greater economic freedom tends to promote higher economic growth. I would not be surprised if Eric Jones considers that such reasoning displays ‘too great a willingness to accept dubious data as proxies for the real thing, and too much of a preference for neat solutions’ (p. 6). He uses those words as a general criticism of economists.

The main question that Jones considers in this book is why the location of manufacturing industry shifted from the south to the north of England prior to the industrial revolution. This is an important question because the clustering of industry in the north provided an economic environment conducive to subsequent innovations, including use of coal-fired steam engines as an energy source.

Jones suggests that the economic history of England does not provide neat solutions to the problem of locating the industrial revolution. He claims:

‘There is no determinate solution to the puzzle of why the industrial revolution took place, and when and where it did so. All that can be achieved is a narrowing of the range of possible mixes’ (p. 245).

Jones sees problems with a simple explanation in terms of levels of economic freedom:

‘Ordinarily we might expect that economic growth would be spurred by market freedoms but there are problems with this line of argument. A number of the outcomes do not seem to have been stable. Free-market preferences within the judicial system were inconsistent, since the judges reverted to precedent when it suited them – not that every law was enforced. Protective duties were raised precisely when “a modest flow of works” was starting to extol the virtues of free trade. Nor was corruption decisively reduced until some way into the 19th century’ (p. 243).

However, similar objections have been raised against attempts to explain China’s economic growth in recent decades as a consequence of market freedoms. A point that is often overlooked is that in considering the potential for economic growth offered in a particular economy by a particular level of economic freedom the most relevant comparison is with levels of economic freedom generally prevailing in other economies with similar income levels. An improvement in economic freedom in a low income country can provide an impetus to more rapid growth even though economic freedom remains heavily restricted.

Jones suggests that the main factor responsible for the redistribution of manufacturing activity to northern England was market integration associated with improvements in transportation. The merging of markets led to greater competition and specialization on the basis of comparative advantage – with a greater focus on agriculture in the south and manufacturing in the north. He points out, however, that these improvements in transportation often had to overcome substantial political obstacles from wealthy land-owners, whose concern to protect the social status that land ownership offered (linked to landscapes, recreation and privacy) often outweighed their interest in increasing the rental value of their land. He suggests that privatising of rights of way – described as ‘judicial theft of the subjects rights’ – was an ‘astonishingly common’ adverse effect of the enclosure of the commons (p. 153). The merging of markets was only possible because the judges and parliament together increasingly embraced market ideology and overlooked, rejected or struck down local protectionist measures (p. 185).

It seems to me that Eric Jones has provided strong evidence that the industrial revolution occurred when and where it did because market ideology prevailed sufficiently to enable market integration, specialization on the basis of comparative advantage and the clustering of manufacturing industry. I am conscious, however, that he might suggest that in offering that summary my preference for neat solutions has gotten the better of me.

How Important is the ‘Size of Government’ Component of Economic Freedom Indexes?

A few months ago a guest blogger on ‘The Baseline Scenario’ blog, StatsGuy, wrote a post entitled ‘Good Government Versus Less Government’. It was described as a ‘must-read’ in a post by Tyler Cowen on ‘Marginal Revolution’ and received a great deal of attention on a range of other blogs including Scott Sumner’s (here).

StatsGuy draws attention to the fact that the size of government component of the Heritage Foundation index of economic freedom is negatively correlated with the other components of this index. He concludes that the Heritage Freedom index is really a composite of measures that get at two different things: good government, and less government. His bottom line:

Overall, the Good Government factors tend to dominate, and drive a lot of the correlation with good economic and quality of life outcomes. When one splits out the factors, the case for Less/Weaker Government weakens substantially, and the case for Clean/Non-Corrupt/Efficient government strengthens considerably’.

Some other researchers have similarly objected to the inclusion of size of government in economic freedom indexes. For example, Peter Lindert describes this as ‘guilt by definition’ on the grounds that it tends to make big government and the welfare state look bad merely by describing this national attribute as contributing to lower economic freedom (‘Welfare states, markets and efficiency: the free lunch puzzle continues’, 2007: 6).

At least one contributor to the discussion of StatsGuy’s post made the point that if economic freedom has two different dimensions, a lack of correlation between those dimensions does not necessarily mean that one of them is irrelevant. For example, it is possible for both size of government and quality of government to be important to economic growth.

I recently had an opportunity to test whether this is so in preparing a background paper for the 2025 Taskforce, which was established by the New Zealand government to advise how average incomes in that country could be raised to equate those in Australia by 2025. The analysis provides some support for the view that size of government is an important component of economic freedom indexes.

