There are four perspectives on this question which are worth noting:

1. There is an obvious gap between the power structure at the IMF, which reflects the way the structure of the world economy after the Second World War, as compared with the present reality. As an example, at present, the Netherlands has 2.08% while India has 2.35%. But the Indian GDP is now $1.6 trillion while Netherlands is at half that.
2. The world would benefit from a competent and capable IMF. The best man (or woman) for the job will not be obtained by having any restrictions on nationality. As an example, in today’s world, a name that leaps out to me is Stan Fischer. But he’s not European, and hence was never even considered for the top job in the last decade. (As with Montek, he is now over age 65 and is hence not eligible for the job today). Given that a large fraction of the top economists of the world are not European, this rule yields a less capable IMF.
3. I feel that a quota system where the IMF MD must now be from an emerging market is as bad as a quota system where the IMF MD is only recruited from a European country. The key is to get away from all these quota systems, to only recruit the best person for the job. The emphasis should be on technical capability. The person recruited should be a technical expert and not a politican. As an example, see how in the UK, they recruited an American into their Monetary Policy Committee.
4. In the standard narrative, one hears the idea that in this crisis in Europe, the Europeans are gaining from their
   control of the IMF. I feel this is absolutely wrong. In the Asian crisis, it was good for Asia that the IMF was not conflicted
   by considerations of domestic Asian politics. Similarly, the IMF program in India in 1981 and 1991 was uncontaminated by domestic Indian political considerations. This helped produce a technically sound program, which helped jumpstart India’s growth. It is not accidental that we see structural breaks in India’s GDP growth around these two dates.

What Europe needs most is a tough IMF, which will be a stern taskmaster, which will force difficult political choices so as to heal the economy. Economic policy in Europe today needs to be cruel to be kind. Instead, by placing a string of career politicians from France into the IMF MD’s job, the valuable role which the IMF could have played in solving the European Crisis is being negated. This damages Europe. The wise thing for Europe today is to say: Give us a tough and competent taskmaster, and let him be
anything in the world but let him not be a European politican. The biggest loser from the present arrangement is Europe.

Using the new method, the authors examined poverty rates in four Indian provinces and evaluated the approach in comparison to the existing income method which had been used in economic and policy analysis by the World Bank and other institutions of economic development. The authors found a significant divergence of poverty rates when measured in both methods. For instance, under Alkire-Foster approach, the poverty rate in Indian state Jharkhand is 50 percent higher compared to the rate of poverty measured under the income method. On the other hand, the authors of the new poverty measure have shown that in some Indian provinces such as Uttaranchal (link), the official measure of poverty highly over-estimates the effective poverty measure as defined by Oxford’s Poverty and Human Development Initiative. The multidimensional worldwide poverty index is also availible on the web (link).

The intuitive question arising from the data and empirical research on poverty is whether higher economic growth in less developed countries boosts the growth of income per capita and what is the role of institutional characteristics in economic development. The authors of the above-mentioned measure of poverty have shown that despite abundant economic growth in past years and falling income poverty rates, the share of population without access to clean water, sanitation and minimum required nutrition remained unchanged. The percentage of malnourished children in India decreased from 47 percent in 1998-98 to 46 percent 2005-06.

The theoretical and empirical literature on economic growth suggests that there is an inverse U-relationship between inequality and income per capita known as Kuznets curve (link). The intuition behind the relationship is simple. At the very low levels of income per capita, income inequality is low. Alongside the course of growing income per capita, income inequality steeply increases and, after reaching a maximum, it decreases as countries achieve higher levels of income per capita. The rate of income inequality is closely related to the evolution of economic policies over time. Wagner’s law, discussed in one of the previous posts, states that government spending over time increases due to long-run income elastic demand for public goods and capture of the democratic system by the particular interest groups that pose a permanent pressure on the growth of government spending and resist the reversals of government expenditures by trading votes.

There’s a wide array of disagreement among economists on the effect of income inequality on economic growth. Back in 2001, Joseph Stiglitz re-examined the East Asian economic miracle and concluded that the evidence from the period of high economic growth in East Asian countries suggests that income redistribution has a positive effect on economic growth (link). Stiglitz’s argument is based on the income distribution in East Asian countries during the economic miracle. East Asian countries have been known for relatively even distribution of income demonstrated by high Gini index and relatively high income tax rates.

