RBI reaches for capital controls

By and large, I have felt that RBI has done a pretty good job of the exchange rate. They doubled currency flexibility twice, in 2004 and 2007. In 2009, they shifted to a floating rate. There were two problems:

  1. They continue to sometimes do tiny blocks of trading on the currency market. In a market of $70 billion a day, a small scale of trading (e.g. $1 billion a month) is irrelevant, so why bother doing it? This has been pointless, but it has done no damage.
  2. They have failed to correctly communicate to the market that the exchange rate is now a float. I cannot recall an RBI governor who used the phase “floating exchange rate”. Many economic agents seem to have got the following message: You’re on your own for small fluctuations, but if there are big movements, RBI will block them. This was mis-communication. The people who hedged against small movements but not against large ones, as a consequence of RBI, have now got burned. This is going to further increase the cost of RBI to gain credibility in the years to come, to come to a point where its words are respected.
Barring these two issues, I have felt that RBI has done a pretty good job of the exchange rate. Until now.
RBI has just announced a batch of capital controls against the currency market. This is a mistake:
  1. When there is turbulence on the currency market, you want greater activity on the currency derivatives market – which is where people protect themselves from currency risk – not less. Recall how the Greek default really damaged the Italians because on that day, the owner of an Italian government bond was told that maybe his CDS would malfunction if an Italian default came about. It was not good for Italy for economic agents to have a reduced ability to manage this risk.
  2. This will merely shift business to alternative venues – the offshore market and the onshore currency futures market. To the extent that shifting to these venues is tedious or infeasible (e.g. FIIs are banned from the onshore currency futures market and don’t have that choice), economic agents will be averse to holding India risk. This is bad for asset prices in India at a particularly difficult time.
  3. In a climate of pessimism about economic policy, it is important to send out a message, through action and non-action every day, that RBI (and more generally the Indian economic policy establishment) possesses top quality knowledge and decision-capabilities in economics and finance. This action of RBI reinforces the gloom about economic policy capabilities in India.
In April, Ila Patnaik and I released a paper titled Did the Indian capital controls work as a tool of macroeconomic policy? Our answer was largely in the negative. RBI’s actions of today are likely to shape up as yet another episode of this larger theme. It might make things worse for the rupee, for Nifty, etc.; to this extent these decisions would not be irrelevant.
Financial regulation should be focused on the problems of consumer protection, micro-prudential regulation, market integrity and systemic risk. It should not be used as a tool for short-term macroeconomic policy. If this is done, it damages market liquidity and yields a less capable financial market. This further damages the limited monetary policy transmission that RBI possesses.

Be skeptical. Be very skeptical.

In recent months, we’ve had a few slip-ups by the official statistical system in India:

  • Yesterday’s IIP release was preceded by a mistake. Mint says: On Monday, the government was guilty of a similar error in its factory output data. Till it corrected the number pertaining to capital goods output, analysts were left scrambling for explanations as to how this had grown 25.5% while overall factory growth had shrunk 5.1%. (The answer: it hadn’t, and had actually shrunk by 25.5%).
  • On 9 December, we discovered there were important mistakes in the exports data.
  • In December 2010, RBI modified the numbers that it releases about its trading on the currency market.
  • In September 2010, there was a mistake in the quarterly GDP data released by CSO.
These examples are part of a larger theme, of problems of the official statistical system. The Indian statistical system is afflicted by three levels of problems:
  1. The first level is conceptual problems and analytical errors. As an example, the weights of the WPI basket are wrong; the estimation methods used in the IIP are likely to be wrong, etc. Quarterly GDP measurement does not have a demand side (which requires a quarterly household survey, which the government does not know how to do).
  2. The second level is the lack of rugged IT systems. The production of statistics requires high quality enterprise IT systems. The government does not have the ability or incentive to roll these out. As an example, the September 2010 mistake in quarterly GDP data seems to have come about because quarterly GDP data is produced in a spreadsheet. As with all usage of spreadsheets, this is highly error prone.
  3. The third level is the problems of truant front-line staff. In a country which is not able to get civil servants to show up at school to teach, it is not surprising that front-line staff of statistical agencies are untrustworthy in going out into the field and filling out survey forms.
The mistakes that we’re seeing are merely a reflection of #2 (the lack of rugged enterprise IT systems). But there is much more going on which holds back the usefulness of official statistics.
Government officials in this field have pinned a lot of hope on the implementation of the report of the statistical commission (headed by C. Rangarajan, 2001). I am personally not optimistic about this. The report seems to emphasise an incremental agenda of building the statistical system, emphasising the interests of the incumbents. What is required is a ground-up rethink about the statistical system, from first principles, so as to address the three difficulties above.
Turning to the users of official statistics, most economists attach enormous prestige to phrases like GDP, IIP, CPI, etc. But in India, we cannot unthinkingly use some numbers just because they come with the label `GDP’ from some government agency. We have to always skeptically ask first principles questions about how the data is generated. All too often, the standard Indian government data is useless.
In the class of government data that I know of, I feel the CPI is reasonably okay. The WPI is a fairly useful database about prices but useless as a price index. The quarterly GDP data, IIP, NSSO, ASI are untrustworthy.
Decision makers in government and in the private sector need to struggle with these issues, carefully thinking about what statistics are allowed to influence their decision processes. Academic users of data need to be much more careful about avoiding garbage-in-garbage-out problems.
For more on this subject, you might like to look at the label `statistical system’ on this blog.

