A Third Option

In many ways the monetary policy issue is even more important, simply because we are running out of rope on our national debt-addiction rappelling adventure and the floor is still 100′ down.  That’s a serious problem — and “gold standards” do not (in fact cannot!) fix it.  The only fix that works is to demand and enforce a zero-CPI standard with honest statistics, along with an end to federal government borrowing — period.  “Hard money” .vs. “Fiat money” is immaterial; if you permit fraud in the monetary and credit system, as we have, the rest simply does not matter and yet if you put a cork in the frauds and lock up the scammers then you quickly come to the conclusion that allowing a handful of producers of some metal, the majority of which are foreign entities, is the last group you want running your monetary policy!

The Paulites get this wrong and so does Ron Paul himself despite the historical fact that the United States had massive inflationary bubbles and detonations of them during the time it was on the Gold Standard.  1873 anyone (as just one example.)

The real problem in 1873 as with all other similar blowups was the issuance of bogus debt instruments unbacked by anything.  In the case of 1873 concentration was in railroads and related construction all financed by long-duration bonds (and therefore subject to high degrees of price risk due to their duration) but which were entirely-speculative and in fact for which there was no actual demand in the economy for the services (transportation to be provided by said railroads) at a level sufficient to meet the intended expense.  It didn’t help that we were playing games with our exports (and Europe with its imports) much as China and the US are today, effectively hiding the bubble’s impact for a period of time and allowing it to inflate to ridiculous size.  When the over-leveraged positions became exposed the game collapsed and the Long Depression followed. [Emphasis original.]

Denninger correctly notes that a gold standard, in and of itself, is not enough to prevent a bubble of any sort. He also correctly notes that enforcing a zero-CPI standard would fix the current currency mess. However, what he seems to neglect in his analysis is that the real problem is not with the proposed solutions, but the fact that the government has to enact and enforce them.

This then begs the obvious question: given the government’s obvious failures to prevent bubbles by keeping money honest, regardless of the money is metal or digital, why then even bother to put the government in charge of the money supply? They can’t manage it properly when gold is money, and they certainly can’t manage it properly when paper is used as money. Why then trust them with it?

The better solution is to simply allow currencies to freely compete with each other, which will have a strong tendency to ensure that currencies remain sound, strong, and free from inflation. By the way, there is one presidential candidate who has proposed legislation that would do exactly this. We all know who he is.

ECB/Fed Support for the European Banking System - 750 billion USD, and counting ...

One point that I have been shouting from the proverbial roof tops in my research, to partners and colleagues is that 2012 may well be the year when all major central banks will be conducting both conventional and unconventional monetary easing at the same time. I think this is a very strong testament not only to the severity of the ongoing debt crisis in the developed world, but also to the propensity of central banks to choose inflation as the  desired route to recovery. We need not initially discuss whether they are deploying the proper set of policies or even whether such policies represent moral hazard or a ponzi scheme on government debt.

The main thing is to realise that this is an unprecedented global monetary experiment.

My message to investors in 2012 would then be not to underestimate this inflation bias by part of global central banks. Inflating your way out of too much debt won’t work in the long run without considerable defaults and/or economic stress (hyper inflation). Events since 2008 are ample evidence of this, but the simultaneous inclination to create inflation and debase your currency (to generate more inflation and exports) by all major central banks will continue to exert a profound effect on asset prices and the global economy.

In so far as goes the idea that an investors’ interest in asset prices is conditioned on return and volatility we can say that central bank policy will affect both. Financial assets will certainly benefit from excess liquidity, but the unravelling of too much debt through inevitable defaults and the central bank policies themselves will generate volatility. Whether the combination of such volatility and return means that you should stay out of the market entirely is a question for the individual investor. I believe that

From a macroeconomic point of view, the downbeat assessment remains however that it is difficult if not impossible to paint a picture of where sufficient growth is going to come from and on the investment side of things, the higher level of volatility will tend to shake the foundation of investors even if money is to be made for short periods of time.

Most attention has been centered on the ECB, whether the 3y LTRO represent QE and whether the continuing rejection to buy government bonds outright means that the ECB is a laggard among global central banks (see this excellent report by Hinde Capital for additional analysis relative to the points below).

750 Billion USD,  and counting …

Europe remains the center of the global debt crisis, a role the continent has now decisively taken over from the US which stood at the forefront in the initial phases of the crisis in 2008. Apart from the almost endless summits and meetings among government officials the significant measures continue to be the ones coming from the ECB.

In my view, the European interbank market is virtually dead and dusted, and the ECB and the Fed are now effectively the only thing between Europe’s banks and large scale failures. Since early September 750 billion USD worth of liquidity has been provided to the European banking system of which 100 billion sits on the Fed balance sheet through USD swap lines.

Who will bet against the final 3y LTRO auction to take this beyond one trillion USD?

Spanish and Italian curves are now nicely steep again after a brush with inversion which obviously was one of the main objectives even if it was always debatable whether banks would buy government bonds with the liquidity taken up at the ECB.

The question is; how do you unwind all this? 750 billion USD to roll short term liabilities with the ECB and the Fed seems to me to be one of the biggest gamble in monetary history.

While the BOE and the Fed have been transparent in their QE efforts and the BOJ never really having left the zero bound the ECB has been more covert. However, it is my contention that with the expansion of the securities market programme (SMP) in 2011 to buy considerable amounts of government bonds (1) as well as the 3y LTRO the ECB is now fully engaged in quantitative easing.

I base this on two points.

  • The ECB has acted as a sovereign debt buyer of last resort in times of crisis. It is common knowledge in the market that the ECB has been Italian and Spanish bonds in times of particular stress on the notion that these two economies in particular could not be allowed to fatally succumb to the debt snowball dynamics.
  • ECB support for the banking system in the form of collateralised liquidity and wholesale funding is not temporary but structural and permanent in nature. The interbank market in Europe is not working and has not been working since the crisis started in 2008.

    The ECB will of course vehemently deny this but investors should understand that such denial is mainly out of political reasons.  When Draghi unveiled the ECB’s attempt to backstop the crisis in Europe by offering full allotment liquidity on a 3y basis, the market was disappointed because the central bank president also reiterated that the ECB would not step up its purchases of government bonds.

    I think that the ECB will be forced into a much more direct and active role where unsterilized purchases in the primary market (monetisation) will be needed, but I fully appreciate the political issues. We are currently in a delicate situation where new governments in most of the involved countries are saddled with forced mandates to impose austerity. It is very difficult for all parties involved to push this agenda if the ECB had stepped up a full backstop. Moral hazard risks are consequently paramount here.

    As such, investors must content with the ECB’s attempt to shore up the European banking system which is no little feat given the bank rollover schedule in 2012  as well as new Basel II regulation which will further impair already shaken balance sheets. The ECB’s initiatives then follows the steady deterioration of conditions in the European (indeed global) banking system which initially culminated in the coordinated action by global central banks to supply dollars through Fed swap lines and which found its European answer in the ECB’s decision to provide unlimited liquidity yet again.

