Gold and the Punchbowl

I have just been listening to Ben Davies’ podcast (see also FT Alphaville here) from Hinde Capital about the funding issues of the Japanese government and the points he makes are important. I have used the metaphor of Japan as a bumblebee before and while I believe that the story on Japanese savings may just be a little more complicated than many believe I think Ben points his finger at two very important points. One is how Japan has difficulty with both deflation and potential inflation (higher yields) at the same time which not only puts the economy in a very tight spot, but also locks in Japan towards a balance between veering to far in either direction, a balance which can be difficult to strike. The second is that while Ben believes that Japan will ultimately pop, the central bank (and indeed Japan itself) will try to do everything it can before that happens. Especially the last point is very important. Coupled with the need for Japan to attempt to maintain a structural external surplus it brings me back to a point I have made before (and which I will continue to make again and again).

Ageing societies are not, in the main, characterised by aggregate dissaving but rather by the fight against it.

So, Japan will fight and the central bank will do the government’s dirty work and the most intriguing question here is how long it will take of unsterilised hyper-QE before an economy such as Japan stuck in both a fertility and liquidity trap [1] implodes in hyperinflation; will it happen at all(?) and what can the country do to balance the trade-off between deflation and inflation.

Finally, on Ben, he is bullish on gold but then again, he would be wouldn’t he as runs a gold fund. But there is a subtler point underneath the reaffirmation of the bull market in gold since Hinde is also, following Ben’s comments, long volatility, a bet which has not, yet, paid off (and one would assume the “position” has some carrying/opportunity costs even if volatility is flat). Or put differently, gold (precious metals) have performed strongly alongside risky assets as liquidity has been plenty but what has not happened yet is the ultimate shakeout in which volatility spikes and investors buy gold and not the dollar. I think that you need to fit two stories in your head. One is why gold might move alongside risky assets as fiat currencies are slowly debased as well as how gold should do also do well in a situation where volatility suddenly increases quickly and abruptly although I suspect this last situation is the ultimate endgame with the interim mainly being one of dollar strength in times of sudden reversals in market fortune.

But even gold can’t be a free lunch, right? Perhaps, this is one way to rationalize that fact that investor performance currently seem to be demarcated by those who climbed on the gold train a year ago (or 2-3 years ago if you will) and those who didn’t. When times are tough and volatility spikes, the USD rallies but as such events almost inevitably carries an immediate response of more liquidity so will gold (and other non-printable assets) do well. But then as liquidity manages to smooth over markets and as the SP500 starts to tick back up this should again be constructive for gold since after all; the whole precondition for low volatility at the moment is the promise of more QE from the Fed (well not quite, but still very close I think). This is then good for a long gold position but not a long volatility position although I am intrigued by the ultimate punt on the final coup de grace in which gold and volatility becomes the only place to be. Still you got to have that acking feeling on gold, I mean; either it trades as a risky asset or becomes the safe haven of choice in times of volatility. So, which is it? I don’t know, but perhaps we are going to find out very soon.

The Punchbowl

Indeed, I suspect that many readers would have counted on me pointing to gold as the ultimate punchbowl  and while I can certainly envision a situation is which gold takes a 10-15% correction (or even more) the point is that this would not counter the trend (not even close). This brings me to the real punchbowl at the moment; equities, emerging markets and high beta EM currencies (Asia and Latam). I am largely indifferent to the first in the long run, long term bullish on the second, and by consequence pretty constructive on the latter as well in the long run [2].

However, in the short run I think that while the punchbowl never left the table, talks about a new round of QE and how Japan’s intervention might actually be a leading indicator of more to come from OECD central banks all at the same time as the SP500 breaks 1160 is extraordinary.

(quote Bloomberg)

The Bank of Japan may have acted first in a new round of central bank action to prop up the global economy as recoveries in industrial nations falter.

The unexpected decision by the Japanese central bank yesterday to drop its interest rate to “virtually zero” and expand its balance sheet follows the U.S. Federal Reserve’s move toward more unconventional easing. Bank of England officials will consider further stimulus tomorrow, while the central banks of Australia, Canada and New Zealand are among those now holding fire on further interest-rate increases.

It reminds me of a point made recently [3] that the marginal returns of additional QE measures (Q1, Q2, Q3 … QN) are declining rapidly. I mean, how much QE do we need before the SP500 hits 1200 or 1250 perhaps? Certainly, I think this is a worthwhile consideration when talking about the effects of QE even if the ultimate policy rationale for additional measures has intensified with the macro environment definitely turning darker in the OECD.

Actually, if you will allow me a mathematical description of this.