Watching markets work: Spreads at a money changer

I was at a money changer in London and saw a tariff card, for purchase and sale of a few currencies (all to the GBP). (This was a while ago: It was on 12 May 2011).

This makes you think: What countries land up in this display, and how bad are the spreads?

Let’s start with the tightest spreads: USD and EUR. The spread — 19.98% for the Euro and 20.87% for the USD — is a pretty huge one
compared with the transaction efficiencies that we’re used to seeing on NSE and BSE. (Don’t miss the GBP 3 charge that’s also tacked onto transactions). The bid/offer spread on the wholesale market for the USD/GBP and the EUR/GBP are roughly zero. The inventory risk carried by the money changing firm must also be quite low given that many customers are likely to come by with such orders. Hence, the values of the spread seen there represent the pure cost of the retail front-end: paying rent, paying salaries, the cost of capital etc.

It’s hence interesting to subtract out the lowest value (19.98% for the Euro) and sort the remainder:

Euro 0
USD 0.892
Japan 2.141
Australia 2.479
Saudi Arabia 4.372
UAE 4.705
Russia 6.181
Malaysia 6.911
Thailand 7.695
China 8.860
Kenya 9.823
Sri Lanka 13.788
India 16.853

Japan and Australia are floating rates with full convertibility. There is no illegality involved. But the inventory risk is greater given that these are smaller countries; there would be fewer buyers/sellers of their currencies to the GBP. The vol is much like GBP/USD or GBP/EUR, so the enhanced spread reflects purely the greater inventory risk.

Saudi Arabia and UAE have credible hard pegs to the USD. Their vol to the GBP is exactly the vol of the USD to the GBP. (And, they are as convertible as the US). But their spreads are much bigger than that seen for the USD. It must reflect a small number of
transactions and hence inventory risk. They are small countries and even fewer transactions would be taking place. Many of their
nationals would probably hold the bulk of their liquid wealth in USD so the question of transacting through the local currency might not even arise.

Russia has full capital account convertibility, so there is no illegality. But it’s a highly volatile currency and the transaction flow is small. So we get the next step up in the spread, to 6.18%.

China has near-zero volatility to the USD, which means they are a high volatility rate to the GBP. It is a big country so there must
be quite a bit of traffic; there would be low inventory risk. The real issue is the illegality. The enhanced spread is the price paid
by people undertaking these transactions, for the capital controls of China.

And then we have India, the fattest spread in this group of countries, where I reckon it’s a combination of illegality (akin to
China), low volume of transactions (since India is a much smaller economy than China) and currency volatility (since India floats
while China does not).

I wasn’t able to make any sense of the list of countries that showed up in the list. Why Kenya and Sri Lanka, and why not Nigeria
or Indonesia?

What in the world is happening to the rupee?

The INR/USD rate is now nudging Rs.50 to the dollar. This is a big move over a short period: a depreciation of 12.1 per cent over the 84 days from 1 July till 23 September.

What fluctuations of the INR/USD can we reasonably expect?

After the rupee became a float, so far, it has had average volatility of roughly 9 per cent annualised. Roughly speaking, this means that over a one year horizon, the movement over a year would range between -18 per cent and +18 percent, with a 95 per cent probability. More extreme movements would happen with a 5 per cent probability.

Over a period of 84 days, roughly speaking, we’d have expected this 95 per cent range to run from -8.6 per cent to +8.6 per cent. Compared with that, a 12.1 per cent move is a bit unusual.

It’s only a bit unusual because the historical volatility of the INR/USD, in the period of the float, was rather low. The USD/EUR rate,
which is perhaps the world’s most liquid market, has had an annualised volatility from January 1999 onwards of 10.3 per cent. The INR/USD has got to surely be more volatile than this, given the inferior liquidity of the INR and given the greater macroeconomic volatility in India. Hence, I think we should consider the 9 per cent vol, that was seen in the early days of the float, as relatively unusual. The future will most likely hold bigger values for this vol.

