In my first post, I argued that removing the fuel subsidy is ultimately the right thing for Nigeria to do, as it is riddled with corruption, offers massive benefits to a few companies fortunate enough to have been awarded import contracts, and dominates the government budget at the expense of critical infrastructure projects. What I hadn’t understood fully is that the protests aren’t against removal of the subsidy per se, but about a lack of trust in government. As Nicholas Ibekwe, one of the organizers of the Occupy Nigeria protests in London explains, “Most organizers of the protest believe that removal of subsidy is not a bad thing. And I share that sentiment as well. However, the removal of subsidy in Nigeria is not about economics, it is mostly about trust, corruption and timing. The Nigerian government has not given the ordinary Nigerian reason to trust it.”

Put more simply by Chude Jideonwo on YNaija, “This is good policy badly executed, not because of timing necessarily as because of trust.” In the long run, Nigeria needs to eliminate a fuel subsidy that buys imported fuel – it makes very little economic sense for a nation to produce raw petroleum, export it to countries that refine it and subsidize its reimportation. It would make much more sense for the Nigerian government to help rebuild the nation’s refineries so the oil could be processed locally.

The problem is that, as Ibekwe and Jideonwo both explain, people don’t trust the Jonathan government to repurpose the subsidy to build infrastructure. Many of the arguments against subsidy removal focus on overspending in the Nigerian government, particularly on salaries and benefits to elected officials. The assumption – not without some justification – is that any savings from the subsidy will line the pockets of politicians at the expense of ordinary Nigerians.

Based on the feedback I’ve gotten from Nigerian friends, there’s no doubt that the subsidy removal was implemented poorly. Removing the subsidy in one fell swoop may have been designed to minimize opportunities for dissent (as each step of a gradual increase might invite protest), but it maximizes harm to the ordinary Nigerians who are struggling to cope with cost increases. The removal of the subsidy during the Christmas season had the additional complication of stranding some Nigerians in their home villages without sufficient funds to pay for transport home. And, as the commentators I quote above have pointed out, the Jonathan government simply doesn’t enjoy enough popular support and trust to have implemented these changes so unilaterally.

Alex Thurston at Sahel Blog argues against two arguments he sees me making in the piece. The first argument he sees me making is that removal of the subsidy is a good thing. I don’t think that’s what my argument was, precisely – I think removing the subsidy, ultimately, is something Nigeria needs to do. But as I’ve conceded here, I agree the move was made badly, without sufficient consideration of the harms to ordinary Nigerians, and I hope it will be rolled back and implemented in a more careful, considered way.

The second argument Thurston disagrees with is my contention that a protest against the subsidy is reactionary. Here I think he and I genuinely disagree. Thurston suggests that removal of the subsidy favors the 1% over the 99%, and suggests that because the World Bank and IMF would like to see the subsidy removed, the interests of the powerful favor subsidy removal. I don’t think it’s especially fair to equate the oft-maligned IMF and World Bank with the globally rich and powerful. There are lots of smart economists – including Nigerian Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, former Managing Director of the World Bank – who are looking for solutions to Nigeria’s long-term economic woes, and who see removing the subsidy as a step towards economic reform.

There’s no doubt that removal of the subsidy is hurting the 99% in the short term. But poor and middle-class Nigerians were experiencing a great deal of economic misery before removal of the subsidy. In the long term, one way or another, Nigeria needs a functioning infrastructure, a working power grid, better roads and rail, better health care and education. In the long term, some of these services need to come from the government… and the government will gain legitimacy by providing services that people want and need, beyond cheap fuel.

Thurston and the Occupy protesters seem to be arguing that the government can’t and won’t provide those services, and therefore we should focus on the short term: maintaining a large subsidy on the import of foreign petroleum products. That mistrust of government’s ability to provide any services sounds more like the Tea Party than the Occupy movement to me. I’m not saying that the protesters are wrong in their mistrust of Jonathan’s government. I am saying that a government taking steps towards modifying a budget to provide essential goods and services appears more progressive than supporting a massive subsidy.

In US terms, this argument sounds like a very typical right-wing argument: we can’t trust the bloated, lazy government to produce public goods, so we should have very low taxes and rely on the private sector for any goods and services. In practical terms, removal of a fuel subsidy is a tax increase. It’s a badly implemented tax increase and it affects people who are ill able to afford it. But the goal is a progressive one, so long as you accept the notion that Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and Jonathan are genuinely trying to build infrastructure and help the economy recover. If you don’t trust their motives, obviously, you won’t see this move as anything other than an opportunity for more corruption.

Do I think the subsidy removal was a good idea? I think it’s an admirable goal in the long run, but was badly implemented and should be rolled back and implemented gradually in closer consultation with a variety of non-government groups. Do I support the Occupy Nigeria movement? Yes, inasmuch as I think it’s great to see organized, peaceful, popular opposition to corruption in Nigeria. But I am deeply worried that the movement is focused on rolling back a change that, in the long run, is intended to correct some of the major problems of the Nigerian economy. Do I still think the movement is reactionary? Yes, in the literal sense that protesters are trying to roll back a change made by government, and more figuratively, because the movement questions the ability of the government to create positive change for the people. I hope the movement will become a broader anti-corruption movement, which I would see as less reactionary, more progressive and more in line with global Occupy movements.