    The problems look ominous for European banks and the global financial system in general. No matter what, European financial institutions will have to delever significantly which will spread its tentacles wide and far due to the high penetration by European banks in emerging markets (Eastern Europe in particular).

    Behind the scenes however, significant ink has been spilled to debate and speculate on to the exact significance of the ECB’s liquidity operations.

    John Hempton for example suggests that the ECB’s policy move is an open invitation to play the carry trade game using almost free liquidity to buy higher yielding government bonds.

    Well the Euro fix is in. Whether it works – that is another question. But the fix is this: European banks can borrow unlimited amounts for three years to buy Euro government debt. The debt often yields 5 percent. The money costs 1 percent.

    I agree that the incentives are certainly there for the banks to play this game especially in the context of government bonds as zero risk weighted assets. The problem is that many European banks have spent more than a year and two stress tests to get rid of substantial amount of peripheral government debt (which do not count as zero risk weighted assets according to Basel III) and as such weak governments are unlikely to benefit from this.

    The flip side of this is that most of the liquidity taken up by banks go straight back to the ECB at the deposit facility which is now standing higher than at any time between 2008 and 2010.

    Quote Reuters

    The euro zone banking system starts the new year awash with record levels of liquidity but few signs that institutions are prepared to lend to each other, leaving money markets frozen.Most of the near half trillion euros of three-year funds borrowed from the European Central Bank in the last week of 2011 have made their way back to the ECB’s overnight deposit account.

    The Reuters piece goes on to argue that most of the liquidity will probably go to aid the large refinancing need banks face in 2012 and thus effectively as a replacement for a non-functioning interbank market that would normally be able to roll this financing. If this does nothing to solve the problem of sovereign insolvency and illiquidity it will work wonders through the fact that banks won’t act as a drag on their respective sovereign’s balance sheet as long as the ECB is involved.

    I would note though that even though the liquidity is mainly reflected in reserves held at the ECB, it still represents excess liquidity as noted by Danske Bank.

    Some market commentators have argued that the first 36 months long-term refinancing operation (LTRO), in which banks took EUR490bn in total, has so far not worked as planned because the extra liquidity has simply been placed on the deposit facility at the ECB. However, this argument is false.The sharp increase in outstanding open market operations (MRO+LTRO) increases excess liquidity (defined as open market operations plus recourse to the marginal lending facility minus autonomous liquidity factors minus reserve requirements) and this excess liquidity shows up as deposits at the ECB in just the same way as it did in 2008-10.

    However, nothing is easy and despite the fact that collateral can be posted for liquidity the sovereign is still on the hook as my friend Edward Hugh points out.

    Banks are being encouraged to keep rolling over what are basically NPLs by financing them at 1% at the ECB (foreclosing on them in Spain and keeping the property on the books may cost something like 8% in comparison). But the ECB isn’t assuming the risk here, the national sovereign implicitly is, and is getting in deeper by the day.

    This is certainly true by the letter of the law but one has to wonder whether the ECB will ever get paid back here. I mean 3 years is an awful lot of time. The ECB can roll these loans as long as need be (it has already effectively been rolling bank funding since 2008) while maintaining the figue leaf that it is not funding sovereigns. This may be true, but it is effectively funding the sovereign’s banks and postponing the day of reckoning which is bank failures or nationalisation or both.

    If the ECB is then forced take a hit on the collateral or the loans themselves, it will need to create the money to pay for these loans by printing euros. This sounds as a plan to me except that it does not solve the funding risks of governments which may or may not be able to ask their banks for help. The likely answer is that they won’t be unless the ECB and EU decide to wield the ultimate weapon of financial oppression which would be to penalise reserves over a given level with negative interest rates at the same time as banks would be forced, through regulation, to hold government bonds.

    But Edward makes another interesting point;

    Looking at the Greek PSI, what they would try and do (if all this gets that far, I mean if the Euro holds together long enough in this Byzantine world) ) is load up the private sector share of the haircut, and keep the ECB as untouchable official sector. At the limit they can use ELA to keep the banks afloat while the sovereign restructures and then recapitalises.

    (…)

    Why would any ex Eurozone third party want to be counterparty to anything which might end up being subordinated to ECB exposure later on down the line. The more I think about it the more it seems to me that the 3 yr LTROs might end up choking the European banking system to death.

    It is difficult to disagree on the gist of this point, namely that the ECB is digging itself a very big hole. If banks can exchange under water assets at the ECB for a deposit asset at the ECB (albeit with a negative carry) the ECB is running the risk that it becomes the sole counterparty of bad assets in the euro zone in which case seniority will mean very little.

    The Greek situation is a good example. Private creditors face an almost certain 100% wipeout exactly because they represent such a small tranche of the total stock of debt. In such a situation the asymmetric relationship between subordinate and senior debt holders mean that the latter essentially become equity holders. But once subordinate creditors are wiped out the turn comes to the senior debt tranches and the further the ECB goes along the road of providing full allotment liquidity the higher will be its implicit direct claim on assets of all sorts of qualities.

    In conclusion, it is my view that the ECB is now the only thing between the economy and widespread bank failures, but I also concur that the consequence of this is a permanent outsourcing of the interbank market in Europe to the ECB’s balance sheet and, quite possibly, Fed’s USD swap lines.

    (1) – Even if such purchases have been fully sterilised.

    European Bank Runs And Underestimated Physical Gold Demand

    The demand for gold is vastly underestimated. About 18 months ago I wrote about Euro Gold and the Euro Zone and Euro Evaporation Leading To Credit Default Swaps and IMF Gold. One key excerpt was:

    The Euro is broken. This was its destiny. This is the destiny of all fiat currencies. These bureau-rats cannot stop this anymore than Cnut the Great could command the tide to halt.

    And here we are.

    THE GREAT CREDIT CONTRACTION

    The Great Credit Contraction has been in relentless advance for years. This is a massively deflationary period as capital, both real and fictitious, burrows down the liquidity pyramid into safer and more liquid assets. The fictitious capital that does not move fast enough evaporates. Poof goes trillions of wealth!

    In the Information Age bank runs happen with the click of a mouse and not lines outside the physical branches.

    FRACTIONAL RESERVE BANKING

    Fractional Reserve Banking is the banking practice in which banks keep only a fraction of their deposits in reserve (as cash and other highly liquid assets) and lend out the remainder while maintaining the simultaneous obligation to redeem all these deposits upon demand.

    Fractional reserve banking occurs when banks lend out any fraction of the funds received from demand deposits. Despite being a form of embezzlement and fraud this practice is universal in modern banking.

    This mismatch between time, borrowing short-term and lending long-term, is what creates the potential for a bank run. But an even larger looming problem lurks in ‘cash and cash equivalents’. Yes, those pesky Tier I, II and III distinctions.

    As a bank’s assets evaporate their ability to make new loans, even extremely short-term loans like overnight, becomes impaired. When an entire banking system knows that all the major players have assets on their balance sheets, assets which are not accurately priced or accounted for, then there is an extreme reluctance to lend.

    This is what happened when Lehman Brothers evaporated. The credit markets seized up. People acting in their own self-interest according to principles of praxeology moved into safe and liquid assets and refused to lend.