On the other hand, the empirical investigation of the initial conditions in East Asian countries before the economic miracle shows that the political influence of interest groups had been relatively weak compared to Western Europe after the World War 2 when the productivity growth stalled from early 1970s onwards. The relative weakness of interest groups and a stable judicial system, inherited from English common law tradition, enabled high economic growth in the longer run given an enduring stability of property rights protection and the rule of law. In such conditions, income redistribution had relatively little effect on economic growth since the empirics of East Asian miracle suggests that the sizable proportion of growth in East Asian countries (Malaysia, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan) had been driven by technological progress, investment and export orientation. Considering export orientation, Rodrik et. al (2005) provided the evidence (link) on the positive effect of high-quality export orientation on economic growth. The productivity growth in East Asian countries between 1975 and 1990 had been a pure example of economic miracle defined by the share of growth that could not be explained by the contribution of labor and capital input. In Taiwan and Hong Kong (link), total factor productivity accounted for about 60 percent of output per capita growth. Between 1975 and 1990, in Singapore, output per capita had increased by 8.0 percent. Consequently, the resulting outcome of almost two decades of robust productivity growth had been a significant decrease in national poverty rates (link). The lowest poverty rate, as defined by the measures of home authorities, is in Taiwan where 0.95 of the population live below the poverty threshold.

The basic set of policies that alleviate extreme poverty such as providing access to clean water, nutrition, medical protection against HIV/AIDS and basic sanitary standards have a positive effect on the economic growth and the standard of living. However, the major cause of persistent under-development in Subsaharan and Tropical Africa is mostly the lack of institutional enforcement of property rights, the rule of law and independent judiciary. In spite of billions of USD of direct foreign aid, countries such as Zambia, Sierra Leone, Mali and Rwanda endure in persistent poverty and under-development. Esther Duflo, this year’s recipient of John Bates Clark Award, has shown in several studies how field experiments can enlighten the understanding of incentives in least developed countries (link). Understanding the significance of incentives in reducing poverty is crucial to further examination of the relationship betwen income inequality and economic growth.

Question: History reveals that every international crisis leaves a lasting mark on the world, once the crisis is over and the difficulties it brought have been encountered, things tend to change. Similarly, do you think that the current global economic crisis must lead to a fundamental reassessment of how power and influence is expressed through the world?

I belive that the current financial crisis have accentuated what we already knew and what has been present in the data and the discourse for some time. Specifically I am talking about the idea that big emerging markets such as India, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Chile, Turkey etc have slowly but steadily taken over as the global powerhouses in terms of economic growth and thus it is also natural that they are gunning for more political and institutional power. When it comes to financial crises in particular the latest batch of proposals from the Obama administration to regulate the financial industry is another and more micro oriented theme which is a recurring event in the context of economic crises. Crises are often, in this way, catalysts for abrupt discrete changes in the economic and political environment.

Ultimately then I think that this fundamental reassessment of power and influence in the world (both politically and economically) have not been initiated by this crisis but it may be reinforced.

Question: As the Great Depression paved the way to World War II and to a new world order, how far the present crisis produce grave repercussions on the global economic order?

This intimately depends on how you define world order naturally. If I have to point towards the most enduring change which appears to have come on the back on this crisis it is the attitude to debt and long term sustainability of public finances. Those of us who have been interested in demographics and its effect on macroeconomic processes have long been waiting for (and predicting) the inflection point where the mismatch between expensive welfare systems and the increasingly broken demographic structure as as result of persistently below replacement fertility. In this way, the ability to take on debt today as a liability for the future and despite the theatricals on sovereign spreads and CDS on Greek and Spanish government debt, are in fact fundamentally driven by long term liability problems. For an excellent excursion into this topic in the context of Australia/New Zealand and beyond I warmly recommend this one by John Hempton.

Extrapolating to the idea of a new economic order this brings us into a fundamental dilemma. With every part of the national identity overlevered [1] and in need to rebuild their balance sheet most economies are looking to the last part of the identity to make up for the shortfall of savings; the external balance. The problem is that not everyone can export excess savings (i.e. run a current account surplus) at the same time. In my opinion this is where the big new emerging economies come in and despite by personal skepticism towards China pulling the world anywhere it remains obvious that those who can reasonably be expected to run sustainable net external borrowing positions (i.e. current account deficits) are exactly those economies mentioned above who are about to ascend as the new drivers of economic growth. If they don’t, it is not easy to see where the growth is going to come from.

