FOFOA has an interesting speculation on the movements in GLD:
So now I offer up a scenario, not as a statement of fact, but as fodder for thought and discussion. In this scenario I am not assuming that the drain on GLD to date has been the direct redemption of ETF shares by Giants. I presume it is simply redemptions by Bullion Banks in order to meet the delivery demands of “important clients,” real Giants, perhaps from Asia and the Middle East. And because the BBs would normally have better options than plundering GLD, I am assuming those options are either gone or far more problematic than legalized looting.
Also, following Lance Lewis’ “puke indicator,” one could be forgiven for suspecting that the Bullion Banks have some way to temporarily “pound” the price of gold down on the COMEX in order to buy back ETF shares during a “good price window” with the intention of redeeming those shares into deliverable gold for clients that purchased it at a higher price.
I left a comment, which I post below FYI:
The reason one cannot correlate gold price and GLD holdings is because authorized participants (AP) don’t have to create and redeem GLD shares on a daily basis in response to investor activity in GLD.
For example, if you’re an AP and have a view that the market is bullish, then you expect over time to see net buying of GLD. Therefore, if on one day there is net selling of GLD, then you can:
1. Buy GLD shares
2. Immediately lease gold and sell it (or just short futures).
3. AP is now long GLD and short unallocated gold or futures. Important to note they have no exposure to gold price movements.
4. Sit on the GLD shares and when investor bullish sentiment returns
5. Sell your GLD shares
6. Buy unallocated gold and repay your lease (or close out your short future).
The above process means that the AP avoids GLD share redemption and creation costs.
Same thing happens in the face of net buying – an AP borrows gold and delivers it to GLD for shares, which they sit on an over a period of time sell into demand for GLD.
This is a way of minimising transaction costs when making a market in GLD or SLV or any other ETF.
The end result is that we see lumpy creation and redemptions, reflecting accumulated buying or selling activity over a number of days.
In the case of large lumpy redemptions, that can reflect an AP who held on to GLD shares in the expectation they would be able to offload them later into expected buying. If that buying does not eventuate, then the AP offloads the lump of GLD share they have as they are incurring ongoing funding costs.
You are correct in that redemptions of GLD cannot really be used to infer too much about what is going on re investor sentiment. The GLD bought back by an AP and gold redeemed is just sold by the AP to someone else, ultimately.
All GLD holding movements tell us is the sentiment of GLD holders. All that futures tell us is the sentiment of futures traders. Are these markets representative of the all private investors in gold. Maybe, maybe not.
What commentators miss is the OTC “dark pool”. Consider that ETFs + Futures only represent less than 10% of estimate privately held gold (see this post).
In that case, we should not get too excited by the activity we see with ETFs and futures as it is not where the real giants are.
Consider also that bullion banks know their activities in ETFs and futures can be seen/deduced in some way. Therefore you must assume they let you see what they want you to see, with their real position and activities hidden in the “dark” OTC market.
One of the many fascinating facts that you see in Economic History and Modern India: Redefining the Link by Tirthankar Roy (Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 2002) is about India’s trade/GDP ratio. The trade/GDP ratio rose dramatically from 1 to 2 per cent in 1800 to 20 per cent in 1914.
By 1970, the trade/GDP ratio had dropped to 8 per cent. It was only in the mid 1990s, the trade/GDP ratio had got back to
Most people in India today are not aware of the pre-War world, where goods and services flowed freely across the boundary, when
After the War, there was a big push worldwide to reduce trade barriers. Governments, then, made the call that agriculture was not
But world GDP shifted away from manufacturing. Today, world GDP is dominated by services. World GDP is now 5.8% agriculture, 30.8% manufacturing and 63.4% services.
Crudely speaking, if we have full free trade in goods, but zero trade in agriculture or services, then 69% of World GDP is submerged
Over the last 20 years, manufacturing trade liberalisation has continued, but the share of services in world GDP has risen. I suspect
An interesting article on voxEU by Sebastien Miroudot, Jehan Sauvage and Ben Shepherd points out that in the aggregate, the costs of trade have dropped sharply for goods from 1995 onwards, but not for services.