    Liquidity dried up overnight. Mortgage backed securities, auction rate securities and plenty of other assets which had for decades been treated as ‘cash equivalents’ were suddenly shunned. The bid evaporated from a loss of confidence, the prices plunged, investors were snookered and bank balance sheets were massively damaged.

    The gears of industry are seizing up.

    EUROPE’S WORTHLESS BANK DEPOSITS

    The European banks have balance sheets with trillions of Euros in value recorded but assets which every rational non-ignorant person knows are severely impaired. The credit markets are freezing, trust is evaporating and as a result liquidity is drying up.

    Sure, the central banks of the world have joined in a massive illegal effort to lubricate the system but it will fail. Years ago when QE1 was announced I wrote The Federal Reserve Will Fail With Quantitative Easing. They are still failing just on a grander scale.

    To recapitalize and lubricate the European banking and financial system would take at least €25 trillion and maybe upwards of €100 trillion. The failure is a mathematical certainty. The gears of industry are seizing up.

    The Greek and Italian democracies were assassinated by banksters Lucas Papademos, Mario Monti and Mario Draghi who will attempt to prolong the failed banking and financial system by privatizing the gains and socializing the losses with inflationary tactics and bailouts in a vain attempt to prevent the credit liquidation. They will only succeed in prolonging and exacerbating the necessary correction.

    What holders of capital should understand is that European bank balance sheets are caught in an unrecoverable credit contraction spin, the appropriate emergency maneuver is to Run To Gold and only a few will make it with their purchasing power intact.

    The vast majority of assets will become charred wreckage as their purchasing power evaporates into worthlessness. Sure, there may be a few near miss recoveries between now and the ultimate failure but why take the risk?

    LATENT GOLD DEMAND

    There is massive latent gold demand as a ‘cash or cash equivalent’ asset. Why should a holder of capital store their wealth in bank deposits with counter-party risk when they can completely eliminate it by moving into unencumbered physical gold bullion?

    Plus, by moving into physical gold bullion they eliminate the risk associated with fiat currency becoming worthless through the deflationary event called hyperinflation. Really, hyperinflation is just the next step in The Great Credit Contraction after capital has moved almost entirely down the liquidity pyramid.

    The money managers allocating trillions of FRNs, Euros, Yen, etc. have not even begun moving into the monetary metals. In most cases it is only beginning to become acceptable to speak of them. Some fallaciously argue there is not enough gold to go around.

    Sure, there is enough gold for it to be used as the world reserve currency but it is only a matter of price. A price that Jim Rickards argues the case for in Currency Wars of being between $8,000 and $54,000+ per ounce.

    CONCLUSION

    The European banking and financial system is imploding before our eyes in a massive credit contraction which is just the latest wave in The Great Credit Contraction. The European banks are in an unrecoverable deflationary spin. There is only one acceptable emergency recovery procedure and that is to Run To Gold.

    Because so few have, therefore, the real gold demand is completely hidden and obscured from view. It will come when people lose confidence in the current banking and financial system by turning to and using alternatives that do not possess the same kinds of risks. In the Information Age bank runs happen with the click of a mouse and not lines outside the physical branches.

    DISCLOSURES: Long physical gold, silver and platinum with no interest in DOW, S&P 500, the problematic SLV ETF, gold ETF or the platinum ETFs.

    Ideology and Pragmatism

    He is known, of course, for his work on money and inflation. But he did not propose, as Hayek did, competition in currency production. He thought the reality of our times is that governments are in control of the money supply, so the question is simply how to sustain them. He thought a gold standard impractical – inevitably, rather than using the metal itself as money, people would use paper (or electronic) receipts for it, so you have the same problem of potential over-printing of that paper as you do today. So he thought the best thing was to have a monetary rule, preventing politicians from over-producing the paper money we have today.

    While having a consistent ideology is important, it is always tempered by pragmatism. This is due to the very simple fact that humans are finite beings and cannot possibly fight every possible ideological battle that could possibly be fought. There are limits to what one person can do. Therefore, every person usually compromises his ideals at some point in life. Sometimes this leads to regret, sometimes this leads to relief.

    Milton Friedman is no exception to this. Though he was very much a libertarian, he thought monetary policy to be a point of pragmatism. I’m not sure it’s wise to fault him for this, given the setting in which he made his decision. Government interference in all aspects of the economy was pretty rampant, and the general trend towards statism was ramping up when he hit it big. He had respect and was listened to by many people. But even Friedman had to pick his battles. It’s easy to criticize his decisions ex post, but it’s helpful to remember that he could not foresee most of the consequences.

    Now, one can credibly argue that it’s foolish to trust the government to arbitrary rules about money policy. This assertion is true. One could also argue that “sound” money forces the government to be honest. This is also true, assuming you can keep the money sound. See, the United States used to be on a gold standard, then it left it. Going back to a gold standard, though desirable, was no guarantee against this happening again. As such, from a practical standpoint, it didn’t really matter what rules the government constrained the government; the government was going to look for ways to get around them and inflate the currency, one way or another.

    It is certainly legitimate to criticize Friedman for his failure to harp on sound money, given the scope of his influence. Perhaps then much of the mess the United States face today would have been headed off earlier. Perhaps not; we can’t be sure. However, it is unfair to paint Friedman as a statist when his record is clearly libertarian. He may have been unnecessarily pragmatic on monetary policy, which is a matter with plenty of room for reasonable disagreement, but he certainly worked to advance the cause of freedom, and for that he should be thanked.

    Random Shots - Fed Outgunned, EMU Outflanked

    As I read the latest round-up of comments by Fed officials that they are certainly not ruling out another round of asset purchases I am wondering whether this signals another round of actual quantitative easing by the Fed or whether investors should change their mindset back to before the crisis where it wasn’t the USD that acted as the global carry trade funder but rather the JPY (or maybe the GBP here?).

    Quote Bloomberg

    Fed Vice Chairman Janet Yellen said yesterday that a third round of large-scale asset purchases “might become appropriate if evolving economic conditions called for significantly greater monetary accommodation.” A day before, Governor Daniel Tarullo said buying mortgage-backed securities “should move back up toward the top of the list of options.”

    They join Charles Evans, president of the Chicago Fed, and Boston’s Eric Rosengren in calling for consideration of further stimulus to boost growth and bring down a jobless rate stuck around 9 percent or higher for 30 months. A stock-market rally and gains in manufacturing and retail sales may convince the Federal Open Market Committee, which meets Nov. 1-2, to decide that it’s too soon for a third round of bond purchases.

    You see, the recent initiative of the Fed in the form of Operation Twist is not quantitative easing since it does not involve an expansion of the balance sheet. In stead, it is what we refer to as qualitative easing as the bonds the Fed intends to buy on the long end (to move long rates down to help the mortgage market) will be paid for by proceeds of selling bonds on the short end.

    The biggest problem for the Fed here is not necessarily that Operation Twist is a bad idea. Indeed, to the extent that it fixes the effort squarely on halting the slide in the housing market and supporting volume and price in the primary and second market for mortgage securities I think it is an excellent idea.