The implied volatility of the INR/USD at the NSE has reared up to values like 14 per cent annualised. That sounds more sensible to me.

What about other currencies?

We tend to do wrong by focusing too much on the bilateral INR/USD rate. In the recent days of distress, as fear has resurged, people
have taken money out of everything under the sun and put it into US Treasury bills. This has given a strong dollar at the expense of
essentially every other currency. Here’s the picture for the INR, against the four major currencies of the world, from 1 July till 22
September:

1 July 22 Sep. Depreciation
(per cent)
USD 44.585 48.821 9.50
EUR 64.804 66.103 2.00
JPY 0.553 0.636 15.01
GBP 71.720 75.481 5.24

The picture of the rupee is much more complex than that implied by simply watching the bilateral rupee/dollar rate.

Can RBI block such a large depreciation?

Let’s think through the steps which would follow if RBI tried to sell dollars in trying to prop up the INR:

  • Global trading in the INR stands at roughly $75 billion a day. If you want to manipulate this market, you need a big stick. Small trades will do nothing. If preventing INR depreciation is the goal, RBI has to go into this with trades of $2 to $5 billion a day, with the willingness to stick it out for the long run. With reserves of $281 billion, there is not much hope here. Specifically, if RBI sells $80 billion in reserves, the market will see that. They will know that further rupee defence is now going to be hard (since $200 billion of reserves is starting to look like a small hoard), and speculators across the world will start betting that RBI’s defence of the rupee will fail.
  • Reserve money is only $275 billion. For each $27.5 billion that RBI sells, reserve money drops by 10%. At a difficult time like
    this, a sharp and sudden monetary tightening will be an unpleasant side effect of defending the rupee. (This trading can be sterilised, but that has its own problems. I just want to emphasise that selling reserves is not easy and is not a free lunch).
  • The rational speculator knows that the exchange rate will eventually find its level. When RBI prevents a large INR depreciation today, they are giving a free lunch to the speculator, who would take a bet that INR would depreciate in the future. Specifically, it would be efficient for domestic and foreign investors to dump assets in India, take money out at (say) Rs.45 to the dollar which is the artificial price, wait for the gradual depreciation to Rs.50 to the dollar, and come back into India to buy back the same assets. This trade generates 11% returns over a short period and is thus very attractive. In other words, a defence of the
    rupee would trigger off an asset price collapse in India.

Meddling in the affairs of the currency market is thus highly ill-advised for a central bank.

Should RBI try to block INR depreciation, even if they could?

Let us play a thought experiment where RBI had $2810 billion, i.e. 10x larger than what’s with us today. In that case, RBI could
play in the currency market, selling $2 to $5 billion a day for a year without serious distress. Is this a good idea?

I would argue that this is not a good idea. When times are bad, the rupee should depreciate. This drives up the profit rates of all
Indian tradeables firms and thus bolsters the economy.

Under a floating rate, in good times, the INR appreciates (which pulls back the exuberance of tradeables) and in bad times, the INR
depreciates (which fuels profits and thus the physical investment in tradeables). This is arguably the only element of stabilisation
in Indian macroeconomic policy
.

RBI is playing this mostly right

From early 2007 onwards, the INR has been quite flexible. In particular, after early 2009, RBI’s trading on the market has tailed
off. There have been a few months with minor amounts of trading by RBI. This trading has mystified me, since these small trades can do nothing to influence the price. In practice, the INR has been a float.

A floating exchange rate is exactly the right stance for difficult times like this. In bad times, the best thing that can happen for
India is a big INR depreciation, thus bolstering the tradeables sector.

Let’s evaluate an alternative policy platform: To peg the INR in normal times but to let go in difficult times. Is this feasible?
Yes. But this is very disruptive: if economic agents have been given an implicit promise that the INR will not move, then the large move (which will surely come) would cause pain. It is far better to stay out of the market all the time, and create a trustworthy structure of expectations in the minds of economic agents about what the future holds.

We had a large depreciation in the crisis of 2008, and that served India well. In similar fashion, we should welcome the INR depreciation that is accompanying global gloom.

The only element of RBI policy where I have a major disagreement is communication. RBI has never used the words floating  exchange rate. RBI needs to clearly communicate to the economy that the rupee is now a market determined exchange rate, and RBI is no longer in the business of trading in this market. There is greater clarity of thought at RBI as compared with the quality of communciation; the speech writing still suffers from twinges of 1960s economics.

What is the collateral damage of a large INR depreciation?