We need to work harder on removing a variety of barriers to trade in goods. But we need to work much harder on removing the barriers to trade in services.
In this sense, the globalisation project is far from done. By and large, the world has done well on removing barriers to the movement of goods and capital (though India is as yet a laggard on both fronts). The two great frontiers are now trade in services and the movement of people. Given the huge footprint of services in world GDP, it is not even the case that we are exposing the world economy to as much global competition as was the case a few decades ago, when manufacturing was a big part of world trade and there was a lot of trade in it.
At 8:30 AM EST, the monthly Personal Income and Outlays report for December will be released. The consensus for Personal Income is an increase of 0.4% over the previous month and the consensus Consumer Spending index change is an increase of 0.5%.
At 9:45 AM EST, the Chicago PMI Index for January will be announced. The consensus index value is 65, which is 3.6 points lower than last month, but is still well above the break-even level at 50.
At 3:00 PM EST, the Farm Prices report for December will be released, giving investors and economists an indication of the direction of food prices in the coming months.
Marshall Auerback, corporate spokesperson for Toronto-based Pinetree Capital, is a so-called “hedge fund” strategist. He believes that deficit spending is not bound by anything other than inflation, which, he says, is of limited consequence right now. Marshall believes the U.S. government’s main goal should be to reduce unemployment, and he predicts the gold price is likely to remain rangebound between $1,100 and $1,400 an ounce in 2011. However, his long-term outlook for precious metals remains rosy given that “casino capitalism” is setting the stage for a new bubble. In this exclusive interview with The Gold Report, Marshall reveals some of Pinetree Capital’s precious metals holdings and explains why he fears for the global economy.
The Gold Report: Marshall, let’s talk macroeconomics. You, like Economist Warren Mosler, believe that government spending is not limited to how much a government can tax the population or borrow. Essentially, you believe government spending is limitless and that deficit spending ultimately creates jobs. Please explain how that works.
Marshall Auerback: That’s a slight mischaracterization of our position. It’s not so much that people like Warren, myself or some of these so-called “hedge fund” economists like Randall Wray or Jan Kregel, say deficit spending is limitless; we say deficit spending is not operationally constrained by any external or financial constraints. We don’t exist under a gold standard. Under the gold standard, your spending was limited by the gold in your central bank. If you started running low on gold, then the gold would start to leave the country.
Interest rates would rise to attract additional gold inflows whilst higher interest rates would slow down domestic economic activity and thereby prevent overheating. Effectively, it would become a self-correcting mechanism. That sounds wonderful except that it didn’t deal adequately with the huge demand shocks of the sort that we had in 2008, the Great Depression or several of the depressions that we had during the 19th century.
As far as government deficits go, what we argue is that there are no financial constraints—there is a real resource constraint. In other words, inflation is the ultimate constraint. We shouldn’t be constructing fiscal policy with some sort of vague, undefined notion that it’s fiscally sustainable. Nor should we define “fiscal sustainability” via some arbitrary number as Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart have done in their recent book, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, wherein they say if a debt-to-GDP ratio gets above 90%, then bad things start to happen. That’s not an accurate way to look at it because you have to consider the economic context and the institutional arrangements governing the economy. A pure fiat currency regime, as we have in the U.S. or Canada, for example, is vastly different than a country which operates a currency peg system, such as Latvia or Argentina in the 1990s.
The United States also experienced six periods of depression that began in 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893 and 1929.Therefore, every significant reduction of the outstanding debt, with the exception of the Clinton surpluses, has been followed by a depression, and every depression has been preceded by significant debt reduction. The Clinton surplus was followed by the Bush recession, a speculative private-debt-fueled euphoria, and then the collapse in which we now find ourselves.
