By Claus Vistesen, on November 16th, 2009
As I am preparing for a tournament this weekend in Sweden I only have time for some random shots, but then again; taking random shots seem to be exactly what the markets are all about at the moment. The first such random shot came from today’s release of the GDP figures from Europe which showed, with much fanfare, how the Eurzone (and Europe) is now effectively out of recession.
(quote Bloomberg)
The euro-area economy emerged from its worst recession since World War II in the third quarter as exports from Germany and France helped compensate for households’ reluctance to increase spending Gross domestic product in the economy of the 16 nations using the euro rose 0.4 percent from the second quarter, when it fell 0.2 percent, the European Union’s statistics office in Luxembourg said today. Economists had forecast the economy to grow 0.5 percent, according to the median of 34 estimates in a Bloomberg survey.
Europe’s economy is gathering strength after governments stepped up stimulus measures and the European Central Bank injected billions of euros into markets to encourage lending. While confidence in the economic outlook is at a 13-month high, rising unemployment, the expiration of stimulus plans and a surging euro are threatening to undermine a recovery. “The euro-zone economy has officially turned the corner and that is cause for relief, but not celebration,” said Martin van Vliet, a senior economist at ING Bank in Amsterdam. “The economy remains in a fragile state and is recovering mainly because of government stimulus and temporary inventory effects.”
Now, before we get ahead of ourselves, the comments by Mr. van Vliet should, as I would assume the comments from any other proper economist, alert us to the fact the current impressive figure, while not a figment of imagination, is indeed driven by decidedly imaginative factors in so far as goes the idea of a sustained recovery. In this way, one off government spending which, by nature, cannot be sustained indefinitely as well as a less severe bout of inventory reduction by part of companies (which may of course be a forward looking indicator) do not in themselves make a recovery.
Add to this that behind the headline figure for EU16 and EU27 of 0.4% and 0.2% GDP growth qoq respectively lies a decidedly murkier picture. Consequently, Greece and the UK continued to spend the third quarter in recession (-0.3 and -0.4 qoq respectively) and then we have poor Spain of course where the horror show of a recession continues without showing any signs (-0.3 qoq), whatsoever, of abating. It is noteworhty in this respect to consider the stark contrast between the European economies in the context of the latest aggregate confidence reading conducted by Bloomberg;
Bloomberg users in Spain remained the most pessimistic in Europe as that nation stayed mired in recession, with unemployment soaring toward 20 percent and the economy struggling to recover from a construction-industry collapse. The Spain confidence index was 17.7 this month from 10 in October.
So, the divergences are growing inside Europe and already they must be hard at work in Frankfurt to try to knit to together a strategy to suit all the individual economies of the Eurozone. The point is of course that they can’t and it will indeed be interesting to see how they manage this particular challenge in the future. Before we get to that though and, one would assume, any talk of lifting nominal interest rates from their current low levels we need to get over the hurdle of when and how to pull back “extraordinary measures” of monetary policy.
And here, this is not only about the ECB.
Consequently, and with the small exception of the BOE where Mervyn King recently left it an open question of whether the BOE would buy additional gilts, the three major central banks have all upped their discourse on the winding down of asset purchases in the context of the Fed and BOJ and “enhanced credit support” in relation to the ECB.
In Frankfurt and elsewhere, the outlook on these exit strategies remain opaque except to say that with the continuing emphasis by part of central banks most market commentators expect these measures to be withdrawn some time in Q1-Q2 2010 with the notable exception that the ECB seems to have indicated that the liquidity offering (12 month) coming in December will be the last.
Without going too much into detail [1] it appears to me that central bankers may end up in trouble on account of those exit strategies and how to instigate them into a 2010 “post stimulus” slowdown. This is not so much because I cannot see the impetus to exit in itself, but rather because if now is not the time to exit, how can you argue in the first half of 2010 that it is?
Surely, on this account I would give them an A+ in so far as goes the attempt to prepare markets, but I am more uncertain as to which they will also be able to actually deliver the exit strategy to the tune of the same grade. We will see I guess; for now, I hope that they are not taking, what will turn out to be, random shots at volatile asset prices and premature signs of non-materialising recoveries.