Do I expect that this post will reduce the amount of angry email I’ve recently received? Probably not. As several correspondents have pointed out, passions are understandably running very high around these issues. It’s hard to both critique and support a movement, but I think the issues here are complicated enough that it’s worth trying to do both simultaneously.

• 16 May: Deepshikha Sikarwar has a story in the Economic Times today titled I-T dept seeks former SEBI chairman CB Bhave’s tax returns details.
• 25 April: Shaji Vikraman had a front page story in the Economic Times about how Bhave’s team at SEBI was being dispersed. And, Mobis Philipose on these issues in Mint, and Sahad PV on VCCircle.
• 23 April: P. Vaidyanathan Iyer had a front page story in the Indian Express on how C. B. Bhave was removed.
• 18 April: Paranjoy Guha Thakurta on the problems of recruiting a successor for U. K. Sinha at UTI.
• 9 April: Subhomoy Bhattacharjee and Sunil Jain in the Indian Express on problems in the recruitment of a successor to U. K. Sinha at UTI.
• 5 April: An interview with C. B. Bhave in the Business Standard by Shyamal Majumdar and Rajesh Bhayani.

The concept of the charter city has gained significant attention by development experts in discussing developmental malaise in world’s least developed countries in Africa. The empirical evidence on Africa’s underdevelopment is striking. It suggests a blinking interplay of corruption, institutional fragility and state failure. According to African Development Indicators, about 75 percent of firms in Cote d’Ivoire identify corruption as the major constraint in doing business. In Ethiopia, less than 2 percent of females enroll tertiary education. Moreover, the average Ethiopian female can expect only 7 years of total schooling. In Liberia, about 11 percent of married women partake a contraceptive use by any method. Hence, one third of young Liberian women, aged 15-19. In addition, 60 percent of Liberians live below $2 per day. In Mozambique and Sierra Leone, only 45 percent of young women are literate. A female at birth in Sub-Saharan Africa can expect to experience no more than 8 years of total schooling throughout her life.

The perennial question in the establishment of charter cities is whether the idea can serve as a source of good rules, promoting good governance through low-cost contract enforcement. Institutional fragility of states across world’s least developed countries is largely the economic outcome stemming from wrong development diagnostics, mismatched policy choices and a rigid structure of formal and informal institutional arrangements which resulted in a myriad of bad rules and corrupt political leadership across the specturm of world’s poorest countries. The general conclusion from the lessons of development policy is that in the last century, development policy failed to facilitate meaningful prescriptions for a permanent rise of GDP per capita. In particular, the misdiagnosis of essential development dilemma is not a consequence of technical failure in delivering concrete solutions to applied issues of economic development but a consequence of mismatched theoretical foundations which supplied wrong assumptions. Theoretical models of economic growth and development in late 1950s and early 1960s rested on the assumption on output per worker as an increasing and diminishing function of the capital per worker. Although the validity of the neoclassical growth theory remains undisputed, development policy and international aid donors failed to recognize that increasing the amount of aid does not lead to better development outcomes. In fact, the majority of Sub-Saharan countries experienced the relative decline of GDP per capita in the 20th century. In 1913, the GDP per capita of Ghana (in 1990 international dollars) represented 42 percent of the average GDP per capita of European periphery. In 2008, Ghana’s GDP per capita represented merely 8 percent of the average GDP per capita of European periphery. By the available statistics, Algeria was the second wealthiest country in Africa, only after South Africa. In 1913, Ghana was the fourth richest society in Africa, only after South Africa, Algeria and Egypt. In 2008, Ghana’s GDP per capita was ranked 20th in Africa, in the same range as Angola, Lesotho and Nigeria.

The question surrounding the emergence of the charter city is whether it can serve as a treatment to the contagious sclerosis of fragile institutional structure in failed states, marred by poor governance and the lack of law and order, causing the failure to enforce private contracts as to ensure the rule of law and provide the institutional impetus for sound governance and better formal and informal rules. A notable criticism of the institutional fragility in world’s less developed countries pertains to the capture of the state by the political elites. The political elites in world’s poorest regions have provided sufficient conditions for the capture of government and judicial system by incorporating a system of powerful informal arrangements through bloated corruption which consequently impaired investment and ultimately resulted in the expropriation of private property rights. The institutional chaos in the most failed states of the world culminated into behavioral adaption to bad rules. The sequence of harmful economic policies eventually seized upon poor development outcomes such as high rates of poverty, stagnating income per capita, low life expectancy and poor health and education indicators.

The foremost task of the charter city should facilitate the institutional decency to enforce private contracts without transaction cost barriers and ensure a robust system of the rule of law since better rules nonetheless depend on how informal institutions such as culture, habits and behavior embrace the virtues of free markets, limited government and the rule of law. Aside from the essential infrastructural arrangements, the provision of institutional conditions for living under a different set of rules does not necessarily imply sufficient prerequisites for the productivity growth that could, in the long run, transform the charter city from low-wage pool of unskilled labor into high-wage urban agglomeration. What is needed for a charter city to flourish is the acceptance of informal institutions of the liberal society such as the freedom of contract and the freedom from corruption. One should not hesitate that economic and personal liberties in world’s poorest countries are plagued by predatory rent-seeking political behavior as well as contended against the principles of adherence to formal rules. Without a sensory adherence to these principles, it would be impossible to envisage the charter city as a solution to world poverty and underdevelopment.