The first derivative of QE with respect to the macroeconomy and risky assets are positive but the second derivative appears to be negative for the macroeconomy. More and more is needed to have a smaller and smaller effect. But it is more complicated than that and some asset classes clearly have a very positive second derivative (gold for instance) and look at those poor emerging markets as well. More and more liquidity chasing relatively few assets and high yield opportunities are relatively scarce. This is then a positive second derivative and a clear risk of a bubble.

Quote Bloomberg

Emerging-market borrowers are on course to sell more bonds than ever this year after yields hit record lows and developing economies rebounded faster from the credit crisis than advanced nations. Governments and companies in developing countries including Vale SA, the world’s biggest iron-ore exporter, and Korea Electric Power Corp., South Korea’s largest electricity producer, borrowed $196 billion from July to September, the most for any quarter, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Bond sales surged from $157 billion in the second quarter of 2010 as yields in developing countries slid to an all-time low of 5.4 percent on Aug. 23 from as high as 6.8 percent in February, JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s EMBI+ index shows.

(…)

Brazil doubled the tax yesterday on foreign investment to 4 percent on fixed-income securities to stem the currency’s two- year rally and help shore up exports. The move coincided with the Bank of Japan’s reduction of the overnight call rate target to a range of zero to 0.1 percent, the lowest since 2006, and said it would set up a fund to buy bonds. Brazil’s benchmark interest rate, at 10.75 percent, is the second-highest among the Group of 20 nations after Argentina’s and is luring demand for local-currency debt. “The IOF tax isn’t enough to contain the flows coming from the liquidity injection by the Japanese central bank and global dollar weakening,” said Luis Otavio Souza Leal, chief economist with Banco ABC Brasil SA in Sao Paulo.

(…)

Governments from South Korea to Brazil are stepping up attempts to control their currencies as investors pour a record amount of money into emerging markets.

Regulators in Seoul will start an audit of lenders handling foreign-currency derivatives on Oct. 19 to curb volatility caused by capital flows, the finance ministry said today. Brazil doubled a tax it charges foreigners on investments in fixed- income securities to 4 percent yesterday. The yen fell the most in three weeks after the Bank of Japan cut benchmark interest rates and pledged 5 trillion yen ($60 billion) to buy bonds and other assets, having sold $25 billion worth of its own currency last month in the first intervention since 2004.

This is just a small smørrebrødsbord then of the effects this is having in emerging markets where more and more creative policy measures are being tried to keep the money out. This is then a strongly positive second derivative effect and one which is a key mechanism to be aware of in the global economy.

The point here is of course that there is a lack of stability. It is fairly well established from Japan’s experience that once caught in a liquidity trap and with a rapidly ageing society the extra effect of more liquidity is almost 0 with respect to the macroeconomy (until of course the balance tilts, but sufficient unto that day and all). Yet, there is always a bubble waiting to inflate elsewhere as such the Japans of the world create a huge externality in the global economic system by filling the proverbial punchbowl for risky assets.

Yet for now and as markets seem to be wanting more and more QE to push forward it appears that investors should be careful diving too deep into the punchbowl even if it currently might appear as a golden opportunity.

[1] – For more on the fertility trap, look no further.

[2] – Although an AUD/USD at 0.97 is unbelievable to me. I think this is one of the brightest stars high  their looking for a strong correction.

[3] – I can’t for the life of me remember who it was.

Join the forum discussion on this post - (1) Posts

Transactions Between Banks in Bad Assets: An Interesting Legal Drama

The much awaited decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of ICICI v. Official Liquidator of A.P.S. Star Industries is now available. The case had come as an appeal against a decision of the Gujarat High Court which invalidated transfer of Non-Performing Assets between banks. The decisions of the High Court and the Supreme Court are important in illuminating the legal foundations of Indian finance.

Background

Various borrowers owed a total of Rs. 52.45 crores to ICICI (Amongst which one of the borrowers was M/s A.P.S. Industries). These loans were classified as Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) by ICICI. ICICI transferred these NPAs to Kotak Mahindra on “as is where is” basis by way of a Deed of Assignment. Consequently, the Kotak Mahindra became the full and absolute owner of the debts and as such the entity legally entitled to receive the repayments of debts.

M/s A.P.S. Star Industries subsequently went into liquidation. Kotak Mahindra filed a Company Application in the winding up proceedings of A.P.S. Star, praying for being substituted in the place of ICICI (As it was now the owner of the debt). Though the transfer document between ICICI and Kotak was held to be valid the company court held that such transfers of NPAs was not allowed under the Banking Regulation Act of 1949 (BR Act).