The jury is still out on whether we might yet suffer another great depression. While I cannot rule out coincidences, seven surpluses followed by six and a half depressions (with some possibility for making it the perfect seven) should raise some eyebrows. And, our less serious downturns in the postwar period have almost always been preceded by reductions of federal budget deficits. This brings me back to an obvious point: the federal government is big—especially since WWII—and movements of its budget position have a big impact on the economy. That’s the point we are trying to make.
Under the type of regime we have in Canada or the U.S., there is no inherent reason why any level of government spending should be fiscally unsustainable over a longer period. You have to look at the economic context; clearly, you shouldn’t have deficits of the magnitude you have now when you have unemployment down at, say, at 3% or 4%, or if you’ve got a capacity-realization rate close to 90% or 95%.
Clearly, in these circumstances government spending should be reined in. In fact, it will be because tax revenues rise sharply, social welfare expenditures come down and deficits tend toward balance. This is exactly what happened during the 1990s. However, what we’re seeing right now is that the private sector has demonstrated a large propensity to save and deleverage. That decision, in many respects, can be facilitated by the government running larger budget deficits. Absent that, you get 1930s-style debt deflation.
We also tend not to view government spending in isolation the way a lot of people do, but rather on a stock-flow, sectoral-balances approach. If you want government spending decreased, where are you going to get the offset? In other words, is the current account going to move into surplus (as is the case in Asia, for example), or are you going to start seeing private debt increase? Those are the kinds of variables one has to examine.
I think that the real central flaw in most macroeconomic analysis is it doesn’t incorporate these sorts of accounting flows when considering government spending. Therefore, you get all sorts of misconceived policy approaches like you have right now across the globe.
TGR: Isn’t your approach somewhat counterintuitive?
MA: It’s counterintuitive to the extent that we normally compare government spending to household spending. People say we can’t spend beyond our means, and that way of thinking fits into people’s own intuitive experience. But you and I are not the same as a government. A government is a monopoly. It’s controlling the currency. If you and I had printing presses in our basements and we were able to print $20,000 whenever we needed, we wouldn’t be debt constrained in the same way that private businesses or individuals are today.
Clearly, a government is in a unique position because it’s the only entity that issues currency and, in effect, creates new net financial assets. The household analogy breaks down because we fail to distinguish between users and issuers of currency.
TGR: But if you keep printing money you’re going to devalue your currency and no one is going to lend you money.
MA: Not necessarily. That is another flawed argument. By definition, if you are the monopoly—it’s your currency. You don’t need to have people lend you money. Again, this is a case where people have the causation wrong. Consider the argument that one always hears about China “funding” our deficits because they buy our bonds. Okay, so China decides to sell us a billion dollars’ worth of T-shirts. We buy a billion dollars’ worth of T-shirts from China. And the way we pay them is somebody pays China. And the money goes into their checking account at the Federal Reserve. Now, it’s called a reserve account because it’s the Federal Reserve, and they give it a fancy name. But it’s a checking account. So we get the T-shirts, and China gets $1 billion in their checking account. And that’s just a data entry. That’s just a one and some zeroes.
Whoever bought them gets a debit. You know, it might have been Disneyland or something. So we debit Disney’s account and then we credit China’s account.
In this situation, we’ve increased our trade deficit by $1 billion. But it’s not an imbalance. China would rather have the money than the T-shirts, or they wouldn’t have sent them. It’s voluntary. We’d rather have the T-shirts than the money, or we wouldn’t have bought them. It’s voluntary. So, when you just look at the numbers and say there’s a trade deficit, and it’s an imbalance, that’s not correct. That’s imbalance. It’s markets. That’s where all market participants are happy. Markets are cleared at that price.
Okay, so now China has two choices with what they can do with the money in their checking account. They could spend it, in which case we wouldn’t have a trade deficit, or they can put it in another account at the Federal Reserve called a Treasury security, or bond, which is nothing more than a savings account. You give them money; you get it back with interest. If it’s a bank, you give them money; you get it back with interest. That’s what a savings account is.