For a charter city to provide a clear and cohesive framework of rules, it is essential to provide the credibility and predictability of rules. In early 1950s, Hong Kong was a small island chartered by the British who established a system of credibility over centuries. Hong Kong was the only place where Chinese workers were allowed to migrate from the mainland China. The credibility of the rules, emphasizing limited government over extensive government intervention, free markets over regulated command-and-control economy and the rule of law over political discretion and interest-group politics, proved vital in Hong Kong’s steady economic growth in the 20^th century. In 1950, Hong Kong’s income per capita was around GBP 2,500. By 1997, the average income per capita rose to GBP 20,000.

The idea of building charter cities to boost income per capita by innovative framework of governance is a valuable alternative to the mainstream development policy. First, setting a charter city in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America would encourage seasonal and permanent migration flows from areas with low population density both on domestic and international scale. David McKenzie and John Gibson examined the impact of New Zealand’s Recognized Seasonal Employer program (link), aimed at encouraging seasonal migration from Pacific islands Tonga and Vanuatu to New Zealand, benefitting employers at home. The empirical evidence and policy conclusions suggest that seasonal migration is offering a triple win since a migrant, the sending country and the receiving country benefit from participating in seasonal migration program:

“Nevertheless, there are several caveats to these conclusions. The first is that development is a long-term process, and some of the effects of the RSE may only materialize over many years of community involvement. These could include positive effects such as greater asset-building, investments and skill development if workers return for many seasons, as well as potential longer-term negative effects of continual absence of family members on family and community relations. Secondly, while the gains to households from this seasonal migration are large, they still pale in comparison to the gains from permanent international migration (McKenzie et al, 2010). A key policy issue is therefore the extent to which seasonal migration can or cannot eventually open up avenues for permanent migration. Finally, as with all evaluations, there is the question of how far the policy details and findings can be extrapolated to other settings and that it was developed drawing on lessons from experiences around the world should provide some external validity. As temporary migration programs are increasingly emphasized in policy discussions, there is likely to be plenty of scope for governments and researchers to work together in the future in assessing how well these lessons translate.”

Second, charter cities would nevertheless spur the diffusion of knowledge into the countries of poor regions in the world. In its most distinctive form, charter cities would be similar to the role of small states in the global economy. For instance, consider Mauritius. Back in 1968, when the island gained the political independence from the United Kingdom, the economic prospects of the country were undermined by rapid population growth, rachitic productivity and overdependence on sugar as the only export industry. In addition, trade policy imposed high tariffs and import quotas to protect sugar manufacturers. Since it was impossible to dismantle the barriers to trade, the government of Mauritius responded by creating a virtual special export zone. Any foreign and domestic company could enter and exit the export zone by retaining the profits earned. Companies within the export zone operated under different rules with no trade restrictions such as tariffs, import quotas, voluntary export restraints etc. Hence, the only entry requirement for locating in the special zone was that companies manufacture only for exports as not to compete with domestic markets. The special export zone proved to be a success story. Productivity and employment rates increased sharply, boosting income per capita and standard of living. In 2010, Mauritius’s GDP per capita ($15,500) is the second highest in the region, only behind Gabon ($14,600). The experience of Mauritius with the special export zone and its consequent impact on the economic prosperity of the island, suggests that institutional competition ultimately rewards the institutional structure with better economic outcomes. The entire concept of the charter city is based on encouraging the institutional competition between charter cities and politico-economic systems in poorer countries where charter cities would be most likely to settle. Low initial level of income per capita in charter cities would encourage low-wage employment with unskilled labor. The experience of countries such as Mauritius, Singapore and Hong Kong suggests that favorable institutional features at the beginning stage of development result in better economic policies, ultimately leading to stable economic growth, higher standard of living and better education and health indicators. In Mauritius, the judicial independence from political influence has been enhanced by delegating the highest court of appeal to the British Privy Council, a royal judicial committee (link), full powers of judicial authority.

Many smaller countries in the 20^th century, known for good development outcomes, have adopted roughly similar institutional impetus for economic growth and development. In Africa, countries with the highest level of economic freedom and the lowest perception of corruption, such as Mauritius, Botswana and Namibia, enjoy the highest level of GDP per capita in the African continent. In spite of the abundance of natural resources, Botswana adopted market-friendly economic policies in the second half of the 20^th century, conducive to private enterprise and investment. According to World Bank, it takes 152 hours to pay taxes in Botswana compared to Sub-Saharan average of 315 days. In addition, a claimant in Botswana can expect to recover 63.7 cents per $1 from an insolvent firm compared to 8.4 cents per 1$ in Angola, 16 cents per 1$ in Niger and 0 cents per 1$ in Madagascar.