There are three things that go wrong alongside a big INR depreciation:

  1. Firms who have unhedged foreign currency borrowing get hurt, because they have to pay back more than anticipated. A person who borrowed Rs.100 (in unhedged USD) has to pay back Rs.110, owing to the 10 per cent INR depreciation. The stock market is doing a fine job of identifying these firms and beating down their stock prices.Of crucial importance is the fact that from early 2009 onwards, the INR had already moved to a float with a 9 per cent annualised vol. So CEOs and CFOs knew that the INR/USD rate was going to fluctuate. They were not lulled into complacence thinking that the exchange rate was going to be stable. By avoiding this moral hazard associated with pegged exchange rates, RBI’s decision to float in early 2009 laid a good foundation for the structure of firm borrowing as of July 2011.

    When a country has a pegged exchange rate, you tend to see a big buildup of unhedged currency exposure on corporate balance sheets. When the big depreciation comes, the big businessmen then queue up to the central bank begging for defence of the LCY. Prevention is better than cure: It is far better to have high exchange rate volatility all along, so that firms do not undertake such risks, and the toxic political economy does not come into play.

  2. With an INR depreciation, tradeables become costlier. On one hand, this bolsters the profitability of tradeables firms, and
    thus their investment plans. But at the same time, this feeds into inflation. In recent months, tradeables inflation has been  sleeping while non-tradeables have contributed to the high CPI-IW inflation. We will now see a resurgence of tradeables
    inflation. This will exacerbate the inflation crisis. RBI will need to stay on the project of raising rates in order to combat this
    inflation.
  3. The government’s subsidy program with petroleum products and fertilisers gets costlier when the INR depreciates. So India’s
    fiscal crisis gets a bit worse when the INR depreciates.

This logic is rooted in high levels of de facto capital account openness. Sometimes, policy analysts think that you can have your cake  and eat it too, and try to dodge these arguments by utilising capital controls. This has not worked in India, and the levels of de facto
openness have only grown through the years.

In summary, what should RBI be doing?

RBI should be focused on using the short-term interest rate as a tool to bring CPI-IW inflation under control, without distortions of
interest rate policy caused by trying to meddle in the currency market. This should be accompanied by liberalisation of the Bond-Currency-Derivatives Nexus so as to achieve an effective monetary policy transmission. These are the two things that RBI needs to focus on.

India shifted away from government interference in the currency market, from 2007 onwards but particularly after 2009. This is one of the biggest achievements in India’s economic liberalisation. This is a bigger issue in economic liberalisation than (say) decontrol of petroleum product prices. The INR is now a market. Nifty and INR are the two most important markets in the economy. It is time for all of us to analyse the INR as we analyse Nifty: as the outcome of a market process.

Is RBI back to trading the INR?

We don’t know. The data only comes out at monthly resolution, with a two month lag. But early signs that would show up would be unusual jumps in the weekly data about reserves, reserve money, etc. Greater transparency from their side would help greatly.

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A Fofoarain take on the swiss move

The Swiss National Bank press release: The current massive overvaluation of the Swiss franc poses an acute threat to the Swiss economy and carries the risk of a deflationary development.”

The Fofarian rephrase: “Too many people are trying to store value in our currency, which is distorting it’s role as a medium of exchange. We’d rather you save your wealth in something whose price increase won’t impact the economy because it has minimal industrial/productive use but which many people still think is valuable anyway. Hey, I know, how about gold?”
Don’t know what I’m talking about? Have a look at this picture and then read this.


Random Shots - No Light at the End of the Tunnel?

One of the stories that caught my attention this week was the Bloomberg piece about how banks in London and New York are starting to jump ship on the old finance hubs due to fear of effects from planned regulatory tightening.

Quote Bloomberg

Banks in Europe are exploring ways to cut costs by routing more of their trades and other business through overseas subsidiaries, a plan that may shift tax revenue away from London and loosen European regulators’ influence over the lenders.Nomura Holdings Inc., HSBC Holdings Plc (HSBA) and UBS AG (UBSN) are among lenders preparing plans to book as much business as possible through legal entities in jurisdictions where tax rates are lower and rules on capital and liquidity are less onerous, the banks and lawyers and accountants working with them say.

(…)

Banks could record as much as 30 percent of the value of their trades through Hong Kong, Singapore and other jurisdictions instead of hubs such as London and New York without running into trouble with regulators, Matten said. Such a move would hurt traditional hubs such as London because assets are treated for tax and regulatory purposes in the country where they are booked. It would also allow banks to sidestep the U.K. bank levy, introduced last year to raise 2.5 billion pounds ($4.1 billion) from lenders operating in Britain, as well as any financial transaction tax imposed by the European Union.