The example here clearly illustrates that bonds are a savings alternative which we offer to the Chinese manufacturer, not something that actually “funds” our government’s spending choices. It demonstrates that rates are exogenously determined by our central bank, not endogenously determined by the Chinese manufacturer who chooses to park his dollars in treasuries (credit demand, by contrast, is endogenous).
So, in fact, the bond is offered as a Certificate of Deposit (CD) savings alternative. It’s not actually used as a means of funding government expenditure. Bonds are also used to help drain reserves from the banking system. Because, as I said, government spending works toward increasing the amount of reserves in the banking system because when you spend, you credit the reserves into the banking system. If you want to drain those reserves for any particular reason, you issue a bond. People who buy the bond will have their bond accounts credited and their reserve accounts debited. Effectively, they’re there as an interest rate maintenance operation or as a reward to enhance savings. But they are not necessarily there to fund.
TGR: If you were Ben Bernanke, what course would you chart for the U.S. economy at this point?
MA: To me, the more important figure is not Ben Bernanke—it’s U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Tim Geithner. Monetary policy per se is a very ambiguous tool in terms of managing aggregate demand. Fiscal policy is more effective. The only thing I’d like to see Ben Bernanke stop saying is that we have to deal with the long-term deficit problems, because I don’t think they are problems. I’d like to see government spending reach a point where we start seeing unemployment decrease substantially. If that starts to happen—surprise, surprise—t he deficits will start to come down because tax revenues will increase. Social welfare payments will decrease and the economy would be on much sounder footing. I’d like to see a much more aggressive fiscal policy, but see it directed toward genuine job creation rather than a series of financial subsidies for zombie financial institutions.
TGR: John Williams of ShadowStats believes that true unemployment numbers in the United States are somewhere closer to 20%. Where do you peg unemployment?
MA: Williams could well be right. If you look at unemployment coupled with underemployment, you probably get something close to 16% under the so-called “U6″ measure. Of course, that discounts the fact that a lot of people have just given up looking for work, so we could be closer to Depression-like levels.
TGR: He actually does take that into account.
MA: He does, but most conventional statistics do not. There are people between the ages of 55 and 65 who will likely never find decent long-term employment again. It’s a tragic position. I don’t see it getting sorted out given the current configurations of policy and the current political configuration in the U.S. Congress.
TGR: You’ve penned a number of articles about the economic situation in the EU. In one entitled, The United States of Europe, or Full Exit from the Euro?, you discuss the growing disconnect between various EU countries and the possible end of the euro as a currency. How is the situation in the EU with the euro affecting the gold price?
MA: I think it has had a benign impact on the gold price in that we’ve got a situation wherein the very existence of a major currency union has come into question. I think a number of people have decided to buy gold as a consequence, as a kind of insurance policy. They’ve said, “We don’t know if we’re going to have a euro. We don’t know if we’re going back to a debased drachma or a Portuguese escudo, so let’s buy gold.” It helps to create a marginal bid in the marketplace.
In fact, the overall macroeconomic backdrop has been very positive for gold in the sense that you’ve now destroyed the myth of the omnipotent central banker. I think a rising gold price is generally associated with a vote of no confidence in the official sector. There has also been some concern about all this so-called monetary expansion being a precursor to some form of hyperinflation, which I think is highly misconceived. But all those things have helped gold in the short term.
TGR: What about inflation’s impact on the gold price?
MA: I don’t think inflation per se is a problem. Food and energy price increases have been significant and they are real. I’m not trying to diminish their importance; but in the absence of income and job growth, people have to heat their homes, fuel their cars and feed their families. That just means more discretionary income is tied up in those areas, which means less discretionary income for retail, restaurants, etc. I think the ultimate impact is deflationary rather than inflationary.
Also, the high rates of unemployment are not going anywhere. Labor has no pricing power. There’s no generalized increase of consumer price inflation. As that perception grows, the marginal bid could be taken out of the gold market for a while, which is why I am cautious on the gold price short term.