    But we are forgetting the auxiliary objective of QE by the Fed; to weaken the USD. Make no mistake that this is an important objective for the Fed even if they have never declared this formally. And herein lies the rub.  Quite simply, with the recent announcement by the BOE of another round of QE worth £75 billion, with the ECB now willingly or unwillingly being forced into increased support of peripheral debt markets and with the BOJ also pledging more stimulus, the Fed is starting to look like the conservative central bank in the G4. [1].

    In my opinion, this is very significant and also one of the reasons why Fed officials are busy ensuring markets that they have plenty of ammunition left should economic conditions merit it. But investors should not take anything at face value I think. Before the Fed actually starts to buy those MBS and/or moves to lower interest rates on excess reserves there is a real chance that especially the JPY will start to act more like the JPY of old, a.k.a global carry trade anchor of choice. Of course, this requires the BOJ to back up all the pledges with real action. For now though, the only thing we can say is that the Fed looks set to be outgunned by its peers in the G4.

    EMU Outflanked

    Is Europe now finally getting down to serious business or is it just another round of fudge from the fudge factory that investors have learned to respect for its ability to produce relief rallies out of nothing. Looking at the evidence I thoroughly inclined to go for the latter even if each failed attempt to shore up market confidence brings Europe closer to full fiscal union.

    Even if Merkel and Sarkozy, and rightly so, appear most concerned with putting pressure on Italy, the most significant issue remains Greece which is now in default a fact that was un-sanctimoniously confirmed by the leaked bailout document which has the Troika admitting that the medicine they were mandated to administer would only make the patient worse and not better.

    Quote FT

    Greece’s economy has deteriorated so severely in the last three months that international lenders would have to find €252bn in bail-out loans through the end of the decade unless Greek bondholders are forced to accept severe cuts in their debt repayments.The dire analysis, contained in a “strictly confidential” report by international lenders and obtained by the Financial Times, is more than double the €109bn in European Union and International Monetary Fund aid agreed just three months ago.

    The most recent estimate of haircut has now risen to 60% and this, mind you, would only reduce the debt to GDP to 110% and this without any consideration on how Greece is supposed to grow itself out of this level of debt while simultaneously dealing with the default. In addition and only adding to my disdain for the ECB, Reuters reports that the central bank opposed a 60% haircut on account that it  the private sector would refuse likely refuse this leading to a “fullscale” Greek default.

    I am continuingly amazed by the denial here. Ever since the first Private Sector Proposal (PSI) was put on the table, Greek has been in default and figuring out who would pay for recapitalising banks as a function of how large the final haircut ends up are merely steps in the actual default process.

    The second issue on the table is what to do with the increasingly freakishly looking EFSF. There has been no shortage of suggestions on how to increase the scope of the fund using the same guarantee by the same countries for the same amount of money (currently €440 in effective capital). The suggestion that might actually work came from France which has aired the suggestion that the EFSF be turned into a bank which would then allow it to access liquidity from the ECB. Both Germany and the ECB however have vehemently denied this which indicates that there is still notable reluctance to allow the ECB to wield the full arsenal of quantitative easing.

    The proposal which currently seems to have most traction is to turn the EFSF into a monoline insurer which would essentially use its capital to insure anything from 10% to 30% on any new issuance of sovereign debt by Italy and Spain. Crucially, the idea is that this “leverage” would bring calm to markets as this insurance could cover as much as 2 trillion worth of debt.

    I really struggle to find adequate words here. I think this is madness and if any Eurozone politician were afraid that an equivalent of AIG would certainly enter the scene, they now seem content on creating one. The first and most widely flagged issue is this would obviously create a two tier bond market.

    Quote Reuters

    This would create a division between insured and non-insured debt, that could split a country’s investor base and suck liquidity out of the market unless new bonds were carefully constructed to allow them to trade on a par with existing debt.”The issuer would have to create a new curve of insured debt, limiting the liquidity in both curves with risks that investors would dump the old non-insured bonds,” said Commerzbank rate strategist Christoph Rieger.

    Based on a 20 percent insurance model, JPMorgan estimates that insured bonds issued by Italy would trade at a yield around 100 basis points below existing debt with new, insured Spanish debt likely to be priced 80 bps lower than existing bonds.

    I think this is significant, but we are missing the main point here. If this is set ut Spain and Italy will likely never be able to issue un-insured debt again and the contingent liability here is not only complex but will lock in future capital commitments to this aim of providing first loss insurance. For me, this is a horrible way to spend already scarce capital.

    Another issue is obviously that it assumes that it will make the Spanish and Italian problem go away which it clearly won’t. However, much more fundamentally; while the idea is to ring fence Italy and Spain it almost guarantees painful haircuts in the case of Ireland, Portugal and Greece and once again, who will pay for those I might ask.

    The only silver lining I have seen in the latest reports is that it seems to me that while the imminent objective is to fiddle with the EFSF, there has also been serious talk about bringing forward the ESM which would have a much stronger mandate and essentially constitute a first step towards socialising of sovereign risk in the euro zone. Until that happens, the EMU and her politicians will be continuously outflanked by economic realities.

    [1] – I repeat that with the ECB not formally in ZIRP mode, the Fed still has the yield disadvantage here but do we really expect the ECB not to lower going forward?

    This Does Not Bode Well

    As can be easily seen from this chart (source), the money stock as measured by the Federal Reserve has grown by approximately 6.67% in the last five months! Since real GDP is projected to grow by only 1% (and will likely be revised downwards ex post), this means prices are going to rise fairly dramatically in a short period of time. And just in time for the holidays!

    Anyway, there are a couple of ways this will play out, at least in the short-term. Either consumers will face higher prices or manufacturers, suppliers, and/or retailers will face lower profit margins (or some combo of these possibilities). I doubt that retail prices will rise much in the short term because most people can’t afford price hikes in lieu of relatively stagnant income over the past year. Instead, I think businesses will eat the increased costs in the short term, most likely through the holidays and the post-holidays stock liquidations.

    After the new year begins, though, I think prices will begin to rise. And when that happens, it won’t be pretty. Thanks, Bernanke!

    US manipulating the gold price up

    Very funny to read this from Reuters where Iran claims that its enemies were deliberately causing the price of gold and foreign exchange to rise in a bid to undermine the Islamic Republic’s economy. “The enemies and ill-wishers want to make a fuss and present wrong information to provoke and deviate the market,” Ahmadinejad told a crowd in a town in the western province of Hamadan, where he was on one of his frequent provincial visits. “In order to disturb the market they buy a lot of gold coins with their huge amount of money …

    Seriously, this should be read in context of Vietnam’s issues with its citizens buying gold as an inflation hedge/savings, which I’ve blogged about in the past. We are seeing how politicians respond to high inflation. In Vietnam’s case, try to ban/restrict gold or in Iran’s case, blame outsiders. In neither case take responsibility. Don’t expect it to be any different in Western countries.
    I also note DGC Magazine’s pick up of expansion of reporting (in USA) of export/import of physical money to prepaid access/stored value card products. Of course all about preventing the “transfer of money obtained through illicit activity”.  I wonder how long before the movement of money between states within a country has to be reported. They may as well get it over and done with and tell us fuck your privacy and just ban all forms of physical money/value and tell us we have to have one government issued credit/debit card we have to use for any transaction.
    Finally, I recommend reading Unqualified Reservations blog post on maturity transformation, on which he has written about before. His argument is that borrowing short and lending long is at the heart of our banking problems and cause of the business cycle.
    Quote:
    The genius of Professor Krugman is that he goes so near the truth that he makes it obvious even to his commenters – who typically are both idiots and fools, but several of whom spontaneously exhibit the same insight themselves: Why can’t we regulate or even ban the maturity mismatch? Savers would have to make the maturity choice themselves and it would be transparent. Currently, the savers don’t understand the huge run risks that the banks have by funding with demand deposits and lending long. It’s hiding the risk.