Question: The world financial crisis has been a defining moment in the ascension of emerging economies onto the international economic stage. Please comment.

Not really. In my opinion this goes back to the idea of decoupling from the US economy and how, before the crisis, many observers had their hopes pinned on the Eurozone (and the Euro) as well as Japan (and the JPY) to take over the baton from the US economy in steering forward global demand. In the context of Bretton Woods II this seemed a turkey shoot of an argument. Just de-peg from the US dollar and re-peg to the Euro and it is all engines go. Obviously, this was always going to be a mirage and essentially a smoke screen puffed up by those who have a fundamental desire to see the US economy fail and cave in on itself. So, why this detour in answering the question above?

Well, quite simply, the world “decoupled” for the US and indeed the advanced (G7) economies a long time ago.

From 1980 to 2008 the share of total world GDP made up by G7 economies declined from 51.33% to 42% and the corresponding figure for newly industrialised Asian economies rose from 7.17% to 21% and according to IMF this trend is set to continue. This is the real decoupling and it represents a major structural change in the global economy which goes far beyond the current financial and economic turmoil. Whether there will be anything particularly defining about the role of emerging economies as a result of the financial crisis is too early to say. A sovereing default in Greece or elsewhere in the Eurozone should increasingly make investors aware that global risk is not primarily present in emerging markets but actually right at the heart of the G7 and OECD edifice. Perhaps this will be a definining moment, but the general ascend of big emerging economies to the center of the world stage is not a product of the current turmoil.

Question: To what extent will emerging economies remain the drivers of global economic growth in 2010?

To a very large extent I would argue. In 2010 the IMF estimates (in their October 2009 Outlook) that the world economy will resume growing at an annual rate of 3.1% after having contracted by -1.06% in 2009. Breaking this up on the major advanced economies (G7) and developing and emerging economies the IMF estimates that the former will grow by 1.7% and the latter by 5.1% in 2010. Yet this difference does not tell the whole story. Consider then the fact that measured in US dollars (current prices) the share of world GDP made up by the G7 as well as the emerging and developing economies was 53.8% and 30.7% respectively. Yet still, and out of a total estimated value of 2010 world GDP growth at trn 3.267 USD the G7 is expected to contribute to this with only trn 1135 USD while emerging and developing economies are expected to contribute with trn 1674 USD.

More generally, this is a tendency we should expect to continue. Consequently and while global GDP forecasts into 2014 are quite fickle, forecasts by the IMF has the current price value of total world output (in USD) rising from trn 60.429 USD in 2010 to trn 74.660 USD in 2014. Out of these trn 14.165 USD, the G7 and the emerging and developed world are expected to contribute with trn 4886 USD and trn 7871 USD respectively.

In this way and I hope that my readers will forgive me the excessive arithemetic; if we take the IMF’s forecast to heart, emerging markets are definitely going to be the main drivers of global headline GDP growth in 2010 and beyond.

Question: As the evolving international order is going to be Asia centered and polycentric for a variety of reasons. Do you think that India is ready to play a larger role to ensure stability, security and peace in the world?

I sure hope so. A lot of the future stake of the global economy is pinned on India, China, Brazil, etc to develop and evolve both politically and economically. India already plays a very big role in the global economy, but is somewhat dwarfed (in terms of attention at least) by China. However, I believe this will change. Despite some well described and severe issues with a growing gender gap (which is also an issue in China) India is set to enjoy a much more stable and slow demographic transition into old age than China who will age very quickly due to its one child policy.

In this sense I forsee that India will slowly but surely take over from China as the big global emerging economy powerhouse. However, and beyond the obvious political responsibility this entails it also comes with an economic ditto. Thus, one of the biggest problems with China is that she will never be able to run a respectable external deficit that would resolve and alleviate global macroeconomic imbalances. A deliberate mercantilist policy and the effects of the one child policy which strips the economy of the capacity to suck up its own (let alone foreign) savings are two crucial factors here. In my opinion we have one shot to correct these global imbalance and much will hinge upon India (and the rest of the emerging pack) here. Specifically, India must ensure that the demographic transition is kept in check from below as well as, currently, from above. By this I mean that Indian must ensure that it does not fall into a fertility trap with total fertility rates lingering below 1.5 children per woman. Secondly, India should shy away from mercantilist policy. Standard economic theory tells us that external borrowing is not an ill if matched by a sound and long term oriented investment policy as well as capacity in the economy proxied by a large share of young to mature workers out of the total population.