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[1] This will have to wait for another time.
By Claus Vistesen, on October 14th, 2009
What follows is the reason that last week was completely quiet here at Alpha.Sources. Essentially, I was working away on a detailed look at the ECB’s balance and the related question of whether we can call, what it is that ECB the is doing quantiative easing or not? Needless to say, I think that this question is an important one in a general context since if I am right and if the crisis has indeed now moved to the center and periphery of Europe, in stead of the US, then a close look at the ECB’s policies is not only merited, but quite important.
With the distinct risk of turning this into a cheesy copy of the Oscars show I should thank Edward Hugh for his patient and thorough back-editing of the piece for English language as well as the actual arguments themselves. All mistakes and mishaps naturally fall entirely on my shoulders and criticism should be directed accordingly. I reproduce the executive summary below and the full report is online here where you can view it in Google Docs or download it as a PDF. The analysis includes data up until week 35 (and July for the monthly data). If you want a copy of the spread sheet, please let me know.
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Executive Summary
Is the ECB deploying a variant of Quantitative Easing in any fashion, way, shape or form?
If you are talking about Quantitative Easing senso strictu then my answer has to be a simple and straightforward no. However, if we stop being quite so by the letter of the book, and broaden our definition slightly, then I would strongly suggest that the battery of credit enhancing measures put in place by the ECB when taken together with
the steady increase in securities accepted onto the balance sheet as collateral, do make it evident that the ECB – whether wittingly or unwittingly – has moved into some form of what we could at least call “quasi” Quantitative Easing.
Is the ECB indirectly monetizing the debt issuance of Eurozone governments?
If my initial answer to this question – before actually going through the books – would have been an outright yes, I now feel the need to tread much more carefully on this point, since I have most definitely not been able to conjure up that proverbial smoking gun. In fact, it has proved very difficult to establish any kind of direct link between the amount of funding drawn from the ECB refinancing operations and the purchase of government bonds by the MFIs at the national level.
This is not to say, however, that circumstantial evidence is not available that this process is taking place to some extent, and in some countries. I do believe, for example, that the massive purchase by Spanish MFIs of government bonds in that country does offer prima facie evidence that some such connection may well exist, and thus all I can say at this point is that further research is called for, and especially a much more detailed and discriminating data-mining dig-down.
What are the prospects and possibilities for a viable exit strategy for the ECB from its non-standard monetary policy measures?
The measures collectively known as Enhanced Credit Support are by their very nature flexible. However, if there is anything we have learnt from the operation of monetary policy in Japan over the last twenty years it is that premature exit from the sort of substantial support the ECB is offering only makes matters worse, and in addition
this kind of massive liquidity easing is a lot easier to get into than it is to get out of.
A true economic recovery will inevitably be somewhat selective, and it is at this point that the ECB’s problems will really start, since the recovery will begin in some countries and not in others. To take the extreme case: it will be awfully hard to maintain massive monetary easing for a Spanish economy which remains stuck in an “L” shaped non-recovery if in France headline GDP growth were to start to tick back again towards – say – 2%. Then the real dilemmas which face the ECB will begin in earnest. As such, it is going to be much more difficult for the ECB to instigate that dearly beloved exit strategy than many currently like to believe.
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By Claus Vistesen, on October 9th, 2009
I should immediately reassure my readers that I am not going to re-account or even continue Macro Man’s story of 2007 in which Sherlock Holmes was looking for a vanishing bid in risky assets. Also, I am not sure that we are actually looking at a bid which will vanish but one which will perhaps taper off gradually or so at least is the estimated scenario policy makers would like markets to believe in. Of course, recent messages from the BOJ suggested a very cautious stance towards the economic outlook and although the ECB’s chairman Trichet has ardently argued that an exit strategy from extraordinary financing provisions, the statement that, now is not the time to exit, still echoes most of the official messages coming from the ECB.
But perhaps more important than when to exit is the question of how and whether indeed it will be so easy and simple for central banks to simply wind down the supply of medicine. In the context of the ECB for example, I remain rather sceptical.