And third, charter cities would vastly improve the infrastructure of the residents, choosing freely to enter and exit the city. Households in countries such as Guinea still lack the access to electricity, forcing students to do the homework under streetlights and use the car park lights to review school notes (link). Despite being one of the largest receivers of aid per capita, Guinea still suffers from the lack of widespread access to electricity. One could hardly believe that the efforts pledged by international aid donors to reduce poverty and improve the standard of living across the African continent, were not sufficient. What created the black hole, such as the above in Guinea, is the institutional structure plagued by persistent corruption, political cronyism and bad governance, creating bad rules and wrong incentives. Charter cities would ingeniously cure the widespread persistence of misrule and political misconduct since the system of rules would be defined by the founding charter of the city. Good prospects of charter cities would require free entry and exit from the city as well as transparent and honest oversight of the respect for rules by independent judicial authority, managed by a guarantor country such as the United Kingdom, U.S. or Canada. In the proposed form, a typical charter city would become a manufacturing hub. In particular, it would enable access to low labor costs and significant economies of scale to technology entrepreneurs from rich countries as well as transparent contract enforcement, law and order and the security of private property rights. On the other hand, cities would enable millions of people from poor countries to migrate to chartered cities and seek employment opportunities in an environment, safe from corruption, political restraint, violence and bad governance. Hence, charter cities would provide a necessary input to the intellectual competition of ideas in economics, law and political philosophy and elsewhere to be implemented in chartered cities.

The concept enables social scientists and development experts a real-world experiment of ideas. Hence, charter cities could provide a safe haven for prosecuted individuals in poor countries, suffering from judicial errors, physical and military violence or illicit property expropriation. The UN estimates that, over the next few decades, 3 billion people will move to cities. The inflow exerts a growing pressure on urban agglomerations. The lack of basic infrastructure and the continuity of predatory misrule could cause a rapid growth of slums in larger cities which, by and large, are the main source of infectious diseases, HIV prevalence and youth crime since the absence of access to clean water, electricity and education are the major impediment to the improvement of development outcomes in poor countries. A charter city could flourish to become an impulsive alternative to the current state of overdependence on foreign aid. However, it should be unambiguously clear that adherence to good rules and governance requires a bold and decisive change in the set of informal behavior; in which corruption, crime and nepotism are doomed to the fullest possible extent by the full enforcement of private contracts and the rule of law.

A commenter (Lorraine) suggested that ‘never’ is a pretty powerful word and that my ‘inner paleoconservative’ was showing. On reflection, I agree that it is difficult to argue that any of these forms of corruption are never justifiable under any circumstances. For example, I would find it difficult to argue that a person living in a society where corruption is the norm has as strong a moral obligation to refrain from corrupt activities as a person living in a society where there is little corruption. That is why corruption is so insidious – the more prevalent it is, the more difficult it becomes for anyone to resist it. (I suppose that kind of reasoning must make me some kind of moral relativist, but I don’t think I will lose too much sleep worrying about that!)

Survey respondents are asked to give a rating from 1 to 10, depending on whether they consider each behaviour is never justifiable (1) or always justifiable (10). In the following tables I have labelled ratings of 1 and 2 as ‘very rarely or never justifiable’ and ratings of from 1 to 3 as ‘rarely or never justifiable’.

The relaxation in degree of opposition to welfare fraud, tax evasion and bribery does make some difference to the rankings. The general picture remains broadly the same, however. There is generally more red at the bottom of the tables than at the top, suggesting greater opposition to corruption among people in the countries with smaller governments.

The rise of development economics in the 20th century was a natural response to growing disparities in income per capita between rich and poor countries. In the framework of neoclassical theory, development economics emerged from a neoclassical growth theory, pioneered by the famous Solow-Swan model. In the simplest possible form, the growth of output per capita depends on the capital per worker and the initial level of output under stable rate of national saving and capital depreciation. Assuming diminishing returns to scale and constant rate of population growth, the increase in capital per worker would increase the output per worker that would, hence, approach its steady-state equilibrium. Theoretical notions of the Solow-Swan model were tested against the empirical data on economic growth. The key assumption of the neoclassical growth model is that poor countries would tend to catch-up rich countries, assuming higher output growth in poor countries. The convergence of income per capita would imply a neg relationship between the initial level of output per capita and output growth over time. Thus, countries with lower levels of output per capita in the initial period would experience faster rates of output growth. Consequently, the output per capita and the standard of living would approach to the level in rich countries. The empirical tests of the Solow-Swan model failed to confirm the theoretical hypothesis since economic growth rates in 20th century in developed countries were higher compared to developing countries. The divergence of income per capita led to the subsequent modifications of the Solow-Swan model. In fact, the main criticism of the model points out that the model itself failed to capture the role of technological progress in determining the level of output per worker. The mysterious growth episode in Japan and other East Asian nations posed a difficult question. How can a country with low initial level of output per worker at the end of the WW2, exceed the productivity level in rich countries? The obvious answer is that Solow-Swan growth model failed to capture the role of technology shocks which violate the assumption of diminishing capital returns, what could explain why initially poor countries subsequently converged to the level of productivity in rich countries and then exceeded the level. The phenomenon, known as growth residual, has subsequently reduced the predictive power of the Solow-Swan model since a considerable share of economic growth was not ascribed to capital and labor inputs but rather to the persistent role of technological change.