Perhaps this is a sign of the times in the sense that both banks and market participants seem to be looking increasingly outside the boundaries of the developed world for growth, profit and eventually prosperity. Having just moved to the Big Smoke I would not necessarily lament a downsizing of the finance sector even if it is the pond that I also do my fishing for the daily meal ticket. Perhaps, if fast moving financiers chose to go to Singapore instead of London, the residents of the latter would not have to endure paying 300.000 GBP for a studio flat in Canary Wharf [1].

Of course, it may all be a red herring but it could also be part of a number of tentative signs that the locus of global activity on a variety of fronts is moving to new epicentres. Let us hope they do not travel entirely in our foot steps.

More generally, we just put out our monthly report and the outlook is very much wishy-washy. Surely, our leading indicators are pointing down, but after the market puke in August it seems to me that the end of the world had almost been priced in as the S&P500 hit the 1100 marker. In this sense, do not be surprised to see it ticking towards 1250 even if the recent job data were abysmal, but beware. The old range has been broken and we are finding a new lower one. Market prices have a tendency to become “normal” after a period and with global economic activity visibly slowing the fundamentals are not really on the bulls’ side even if they point to the merits of chasing a counter trend rally after a 10% drawdown.

More generally as I noted before, the divergence between respectable analysts is widening which always makes me take a few steps back. On the one hand I see both buy side and sell side analysts rather stubbornly sticking to their year-end S&P500 targets of 1300-1400 while other independent analysts put the fair value of the index at 900-1000. Both will obviously have an axe (or maybe even a book) to grind, but part of my job is to synthesize the consensus into a fairly straight road map for our clients, and it is getting difficult.

I tend to side with the pessimists if only because I find it difficult to see how US corporates can continue to operate as efficiently as they have been doing so far. Gerald Minack had some excellent points on this in his latest report;

A big medium-term uncertainty for DM equity investors is the sustainability of earnings. A decade ago, the big uncertainty was whether valuations could be sustained. They weren’t . The de-rating may have further to go, but clearly valuation is less of a headwind now than at the TMT-inspired peak. Earnings, on the other hand, are very high. Profits are now near an all-time high as a share of global GDP, and the real return on equity has followed . What’s not able, however, is not the cycle rebound, but the elevated level of earnings (and real returns) over the past decade. The forward-looking issue is whether those elevated returns can be sustained. At a global level, the answer may be ‘yes’ – for the simple reason it’s now possible to make profits in places where previously it was not. What’s not clear is the sustainability of high earnings in the developed world.

In particular, I would would point to the contradiction between continuing ultra low unit labour costs and the need to now see growth moving from cost cutting to topline growth. Something does not add up.

Real unit labour costs are now at 60-year lows. This matches the decline in wage share of GDP to a 50-year low. Arithmetically, this is the most important support for high profits. As I’ve discussed in prior reports, it’s not clear how long households can support consumer spending at near 70% of GDP with labour income at multi-decade lows. That’s been possible recently due to massive transfers from the public sector, but that support appears unsustainable.

In my opinion, this is big elephant in the room in relation to the US stock market. It will be difficult for earnings (and margins) to stay at current levels going forward. It follows naturally from the fact that if all companies cut costs and this improves margins this will only work for a limited period time as there are decreasing returns if everyone follows this strategy at the same time. Now we need to see topline sales growth for margins to be sustained, but this is obviously difficult with the current macroeconomic backdrop, so something has to give.

Globally, coincident data is already slowing visibly across the globe with headline PMI readings and trade data coming in steadily lower. In that sense we are up against the wall again only so shortly after the shock of 2008/09 and this time, the ability of policy makers to respond is limited.

However, I would be weary about calling this another 2008. One of the effects of experiencing a balance sheet recession with subsequent deleveraging is that trend growth falls and thus that the economy becomes liable to more frequent recessions. This applies to the US in particular but essentially also to the whole of OECD. This means that we will see more frequent but also essentially shallower recessions. The only qualifier here is really that some parts of Europe are now stuck in a depression locked in a vice of dysfunctional institutions and a lack of willingness and political capability to deal with the problems.

As such, within Europe also lies the potential source a Lehman like shock should the crisis prompt a rapid and violent default of one or more sovereigns and/or financial institutions. Certainly, euro area banks are feeling the pinch as USD funding is getting cut off and if anything it seems to me that the EURUSD is looking a bit too strong for its own good given the backdrop of the mess in the euro zone. As cash levels at euro zone banks are drawn down the currency will adjust to fundamentals not to mention of course the fact that the ECB is slowly but steadily being pushed into full blown QE and monetisation of peripheral debt.