However, this day is all about the Fed decision and although I only rarely delve into account of US monetary policy decisions (comparative advantage you know!) this one is important since it was always going to be parsed very closely for signs of hawkishness on rates on the one side as well as indications of the future wind down of asset purchases. Now, for those who expected a big bang, I have to side with Macro Man that it seems to be much ado about nothing in the sense that the Fed basically reiterated the general view that although economic activity had been showing positive signs lately and especially in the context of leading indicators pointing to a strong bounce in Q3 and Q4 activity, the fundamentals of very low capacity utilisation and deleveraging across the real economy remain intact. In the context of Fed speak this translates into maintaining the current rate target at the zero bound and the the forward looking statement that rates are to kept low for an extended period;
Conditions in financial markets have improved further, and activity in the housing sector has increased. Household spending seems to be stabilizing, but remains constrained by ongoing job losses, sluggish income growth, lower housing wealth, and tight credit. Businesses are still cutting back on fixed investment and staffing, though at a slower pace; they continue to make progress in bringing inventory stocks into better alignment with sales. Although economic activity is likely to remain weak for a time, the Committee anticipates that policy actions to stabilize financial markets and institutions, fiscal and monetary stimulus, and market forces will support a strengthening of economic growth and a gradual return to higher levels of resource utilization in a context of price stability.
With substantial resource slack likely to continue to dampen cost pressures and with longer-term inflation expectations stable, the Committee expects that inflation will remain subdued for some time.
In these circumstances, the Federal Reserve will continue to employ a wide range of tools to promote economic recovery and to preserve price stability. The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and continues to anticipate that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period.
So far so good then and this was really all we needed, one would imagine, to extent the rally in risky assets as well as the downward trend in the USD as the new funding currency for carry traders and others of their ilk. So far, there has been no signs of panic anywhere and everything seems to be all engines go.
Meanwhile, the Fed did actually give away some details as to how the future bout of asset purchases are to be conducted. On the matter of treasury purchases the Fed will its total purchase of $300 billion by the end of October. Most of us would naturally like to be able to predict what this will to do yields and prices and really you could spin this two ways. In the context of supply side worries, the Fed’s withdrawal from the treasury market should push down yields if we add the, perhaps dubious assumption, that the $300 billion worth of supply of treasury bills has only been there to the extent that the Fed has been the main bidder (Say’s law and everything). On the other hand it could also push up yields in a world where one assumes that there has been a decisive need to issue such bills and now that the Fed is stepping aside new buyers must step in and notwithstanding those with a printing press of their own, it should push up yields. Although this may seem quite innocuous and technical (i.e. unimportant) it may turn out to be important in a general context when it comes to the ability of economies (not just the US) to lift themselves out of the mire without the crutches of stimulus to lean on.
In the context of the Fed’s outright asset purchases, the statement delivered good news for bulls/doves in so far as goes the fact that although the Fed was invariably going to issue a deadline, it seems to have been pushed somewhat out in the distance; well, at least a quarter. Consequently, the Fed will buy $1.25 trillion of agency mortgage-backed securities and up to $200 billion of agency debt, purchases which are set to be concluded by the end of the first quarter and not by year end which was the final date I had been led to believe judged by the points made in various economics report digested over the last week.
So, it is here perhaps that we may be looking at a disappearing bid in the context of the Fed gradually but surely reducing its presence in the market for MBS turds not to mention the agency market which went belly up as Fannie and Freddie crashed and burned. In the nice soothing light of efficient markets it is difficult to expect the decision to wind down purchases to be a big market mover as long as the incoming bout of data continues to provide plenty of upside and no downside. But if we get a setback just around the time when the Fed had envisioned to stand down its most aggressive measures of QE, one finds it difficult not to expect general sentiment and thus, in a forward looking perspective, real economic activity to take a hit which is exactly what we would all like to avoid; the double dip recession or “WL” recession if you will.
Ultimately, it is of course all still a great big mess, something which was neatly conveyed by the way Bloomberg handled the message carried by the IMF envoy to the G20 summit. On the one hand, the IMF was quoted for urging central banks to map a viable and transparent exit strategy and on the other hand Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn was quoting for urging policy makers to not withdraw fiscal stimulus to quickly. Lost in translation are we?
