Flaring Hubris

Most skip over a lot of the corporate business news, but the machinations within Chesapeake Energy have risen to a certain level of public consciousness of late.  Most likely because of the outsize role CHK plays in all things Marcellus.

The specifics of the issues at Chesapeake really are in the end pretty classic when it comes to resource booms.  Overconfidence and misunderstanding of economics always play a role.  For me, and a lot of others the biggest inexplicable factor is why so many people thought you could produce so much more natural gas and somehow invoke ceteris paribus and just blindly believe the price will stay the same. Supply? Demand? Someone took econ 101 out there. Even if Ceteris Paribus is a convenient fallacy in itself there was no rational reason to believe prices would not retreat in the face of a massive new supply coming online.  Yet that seemed to be the message.

Hold the thought that somehow there would be… still might be someday.. the big transformative shift in demand for Natural Gas in the US…  autos using NatGas… new international exports of NatGas.. etc.. etc.  I don’t doubt any of that, but I am quite sure the time frame for any of that to happen is a lot longer than companies like Chesapeake were suggesting to their current or potential investors.

Let’s talk about those investors.  You can summarize the problem just looking back at one of Chesapeake’s quite extensive investor presentations from last year.  For context it might be worth noting that the price of front-month natural gas was dropping already and so was CHK’s stock price.  The question as it always is for investors is what would the future hold?

Here is one page that pretty much encapsulates it all from CHK’s October 2011 investor presentaion.  Note first their general prediction of possible prices for natural gas in the future.. Then quote at the bottom is remarkable.  They seem to be trying to say that right NOW is the time to really jump in. That the optimal investment point was just past and the public was on the verge of missing the boat so get ought to get in quick (my paraphrasing but if that was not the message what was?).  Everyone thinks they can time the market. So in this one slide they are trying to say that for both the short and long term it is the time to buy their stock. A no brainer. You can go and look up how the stock price of CHK has fared since October.

And don’t forget.. we are now well into the period where producers have been cutting back production because prices have dropped so much.  As of yesterday it seems to not have dampened the growing oversupply of the market and new price drops. So NatGas has dropped in price back to where it was when the announcements of production cutbacks began.
In the longer term the price suppression may not go away quickly since everyone is saying there is all sorts of new supply shut in by lack of pipelines to get it to market.    Mark my words… September, this September for the record… let’s not even think about September 2013,  will be interesting in the NatGas markets as supply potentially physically exceeds the capacity to store it in the US.
But to be a bit gratuitous and go back to CHK’s stock price.  They really were not shy.  From last October still they actually were predicting their stock price was going to triple.In reality the stock has been cut in half since a peak early last August.  August may seem like ancient history, but never fear; hubris is eternal.  Though they did include a question mark in the slide title..  A bit reluctantly I bet.
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A Major Uranium Supply Gap Is Looming: Ed Sterck

Edward Sterck With Japan set to restart reactors and Russia’s Megatons to Megawatts program near its expiration date, Analyst Edward Sterck thinks uranium stocks could pick up momentum, even if uranium prices show no inclination of heading north. In this exclusive interview with The Energy Report, Sterck warns of a supply-demand gap that could hit the world as early as 2015. In the meantime, consolidation is the name of the game.

The Energy Report: Why is the uranium market still down more than a year after the Fukushima accident?

Edward Sterck: While the uranium price is lower than it was immediately prior to Fukushima, it’s important to remember that it is at a higher level than we saw in mid-2010, which was only six months before Fukushima. At that time, the uranium price was in the mid- to low-$40s, and we’re now in the mid- to low $50s. From that perspective, I think the market is looking more robust than it did in 2010 despite the impact of Fukushima.

Uranium prices appear to have established a base in the mid- to low-$50s, but are now drifting along without any particular inclination to head higher. The main things keeping a brake on uranium prices are the current supply-demand balance and also some residual uncertainty regarding Japanese reactor restarts and the issuance of new reactor licenses in China, which were suspended after the Fukushima accident. I think we could see some positive news on both fronts in the not-too-distant future.

It looks increasingly likely that Japan will begin to restart reactors. Local opposition to reactor restarts was overcome last week, and the government appears to be getting closer to a definite restart decision, although the exact timeframe remains unknown.