In addition to that, there’s a growing perception that the European monetary union countries are beginning to get their collective act together in dealing with this so-called solvency problem. If they do, that takes another marginal bid out of the gold market. In the short term, I think other commodity areas are more interesting than precious metals—notably the agricultural and energy sectors—and Pinetree is positioning itself accordingly.
TGR: In light of those thoughts, how do you see gold and silver performing in 2011?
MA: I think the gold price is actually going to be rangebound this year. Ultimately, I can see it going much higher because I think the response to these crises will be the creation of yet another financial bubble, which would enhance the value of gold. But right now, we’re in this benign spot wherein we’ve got inflation, which looks to be under control, and the Eurozone doesn’t look like it’s about to blow up. It wouldn’t surprise me if gold fell back to the $1,100 level and consolidated for awhile before it took off again. These things never go in a straight line.
TGR: What are those ranges?
MA: Let’s say $1,100–$1,450; that would be my guess, but it’s not a house view. We have a very heterogeneous shop at Pinetree and I’m sure various people have different views.
TGR: Precious metals are the assets to which Pinetree has the most exposure. Could you tell us about some of Pinetree Capital’s more promising gold and silver holdings?
MA: Sure. Here are a few names that Pinetree likes: First, Gold Canyon Resources Inc. (TSX.V:GCU), which is a Canadian-based unique mineral exploration company with a long history of exciting projects in both Canada and the United States. It completed a diamond drill program in the summer of 2010 at Springpole Gold Project, 110km northeast of Red Lake Mining Camp, Ontario, and a winter drill program is in progress. Springpole, which shares many similarities with deposits such as the Cripple Creek Gold deposit in Colorado, is an alkaline intrusion hosting a gold system that represents a potentially new style of Canadian Archean Shield gold deposit. At Springpole, the weighted average grades of the Portage Zone intercepts from the 18 holes drilled in 2010 is 1.36 grams per ton (g/t) gold and 5.95 g/t silver, a silver to gold ratio of 4.4:1.
Another one we like is African Gold Group, Inc. (TSX.V:AGG), a minerals exploration firm focused in West Africa, which has significant gold concessions in both Ghana and Mali. Its most advanced asset is the Kobada gold project in Mali, which has an NI 43-101-compliant inferred mineral resource of 740 Koz. of gold at 0.3 g/t Au emanating from 10% of strike potential. Recent news (1/13/11) from the company included analytical results for 19 near-surface oxide drill holes. At the Foroko North Discovery Zone, which is contiguous with AGG’s Kobada concession on the eastern boundary and projects north into the northeastern section of the Kobada concession, step-out hole KBRC10-059 extends gold mineralization to 1.2km (expanded from 600m). That same hole intercepted 48 mat 1.28 g/t Au, including 1m at 12.72 g/t Au. Of great significance is the fact that this discovery hole is located 600m south of hole KBRC10-048. This was a significant extension of the gold mineralization area.
In addition, another company on our list is Colossus Minerals Inc. (TSX:CSI), which is now at the resource delineation stage with a gold-platinum-palladium project in Serra Pelada in Brazil. It is advancing towards production. They have had a great run with high grades.
Finally, Continental Gold Ltd. (TSX:CNL) is an advanced-stage gold exploration company with an aggressive development timeline for its flagship Buritica project in Colombia. They have an extensive portfolio of gold projects, more than 200,000 hectares of highly prospective ground in areas of historical gold production. The company’s priorities include advanced exploration and definition drilling programs at its high-grade Buriticá gold project and phase-one drilling at the Berlin project, which produced over 413,000 oz. at 16g/t gold, historically.
TGR: Do you have some closing remarks?