Well, I am perhaps being unfair here to the editors of Bloomberg not to mention the IMF in particular since ultimately; talking about exit strategies is not the same thing as enforcing them. However, I do feel rather strongly about the need to make the following point that the two are of course intimately connected and withdrawing QE cannot but affect the trajectory of fiscal stimulus. This is a point which I believe for example is absolutely crucial to understand in the context of the Eurozone where the ECB’s refinancing operations seem to be implicitly underpinning national governments’ efforts to shore up their capsized economies.
In this context and assuming that both the BOJ and the ECB will be trailing the Fed somewhat, it will be most interesting to see whether Bernanke manages withdraw the bid on financial markets currently offered by the Fed’s policies and indeed whether others may follow in his footsteps and withdraw theirs.
By J.D. Seagraves, on February 5th, 2009
“How is the Fed’s performance in the present economy,” asks The Citizen Economists’ Poll. “They’re doing excellent,” say a sarcastic and/or deranged 5 percent of respondents. Twenty-one percent say they’re “doing okay,” and another 12 percent say “pretty good.” But the most popular answer is “horrible,” which leads polling with 30 percent, and the second-place answer is more radical yet: 25 percent of respondents say, “We should get rid of them.”
Support for abolishing the Federal Reserve System is mounting every day. Hundreds of anti-Fed protesters convened on the Federal Reserve Bank of Detroit, where they joined former Governor Jesse Ventura, The Creature of Jeckyll Island author G. Edward Griffin, and Libertarian Scotty Boman in calling for a return to the gold standard. Eleven thousand people broke into several impromptu chants of “End the Fed!” at Ron Paul’s Minneapolis counter-convention this past September, and Google searches for “Austrian Economics”—the school of economic thought most vociferous against fiat money and central banking—are have spiked dramatically in the past year. This all begs the question: Why are so many people suddenly interested in what has for years been considered a “boring” subject? Well, it wasn’t always viewed that way.
Monetary Policy: Once a Burning Issue
The presidential elections of 1896 and 1900 were almost entirely about monetary policy. The “conservatives,” for lack of a better term, were the “hard money” camp—they supported a strong gold standard. The “radicals” wanted a government-managed fiat-money system much like we have today—only they were naïve enough to believe it would be to the benefit of the working man, rather than a vehicle to serve the interests of the elite. And finally, there were the “moderates”—those who favored a middle-of-the-road position in which silver would be coined in addition to gold, thereby causing inflation which, believe it or not, the moderates and the radicals thought was a good thing.
All three of these constituencies existed primarily within the Democratic Party. The “conservatives” were in fact the classical-liberal wing, led by staunch gold man Grover Cleveland. The “radicals” were Midwestern farmers who had broken with the Dems in the previous election and formed the Populist Party, winning 5 percent of the electoral vote in 1892 and nearly costing Grover Cleveland the election. Stepping in to “unify” the party was William Jennings Bryan, a staunchly anti-gold populist but loyal Democrat who did not go as far as the Populist Party. Instead, he was a “silver fusionist.” Bryan won the Democratic nomination in 1896 and 1900, losing in the general election both times to William McKinely (who was nominally pro-gold), and changing the Democratic Party forever, for the worse.
Now think about how much has changed since the turn of the 20th century: disputes over monetary policy were the basis of a third-party presidential campaign that grabbed 8 percent of the vote and won five states, led to a civil war within the Democratic Party and the realignment of the two-party system, and were the major issue discussed in at least two consecutive presidential elections. The American people were engaged and educated, and didn’t fall for bogus platitudes about “change,” “mavericks,” “yes, we can,” and “country first,” etc.—they understood the real issues that affected their daily lives, and nothing could possibly be more critical than the money question.
Why The Monetary System is So Important
And why is that? Well, when the government has control of the monetary system, it can manipulate it for the benefit of some and to the detriment of others. Ultimately, this government manipulation is always to its own benefit and at the expense of the people.