“While the uranium price is lower than it was immediately prior to Fukushima, it’s important to remember that it is at a higher level than we saw in mid-2010, only six months before Fukushima.” –Ed Sterck

In China, some nuclear regulators have come out publicly over the course of the last few months, saying that they will begin to issue new reactor licenses again, potentially as early as June. We could possibly see those licenses issued fairly shortly. In addition, at the beginning of June, the Chinese cabinet reportedly reconfirmed the country’s commitment to its nuclear program, although exact details are yet to be released.

In summary, Japan and China’s unfolding nuclear policies are potential catalysts we may see in the near future. These two short-term catalysts may not necessarily result in an increase in the uranium price, but I view them as being potentially positive for uranium stocks. Such events may derisk the outlook for the nuclear industry in the investment community, and therefore for uranium demand. This could draw capital back into uranium stocks and potentially result in a rerating of the market valuation multiples applied to them.

TER: Could a catalyst like the end of the reprocessing program in Russia turn the prices up again?

ES: The downblending of Russia’s highly enriched uranium, derived from decommissioned Russian nuclear weapons, ends at the end of 2013. The so-called Megatons to Megawatts program currently produces the equivalent of about 23 million pounds (Mlb) per year. Although it’s possible Russia may continue to downblend some material for internal purposes or sell its reactor technology to third-party countries, the resulting production will be greatly reduced. Even in 2013, the last year of the current deal, the quantity of material available to the market is expected be somewhat lower, at around 16 Mlb. However, the impact of that is somewhat difficult to ascertain with absolute certainty.

“We’re already coming into the timeframe where the Russian material is all spoken for.” –Ed Sterck

The program’s output does represent a fairly large part of the market—around 12% of annual uranium demand. As such, one would expect some price appreciation after that material is no longer available to utilities. However, when you look at the procurement process for nuclear fuel, the utilities typically look at supply levels 18+ months ahead. So we’re actually already coming into the timeframe where the Russian material is all spoken for, and the utilities should need additional sources of material from 2014 onward. But we haven’t really seen a huge price movement to reflect any supply-demand shortfall there.

It’s probably fair to assume that the increase in production from various parts of the world, particularly Kazakhstan, has been sufficient to offset the Russian material, at least for the time being, although we could see a supply-demand deficit opening up in the years after 2014.

TER: Given what you’ve said about China and Japan, will things pick up in the market over the summer? Or is it going to take a little longer than that to bounce back?

ES: The summer is traditionally a very quiet time in the nuclear space, as it is in capital markets in general. It’s possible we could see some movement toward the end of the summer, but I think the world is still somewhat fixated on the uncertainty surrounding the Eurozone and the broader macroeconomic impact that any continued problems with the Eurozone might have. Until those are resolved, it’s very difficult to make absolute calls on these sorts of things.

TER: Quite a few of the uranium stocks are down right now. Is this going to make them ripe for acquisitions?

ES: I think it’s possible we could see a period of consolidation. There have been some transactions over the last year or so. ARMZ Uranium Holding Co. and Uranium One Inc. (UUU:TSX) bought Mantra Resources Ltd. (MRU:TSX) a little over a year ago. Extract Resources Ltd. (EXT:TSX; EXT:ASX) has been bought by China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group and another Chinese investor. In addition to that, Hathor Exploration Ltd. was purchased by Rio Tinto (RIO:NYSE; RIO:ASX) in December 2011. Given the current valuations, it’s possible we could see some consolidation.

Most of the current producers are already currently spoken for, with the exception of Paladin Energy Ltd. (PDN:TSX; PDN:ASX). The other major listed producers have significant shareholders who can block any takeover acquisition, whereas Paladin has a broad shareholder base. In addition, its balance sheet is looking a little bit stretched at the moment and this could make the company vulnerable.

There are a couple of others out there that could be of interest. Denison Mines Corp. (DML:TSX; DNN:NYSE.A) is one. It has a couple of interesting projects, one in the Athabasca area with the Wheeler River project, on which it has a joint venture with Cameco Corp. (CCO:TSX; CCJ:NYSE). Cameco owns about 30% of that joint venture. Denison also has the Mutanga project in Zambia, which already has its mining license but probably needs to undergo some further exploration to develop critical mass. In addition, Denison has a 22.5% interest in the McLean Lake mill operated by AREVA (AREVA:EPA) at present.