    What in the world is happening to the rupee?

    The INR/USD rate is now nudging Rs.50 to the dollar. This is a big move over a short period: a depreciation of 12.1 per cent over the 84 days from 1 July till 23 September.

    What fluctuations of the INR/USD can we reasonably expect?

    After the rupee became a float, so far, it has had average volatility of roughly 9 per cent annualised. Roughly speaking, this means that over a one year horizon, the movement over a year would range between -18 per cent and +18 percent, with a 95 per cent probability. More extreme movements would happen with a 5 per cent probability.

    Over a period of 84 days, roughly speaking, we’d have expected this 95 per cent range to run from -8.6 per cent to +8.6 per cent. Compared with that, a 12.1 per cent move is a bit unusual.

    It’s only a bit unusual because the historical volatility of the INR/USD, in the period of the float, was rather low. The USD/EUR rate,
    which is perhaps the world’s most liquid market, has had an annualised volatility from January 1999 onwards of 10.3 per cent. The INR/USD has got to surely be more volatile than this, given the inferior liquidity of the INR and given the greater macroeconomic volatility in India. Hence, I think we should consider the 9 per cent vol, that was seen in the early days of the float, as relatively unusual. The future will most likely hold bigger values for this vol.

    The implied volatility of the INR/USD at the NSE has reared up to values like 14 per cent annualised. That sounds more sensible to me.

    What about other currencies?

    We tend to do wrong by focusing too much on the bilateral INR/USD rate. In the recent days of distress, as fear has resurged, people
    have taken money out of everything under the sun and put it into US Treasury bills. This has given a strong dollar at the expense of
    essentially every other currency. Here’s the picture for the INR, against the four major currencies of the world, from 1 July till 22
    September:

    1 July 22 Sep. Depreciation
    (per cent)
    USD 44.585 48.821 9.50
    EUR 64.804 66.103 2.00
    JPY 0.553 0.636 15.01
    GBP 71.720 75.481 5.24

    The picture of the rupee is much more complex than that implied by simply watching the bilateral rupee/dollar rate.

    Can RBI block such a large depreciation?

    Let’s think through the steps which would follow if RBI tried to sell dollars in trying to prop up the INR:

    • Global trading in the INR stands at roughly $75 billion a day. If you want to manipulate this market, you need a big stick. Small trades will do nothing. If preventing INR depreciation is the goal, RBI has to go into this with trades of $2 to $5 billion a day, with the willingness to stick it out for the long run. With reserves of $281 billion, there is not much hope here. Specifically, if RBI sells $80 billion in reserves, the market will see that. They will know that further rupee defence is now going to be hard (since $200 billion of reserves is starting to look like a small hoard), and speculators across the world will start betting that RBI’s defence of the rupee will fail.
    • Reserve money is only $275 billion. For each $27.5 billion that RBI sells, reserve money drops by 10%. At a difficult time like
      this, a sharp and sudden monetary tightening will be an unpleasant side effect of defending the rupee. (This trading can be sterilised, but that has its own problems. I just want to emphasise that selling reserves is not easy and is not a free lunch).
    • The rational speculator knows that the exchange rate will eventually find its level. When RBI prevents a large INR depreciation today, they are giving a free lunch to the speculator, who would take a bet that INR would depreciate in the future. Specifically, it would be efficient for domestic and foreign investors to dump assets in India, take money out at (say) Rs.45 to the dollar which is the artificial price, wait for the gradual depreciation to Rs.50 to the dollar, and come back into India to buy back the same assets. This trade generates 11% returns over a short period and is thus very attractive. In other words, a defence of the
      rupee would trigger off an asset price collapse in India.

    Meddling in the affairs of the currency market is thus highly ill-advised for a central bank.

    Should RBI try to block INR depreciation, even if they could?

    Let us play a thought experiment where RBI had $2810 billion, i.e. 10x larger than what’s with us today. In that case, RBI could
    play in the currency market, selling $2 to $5 billion a day for a year without serious distress. Is this a good idea?

    I would argue that this is not a good idea. When times are bad, the rupee should depreciate. This drives up the profit rates of all
    Indian tradeables firms and thus bolsters the economy.

    Under a floating rate, in good times, the INR appreciates (which pulls back the exuberance of tradeables) and in bad times, the INR
    depreciates (which fuels profits and thus the physical investment in tradeables). This is arguably the only element of stabilisation
    in Indian macroeconomic policy
    .

    RBI is playing this mostly right

    From early 2007 onwards, the INR has been quite flexible. In particular, after early 2009, RBI’s trading on the market has tailed
    off. There have been a few months with minor amounts of trading by RBI. This trading has mystified me, since these small trades can do nothing to influence the price. In practice, the INR has been a float.

    A floating exchange rate is exactly the right stance for difficult times like this. In bad times, the best thing that can happen for
    India is a big INR depreciation, thus bolstering the tradeables sector.

    Let’s evaluate an alternative policy platform: To peg the INR in normal times but to let go in difficult times. Is this feasible?
    Yes. But this is very disruptive: if economic agents have been given an implicit promise that the INR will not move, then the large move (which will surely come) would cause pain. It is far better to stay out of the market all the time, and create a trustworthy structure of expectations in the minds of economic agents about what the future holds.

    We had a large depreciation in the crisis of 2008, and that served India well. In similar fashion, we should welcome the INR depreciation that is accompanying global gloom.

    The only element of RBI policy where I have a major disagreement is communication. RBI has never used the words floating  exchange rate. RBI needs to clearly communicate to the economy that the rupee is now a market determined exchange rate, and RBI is no longer in the business of trading in this market. There is greater clarity of thought at RBI as compared with the quality of communciation; the speech writing still suffers from twinges of 1960s economics.

    What is the collateral damage of a large INR depreciation?

    There are three things that go wrong alongside a big INR depreciation:

    1. Firms who have unhedged foreign currency borrowing get hurt, because they have to pay back more than anticipated. A person who borrowed Rs.100 (in unhedged USD) has to pay back Rs.110, owing to the 10 per cent INR depreciation. The stock market is doing a fine job of identifying these firms and beating down their stock prices.Of crucial importance is the fact that from early 2009 onwards, the INR had already moved to a float with a 9 per cent annualised vol. So CEOs and CFOs knew that the INR/USD rate was going to fluctuate. They were not lulled into complacence thinking that the exchange rate was going to be stable. By avoiding this moral hazard associated with pegged exchange rates, RBI’s decision to float in early 2009 laid a good foundation for the structure of firm borrowing as of July 2011.