Especially the argument on preventing fertility to fall too far and too rapidly is quite politically incorret at the current juncture with climate and overpopulation (still) dominating the discourse. However, it is crucial in my opinion that we are able to differentiate the debate to look at both sides of this coin. Otherwise, India and the rest of us will regre it.

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[1] – (investments, consumption and the government)

Update: Mr. Singh posts the third and, as far as I know, last installment in the series on Asia’s outlook written on the basis of the Regional Economic Outlook for the Asian and Pacific Region. The topic is perhaps the most interesting of all aspects of Asia’s aggregate economy, the high prevalence of savings and its excess over investment which produces a corresponding external surplus which, I’d might add, is structural at this point. See below for more comments.

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In case you had not noticed, the IMF is blogging and it is not “merely” the garden variety IMF staffers they are rolling out to fill the pages; nope here we are treated to the likes of Blanchard, Atkinson, Lipsky, Cottarelli and a host of other of the Fund’s A-listers. Consequently, it would seem that in an already (over)crowded world of econblogging, the IMFdirect blog merits more than a little bit attention.

In the past week, the dual post coverage by Mr. Anoop Singh of the recent Regional Economic Outlook for the Asian and Pacific Region caught my attention in particular. In the first, Mr. Singh invokes among other things the puzzle of Asia’s relatively sharp recovery given the notion that the region is largely dependent on exports to grow. Two reasons especially are important here. One is the simple fact that as these economies moved into the crisis with bulging coffers (especially on the reserves vis-a-vis the rest of the world), the room for fiscal manoeuvre was greater and it was used decisively. According to calculations by the IMF, the collective stimulus programs in the Asia-Pacific region added 1.75% to GDP growth in the first half of 2009 and it makes the programs even more generous than those observed in the OECD and other emerging markets. Secondly, Asian economies has benefited from the, so far, V-shaped comeback by part of the global economy and key regions who are likely to grow smartly in h02-2009.

In general, Mr. Singh’s analysis appears cautiously tied to the great unknown of 2010 where it appears that we will see whether all those battered economies of the world will be able to hold their own in a world where quantitative easing from central banks and lax fiscal policies are withdrawn rather than enacted. Here, Singh’s remarks echo the general discourse where the the underlying tone is one of skepticism. A long period of risky asset buoyancy coupled with upbeat economic data releases have proved before to be crying wolf of an impending recovery and policy makers are advised to take this into account.

It is hard for me to disagree with Mr. Singh that the green shoots observed in the Spring of 2009 seem way too shaky a foundation on which to build a narrative of recovery. Yet, this is exactly what has happened and the famous inflection point will be reached when we discover that the recovery observed thus has been because of and not despite monetary and fiscal stimulus which makes the enforcement of exit strategies going into 2010 a very interesting experiment in the making. Some will make it, some won’t and some will inevitably fall back into recession (not just in Asia).

However, the most important part of Singh’s argument and indeed the most important part of IMF’s analysis in general is the question of whether Asia’s economic trajectory, in a post stimulus/recovery context, will be driven by domestic demand or not? To put it in the most reductionist form. Will Asia be a provider of net capacity to the global or economy or not? If yes, it would mean that a post crisis Asia had truly emerged as something new in the form of a force of a real addition to total demand. If not, it would mean that Asia would revert to old tricks and habits of relying on exports and foreign asset income to propel growth in national income.

Now, leaving the question of the number of export dependent economies the world economy can muster neatly to the side, I am not so optimistic here on Asia’s contribution to the rebalancing of global imbalances through a net expansion of domestic demand. Yet, let me also immediately qualify here that I am not very comfortable with talking about Asia/Pacific in one both because of the obvious heterogeneity amongst the economies, but more importantly; also because I am not really an expert here. I have done the analysis on Japan though and on this I can say with unequivocal certainty that we won’t we seeing any provision of excess domestic demand from this side.