The analysis uses the Fraser Institute’s index of economic freedom because this provides a consistent measure of institutional quality over a longer time period than the alternatives. The data set relates to ‘advanced economies’ as defined by the IMF – this data set includes high income jurisdictions with small governments, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, as well as OECD countries. The regression, based on panel data, explains average per capita GDP growth in each decade in terms of several variables including two components of economic freedom at the beginning of each decade, the size of government index and ‘other economic freedom’. The relevant regression results are presented in Table A 2.3, p 43 (the right hand column).

The coefficients on both the size of government and ‘other’ economic freedom variables were significantly greater than zero – suggesting that smaller size of government has a positive effect on economic growth. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient on size of government is about half that on ‘other’ economic freedom, but that is about twice as large as I had expected it to be on the basis of the weight of size of government in the economic freedom index (20%).

One fairly obvious question that might be asked is that if size of government is so important, how is it that some countries with big governments, an obvious example is Sweden, have managed to maintain relatively strong economic performance. I have attempted to answer this question in the chart below which compares per capita incomes in Sweden and Australia (Penn World Tables, rgdpch with some extrapolation using IMF growth estimates). The results of the simple analysis presented in the chart suggest that if Sweden had not undertaken substantial economic reforms (including some improvement in the size of government component of economic freedom as well as other components) it would have performed poorly. The chart also suggests that Sweden’s economic growth performance could have been much better if it had a smaller government.

This analysis doesn’t tell us that every country could become a paradise if only it had a small government, or that countries with big governments are dreadful places to live. It just suggests that big government is not a free lunch. The lack of correlation between the size of government and other aspects of economic freedom is interesting, but it doesn’t mean that size of government doesn’t matter.

Interesting Readings for May 7, 2010

Pratap Bhanu Mehta in the Indian Express on the problems of getting to an effective State.

Can the courts help get us out of the mess that is Indian labour law? A report in the Indian Express says that the courts are inclined towards penalising striking workers of Indian Railways for the pain they have caused commuters of Bombay. Similar principles can help put the fear of large financial penalties upon political parties contemplating disruptive activities also. As an example, the courts have stopped the Shiv Sena from producing noise pollution at Shivaji Park in Bombay.

Anne Applebaum gets a taste of India (on Slate).

Integrating into the world economy is about removing government-induced barriers to movement of ideas, goods, services, capital and people. It involves a lot of little pieces – such as reducing the hassle of getting a visa to come to India. [also see]. It involves better connecting up with Bangladesh and India. It involves getting away from a deeply ingrained notion that the colour of the skin matters, that Indians and foreigners should be treated differently. See this editorial in the Financial Express on the capital controls against FDI by foreigners in the business of cigarettes.

DNA forgot to show the author’s name for this excellent piece titled Make RBI/MoF’s forex market interventions more transparent. Ila Patnaik in the Financial Express on the choice between inflation control and exchange rate targeting.

Rajkamal Iyer and Jose Luis Peydro have a column on voxEU where they talk about contagion with weak banks in India. Interesting new derivative contract launches: box office futures approved at CFTC, and futures and options on cheese launched at CME.

The nice new McKinsey report on India’s urbanisation.

Vikas Bajaj in the New York Times on Walmart’s work in Indian agriculture.

A great animated image showing the growth of information for one Indian town (Ludhiana) on Open Street Maps (OSM). Till late 2007, there’s nothing there, but after that, almost every month we see the data growing. [back story]

M. R. Madhavan on new laws in higher education, in the Indian Express. Jessica Wallack in the Financial Express on the Right To Education Act. Richard Levin of Yale on universities in Asia.

Reading in a digital age by Sven Birkerts on The American Scholar.

On Poland’s sorrow: the speech that Lech Kaczynski was to read at Katyn. I was astounded and delighted when Russia announced that it would start opening the archives on Katyn. For the first time, I see the Putin regime in a slightly less pessimistic way. Roger Cohen in the New York Times says that Poland is an inspiration to all of us: a piece that every Indian and Pakistani must read. And read Nina Khrushcheva on Project Syndicate.

Wen Liao in the Financial Times on the analogy between the problems of Bismark’s Germany and what China faces today. The phrase ‘great chain of production’ that she uses seems reminds me of the phrase ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ used by Japan in the 1930s. Also see Jonathan Holslag on Project Syndicate about the limitations of China’s charm offense.
There’s quite a bit of concern about China’s economy: See Gordon G. Chang in World Affairs Journal, and Takatoshi Ito on Project Syndicate.

Laszlo Bruszt, Nauro F. Campos, Jan Fidrmuc and Gerard Roland give us fresh insights into why India evolved as we did after 1947, and what will happen in China when the communist regime collapses.