      When a country has a pegged exchange rate, you tend to see a big buildup of unhedged currency exposure on corporate balance sheets. When the big depreciation comes, the big businessmen then queue up to the central bank begging for defence of the LCY. Prevention is better than cure: It is far better to have high exchange rate volatility all along, so that firms do not undertake such risks, and the toxic political economy does not come into play.

    2. With an INR depreciation, tradeables become costlier. On one hand, this bolsters the profitability of tradeables firms, and
      thus their investment plans. But at the same time, this feeds into inflation. In recent months, tradeables inflation has been  sleeping while non-tradeables have contributed to the high CPI-IW inflation. We will now see a resurgence of tradeables
      inflation. This will exacerbate the inflation crisis. RBI will need to stay on the project of raising rates in order to combat this
      inflation.
    3. The government’s subsidy program with petroleum products and fertilisers gets costlier when the INR depreciates. So India’s
      fiscal crisis gets a bit worse when the INR depreciates.

    This logic is rooted in high levels of de facto capital account openness. Sometimes, policy analysts think that you can have your cake  and eat it too, and try to dodge these arguments by utilising capital controls. This has not worked in India, and the levels of de facto
    openness have only grown through the years.

    In summary, what should RBI be doing?

    RBI should be focused on using the short-term interest rate as a tool to bring CPI-IW inflation under control, without distortions of
    interest rate policy caused by trying to meddle in the currency market. This should be accompanied by liberalisation of the Bond-Currency-Derivatives Nexus so as to achieve an effective monetary policy transmission. These are the two things that RBI needs to focus on.

    India shifted away from government interference in the currency market, from 2007 onwards but particularly after 2009. This is one of the biggest achievements in India’s economic liberalisation. This is a bigger issue in economic liberalisation than (say) decontrol of petroleum product prices. The INR is now a market. Nifty and INR are the two most important markets in the economy. It is time for all of us to analyse the INR as we analyse Nifty: as the outcome of a market process.

    Is RBI back to trading the INR?

    We don’t know. The data only comes out at monthly resolution, with a two month lag. But early signs that would show up would be unusual jumps in the weekly data about reserves, reserve money, etc. Greater transparency from their side would help greatly.

    Join the forum discussion on this post - (1) Posts

    Porter Stansberry: Enough Already, Let's Return to the Gold Standard!

    The money supply increases naturally by exactly the amount of increases in productivity in a healthy economy, notes Stansberry & Associates Investment Research Founder Porter Stansberry. He doesn’t have to point out that the economy isn’t healthy, nor that the money supply expands every time the printing presses run to bail out a failing business and bring on a new iteration of quantitative easing. The solution is a simple (albeit not necessarily easy) one, Porter tells us in this exclusive Gold Report interview: Return to the gold standard. That will happen, he says, when the people say, “Enough!”

    The Gold Report: You’ve written a lot about the gold standard recently, and an article in your S&A Digest argues that we should greatly prefer gold-backed money because it would limit the ability to increase the money supply. It goes on to point out that increasing the money supply essentially causes inflation. If regulations prohibited governments from expanding the money supply, would fiat currency be as good as the gold standard?

    Porter Stansberry: In theory, it could be, but in practice that’s never happened. I suspect that the market wouldn’t have much faith in such rules, and they’d be abused eventually. During the Volcker and Greenspan Federal Reserve periods, from roughly 1981– 2006, two central bankers created a de facto gold standard because they remained relatively consistent vis-à-vis money supply targets.

    Volcker absolutely targeted money supply, as did Greenspan up until about 1999. He moved away from that stance due to Y2K fears and then the 2001–2002 recession. So we’ve seen long periods in fiat systems where money supply growth was targeted and fairly reliable.

    The problem, of course, is that the gold-standard rules don’t apply across the banking systems. When the Fed was targeting money supply, bankers lobbied for all kinds of changes related to reserve ratios, which allowed them to massively increase the leverage on their balance sheets. Famously, the investment banks—Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and others—went from, say, 15:1 to 50:1. That had a tremendous impact on the amount of credit in the economy, which ultimately led to the collapse we well remember. Then the Fed started to radically increase the money supply to help reduce the impact of those bad loans.

    That’s a long way of saying that efforts to mirror a gold standard by rule have never been effectual in history, and they haven’t worked in America over the past 40 years.

    TGR: So changing the reserve requirements, in essence, increased the money supply.

    PS: Let’s talk definitions. When I’m talking about the monetary base, I’m talking about the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, which is the foundation of the U.S. fractional reserve banking system. When you increase the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, you can have multiple increases of the actual money supply from that base. By targeting that base, Volcker restrained credit growth in the economy. Greenspan was less successful at that because he chose to expand the monetary base for political reasons.

    In any case, just controlling the monetary base did not control the impact of increases to banks’ balance sheets and leverage ratios, simply because they lobbied successfully to change the rules. They got permission to increase their leverage. The monetary base didn’t change, but the money supply increased due to the actions of the banks. It would have been impossible under a gold standard for the simple reason that the banks would be subject to runs on their gold. That doesn’t happen in a paper system.

    I’m not saying that there would never be another run on a bank, but bankers would have a palpable fear of losing control under a gold standard because the market discipline is so much fiercer now. They never would have leveraged 50:1 under a gold standard. It would have been completely implausible.

    But as long as there’s this notion that they can get a bailout of any size by turning on the printing press, maybe the discipline isn’t quite so sound. That’s exactly what we’re seeing. So rather than allowing runs on the bank or rather than allowing banks to default and for depositors to lose, the government is printing as much money as is required and is giving it to the banks.

    TGR: Is expanding the money supply actually a bad thing?

    PS: In a healthy economy, the money supply would increase naturally by exactly the amount of increases in productivity. In fact, one of the main features of the gold standard is that it creates a balance between creditors and debtors. Creditors are more willing to lend money because they know the money they’re going to be repaid will be sound. Likewise, borrowers are more reluctant to take on debt because they know there’s not an easy way to repay it.

    One of the main reasons you should prefer a gold standard is that it limits increases in the money supply to real increases in productivity. A second reason is that it simultaneously limits the availability of credit. Those limits mean that powerful interests in the economy and/or the government can’t simply create whatever credit they need to buy whatever assets they want. In a true free market, credit is relatively difficult to come by and can’t be manipulated by the various interest groups.

    But in a free market that uses paper currency, it’s very difficult to actually maintain ownership of key assets because competitors in the marketplace may have access to political capital that allows them to buy whatever they want. You see this all the time in various industries, particularly those influenced by the government. In media, for instance, a very small number of vested interests end up owning and controlling all media properties because they have access to credit that their competitors don’t. That’s very difficult to pull off in a gold-standard system.

    TGR: When you say they have access to credit that their competitors don’t, are you talking about on a worldwide basis?