For example, under a hard-money gold standard, paper dollars can only be created if there were real gold coins to back them. Thus, unless there is new gold, there can be no new money. Inflation—which is correctly defined as the expansion of the money supply—did occur under the gold standard as new gold was mined, but only very slowly. As a result, there was no “price inflation” whatsoever. That’s because the advances in technology and accumulated capital more than offset the rate of monetary expansion, and thus, consumer prices went down a little year after year.
But when the government claims for itself the right to print paper money out of thin air—notes that aren’t backed by gold—and uses its military might to force people to accept those notes, there is a recipe for exploitation.
Inflation = Theft
Think of it this way: Imagine there is $1 trillion in total world currency. Paper money itself, of course, is worthless—it’s what you can exchange the money for that’s important. So if the total money supply was $1 trillion, then all of the world’s wealth—all the factories, the natural resources, the finished goods, etc.—would be worth $1 trillion. Now what happens when the government creates $0.1 trillion new dollars? It doesn’t expand the supply of factories, resources, and goods—only the money that the values of those items are denominated in. All existing wealth would now be worth $1.1 trillion, since the total wealth would still be equal to the total money supply. Only now, the $1 bill in your pocket would be worth $1/$1.1 trillion instead of $1/$1 trillion—you’d have just been robbed of 10 percent of your purchasing power.
And that purchasing power doesn’t just disintegrate—it’s redistributed. First, it goes from you to the government, just like a (hidden) tax. And then it goes from the government to its favored industries. This is why corporations spend so much time and money lobbying Congress instead of developing more competitive products: it’s easier to bribe the government to give them your money than it is to convince you to part with it willingly in exchange for better products and services.
Clearly, the intelligence of the average American has fallen precipitously since the elections of 1896 and 1900. But the fact that people are beginning to wake up to the problems caused by the Federal Reserve System is a hopeful sign. The only question is: is it too late? Can the dollar be saved by the political action of the president and the Congress, or must we wait for the entire global financial system to completely melt down so we can start over? If you’re an optimist you can hope for the former, but as a realist, I think the latter is the better bet.
By J.D. Seagraves, on January 14th, 2009
To partisans of the Austrian theory of the business cycle, the cause of the current financial crisis is as plain as day — and that’s why we’ve been predicting it for years. You would think that the neo-Keynesians, monetarists, and Marxists who made fun of us Austrians in 2006 and 2007, and said we’d never have a housing meltdown and financial crisis exactly like the one we’re having now, would come over to our way of thinking — or at least acknowledge that we were right in this one case. But instead, they continue to make fun of us and deride the gold standard as “quackery.” Have they no shame?
Apparently not. And it shouldn’t be surprising. After all, followers of non-Austrian schools are practitioners of non-reality based economics. To them, economics is a religious faith. Since everything is make-believe, they can just pretend that the Austrian school didn’t predict this crisis years ago and that they weren’t poo-pooing those predictions. They can pretend that the Phillips Curve has validity and that stagflation is impossible. They can even delude themselves into thinking that Herbert Hoover was a laissez-faire “do-nothing” and FDR’s New Deal “got us out of the Depression” — or worse yet, that war is good for the economy!
Believing in any of these bogus ideas is akin to medieval doctors practicing the humoural theory of medicine. It was the official doctrine of the church, and therefore, it was accepted even when it was clearly false. Today, the state has replaced the church and Keynesianism is the official state religion.
Why don’t more economists recognize the reality staring them in the face? Well, for one, they’re educated in government-controlled schools. Only two universities in the entire United States do not accept federal money, and as central banking and fiat money are vital tools of Big Government, little else is going to be taught. What’s more, over 50 percent of professional economists in the United States work for the government, with 32 percent working directly for the feds. How can we expect economists to be objective on the question of central banking when their paychecks are monetized by the Federal Reserve? Heck, a huge share of the world’s economists are employed directly by central banks!
So it’s no surprise that “respected” economists — propagandists, really — are pro-Fed. Only one central-banking critic has ever won the Nobel prize: F.A. Hayek of the Austrian school. The greatest economists of the 20th century — Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard — never got the recognition they deserved. But as the predictions they made continue to come true, one has to wonder how long the general public will maintain its faith in the high-priests of economic voodoo that dominate the economics profession.
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