Policy implications from Solow-Swan model imply that the essential requirement to boost economic growth in a country with low initial level of output per capita is to increase the amount of capital per worker, namely by boosting public and private investment in infrastructure. From 1950s onwards, World Bank had repeatedly boosted the growth of infrastructure by facilitating developmental assistance into world’s least developed countries. According to the neoclassical growth theory, higher capital-labor ratio would provide additional investment stimulus, thereby increasing the employment-to-population ratio. Proponents of the foreign aid provided the rationale for higher foreign aid spending by the analogy of post-WW2 Europe when Marshall Plan provided $13 billion, or roughly $100 billion in today’s prices, to Western European economies to recover the physical infrastructure which had been destroyed during WW2. Marshall Plan intervention was rather short, quick and finite. The efficacy of foreign aid in Africa is questionable since little or no growth occured in many African states such as Burundi, Benin, Zimbabwe and Congo. Official forecasts from the United Nations from 1950s onwards, based on the famous Harrod-Domar growth model (link), often assumed a rapid increase in the level of GDP per capita in response to the increase in investment rates. The forecasts, based on the theoretical assumption of diminishing capital returns, predicted a persistent convergence of GDP per capita to the level sustained in richer countries. The fact that the launch of extensive investment in infrastructure resulted in further economic stagnation of many African states, has questioned both the validity and quality of prescriptions laid by the mainstream development economics.

The philosophy of the mainstream development economics was sharply criticized in the light of the fact that foreign aid failed to alleviate poverty and made the growth of African economies slower. The efforts by the World Bank have been diverted from correct diagnosis of the developmental issues in African states to repeated initiatives such as the commitment of the international community to increase the share of foreign aid to least-developed countries to at least 1 percent of the GDP. The criticism of the mainstream development economics was already formulated in 1958 when Mont Pelerin Society organized the 9th meeting and development economics seminar where professor Herbert Frankel of the Nuttfield College put forth the criticism of foreign aid and the failure of development economics:

“The lesson that flows from it is that it does pay to go to these remote areas and find out what the problem is, instead of assuming that one knows the problem before one begins. Until recent years, people have simply assumed in many of these territories in Africa, that there were no real, positive signs of enterprise among the indigenous population, which was supposed to be so uninstructed or inert that it was not able to fend for itself, experiment for itself, or improve itself. It was not realised that a reason why there was this apparent lack of initiative in the population was that there were serious customary or legal obstacles to the exercise of ordinary enterprise, even on a small scale.“

Given the lack of the comprehensive diagnosis of the causes of underdevelopment in African countries, the mainstream development economics failed to capture the appropriate assumptions in the theoretical models of economic development, upon which developmental assistance was justified. A more reasonable theoretical solution to the economic stagnation and social conflict in Africa has been put forth by the human capital theory. In its broadest and most general form, the theory stated that the economic stagnation of African countries is a consequence of the lack of skills and investment in education that could provide the necessary input to increase the economic growth and, subsequently, alleviate the issues of AIDS/HIV, malaria, child malnutrition and domestic violence. There is no doubt that the growth of education initiatives in Africa has sent many children to school. In addition, many universities in Western Europe and the United States have expanded the initiative and offered students from African states preferential admission criteria in various forms such as graduate fellowships, student grants and lower required standardized test scores, to boost admission rates of African nationals at U.S. universities. The efforts of developed countries to bring educational initiatives to Africa encouraged school participation as well as international opportunities of African citizens to study abroad, even at world’s most prestigious and highly-ranked universities. Notwithstanding the importance of education in creating the stock of human capital for the wealth of nations, educational initiatives should address the essential obstacles that creates the failure of African expatriates to return to home countries, hence, bring skills, knowledge and various other forms of human capital, which are essential to the process of long-run growth, the issues of labor market distortions in African countries. These distortions crucially impede the ability of young African graduates to matching jobs in regional labor market.

What the mainstream development economics failed to take into account is the institutional paralysis which prevails in a majority of African countries, plagued by the destructive tribal institutions based on widespread corruption, bribes and domestic violence as means of achieving political power. The prevalence of hybrid institutions, marred by the complete absence of the rule of law and judicial institutions that could facilitate efficient contract enforcement and the protection of private property rights, is not only a severe obstacle to higher economic growth but also the apparent mechanism that captures the set of explanatory features that could possibly account for what caused the misdiagnosis of the African development dilemma. Back in 2002, African Union estimated that each year, corruption costs African economies more than $148 billion or 25 percent of Africa’s GDP. The significance of corruption in state structures in Africa manifests itself in poor quality and provision of public services, the absence of judicial independence from political regimes, cumbersome contract enforcement and unprotected private property rights. Such distortions impede the level of trust and provide evolving incentives to subvert the institutional independence into political cronyism, in which corruption substitutes the tax system through bribes and extortion as methods of lowering transaction costs in overcoming the malfunctioning of the judicial system. In 1978, Erwin Blumenthal of the central bank of the Federal Republic of Germany, warned the international community that “Zaire’s political system is so corrupt that there’s no prospect for Zaire’s creditors to get their money back.” (link)

The advancement of country’s economic prospects requires not only transparent, sound and efficient regulations but, more importantly, highly efficient civil service. In 2010, Transparency International published Corruption Perception Index (link) by measuring the persistence of corruption in public sectors across the world. The findings showed that the vast majority of poor African countries were plagued by extensive and extortionate corruption and ranked in the bottom 20 percent of the distribution. Comparing the level bureaucracy against GDP per capita reveals the amplified evidence of the negative correlation between the efficiency of civil service and the GDP per capita. The ease of doing business in Africa in countries such as Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius and South Africa is remarkably easier with predictable, stable and efficient regulation, compared to countries such as Burundi, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire etc. where highly burdensome administrative procedures in doing business hamper capital formation and restrain productive investment in health-care, education and private-sector infrastructure that could provide the impetus to economic growth.