    PS: I’m talking particularly about the U.S. system, where the well-connected, money center banks—J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, etc.—essentially have access to unlimited amounts of credit, and they can finance almost any kind of takeover they choose, especially if it’s favored by the government that they do so. They can do that because, again, there’s so much flexibility in the monetary base, and credit is so easy to come by. It can be printed. You can’t print gold, so under a gold standard, the government wouldn’t allow the banks to have that much credit because it wouldn’t be able to bail them out.

    TGR: So if the U.S. went to a gold standard, wouldn’t international companies have an advantage over those based in the U.S?

    PS: No, not at all. If our currency were backed by gold, it would be very difficult for foreign investors to buy U.S. assets. One of the big calamities of our current situation is that by devaluing the dollar by 20% over the last three years—which is what’s happened—our government has made everything in the U.S. 20% cheaper for foreign investors. We’re burning the family furniture to keep the heat on in this country.

    It doesn’t make any sense to devalue an economy the size of the U.S. by 20% merely in the hopes of making the stock market or employment go up a couple of percentage points. Giving away your country by devaluing your currency in order to produce economic activity is madness. That couldn’t happen under a gold standard.

    TGR: One of your articles drew the link between devaluing the currency and calling it what it is: inflation. Your great chart, the CRB Futures Index Growth since 1955, shows a spike in 1971 when the U.S. went off the gold standard, and then bounces around rather wildly, never going back to the ‘71 levels. Presumably, that shows how the dollar’s purchasing power has declined, and you relate it to inflation. Interestingly, you also wrote that well-known economists—including some at Stansberry & Associates—continue insisting that there’s no inflation. What arguments do they use to support their viewpoints, and why are those arguments flawed?

    PS: The most well-known person in the deflationist camp is Robert Prechter, but there are many others, including some who work for me who are persuaded by those arguments. We have a running debate because I think these people are foolish to be able to look at any long-term chart of the dollar’s purchasing power and claim any deflation’s going on.

    TGR: When did this trend in decreasing purchasing power begin?

    PS: Pick your date, and the dollar has lost 90% of its purchasing power from that day. A good way of thinking about this is to think about being a millionaire in 1900. To be a millionaire in 1900 was just unheard-of rich. At the time, gold was worth $20 an ounce, so to be a millionaire then, you’d have been worth 50,000 ounces of gold. And today? That amount of gold is worth about $100 million.

    So gold’s supply-and-demand dynamics haven’t changed that much, and its intrinsic value, I would argue, hasn’t changed at all. What has changed, of course, is that the value of our dollar has collapsed by almost 100%. If you go through history and you realize that in 1971 gold was worth $35 per ounce, you can see that it’s declined 97% since then.

    Just during the time Greenspan was at the Federal Reserve, the purchasing power of the dollar fell by about 50%. There’s no deflation in our money supply, and therefore no real lasting decline in prices. For people to say otherwise, I think, is incredibly stupid. No evidence whatsoever suggests that a fiat-backed currency system will ever cause a lasting deflation. And to believe that a short-term decline in prices in one market or another is tantamount to deflation is simply bad economics. It’s not true at all.

    You have to look at broader measures of prices to see the impact of inflation, and you have to understand the impact of increasing the monetary base. If you increase the monetary base threefold, over time you’re going to see a very large increase in prices. Then, beyond all these nuts-and-bolts aspects, just look at history. Where is the fiat currency that collapsed because it became too valuable?

    TGR: Part of the logic in going to a gold standard is to eliminate the inflation or eliminate the devaluation of the dollar. Isn’t some level of inflation a good thing?

    PS: Why? Why should the monetary system favor one party over another? Why should debtors have an advantage over creditors? Doesn’t that retard lending? Doesn’t it retard economic growth when creditors constantly worry what the inflation rate’s going to be?

    TGR: Speaking of economic growth . . .

    PS: The fastest period of wealth creation in American history happened in the decade of the 1880s, during which the U.S. was on the gold standard. If you go back all through history, you find that economies do better with sound money. It’s no mystery why. You can’t make long-term investments without stability in the money. The instability does nothing but increase the prestige and power of the vested interests who control money supply, interest rates and the inflation rate. It makes it impossible for everyone else to do business.

    Why isn’t a gold standard automatically the status quo in a democracy? Why would anyone ever want to get away from that, allowing the government to have both the swords of justice and the scales of money under its control? The outcome is always the same disaster. Credit grows uncontrollably and eventually the printing presses have to get turned on to pay back all the debt. Needless to say, we’re in the midst of one of those scenarios now.

    TGR: Were any economists in 1971 warning that at some point down the road, abandoning the gold standard would trigger these credit problems and massive inflation?

    PS: Absolutely, and some great economists were raising these issues as early as 1933, when FDR began to really move the U.S. away from the gold standard by making gold inconvertible, meaning that you couldn’t go exchange your dollars for gold at the bank. From that point forward, we were really on a pseudo-gold standard. All the economists who warned about what would happen were right.

    TGR: And people apparently didn’t know the history of fiat currencies.

    PS: True. Also, of course, it takes a lot longer for paper systems to break down than people expect because they’re completely reliant upon the confidence of the people using the system, and it’s in everybody’s best interest to play “hear no evil, see no evil”—nobody wants to see the whole house of cards crumble. But eventually it does crumble and people hedge their potential inflationary losses by buying gold and silver. That’s happening now.

    TGR: A common argument is that there isn’t enough gold either in vaults or in the ground to return to the gold standard. The amount of gold above the ground was estimated at 158,000 tons in 2008, or 5 billion ounces. The nominal gross domestic product (GDP) in the U.S. is $14 trillion.

    PS: The nominal GDP has nothing to do with the monetary base, which is where to look in terms of understanding a healthy ratio between gold and the dollar. The monetary base in the U.S. is a fraction of the GDP—about $2.865 trillion. Even so, if you tried to back every single dollar with an ounce of gold, you’d have an astronomical price of gold—that won’t work.

    You want a gold standard that you can get to without taking 50 years or without greatly reducing the amount of money in circulation in your economy—a sensible transitional period that isn’t so deflationary that everyone goes bankrupt. Going from a situation in which we’d had inflation of 4–6% a year over the last 40 years to a period where you’re actually having deflation of the monetary base by 4–6% a year in order to get back on the gold standard would devastate debtors. You want a transition that treats creditors and debtors fairly and gets the economy back on a fixed standard, from which point we can move forward.

    But you don’t need an ounce of gold backing every single dollar to maintain the standard in the vault. You need good lines of credit so that demand can be met. That was done over long periods of time, hundreds of years, very safely, very effectively, with relatively small amounts of gold in reserve.

    Obviously, you need more reserves during times of crisis when people are nervous about the system. But what makes the system work is that the price at which people can demand gold remains unchanged. And people need faith that balance will return even if there’s a disruption in the demand system. After the Civil War, for instance, it was important that the greenback returned to its prewar value, that the gold standard was reinstated at the same price. And that price remained in effect all the way until 1933. So it’s not important to have an ounce of gold to back every single dollar; it is important, however, to have a reserve system that works, confidence that it works, and the political will to stick to the price to ensure that it keeps working.