Cory Doctorow in Publishers Weekly on the dangers that publishers face by cooperating with closed systems like Apple’s iPad or Amazon’s Kindle. A great deal of information and creative output is being produced today in the form of video files. I was not aware of this earlier: there are terrible patent problems hobbling this field. It is as scary as some corporation owning the English language.

Harald Hau on how financial markets in the crisis: he thinks it was more about missing markets than market failure.

William Kerr and Ramana Nanda on what governments can do to fuel entrepreneurship.

Malcolm Gladwell has a great story in New Yorker magazine on spycraft. I have a one track mind: it made me think about monetary policy.

Did you know that women have the power to shake the earth? [Statistical testing scheduled for 26 April]

Join the forum discussion on this post - (1) Posts

How Milton Friedman Saved Chile?

Here (link) is the story of how decades of economic freedom prevent the unthinkable consequences of an earthquake which recently damaged Chile.

Do Economic Freedom and Governance Indicators Tell Similar Stories About Human Flourishing?

This follows on from my last post: Do all well-being indicators tell similar stories about human flourishing? The indicators that I looked at did tend to tell similar stories – countries that have high average income levels also tend to have high rankings on other well-being indicators.

The purpose of this post is to extend the analysis to consider the institutions that are associated with human flourishing. There is a great deal of evidence that economic freedom is associated with high income levels and other aspects of human flourishing such as health and education. Evidence on the effects of democratic institutions is less clear, although the opportunity for citizens to participate in political processes may itself be viewed as an aspect of human flourishing.
A recent study by Michael Stroup (‘Economic freedom, democracy and the quality of life’ World Development, 35(1) 2007) has examined interactions between economic freedom and democracy on measures of health, education and disease prevention. The study found that while greater economic freedom consistently enhances a range of well-being measures, democracy has a smaller positive influence.

I accept that leaders (and potential leaders) of non-democratic countries with low levels of economic freedom may need to consider whether they should give higher priority to democracy or economic freedom when devising strategies to improve the well-being of citizens. There are good reasons, however, why democracy and economic freedom should be viewed as complementary rather than competing objectives. For example, rule of law is less problematic if there is a mechanism for political leaders who are suspected of considering themselves to be above the law to be voted out of office. Similarly, control of corruption is easier in a democracy where the public has power to dismiss corrupt leaders. It is possible for democratic rights to result in greater rent-seeking and less economic freedom, but non-democratic rulers do not necessarily promote economic freedom and widespread prosperity – some seek to benefit themselves and their cronies by impoverishing the general public.

The following table presents indicators of the performance of various societies in relation to two indexes of economic freedom and the World Bank’s governance indicators. As in the table in the preceding post, countries have been ranked by per capita income levels. The ratings of countries with performance in the top quartile for each indicator are shown against a green background, those for the second quartile are shown in yellow, the third quartile in orange and the fourth quartile in red.
The table shows that all the institutional indicators tend to tell a similar story about performance of various countries. There are, however, a few exceptions for ‘Voice and accountability’, reflecting particularly an absence of democratic institutions in some high-income and upper-middle income countries. In the case of United Arab Emirates and Kuwait this is associated with relatively poor performance in a range of well-being indicators, but that is less evident the case in Singapore and Hong Kong (as can be seen by comparing information in this table with the one in the preceding post).
All the indicators are strongly correlated with per capita income levels. A few countries manage to have high per capita incomes without a high level of economic freedom and good governance – but only by producing a huge amount of oil.
Indicators are defined and information sources are presented below the table. Hint: Click on the table for a clearer picture.

Notes:
Income index: Real GDP per capita (rgdpl) for 2007 from the Penn World Table, expressed as a fraction of per capita GDP in the United Arab Emirates, the country with highest per capita GDP. Source: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.3, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, August 2009.
Economic Freedom (Fraser): According to the Fraser Institute’s definition, individuals have economic freedom when property they acquire without the use of force, fraud, or theft is protected from physical invasions by others and they are free to use, exchange, or give their property as long as their actions do not violate the identical rights of others. Data from the 2009 report (for 2007).

Economic Freedom (Heritage): The Heritage Foundation defines economic freedom as the right of every human to control his or her own labor and property. In an economically free society, individuals are free to work, produce, consume, and invest in any way they please, with that freedom both protected by the state and unconstrained by the state. In economically free societies, governments allow labor, capital and goods to move freely, and refrain from coercion or constraint of liberty beyond the extent necessary to protect and maintain liberty itself. Data from the 2009 report.

Voice and accountability: Index compiled by the World Bank capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media.

Government effectiveness: Index compiled by the World Bank capturing perceptions of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.
Regulatory quality: Index compiled by the World Bank capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.