The relationship between the amount of foreign aid, received by the least-developed countries, and the scope of corruption as a rough approximation of the institutional quality in the least-developed states, could provide the answer to the question whether international donors consider the scope and significance of corruption in allocating the amount of foreign aid. The experience from the last century of development policy, suggest that international donors actually allocated more foreign aid to the countries, suffering from severe state failure, widespread corruption, government failure and the complete absence of judicial independence that could provide a system of checks and balances and the necessary restraint on the violiation of private property rights, extortion and violence by the political elites. In 1999, Alberto Alesina and Beatrice Weder (see “Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid,” American Economic Review, 92(4), pp. 1126-1137) found that, contrary to arguments of aid supporters, foreign aid is not used to reward good governments since more corrupt governments received more foreign aid and official development assistance from international donors. The most striking evidence, presented by Alesina and Weder, suggests that U.S donors seem to neglect the persistence of corruption in allocating foreign aid to poor countries while, on the other hand, Scandinavian donors deem the persistence of corruption as highly important, hence, rewarding governments with lower extent of corruption.

In the following graph, I estimated the impact of corruption on official development assistance in the sample of 41 least-developed countries in 2008. In the model, I set the official development assistance to be determined by the scope of corruption in least-developed countries. The official development assistance is expressed as a share of representative country’s gross national income (GNI) for it provides a better measure of aid dependence than foreign aid per capita since the size of population is controlled by the main assumptions of the model. The data on official development assistance were download from World Bank’s World Development Indicators (link). The data on the extent of corruption in least-developed countries were provided by Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perception Index (link). The extent of corruption varies from 1 to 10, where lower values indicate more persistent corruption. I estimated whether countries with more corrupt governments receive a higher share of foreign aid from international donors. On the basis of 41 least-developed countries, sample estimates suggest that a 1 point improvement in corruption perception index tends to decrease, on average, the share of foreign aid in gross national income, on average, by 2.37 percentage points. Sample estimate of the slope coefficient is statistically significant at 5 percent level. Even though, the variation in corruption perception index accounts for 5.51 percent of the variation in official development assistance, the influence of the extent of corruption on the share of foreign aid in gross national income is not spurious but systematic and persistent.

Corruption and official development assistance

The estimate suggests that international donors indeed reward more corrupt governments by increasing the share of official development assistance. In 2002, African Union estimated that corruption was costing the African continent $150 billion per year. The estimates of the total cost of corruption provide an ample evidence that, over the last century, international donors consistently allocated foreign aid to more corrupt governments, creating aid-dependent economies, prone to bloated bureaucracies and extractive institutions which subsequently led to the stagnation of income per capita in the last decades. An ample criticism of foreign aid initiative was put forth by Dambisa Moyo (link) in the WSJ two years ago: “The most obvious criticism of aid is its links to rampant corruption. Aid flows destined to help the average African end up supporting bloated bureaucracies in the form of the poor-country governments and donor-funded non-governmental organizations.”

The consequence of rootedness of corruption and extractive political institutions in African tribal cultures can be, in a considerable part, drawn upon the colonial heritage that spread throughout the African continent from 19th century onwards. The colonial experience across the African continent (link) served not only as a conquest of newly discovered areas but, moreover, also as an experiment of developing political and economic institutions on the basis of European influence. The colonial heritage in Africa was mainly derived from the European occupation of African lands. Hereto, the presence of European colonizers in Africa provided a long-lasting foundation of the institutional lessons from which the African states went forth.

Given the heterogenity of the European perspectives on institutional development, the colonial period in Africa left a long-lasting impact on the economic and political development in Africa. Africa’s richest countries, namely Botswana, South Africa and Mauritius, were influenced tremendously by the colonial heritage. In Botswana and South Africa, the colonial influence of English and Dutch on further economic development was mainly derived from setting strong institutional foundations of economic development such as the rule of law, judicial independence and limited government compared to other African states. Apart from the setting of formal institutions, fostering contract enforcement and the integrity of the political institutions, English and Dutch colonizers provided the establishment of cultural setting not prone to fraud, extortion and extractive institutions. Favorable institutional conditions furthered the advertance of trust and institutional efficiency, which are deemed essential in fostering the development of financial markets. Even the German presence in Namibia from 1884 to 1915 during Deutsch-Südwestafrika (link) fostered, to a certain extent, independent judiciary, relatively sound institutions and cohesive framework of the rule of law. As a result, Nambia retained the status of one of the least corrupt countries in Africa, known for relatively high degree of economic freedom in a regional comparison with other African states.