TER: What about Bannerman Resources Ltd. (BAN:TSX; BMN:ASX)? It backed away from a cash offer from China’s Sichuan Hanlong last year, but in your January interview, you told us it was still talking to some other potential buyers. Has the feasibility study that it has completed for Etango in Namibia changed things? Could these talks send the price up?

ES: We haven’t really heard anything more on the talks from them. Bannerman has completed all of its technical and environmental studies. I suspect the company is probably in the process of consulting with various parties and seeing what interest there might be out there, but there is nothing specific in the market.

“Given the current valuations, it’s possible we could see some consolidation.” –Ed Sterck

TER: Did that feasibility study show it would be viable?

ES: The feasibility study showed that the project is economic, but that it probably needs higher uranium prices, upwards of $70/lb, for it to be a viable stand-alone entity in current market conditions. Bannerman’s primary project is the Etango project in Namibia. Its metallurgy is similar to Rio Tinto’s Rössing operation, which is not too far to the north, and also similar to what was Extract Resources’ Husab. The problem that Bannerman faces is that it appears to be just a little bit too low grade at current uranium prices.

For its share price to appreciate, Bannerman probably needs to see an element of merger and acquisition (M&A) interest. One of the interesting things about the Etango project is that although it’s low grade and doesn’t appear to be economic at least on my current estimates at existing uranium prices, it could be of interest to a strategic parastatal (quasi government-owned) organization. I think this is one of the reasons that the company has had discussions with various Chinese and other Asian groups in the past, the reason being that if you’re a parastatal organization, possibly out of China, with a low cost to capital, then obviously the economics of the project are quite different. It has a very large resource base. So from a strategic perspective, it could be interesting.

TER: Which companies do you think will be hunting for bargains with the stocks down? Cameco plans to raise some money, so is it on the prowl right now? Which companies may be of interest?

ES: Cameco has just filed a short-form shelf prospectus. That doesn’t necessarily mean it’s actually going to raise money. I think it is just putting things in place to give itself some flexibility if it does decide to make a move. Cameco also has a strategy to double uranium production organically by 2018, for which it will need a certain amount of capital. But it should be able to fund the bulk of its needs from operational cash flow. The shelf prospectus just gives it some flexibility if there are any capex overruns or if it does want to consider making acquisitions.

Paladin may be of interest to Cameco, because it has two projects that are mostly technically derisked. It offers about 8 Mlb/year in production straight off the bat. Given the fact that its balance sheet is a bit stretched at the moment, it’s possible that it could be vulnerable. The enterprise value is about $1.7 billion, so it would definitely be at the top end of what Cameco may be able to afford. Beyond Paladin, Denison, as I mentioned earlier, could also be of interest. Additionally, it is worth highlighting that while Paladin may demonstrate M&A appeal, the stretched balance sheet also means that potential investors could be faced with a liquidity event at some point in the future.

TER: Paladin experienced a labor strike in Kayelekera. Production was back up again in May, but could the strike further impact the company?

ES: I don’t think it’s going to have a significant impact. Paladin experienced around five days of reduced production at about 65% of normal capacity, so I don’t expect the strike to significantly dent output unless there have been further issues that have not yet been publicly reported. However, Paladin has been fairly upfront about all of this, so I’m not really expecting any significant surprises there.

TER: In FYQ3, Paladin had a loss of $18 million. How is it going to do in Q4?

ES: We are expecting it to achieve breakeven in Q4. Looking into next year, I’m expecting it to move into a very modest profit over the course of the subsequent four quarters of the next year.

TER: What will propel Paladin’s climb back into the black?

ES: Reducing operating costs at Kayelekera and perhaps tweaking the operating costs at Langer Heinrich may become a focus. However, the principal problem that Paladin faces is servicing its debt, because it’s quite leveraged. The interest payments are pretty much offsetting the profitability from the mining assets at present, so restructuring its balance sheet is probably a priority for it to move toward sustained profitability.

TER: Aside from Cameco, are there other companies looking for bargains to pick up?

ES: If we look at the list of uranium producers, Uranium One has the option to buy the Mkuju River project off ARMZ, so I think from its perspective, it already has a fairly comprehensive pipeline of potential projects it could develop. I’m not necessarily sure that it would be going after or making any major acquisitions. Paladin’s balance sheet probably couldn’t support an acquisition currently, so I think that it will be focusing on its existing portfolio of projects and trying to pay down its debt position, perhaps focusing on reducing costs at Kayelekera. Then, if we look at Energy Resources of Australia Ltd. (ERA:ASX), a one-asset company majority owned by Rio Tinto, I think it’s unlikely that it would be out making acquisitions. Cameco is really the most likely consolidator as I see it.