Control of corruption: Index compiled by the World Bank capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.

A Call to Arms

American populist angst has been rising for some time now. The optimist in me hopes that the Tea Party movement, and with it the rekindling within Americans of the vision of the founders and the defense of our Constitution can “fundamentally transform the United States of America” to coin a phrase from our old socialist pal in the Oval Office.

Yet while my heart tells me that there is a chance to turn this ship around, the overwhelming evidence that I have documented in my more sober if not brutally honest moments speaks to just the opposite. The progressives have been hammering away at our freedoms for well over a century, aggressively indoctrinating the citizenry with their perspicacious propaganda campaign. While our ideas are better, we have not adequately defended them.


Today it occurred to me that the perturbed conservatives I saw on Ailes’ evil news network harping on the blasphemous spendthrift blowhards in Washington were missing the point in blaming our politicians for their actions. Sure I am just as outraged as the next fellow at the spending of taxpayer money on projects fraught with waste and corruption, the sheer arrogance of our leaders in running roughshod over our economic liberty and in general the out of control growth of the nanny state.

But just as it was these political leaders who were the great enablers for the bankers in the financial crisis, through the gobs of cheap government credit provided by the head of the banking cartel – the government’s Federal Reserve, through their implicit guarantees of too-big-too-fail taxpayer protection and through their push along with the ACORN thugs for providing housing for even the least creditworthy among us, so too was it the American people that have enabled this government.

James Madison said of democracies that they “have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.” Perhaps more prescient, Marx posited that “Democracy is the road to socialism.” But alas, this is the system that we allowed to take hold though the Constitution never once mentions it, and we the people, who were supposed to vigilantly defend our liberty, have allowed our government to devolve into an instrument whereby each group plunders each and every other group. And what is this instrument of plunder of government but a representation of the people?

Herein lies the problem with blaming the politicians. It is we that have elected these scallywags. Their sole goal is retaining power in office, future of the nation-be-damned. Like for the bankers, though they know the system to be unsustainable in the long run, what matters to politicians is reaping the rewards before the storm. It is the American public that has let them continue to be irresponsible, leaving us with over $100 trillion in unfunded liabilities. We have condoned the profligacy and pillaging of our rights.

Throughout history in this country there has been a constant battle waged between those who espouse liberty and those who would sooner trade liberty for tyranny than live in a society based on self-reliance, merit and morality. Even if we have voted against the bad apples, we are complicit in having not convinced our fellow citizens to do so. Instead, we allowed the so-called elites, the political entrepreneurs to take over Washington, D.C., promising the people healthcare, housing and the rest of the hogwash spelled out in the Second Bill of Rights. They debauched our great nation by our sanction.

Now let me turn from criticizing us Americans (I am as complicit in this lack of vigilance as all my Libertarian brethren), lest I start to sound like Barack Obama. What we must do as the antidote to the growing Leviathan is to fight the intellectual fight for liberty on every street corner, in every classroom and through every other media possible. We must infiltrate corrupt and destructive institutions and reveal the truth to our fellow countrymen. We must seek out candidates with no interest in political power – no desire to cut deals but a sheer wish to restore America to its rightful place in the world; to serve as honest and capable stewards aiming to leave a better country for their children and children’s children. We must seek people willing to take unpopular positions with a firm and steadfast resolve, equipped with the knowledge of and confidence in the tenets of classical Liberalism. A good start would be to seek out those who have no desire to hold office.

Good government requires a populace that seeks good government. Further, it requires representatives with the courage to fight for prudent policy, not the petty politics of payoffs and plunder. Most importantly, it beckons those who wish to honor the vision of our Founders, in which the liberty of the most important minority, the individual is protected, in which free market capitalism is advanced through the protection of private property and contract rights and in which the defense of our citizenry and by extension the securing of our freedom is the highest priority of government.

Demoralizing as our situation as a nation may be as a result of a government that we have allowed to run amok, I should say that in some ways I am optimistic no matter what direction this country takes. Should we rally to fight the fight against the socialist sophists and begin to roll back the last hundred-plus years of disgraceful governance, we will succeed. On the other hand, if we continue to hurtle towards the day of reckoning of default and/or hyperinflation in von Mises’ “crackup boom,” the welfare state will collapse of its own weight, and those of us armed with the right ideas will be able to step out of the darkness and help lead the country back to peace and prosperity.

Either way, we must fight on every front to advance the ideals of liberty and engage the leftists (many Republicans included) in debate. We can no longer blame our politicians, but must heed our own advice and take the individual initiative and personal responsibility to ourselves battle to make this country once again a shining city upon a hill. Nothing less than the future of the nation depends on it.