While the influence of German, English and Dutch colonizers was largely beneficial to African countries from the perspective of economic growth and development over the last century, the presence of French, Italian and Belgian colonizers arises serious concerns over the prospects of economic development across the African continent. The myraid of violence, in countries such as Congo Dem. Rep. and Somalia, which ultimately led to civil wars and the settlement of extractive institutions, largely reflects the innate ability of the colonial policies to provide the necessary conditions for the institutional integrity, the rule of law and stringent property rights that could underline the basis of economic development by restraining the power and domination of political elites and their ability to expropriate private property rights in pursuit of extractive monopoly rents from natural resources. That easily explains why countries such as Congo, Zambia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, in spite of vast reserves of natural resources, were seized by the state capture of political elites. The colonial presence largely determined the size and scope of aid dependency in African states. The most plausible and persuasive explanation of the impact of European colonial policies in African countries was presented by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and David Robinson (see “Disease and Development” Journal of European Economic Association, 1(2/3), pp. 397-405):

“European colonists were much more likely to develop institutions of private property, encouraging economic and social development, in places where they settled. In contrast, in places where they did not settle, they were more likely to opt for extractive institutions, designed to extract resources without investing in institutional development. In these places, institutions were highly centralized, with political power concentrated in the hands of small elites and with almost no checks on this elite. The property rights and more general rights of the majority of the population were not protected.“

The political and economic circumstances of the European institutional legacy in African states imparted aid dependency on those countries where the combination of tribal institutions, hostile to free enterprise and judicial restraint of political dictatorships, and unequivocally detrimental colonial policies dominated the development of political and economic institutions, setting the rules of the game. Therefore, the inability of many African societies to establish sensible and effective institutions resulted in the political capture of the state by the elites. The monopoly power of the political elites, enforcing anti-growth public policies, led to consistently poor economic outcomes, plagued by high rates of poverty and infectious diseases such as polio, malaria and measles.

The challenge of development economics is not to design aid schemes, which inevitably lead to aid dependency, marred by persistent corruption and political fraud, but to ascertain correct diagnosis of why foreign aid repeatedly resulted in the poor economic outcomes and the consequent stagnation of income per capita in many African states in 20th century. The failure of African societies to establish a rigorous system of incentives, which could significantly improve economic outcomes, is not a response to market failures (which deemed highly of early development economics) but a result of severe government failure to establish effective institutions of the rule of law, contract enforcement and stringent property rights. These institutions are the broadest foundations of economic development and the only viable alternative to political nepotism and the power of elites which, as poor development outcomes in Africa show, ultimately impose extractive institutions, causing the persistence of poverty and underdevelopment.

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The impact of corruption on economic growth is an important theoretical and empirical theme in the economic literature. In this theoretical and empirical post, I will briefly review the main literature on corruption and development and discuss the empirical studies.

I would firstly refer to the article by Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) where the authors discuss the primacy of institutions for economic development over the exogenous factors such as geography (link). There has been an extensive amount of literature on the role of geography in economic development. The empirical strategy is quite simple. Usually, the basic equation includes the list of explanatory variables such as distance from equator, the percentage of land used for agricultural production and so forth. For example, the basic equation might take the following form:

log(GDP)=b1+b2(Dist)+b3(Land)+b4(Dummy_SubAfrica)+e

where GDP stands for GDP per capita, Dist for distance from equator, Land for the percentage of fertilized land and Dummy_SubAfrica is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if a country is located in the Subsaharan Africa and 0 if otherwise. In addition, e represents stohastic error unexplained by the selected predictors.

However, the basic problem with geographic approach to explaining economic development is that the approach does not, by itself, distinguish between the endogenous features of economic development. In regressing GDP per capita on the distance from equator, the empirical estimates usually result in a modestly negative correlation between the two variables. However, the distance from the equator cannot itself explain the nature of economic development and its significance over time mainly because of its low predictive power in explaining the evolution of institutions and governance.

An interesting approach has been incorporated by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001). They incorporate a historical and institutional perspective in the empirical framework of the explanation of economic development. The authors used mortality rates of colonial settlers to explain the institutional quality. They further argue that where settlers encountered few health hazards compared to European settlement, they established solid institutions, strong enforcement of property rights and a robust system of law. In other areas where health hazards frequently occured, colonizers focused on the extraction of natural resources and showed little or no interest in building high-quality institutions. Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) further estimated the impact of geographic variables, institutions and openness on macroeconomic variables.

The main findings in their study were the following. First, each degree distance towards equator, on average, reduces the income per capita by 0.94 percent. The geographical location by the equator is also negatively related to capital per worker (-1.68), human capital per worker (-0.25) and total factor productivity (-0.32). Second, the quality of institutions is a very good measure of the economic welfare. In their panel, the authors found that each additional improvement in the rule of law, on average, leads to 2.22 percent increase in income per capita. The result is statistically significant at 1 percent. The improvement of institutional quality is both positively related and statistically significant when capital per worker, human capital per worker and total factor productivity are regressed on the institutional quality.

Back in 1997, Peterson Institute published an extensive study, searching the causes of corruption (link). The author estimated that the highest cost of corruption in regressing a series of macroeconomic variables on corruption index is lower education expenditure and a decrease in private investment. The estimate of the total macroeconomic cost of corruption is a difficult and daunting empirical task.