TER: Where will Cameco look to expand capacity?

ES: Its plan is to double production from around 20–40+ Mlb by 2018. The biggest component of that is Cigar Lake, which is gradually coming close to first production. Cameco’s target is first production in mid-2013. I think the first tangible commercial production will probably take place in 2014. That should provide about 9 Mlb/year for Cameco on an attributable basis. Cigar Lake is largely funded already, although there is some capex still to be spent over the course of the next couple of years. For the remaining 11+ Mlb that Cameco would be looking to grow, Inkai in Kazakhstan is one possibility. It has the potential for production to be doubled there, but that depends on whether the company obtains the various licenses from regulators in Kazakhstan. Then Cameco also has the Kintyre project in Australia, for which it completed a prefeasibility study, but it hasn’t released very many details as yet.

TER: Thank you for your time, Ed.

Edward Sterck covers uranium, diamond and platinum group metal mining companies for BMO Capital Markets. He joined BMO in 2007, prior to which he was a mining analyst at Hargreave Hale. Before working in mining research, he spent more than four years trading government bond futures on a proprietary basis. Sterck holds a Bachelor of Science in geology with honors from the Royal School of Mines, Imperial College London.

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The Great Stagnation by Tyler Cowen

The central thesis of Cowen’s book is that the recent economic downturn is mostly due to the law of diminishing marginal returns.  The metaphor he uses to explain this is that of an orchard.  In any orchard, some of the hanging fruit is closer to the ground than other fruit.  The natural tendency is to first pick the low-hanging fruit, then move on to the fruit that is harder to reach.  In the same way, the natural tendency in any macro economy is to make easier, more obvious innovations before making more complex (and more expensive) innovations.  There is a kernel of truth to this, in that there are always diminishing marginal returns in any endeavor.
In particular, Cowen advances the argument that it is becoming more difficult to innovate, as evidenced by the decline in the patents per researcher rate.  This argument is problematic for two reasons.
First, not all inventions and innovations get patented (and some patent attempts are rejected).  There has been a rather slight, though appreciable decline in the patent per researcher rate of the last several decades, but there is no research indicating whether any of this is due to the effects of various open society movements.  These “open” movements are generally predicated on either the belief that ideas are free (in which case patents, copyrights, and other forms of intellectual property are null and void) or on the belief that ideas should be free (the open source movement is predicated on this).  Perhaps the movement away from patenting every last innovation might explain some, most, or all of the rate decline.
Second, there is no attempt to discern whether patent law itself is the cause of declining innovation and invention.  It is assumed, perhaps because this is the constitutional view, that patents encourage innovation.  However, patent law has often been used to bludgeon one’s competition from copying one’s ideas and business practices.  Jeff Bezos’ use of patent law to block other businesses from using one-click shopping is an example of the more extreme tendencies of patent law abuse.  The continual lawsuit wars between Apple, Google, and Microsoft are another.  In this case, innovations are being squelched because a) it is unprofitable to innovate if your profits simply go to your competitor and b) it is more lucrative to litigate than innovate.  When litigation is more profitable than innovation, it should not be surprising that people and firms prefer litigation to innovation.  Thus, it may be that the recent downturn in innovation is due not to diminishing returns but due to inept government market interference.
One bright spot in Cowen’s book is his critique of macroeconomic measuring tools.  In particular, his criticism of counting government costs at face value when determining GDP is well thought-out and intelligently argued.  The insight that government spending is likely subject to diminishing returns isn’t exactly brilliant, but the conclusion that perhaps government costs are inflating the real value of GDP output is quite useful.  His critique of educational spending is similarly insightful, in that he notes in brief that while educational spending has roughly doubled in inflation-adjusted terms, the output, measured in terms of educational testing and economic output, has not budged much.  He makes a similar case for health care as well. Ultimately, his conclusion is that our economy hasn’t really grown; it’s just that the numbers measuring it have been inflated.  Unfortunately, his analysis is not yet able to indicate how much inflation currently exists in economic growth estimates, but at least he’s pointed his fellow economists down the right path.
Cowen also spends some time considering innovation in the online sphere.  He notes that this is classic low-hanging fruit, to use his metaphor, but that this is not likely to lead to economic growth because of the net’s scalability.