MA: Well, I think we’re building the conditions for a new bubble in a series of asset classes. I say that because we’ve got decent, but not booming, aggregate demand. We’ve still got high rates of unemployment, so pricing pressures are still fairly minimal. Corporate balance sheets are cashed up to a degree they haven’t been in years and corporate profitability as a percentage of GDP is the highest it’s been in years. But because the external environment is still relatively uncertain and companies are not inclined to invest substantially in their businesses, they will probably take a lot of that cash and buy back their shares. That’s not a superb environment if the ultimate goal is see the unemployment rate go from, say, 10% down to 6%, but it’s a very good environment for financial assets, so we could see a 25%– 30% move higher in the markets this year.
The other point I want to highlight is that so many CEOs and managers, with compensation packages that are largely predicated on stock market performance, are getting this “casino capitalism” behavior. By that, I mean the stock market is not used as a way to help finance productive assets; the market is just there to help improve a company’s share price.
In many instances, accounting approaches are there to flatter short-term earnings. It’s what my friend, Professor Bill Black of the University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC), who gave testimony re the Lehman failure, calls “control fraud.” I’m not saying all these companies are frauds, but that sort of thing often takes place near the end of a cycle. My guess is that it could be a fairly benign year for financial assets. I think we are setting the stage for a new bubble because, basically, we used the last crisis to re-establish the status quo rather than making structural changes that would make our economy more productive in the long term.
TGR: Thanks very much for your time.
India has an inflation crisis. From 2006 onwards, the Y0Y rise in CPI-IW seems to have gone unhinged:
Why did this happen? We have a `Nobody killed Jessica’ situation here. Sharad Pawar and D. Subbarao both insist that the problem cannot be laid on their doorstep. I would argue that it was the currency policy from 2003 onwards (large purchase of dollars with partial sterilisation) which gave us this mess, which was then compounded by repeated RBI speeches saying that inflation is not important, and RBI actions which were soft on inflation.
The weakness of macroeconomic thinking in official circles is visible, with government actions including banning exports, sending the police to raid traders and hoarders, etc. I believe there is an iron law of economic policy: across each doubling of GDP, you have to reinvent government. The trouble in India is that we are getting each doubling of GDP in a decade or less, giving a very large gap between the structures of government and the underlying conceptual frameworks, when compared with the requirements of the economy. With agriculture at only 15% of GDP, one has to think differently about the role of food in inflation as a macroeconomic phenomenon. Getting back to stable 4% inflation is terribly important, and it’s going to be hard. In recent weeks, Ila Patnaik has written four newspaper pieces which add up to an interesting perspective on inflation: 20 Dec, 25 Dec, 3 Jan, 13 Jan. And, a blog post of mine on food price volatility may also be useful.
At 8:30 AM EST, the advance GDP report for the fourth quarter of 2010 will be announced. The consensus is an increase of 3.5% in real GDP and an increase of 1.5% in the GDP price index. The real GDP estimate is 0.9% higher than the preliminary estimate for this quarter from last month, and the GDP price index is 0.6% lower.
Also at 8:30 AM EST, the Employment Cost Index for the fourth quarter of 2010 will be announced. The consensus is an increase of 0.5%, which is 0.1% more the third quarter of 2010.
At 9:55 AM EST, Consumer Sentiment for the second half of January will be announced. The consensus is that the index will be at 73, which is 0.3 points higher than the value reported in the first half of the month.
Despite the efforts of yours truly to create as strong a profile as possible in the world of econ-blogging I regret to inform my readers that the organizers of the World Economic Forum in Davos have not found it within their hearts to invite me to Switzerland.
This is pity actually as while the last couple of years have been dominated by doom and gloom it appears that this year champagne corks are once again flying high and the good spirit is back. How else could you interpret the Bloomberg story from the forum that the big banks, far from being tarnished knights, are now back in full confidence;
I can add little to this than a simple shrug. If the world of high street finance was weird to me before the crisis, it has not become any less weird by the fact that the industry seems to have returned to their old ways only a few quarterly statements after many of them were injected with tax payer money and free money from the Fed.