The main causes of corruption are mostly endogenous and related to the institutional evolution ranging from legal origins, colonial historical variables to the public sector efficiency variables. In search of the grain of truth, it should be noted that capturing the stylized effect of corruption of economic growth and development requires an interactive empirical approach. In other words, it would be impossible to establish “cause-and-effect” connection between corruption and development indicators without extracting a large amount of historical data and regressing it on the key endogenous variables.

Clearly, the role of geographical characteristics should not be neglected. However, the primacy of institutions in explaining the contemporary patterns of economic development is rather undisputable. Daron Acemoglu recently wrote an in-depth article on the distribution and explanatory factors regarding world poverty (link) where it clearly stressed the lack of institutions of human capital in the evolution of world poverty. When discovering the true causes of corruption, there should nonetheless be a clear and distinct rationale underlined by the evolution of institutional quality over time as the most significant measure in explaining the evolution, causes and effects of corruption on economic development.

Yet while my heart tells me that there is a chance to turn this ship around, the overwhelming evidence that I have documented in my more sober if not brutally honest moments speaks to just the opposite. The progressives have been hammering away at our freedoms for well over a century, aggressively indoctrinating the citizenry with their perspicacious propaganda campaign. While our ideas are better, we have not adequately defended them.

Today it occurred to me that the perturbed conservatives I saw on Ailes’ evil news network harping on the blasphemous spendthrift blowhards in Washington were missing the point in blaming our politicians for their actions. Sure I am just as outraged as the next fellow at the spending of taxpayer money on projects fraught with waste and corruption, the sheer arrogance of our leaders in running roughshod over our economic liberty and in general the out of control growth of the nanny state.

But just as it was these political leaders who were the great enablers for the bankers in the financial crisis, through the gobs of cheap government credit provided by the head of the banking cartel – the government’s Federal Reserve, through their implicit guarantees of too-big-too-fail taxpayer protection and through their push along with the ACORN thugs for providing housing for even the least creditworthy among us, so too was it the American people that have enabled this government.

James Madison said of democracies that they “have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.” Perhaps more prescient, Marx posited that “Democracy is the road to socialism.” But alas, this is the system that we allowed to take hold though the Constitution never once mentions it, and we the people, who were supposed to vigilantly defend our liberty, have allowed our government to devolve into an instrument whereby each group plunders each and every other group. And what is this instrument of plunder of government but a representation of the people?

Herein lies the problem with blaming the politicians. It is we that have elected these scallywags. Their sole goal is retaining power in office, future of the nation-be-damned. Like for the bankers, though they know the system to be unsustainable in the long run, what matters to politicians is reaping the rewards before the storm. It is the American public that has let them continue to be irresponsible, leaving us with over $100 trillion in unfunded liabilities. We have condoned the profligacy and pillaging of our rights.

Throughout history in this country there has been a constant battle waged between those who espouse liberty and those who would sooner trade liberty for tyranny than live in a society based on self-reliance, merit and morality. Even if we have voted against the bad apples, we are complicit in having not convinced our fellow citizens to do so. Instead, we allowed the so-called elites, the political entrepreneurs to take over Washington, D.C., promising the people healthcare, housing and the rest of the hogwash spelled out in the Second Bill of Rights. They debauched our great nation by our sanction.

Now let me turn from criticizing us Americans (I am as complicit in this lack of vigilance as all my Libertarian brethren), lest I start to sound like Barack Obama. What we must do as the antidote to the growing Leviathan is to fight the intellectual fight for liberty on every street corner, in every classroom and through every other media possible. We must infiltrate corrupt and destructive institutions and reveal the truth to our fellow countrymen. We must seek out candidates with no interest in political power – no desire to cut deals but a sheer wish to restore America to its rightful place in the world; to serve as honest and capable stewards aiming to leave a better country for their children and children’s children. We must seek people willing to take unpopular positions with a firm and steadfast resolve, equipped with the knowledge of and confidence in the tenets of classical Liberalism. A good start would be to seek out those who have no desire to hold office.

Good government requires a populace that seeks good government. Further, it requires representatives with the courage to fight for prudent policy, not the petty politics of payoffs and plunder. Most importantly, it beckons those who wish to honor the vision of our Founders, in which the liberty of the most important minority, the individual is protected, in which free market capitalism is advanced through the protection of private property and contract rights and in which the defense of our citizenry and by extension the securing of our freedom is the highest priority of government.

Demoralizing as our situation as a nation may be as a result of a government that we have allowed to run amok, I should say that in some ways I am optimistic no matter what direction this country takes. Should we rally to fight the fight against the socialist sophists and begin to roll back the last hundred-plus years of disgraceful governance, we will succeed. On the other hand, if we continue to hurtle towards the day of reckoning of default and/or hyperinflation in von Mises’ “crackup boom,” the welfare state will collapse of its own weight, and those of us armed with the right ideas will be able to step out of the darkness and help lead the country back to peace and prosperity.

Either way, we must fight on every front to advance the ideals of liberty and engage the leftists (many Republicans included) in debate. We can no longer blame our politicians, but must heed our own advice and take the individual initiative and personal responsibility to ourselves battle to make this country once again a shining city upon a hill. Nothing less than the future of the nation depends on it.