The latest G&F provides a good summary;

(…) The risk of a dollar rally against the euro in coming months is growing. This is because, sooner or later, the ECB will have to reverse its recent insane monetary tightening. Trichet made a start in this direction this week in his usual ponderous manner. Thus, he told the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament in Brussels on Monday that “risks to the medium-term outlook for price developments are under study in the context of the ECB staff projections that will be released early September.” The issue here is whether markets will allow Trichet to save face and not performs an abrupt U-turn before his scheduled departure from the scene on 31 October.

More generally, the recent comments from the IMF that euro zone banks need additional capital is once more a case of stating the almost obviously obvious. The transmission mechanism here is very simple. The market is now effectively pricing in a default of Greece and possibly other peripheral economies and this means that the attention must now turn to the losses that creditors will bear or, alternatively, the size of the bailout if we stick to the old mantra of no losses. As a good friend of mine pointed out recently,

All trough last month’s banking shares’ collapse, I have been thinking that perhaps, equity investors are worried that the recapitalization will be different this time, with either the taxpayer (wrong solution) or the bondholder (rightly, through a bond-for-equity swap), massively diluting the shareholder. Politicians obviously do not have the stomach, nor the muscle for new bailouts.

Or to put it differently, there are no easy solutions left. One solution is the Brady Bond plan which is currently being floated in the case of Greece. The problem as I see is that it is fudged precisely when it comes to the current valuation of the bonds. Basically, there has to be pain today for the creditors, otherwise we are just kicking the proverbial can down the road as recapitalisation is avoided today but made worse for tomorrow. A solution for recapitalising banks today would naturally be for their creditors to accept a swap for equity and thus being moved into the frontline to absorb any losses that the banks would bear on sovereign debt, but that is not popular. Essentially, being degraded to equity holder in a bank with known sovereign assets in the European periphery is equal to taking a haircut on your initial investment, but all this then leaves the inevitable question of who and when someone will step up to take the lead in the debt restructuring.

Of course, the idea of substituting debt for equity is the same principle applied in the case of Greece posting domestic assets (islands, utility companies etc) as collateral for credit. We can then think about this collateral as Greek sovereign equity and as with creditors of banks, it is all good in theory but in practice, not so well.

Elsewhere, the game of Old Maid in global currency markets continue with the SNB still in the spotlight despite already having taken desperate measures to stop the appreciation of the CHF;

Quote Bloomberg

While the Swiss National Bank has so far avoided currency purchases in its latest bid to keep a lid on the franc, it may soon have no alternative but to follow through on its threat to intervene, economists and strategists said.

But what really caught my attention was comments by Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega that lowering interest rates represents an effective antidote against an appreciating currency.

Quote Bloomberg

For “the next two or three years, the conditions will be there for rates to keep falling,” Mantega told reporters in Sao Paulo today. “Falling rates are a good antidote for the gains in the real.”

Allow me to quote myself from the post linked above;

Old Maid is a card game where the simple task is to avoid holding a given card (often the queen of spades) at the end of the game. Even in the company of good friends however, holding Old Maid at the end is not fun. Often, you have to buy the drinks, drop a piece of clothes, or endure other travails. And as it turns out, the global FX market is not unlike this good old game of cards where the Old Maid is proxied by having a strong currency on whose shoulders the correction of global macroeconomic imbalances must invariably fall. In this way, and although one sometimes get the feeling that everyone believes that everybody may actually export their way out of their current misery, buying one country’s currency means selling another and thus, someone (be it an individual economy or a group/basket of economies) must end up holding Old Maid.

The easy investment advice here is naturally to buy the Old Maid which means that just as the global financial punditry searching for clues as to what lies ahead for the global economy and the looming slowdown the SNB et al may have to skint yet awhile for light at the end of the tunnel.

[1] – No my dear reader, I am renting and I would never touch these things but they are there and they are being sold.

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The Swiss Hammer

The cage fight between the SNB and FX speculators continue with the most recent round seeing the SNB coming out fists flying aiming for a knock-out.

Quote Bloomberg

The Swiss central bank said it’s setting a minimum franc exchange against the euro and will defend the target with the “utmost determination” if needed.The Swiss National Bank is “aiming for a substantial and sustained weakening of the franc,” the Zurich-based bank said in an e-mailed statement today. “With immediate effect, it will no longer tolerate a euro-franc exchange rate below the minimum rate of 1.20 francs” and “is prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities.”

And the result, cold steel for the long swissies.