    TGR: That good credit you mentioned, especially when you hit economic bumps—where does that credit come from?

    PS: The various large bullion banks would have swap lines with one another. If there’s an economic problem in Germany, for example, the Fed might lend gold to the German Central Bank to meet requests for the redemption. You can do it any way you want.

    TGR: Would other countries also have to return to the gold standard to have that international credit option?

    PS: The U.S. could do it alone, but it would certainly work a lot better if more of our trade partners agreed to the same standard. The economic area would be larger, too, so there would be more diversification of labor and more economic growth.

    TGR: You’ve suggested that we could return to a gold standard by setting a target date 10 years in the future and then allowing the market to reach the appropriate price level. Taking only 10 years to get it back in balance sounds optimistic.

    PS: It really depends on what you want the price to be. After the Civil War, it took 14 years because it was important to the bankers at the time that we return to the right price.

    You probably could set the price easily between, let’s say, $5,000 and $8,000 per ounce of gold, and have the reserves necessary to make the system work today at the Treasury. People could go exchange dollars for gold as much as they wanted, and have confidence in the system at that price. You could do it right now.

    TGR: What would be the catalysts to spark the move to return to the gold standard?

    PS: I think the catalysts will be the destruction of the dollar and the ongoing inflation. Look at corn prices. When people around the world can’t afford food because the U.S. dollar has lost its purchasing power, it leads to revolutions, unrest, violence, people abandoning the dollar, failures of banks, collapsing markets and all these volatilities that we see. In my mind, returning to the gold standard is inevitable because nothing in human nature has changed in 4,000 years. As long as there is paper currency, it will be debased, and it will cause problems. Sooner or later, people will tire of it and return to gold. I think we’re in the middle of that transition as we speak.

    TGR: If we’re in the middle of it, when do you suppose we’ll actually have a plan to go back to a gold standard? Steve Forbes says it’ll happen within the next five years.

    PS: I think it’ll happen during the next Administration. At some point, to get people back to work, to get the country moving in the right direction, we’ll have to make a big economic readjustment. We’re going to have to get rid of the large overhead costs of government, return to lower taxes, and return to sound money.

    TGR: Do you really think anything like that can happen, considering the recent debacle over the debt ceiling in Congress?

    PS: I personally think we’re going to have an enormous dollar crisis, and that we’re only in the very beginning of it. The dollar has lost 20% of its value since 2008. I think it will lose another 20% over the next 12 months, and the population in America will get really tired of that very quickly. I expect a big political change in this country when people are fed up and say, “We’ve had enough—enough bank bailouts, enough of the money printing, enough of our wages being stolen by inflation. We want a system that doesn’t depend upon the good graces of politicians for its value. We want to use gold as money so that our savings are protected.”

    TGR: So the people rather than the politicians will provide the political will needed to return to the gold standard?

    PS: Absolutely. Politicians are never leaders in political thought. They follow the polls.

    TGR: You’ve made it pretty clear that had we been on the gold standard we wouldn’t be struggling with this economic crisis. You mentioned people’s wages being stolen by inflation. Millions of Americans aren’t even making wages these days because they’ve lost their jobs. And we still have that tremendous debt load hanging over us.

    PS: There’s no doubt at all that if we had been on a gold standard we would have never seen a credit bubble the size of the one we have now. It would have been very difficult for us to have the kind of economic problems we’re having.

    As for the debt, there’s 400% of debt-to-GDP in the U.S. right now—not future liabilities, not Medicare out to 100 years from now. We can’t get people back to work and jumpstart our economy because we cannot afford to pay these debts. These debts are also the reason why we have to keep printing more money. We’re absolutely drowning in debt, and the only way out is to paper those debts over by printing enormous amounts of money that will devalue people’s wages through inflation and also, of course, diminish their net worth by lowering the value of everything they own.

    The total debt in our country right now is $56 trillion, and the Fed has monetized roughly only $3 trillion of it through quantitative easing (QE) so far. We haven’t even begun to see this happen yet. We’re going to see QE3, then QE4, and on and on. And, in general, each level will be larger than the previous, so the numbers will get bigger and bigger as the Fed races against the market to devalue these debts.

    TGR: Then how do we get back on the gold standard?

    PS: Sooner or later people will say, “Enough!” I can’t tell you when that day will arrive, but I’d be surprised if the next Administration comes and goes without a return to gold.

    TGR: This has been a pretty compelling conversation, Porter, and a lot of our readers will want to watch your video/read your essay that goes beyond what we’ve talked about today.

    But before we let you go, you’ve said that unless investors are willing to speculate and start shorting equities, they probably should stay out of the equity market because you’re looking at a long, serious bear market. You advise these people to put 50% of their money into short-term Treasuries and 50% into gold. What’s the logic of the Treasuries if you expect the dollar to be devalued?

    PS: One-year Treasury bills offer some protection from inflation because they have such a short-term duration. You won’t lose a lot to inflation with such instruments. They pay you something to hold them, too—although not very much.

    The reason for holding these instruments is to reduce the volatility of the gold holdings. If you’re not going to hold other securities, all you want is to keep the value of your account stable. Taking half of the uptick in gold over the last year—a gain of maybe 20% and there’s no way that price inflation has been 20% in the last year—you’ve made a net gain in real terms.

    If people are simply able to retain the purchasing power of their savings in the midst of this massive global monetary crisis, they’ll have done a great job. The thing to do now is not to lose, and the safest way not to lose is to go half gold, half cash.

    On the other hand, investors who are in a position to be able to speculate can look at my newsletter’s portfolio and see that we’re long certain stocks that are positioned to profit from these problems and we’re short the stocks that are positioned to suffer from them.

    After serving a stint as the first American editor of the Fleet Street Letter, the oldest English-language financial newsletter, Porter Stansberry began Stansberry & Associates Investment Research, a private publishing company, 11 years ago. S&A has subscribers in more than 130 countries and employs some 60 research analysts, investment experts and assistants at its headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland, as well as satellite offices in Florida, Oregon and California. They’ve come to S&A from positions as stockbrokers, professional traders, mutual fund executives, hedge fund managers and equity analysts at some of the most influential money-management and financial firms in the world. Porter and his team do exhaustive amounts of real world, independent research and cover the gamut from value investing to insider trading to short selling. Porter’s monthly newsletter Porter Stansberry’s Investment Advisory, deals with safe value investments poised to give subscribers years of exceptional returns. You can learn more about Porter and his ideas by clicking here.

    A Fofoarain take on the swiss move

    The Swiss National Bank press release: The current massive overvaluation of the Swiss franc poses an acute threat to the Swiss economy and carries the risk of a deflationary development.”

    The Fofarian rephrase: “Too many people are trying to store value in our currency, which is distorting it’s role as a medium of exchange. We’d rather you save your wealth in something whose price increase won’t impact the economy because it has minimal industrial/productive use but which many people still think is valuable anyway. Hey, I know, how about gold?”
    Don’t know what I’m talking about? Have a look at this picture and then read this.