Now, much of this of course is based on growth in Asia and other emerging markets, but the comparison with past golden years of global growth makes me feel a bit uneasy. Indeed, I would say that it is somewhat of a stretch to assume that the origins of the financial crisis will lead to a recovery of these proportions. But of course, I am being a party pooper now and I would certainly not exclude the possibility that the global economy is in for a super cycle of economic growth. I would however only add a small probability to this happening.
What I am basically saying here is that I can understand why the global intelligentsia and finance jet sets, by simple virtue of the need to do something different, are emanating almost über positive messages from this year’s get-together.
Yet and while I promised not to spoil the party I thought that I would still let you in on my presentation prepared for Davos in the hubris like expectation that I naturally would be invited as a keynote speaker for several of the finest cocktail parties.
In addition, the upshot is that my presentation would be very short and only downbeat to the extent that all those intelligent men and women at the forum would not be able to tell me (you) how it is the developed world is supposed to get economic growth going forward. This should be easy then, or maybe not …
Being a European I would then start with the following chart;
(click for larger picture)
I probably would not say much here, but anyone believing in any form of super cycle hitting the shores of Europe should at least be able to explain where growth is going to come from. This is especially the case in the context of the ongoing focus on fiscal austerity which is going to pull away the main source of growth. This would then bring me neatly to my next chart;
(click for larger picture)
Obviously, I would probably at this point be branded as a fiscal apologetic who believes that governments can just spend as if there is no tomorrow. This would be a mistake. Indeed, if you want to speak of debt and fiscal problems I am all ears. Even with estimated tightening noted above from the IMF’s forecast countries such as Italy and Japan will still be running large structural deficits in 2014 (i.e WITH relative “austerity” accounted for) and this only goes to show that there is really only one end result here.
But this is also a situation of damned if you, damned if you don’t.
If governments choose to focus all their efforts on growth and let fiscal excess continue the already huge debt problem will become worse. And if they don’t, they must face growth rates that are not only low, but perhaps even negative for a long period of time. A very recent shot fired across the bow today by the S&P comes in the form of the downgrade of Japan’s sovereign debt.
I would then pose my spectators one simple question and ask to reflect on some simple issue. What is the trend growth in the OECD and her individual economies with a balanced fiscal budget? And once we have agreed on that answer the obvious next question would how the world will deal with a substantial part of its economies exhibiting negative trend growth rates for as far as the eye can see?
More than anything I think that this has probably yet to sink in to markets and policy makers alike. Indeed, after having pissed in the proverbial bunch bowl I would probably go on to talk about the necessity (although my praise for the apparent success of the Euro bond issuance) of substantial debt restructuring in the Eurozone.
Alas, at that point my microphone would have long been switched off and I would probably, to boot, have been taken out by the in-house Davos sniper tasked with the elimination of any spoilers of the good mood.
Good thing I wasn’t invited then.
One of the important mistakes that India is making, in terms of integration into the world economy, is in visa rules. A key element
Russell K. Nieli on the power of meritocracy as seen in Caltech. The IITs are similar to Caltech in two respects: No concern for how
Materials of the 2010 Neemrana conference organised by NCAER, NBER and ICRIER.
Sigh. Building a clean environment is hard!
Materials from the recent IGIDR finance conference.
Annie Lowrey on Slate on the role of prizes in public funding for research.
A household survey by CMIE tells us something about how ordinary households see the debate about the Bimal Jalan committee.
Sindhu Bhattacharya has an article in DNA about foreign airlines who are being prevented from operating in India. We need
A. D. Miller in the Guardian on why Western authors like Mother Russia.
Interesting developments in the freedom of speech.
I guess they noticed that if you take the first word on every seventeenth page, it spells out “Death to the Shah”. That’s nothing, I have a blog that is banned in China!
A great story about how grain and oil led to the collapse of the USSR. By Yegor Gaidar.
Joe Keohane on boston.com on the odd feature of forecasting: The guy who gets the huge event right is often likely to fare badly in
Lant Pritchett says that the notion of an `ethics code’ for economists is a silly idea.