Ultimately of course, Japan is of little real importance here and so is the rest of Asia really. What really matters on this topic is China and all the hopes currently pinned on her shoulders in the form of the ability of the economy to pull the global economy out of the mire. Traditionally, this has boiled down to a rather technical discussion about the RMB and an almost perennial Becketian wait for the shackles to break and an appreciating RMB to solve all problems. While I concede that the RMB should rise, it won’t solve any of the underlying problems inherent in China’s investment driven economy. Basically, chalk it down to culture and institutional specificity in the origin, but the simple fact remains I believe that just as China may evolve to become the economy we all hope and believe her to become (say in a 2020 context) the one child policy will have done its work so to speak and China will be sporting an OECD like age structure and is likely to even surpass many of OECD’s economies.

This is no recipe for an axis of rebalancing and although China will be the main story to follow for the immediate future I think we should look elsewhere to find the potential rebalancing candidates. This may indeed involve other parts of Asia (India for instance and Indonesia), but in the current discourse the likes of China, Japan (and Korea) hold little promise in terms of providing a decisive engine for rebalancing through sustainable growth in domestic demand which exceed the investment rate.

In this sense I remain cautious on the overall sustainability of the recovery in Asia mainly because of my skepticism towards the sustainability of overall global momentum where I acknowledge that I may be very wrong. Watch out for 2010 and all those exit strategies is what I say and particularly for the “post fiscal stimulus” world. This also means that I am more than a little bit skeptical on the prospects of a sustained recovery across Asia driven by domestic demand, especially in relation to Japan and China.

At least, this would be my humble argument here a murky Monday morning in Copenhagen. In any case, you might want to punch the IMFdirect blog into your RSS reader, just to make sure that you know what the IMF is up on a daily “research” basis.

During that same period of time, however, the Reserve Bank of Australia was raising interest rates to battle surging inflation and contain the effects of a huge influx of capital from soaring commodities prices and a 20% increase in their terms of trade. Flooding in Queensland coke mines and steady demand in Japan, India, South Korea and Taiwan caused the price of coal, Australia’s top export, to triple this year as fresh Chinese demand made it a seller’s market. Negotiated prices of iron ore, their second most important export, nearly doubled, again with Chinese impetus, and there’s really no reason to mention what happened to the prices for Australia’s other commodity goods, such as gold, crude oil, beef and copper.

Asia and Australia

Although there were clear signs the economic slowdown in the U.S. and Canada was spreading to the UK, it seemed that it would make no mark on the Australian and Asian boom, which had seemingly “decoupled” from the Western hemisphere’s problems. The demand surge for commodities in Asia, led by the insatiable maw of that newest kid on the block—you know, the one hosting the Olympic games—turned Australia’s trade deficit into a surplus in June 2008 and looked set to keep it that way for a long time.

After all, the reasoning went, 68.7% of Australia’s exports went to nations in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and another 12.8% went to China. Only 7.3% of all Australia’s exports went to the U.S., and that share was falling anyways. So if it declined further, well, there would be another hungry nation ready to take up the slack.

This decoupling theory for Australia and Asia gained popularity among traders who liked the down-under markets. In the second quarter of 2008, while credit market losses sent depository and investment banks reeling in the U.S. and UK, the Australian dollar embarked on an unbroken nine-week climb against the greenback. It looked amazingly similar to the Canadian dollar’s 17% surge against the U.S. dollar in 2007 that took it to parity and beyond, and foreign exchange traders confidently predicted the same would happen for the Aussie.

But something funny happened on the way to parity.

That creeping economic malaise from the U.S., Canada and the UK spread to their immediate trading partners, including the Eurozone and Japan, and from there it spread further as that other economic theory—globalization—reasserted itself. It took months because the U.S. slowdown began in the housing market, generally a domestic-only sector (not counting imported building materials), but the erosion of discretionary funds ate away at U.S. imports while the weak greenback made U.S. exports more affordable overseas, shifting the balance of trade in ever-spreading ripples across the globe. Partly due to these ripples, gross domestic product for Japan and the Eurozone are both expected to be in red ink for the second quarter of 2008, a point passed by the U.S. in the fourth quarter of 2007.

With global demand starting to fall, commodity prices slid to follow, and with such a large percentage of the Australian economy dependent upon commodity exports, it followed suit. On July 15, the exchange rate between the Australian dollar and the greenback touched 0.9848, a penny and a half beneath parity. Then on August 5, the Reserve Bank of Australia reached for the ax and announced that soon it would need to cut interest rates, too, like almost every other central bank around the world. The Aussie fell off the table, decoupled no more.

In the modern small market world, one might say, no economy is an island—not even Australia.