The High Court ruling

On appeal a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court upheld the observation of the Company Court on the following main grounds:

  • Section 6 of BR Act gives and exhaustive list of activities a bank is allowed to carry out and sale of NPAs is not present in the list.
  • Since banks prohibited from trading activities (See section 8 of the BR Act) and the sale of NPAs is essentially trading, such transfer was invalid.
  • Such trading of NPAs would mean transfer of NPA from one banks balance sheet to another without any resolution and therefore against the health of the banking industry.
  • Since individual loans were lumped together and bought there was no way to ascertain the value of individual loans and the amount recovered from them. This made such loans essentially speculative trading.
  • Since the customer is forced to transact with another bank now and also he is being lumped with other loans, this amounts to violation of the relationship between the bank and the customer.
  • By legislating s.5 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act), the Parliament has made it clear that only securitisation companies can buy NPAs and not banks.

The Supreme Court ruling

To much relief of the banks, the Apex Court has set aside the impugned judgment and order, laying down the following important legal propositions:

  • Section 6(1) of the BR Act is a general provision and enumerates topics as fields in which banks can carry on their business. This is the core banking business. However, RBI, being the regulator, under Section 21 and 35A can issue directions having statutory force, laying down parameters enabling banks to expand their business. Such parameters will define `banking business’. (¶ 13)
  • RBI, by issuing guidelines authorized banks to deal in NPAs and such guidelines cannot be held ultra vires of the Act. Such guidelines have statutory force and hence inter se transfer of NPAs between banks is permissible. (¶ 14)
  • The 2005 guidelines of RBI are not to eliminate NPAs but to restructure the same. Such restructuring cannot be treated as trading. (¶ 15)
  • The SARFAESI Act was enacted enabling specified SPVs to buy the NPAs from the banks. However, from that it does not follow that banks cannot transfer their own assets. (¶ 21)

Deeper issues

While the judgment seems to set law in the correct direction, it raises other questions. The borrowers had argued that the only legal way of transferring financial assets is under Section 5 of the SARFAESI Act which reads:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or any other law for the time being in force, any securitisation company or reconstruction company may acquire financial assets of any bank/FI..”

However, Chief Justice Kapadia, while writing the judgment observed in ¶ 21 that `the SARFESI Act 2002 was enacted enabling specified SPVs to buy the NPAs from the banks’. As discussed, this statement seems to be missing out that even good debts which are not NPAs can be bought by those SPVs under s. 5 of the SARFESI Act. May be this is an inadvertent omission, but it is interesting to observe that Justice Kapadia previously also in Transcore v. Union of India (2008) 1 SCC 125 observed (in ¶ 20) that `it is only when these assets in the hands of the bank/FI becomes sub-standard, doubtful or loss then the account or asset becomes classifiable as a NPA and it is only then that the NPA Act comes into operation’. The same is reiterated in ¶ 30. Clearly, these observations do not quite fit with the literal interpretation of s. 5. Probably the pedantic have got another question lingering in their minds: `Can a bank/financial institution sell off a debt, which is not a NPA, to a securitisation/assets reconstruction company?’

One also asks what remains of Section 6 of the BR Act which describes what activities banks can take part in. Justice Kapadia states `In other words, the 1949 Act allows banking companies to undertake activities and businesses as long as they do not attract prohibitions and restrictions like those contained in Sections 8 and 9′. This would mean that while the legislature drafted Section 6, this is irrelevant today. He also goes on to state `Thus, RBI is empowered to enact a policy which would enable banking companies to engage in activities in addition to core banking process it defines as to what constitutes “banking business”.’

This implies that there is unfettered power with RBI to define what business banks can take part in. This is unusual as it seems that there are no parliamentary control over what banking business can imply. Unlike `securities’ which is defined under the Securities Contract Regulation Act by Parliament and only the central government may modify it by notification, (and therefore no regulator is free to define any instrument as a security and regulate it) `banking’ seems to be under a Henry VII clause for RBI. There seems to be no provision under the BR Act allowing the central government (let alone the RBI) to change the definition of `banking’. The judgment however empowers RBI to do so without and rider or guidelines. This also goes against the principles of interpreting laws as it makes all provisions in Section 6(a) to (o) irrelevant.

Conclusion

The judgment reveals the state of financial laws in the country which are unable to guide the judiciary unambiguously. The judicial interpretations also seem to alter the nature of the laws and the drift between the letter of the law and its meaning continues to increase.

Economic Events on October 8, 2010

At 8:30 AM EDT the Employment Situation report for September will be announced, and the consensus for non-farm payrolls is an decrease of 8,000 jobs compared to a loss of 54,000 in August, the consensus for private payrolls is an increase of 85,000 jobs  compared to a gain of 67,000 in August, the consensus for the unemployment rate is that it will increase by 0.1% to 9.7%, the consensus average hourly earnings rate is expected to increase 0.1%, and the consensus for the average workweek is 34.2 hours.

At 10:00 AM EDT, the Wholesale Trade report will be released for August, showing inventory levels for wholesalers in the United States.

Join the forum discussion on this post - (1) Posts