For now …

Vietnam speculators cause "unstable psychology"

The Vietnam Government saga against its people’s preference for gold continues. Commodity Online reports that after the gold price “skyrocketed” the State Bank of Vietnam allowed private companies to import “5 tons of gold to help stabilise domestic markets and supplement local supply. … ‘Taking advantage of the situation, speculators in the domestic market had speculated, and manipulated, causing unstable psychology among people even though the amount of Gold in the market is still high’ [State Bank of Vietnam] said. The State Bank of Vietnam also said its consistent policy is to stabilize the dong’s value, and it is risky for people to buy and hold gold at the moment…”

I’d say its risky to buy and hold the dong whereas holding gold would indicate a very stable “psychology”!

John Williams: Debt Limit Debate Sign of Deeper Dysfunction

John Williams ShadowStats Editor John Williams advises legislators to stop fooling around with the country’s credit rating. Regardless of the deal reached, he predicts that the Treasury and Fed will continue to print money to meet obligations and add liquidity to the economy. In this exclusive interview with The Gold Report, he explains how that will have the effect of pushing the price of gold and other commodities even higher.

The Gold Report: Unless Congress approves and President Obama signs an increase in the $14.29 trillion debt ceiling, the U.S. Treasury is set to begin defaulting on payments starting August 2. That threat launched months of competing big deals to cut spending and/or raise taxes. To add to the pressure, in mid-July the credit rating agencies Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s threatened to downgrade the U.S. credit rating from its historic AAA status if the debt limit isn’t raised in time to avoid defaulting on interest and bond payments. That could raise interest rates for the government and trickle down to consumer mortgage loan and credit card payments. John, what kind of deal would be good enough to satisfy bond rating agencies and avoid a double-dip recession?

John Williams: First of all, the chances are nil that the government actually will default. There is some talk that if the debt ceiling were not raised by the August 2 deadline, the government could avoid default for a while by playing games with its payments—pay interest and debt first instead of paying other obligations. That could trigger a rating downgrade, if one had not occurred otherwise. Also, I don’t think global investors would view non-payment of general obligations as a plus and could engage in dumping the dollar. I think Congress will agree, however, to something by the deadline. I have no expectation, though, that the deal will be of any substance; nothing that has been proposed would improve U.S. fiscal conditions meaningfully.

A country’s credit rating is a measure of the risk of debt default. The U.S. dollar, as the world’s reserve currency, is considered the benchmark instrument for an AAA rating. That generally is considered the riskless category. It would be very unusual for rating agencies to downgrade a benchmark. Yet the credit rating agencies now are seeing risk of a U.S. default and are talking a possible downgrade of U.S. Treasuries. A downgrade would have about as much negative impact as an actual default. You don’t want to see a downgrade. You don’t want to see a default. Those actions would have all sorts of implications, very negative implications for the financial markets, particularly for the U.S. dollar. You would see heavy U.S. dollar selling and dumping of U.S. dollar-denominated assets such as Treasury bonds. You would see a spike in dollar-denominated commodity prices such as oil. Gold prices would rally sharply, as would silver, as traditional hedges against inflation.

TGR: Is printing more money really what the government is going to do to pay its debt?

JW: That is what countries that spend beyond their means usually do if they can’t raise adequate tax revenues. I can tell you that the current government cannot raise enough taxes to bring the actual deficit under control. It could tax 100% of income, take 100% of income and corporate profits, and it would still be in deficit. In terms of generally-accepted accounting principles (GAAP) that include annual increases in the unfunded liabilities on a net present value basis, the U.S. is long-term bankrupt. A true balanced budget approach would require excessive overhaul—I’m talking massive cuts in the social programs because cutting every penny of government spending except for Social Security and Medicare would still leave the country in deficit. We are spending well beyond the bounds of reason in a number of areas. The country just does not have the ability to pay for all the services it provides.

TGR: In a July 14 commentary, you said that, “In the event of an actual default or downgrade, the United States position as the elephant in the bathtub of sovereign risk likely would cause the dollar to plummet against all major currencies irrespective of any ongoing concerns related to Euro-area debt.” What would this mean for the U.S. dollar and the price of gold going forward?

JW: Already stocks are down because the markets are frustrated with the lack of a deal. The U.S. is such a large player in the world markets that if the dollar is downgraded, the impact will be felt globally. The dollar should sink against most major currencies, including the euro, and gold prices would experience a big bump up. It should be very positive for gold long term. It doesn’t mean that Central Banks aren’t going to intervene and that the Treasury or IMF are not going to try to keep gold prices down. But, over the long haul, you’ll see much higher gold prices.

TGR: What would default or downgrading mean for the dollar?