One interesting point that he makes as evidence of the internet being low-hanging fruit is that there are a lot of amateurs driving innovation.  The widespread presence of amateurs, then, is a signal that there is plenty of room for innovation.
As an aside, there is one sector in the US economy that has a significant amateur presence, and that is the automotive sector.  The presence of amateurs, though, is relatively small, and confined primarily to the area of kit cars.  Kit cars are a sort of DIY car manufacturing project wherein one purchases a frame and body components from a manufacturer, plus whatever accessories one wishes to buy, then goes out and purchases a separate transmission and engine, and assembles the car oneself.  This is not a significant portion of the market, but there is a decent amount of innovation within this subset that is absent from the more general automotive production market.  Perhaps coincidentally, kit cars do not face as much regulation as production cars.  Likewise, the internet is, relative to other sectors, remarkably unregulated.  One possible conclusion to be drawn, which Cowen fails to do, is that perhaps the issue is not that we lack low-hanging fruit but that the government forbids us from picking it.
From there, Cowen observes that the growth of government size and scope is largely tied to technological growth.  This would suggest that government’s attempts to regulate, and thus hamper technological growth will ultimately hamper the growth of the state.
Cowen also dedicates a chapter to explaining the current economic crisis.  His explanation for the crisis is that “we thought we were richer than we were.”  This might seem glib at first, but it is correct.  Basically, all the investments that feel through did so because they were overvalued.  Banks overestimated the wealth and income of marginal lendees.  Investment groups overvalued stocks, bonds, funds, CDOs, and all sorts of other financial instruments.  Cowen does delve a little bit into pop psychology when explaining why we overvalued things.  He relies on an argument about human beings’ tendency to follow other people and rely on signals instead of direct sources.  He doesn’t spend much time discussing policies that gave the illusion of wealth, which would in turn lead to overconfidence.
The book concludes with Cowen asking what, if anything, can be done to fix the problem.  His policy prescription is this:  raise the status of scientists.  This strikes me as an incredibly foolish policy.  First, some scientists are likely to resist this.  Richard Dawkins and PZ Meyers come to mind.  Both have the social skills of an autistic eight-year-old, as evidenced by the fact that they routinely mock and denigrate the belief system held many people, even though the issue of the existence of God is well outside the scope of their respective scientific disciplines.  Basically, these scientists (and several others as well) are complete assholes that few people will ever come to like or respect.
That aside, there is a second concern.  Namely, that scientists in general are not trustworthy.  The relatively recent scandal at East Anglia suggests that there are some scientist who are more committed to ideology than scientific truth.  They can be trusted or respected, and it is unwise to give any form of power to these sort of charlatans.  (Of course, giving power to charlatans is the foundation of democracy anyway, amirite?)  Worse still, even when scientists are being sincere and honest in their research, most of it cannot be replicated and therefore cannot be trusted.  Does it make sense to give status to those who can’t be trusted even when they are sincere?
Furthermore, it was scientists that produced the atomic bomb.  Scientists were behind the technocratic drive of Nazi Germany.  Scientists supported the efforts of central planning in the USSR.  This is not to say that all scientists are evil.  It only to point out that scientists are human, just like everyone else and, as such, are prone to the same problems and imperfections of the rest of us.
Finally, it should be noted that pure science does not lead to as many contributions and innovations as engineering.  Perhaps Cowen conflates scientists and engineers (and that is certainly his right, though it would be helpful to clarify that).  Even so, the better solution would be to give higher status to engineers and other “hands-on” producers and workers that generate the bulk of day-to-day innovations.
In all, this book is generally a mixed bag of obvious truths, shortsighted analysis, and mildly brilliant insights which makes for an interesting, if uneven read.  It’s short and fun and thought-provoking, and seems at times that it’s designed to pick fights.

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Economic Events on June 8, 2012

At 8:30 AM Eastern time, the International Trade report for April will be released.  The consensus is a deficit of $49.3 billion, which would be $2.5 billion more than the previous month.

At 10:00 AM Eastern time, the Wholesale Trade report will be released for April, showing inventory levels for wholesalers in the United States.  The consensus is that wholesale inventories increased 0.5% .

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