JW: If the U.S. defaults or gets downgraded, that likely will end the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency. That’s not a viable option for the United States. People involved with getting the country to that point should be removed from office. If you are the most financially powerful country on earth, you don’t fool around with your creditworthiness.

TGR: So, if the dollar isn’t the benchmark, would it be the euro? Would it be the yen? Would it go back to a gold standard? What would happen?

JW: It would probably revert to some kind of a basket of currencies, probably including gold. The dollar would tend to suffer against the new benchmark and gold would tend to increase relative to the dollar in such a circumstance. But I can’t tell you exactly what would happen.

TGR: The new European Union plan for reducing the debt burden for Greece, Ireland and Portugal offers longer-term and low-interest loans and allows some bonds to go into temporary default. Does that set a precedent? Will it contain Europe’s debt crisis?

JW: The euro never should have been put in place. Anyone who ever thought that the Germans and the Italians could coordinate fiscal policy didn’t know the Germans and the Italians very well. The euro would have been disbanded or at least realigned by now if we weren’t in the middle of a systemic solvency crisis. The European Union will do anything to keep Greece afloat, as long as it is viewed as a threat to systemic solvency. Once the system stabilizes, I’d expect to see a breakup of the euro.

TGR: In our conversation with you last January, you talked about the difference between the true deficit and the cash-based deficit published by the government. What is the true deficit and what can be done to deal with that?

JW: The GAAP-based deficit is running around $5 trillion a year right now. That includes the numbers popularly looked at in the press and the year-to-year change in the unfunded liabilities for Social Security and Medicare adjusted for the present value of money.

To bring the true deficit into balance, there is nothing that can be done short of slashing Social Security and Medicare programs, and I see that as a political impossibility. Again, I mention the entitlement programs here, because you could eliminate every penny of government spending except for Social Security and Medicare, and the government still would be in deficit.

TGR: One of the other things that we’ve discussed with you before is quantitative easing (QE). Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke said there will be no more quantitative easing. In your July 8 commentary, you said the Fed will likely find the markets and banking system pressuring it into some form of QE3. What form might that take? And, how might that impact the dollar and precious metals?

JW: Well, Mr. Bernanke hemmed and hawed about the status of QE3 at his Congressional testimony earlier this month. The economy is weak enough; he will use that as an excuse. I can’t tell you exactly what the Fed is going to do. I imagine it will go back to buying Treasuries, once the debt ceiling is raised. That will cause weakness in the dollar and strength in gold. Generally, anything the Fed does to debase the dollar, which it continues to do on an ongoing and very deliberate basis, means higher gold.

TGR: So, what is your prediction for the final solution?

JW: In terms of the debt ceiling, the solution is going to be to continue raising the debt ceiling. Either that or eliminate the debt ceiling. I don’t know what can be done politically on either side there. But, the government is committed to certain obligations. It doesn’t make sense that it wouldn’t follow through and borrow the funds to pay what it has already committed to spend. As to bringing the U.S. fiscal circumstance under control at present, there simply is no political will by the president or by the aggregate sitting Congress to do so.

TGR: Isn’t it strange that instead of having this debate when they were voting about the budget and whether to spend the money, they are talking about it when it is time to pay the bill for the spending decisions already approved?

JW: No, we’re just dealing with a group of individuals in Washington who are politicians first, second and last. Most of them have very little real interest in the nation’s fiscal condition. They are looking at getting reelected and serving their special interests wherever they can. That has been evident to anyone who has watched the system in recent decades. There are some new, good people in Congress, but not enough to change things, yet. As Congress stands right now, there is no chance whatsoever of putting the U.S. fiscal house in order.

TGR: You look at a lot of numbers. We have really only talked about the debt limit. Anything else that you would like to leave us with that could impact the price of gold?

JW: Well, I think you have covered them. You are going to see ongoing weakness in the economy. The government is going to respond with more stimulus before the 2012 election, despite the so-called efforts at reducing the deficit. The Fed is going to ease liquidity more. All those actions to address the economic problems will tend to be inflationary, and that is generally positive for gold.

TGR: Thank you John.

Walter J. “John” Williams was born in 1949. He received an AB in economics, cum laude, from Dartmouth College in 1971, and was awarded a MBA from Dartmouth’s Amos Tuck School of Business Administration in 1972, where he was named an Edward Tuck Scholar. During his career as a consulting economist, John has worked with individuals as well as Fortune 500 companies. For 30 years he has been a private consulting economist and a specialist in government economic reporting. His analysis and commentary have been featured widely in the popular media both in the U.S. and globally. Mr. Williams provides insight and analysis on his website, www.shadowstats.com.