The Stimulus – One Year Later…

By Eldon Mast, on February 17th, 2010

Many of you have emailed us with the Organizing for America’s chart on job savings and creation since the stimulus bill was passed last year.

I’ve recreated their chart here:

We all know there is a long way to go and many Americans are still struggling to find jobs, but there is certainly cause for optimism depicted in this chart.

No doubt many of you were reminded of the chart we’ve been tracking with linear fit trending since October.  Perhaps the Obama administration took note of how we presented these same facts in our earlier post!?

Thanks to all for the emails.  Keep them coming.

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The Euro Crisis

By Rok Spruk, on February 17th, 2010

Paul Krugman has blogged an interesting analysis of the anatomy of the recent economic crisis in Europe (link).

Europe’s difficult macroeconomic situation in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis has exacerbated rising fiscal deficits and public debt alongside strong deflationary pressures. These pressures were triggered by the highly negative output gap – the difference between the economy’s potential output and the real output. In fact, a brief observation of the output gap estimates (link) shows that the sick men of Europe (Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy, Slovenia) are likely to face negative output gaps. In 2010, Spain is likely to reach -2.12 percent output gap. Slovenia, Italy and Greece will also face a negative output gap. The negative output gap triggered strong deflationary pressures since the nominal aggregate demand is insufficient, causing a decreasing price level.

Before the financial and economic crisis of 2008/2009 evolved, Europe’s peripheral economies faced strong asset price bubble. As real estate prices were soaring, these economies attracted significant capital inflows which lead to inflationary pressures. Before the crisis, the inflationary dynamics in the peripheral countries of the Eurozone were strong. In Greece, Spain and Slovenia, consumer prices increased by more than 3 percent on the annual basis. The asset bubble was further spread by low interest rates. The asset price inflation in these countries was very high. In Slovenia, five-year asset prices increased by 500 percent (see: IMF, International Financial Statistics). As the increase in asset prices widened, Europe’s sick men were faced with rising current account deficit.

In 2007, Spain’s current account deficit amounted to more than 10 percent of the GDP. In such circumstances, a clever monetary policymaker would push up interest rates. As interest rates were at historic lows during the pre-crisis period, the real cure was on behalf of the fiscal policy. Before the crisis, Spain’s fiscal picture was very well indeed. From 2004 to 2007, Spain was running a fiscal surplus which reached the level of 2 percent of the GDP in 2006 and 2007. However, massive capital inflows were not sterilized by raising interest rates which further inflated the real estate bubble and overheating of Spain’s economy.

Independent fiscal policies and a common monetary policy – which is an economic model of the EMU – cause asymmetric shocks. During the years of high growth, these shocks are mostly neglected. However, during the crisis these shocks might cause a serious trouble in the macroeconomic adjustment. Greece, which recently declared a worrisome possibility of debt default, is a typical case of what happens when asymmetric shocks persist.

As Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Slovenia now face high fiscal deficits and poor economic growth, these countries will likely face years of deflationary pressures and high unemployment. The fiscal policymakers already exhausted the ability of governments to boost spending. Further growth of government spending is impossible unless European countries want the Greek debt episode to evolve in a domino effect throughout the Eurozone. The ECB will sooner or later this year raise the baseline interest rates to avoid the inflationary swings in Germany, Austria, Netherlands and other countries with current account surplus.

The macroeconomic outlook for the Eurozone is backlashed by the debt crisis in Mediterranean countries. An economic recovery may include indepedent monetary policies to adjust interest rates and prevent another asset bubble episode as well as to target current account balance. However, European countries will have to rethink the role of indepedent and discretionary fiscal policies pursued by the sick men of the Eurozone.

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Danny Tarkanian on Monetary Policy

By Mark Anderson, on February 17th, 2010

This doesn’t represent an endorsement by me of Danny Tarkanian nor an endorsement of me by Danny Tarkanian. I invite all candidates to submit a position statement on this issue because I feel it is important.  So far, Team Tark is the only campaign that has responded to my invitation. Below is a statement from U.S. Senate candidate Danny Tarkanian:

Congressional spending and Federal Reserve policy have teamed up to lock the U.S. economy into a downward cycle that may lead to catastrophic failure if left unchecked. Both Congress and the Federal Reserve have taken reckless abandon in their recent attempts to insert the federal government as a solution to the country´s economic woes. Rapid response and common sense solutions are required to counteract these irresponsible practices.

With the increase in federal spending, and the latest passage of a debt ceiling increase by Congress and subsequent signing into law by the White House, interest in investing in U.S. Government securities, like treasury bills, has begun to decline. The increase in deficit spending has created a growing loss of confidence in the government´s ability to repay its loans and threats from credit rating agencies of a potential downgrading of the US’s credit rating. As interest in the bond market decreases, interest rates on bonds automatically increase creating a higher cost to the U.S. government to sell its debt.

The Federal Reserve’s loose monetary policy to finance deficits and suppress interest rates indirectly contributes to what is known as the “carry trade” against the U.S. dollar. By borrowing dollars on the assumption that the dollar will decline and then using them to buy commodities, investors reap higher profits when paying back the initially borrowed dollars. With the continued decline in value of the dollar, the incentive to use the carry trade is increased which leads to a growth in speculation that the dollar will continue to be devalued.

Separately, the Federal Reserve is essentially subsidizing financial institutions by setting the benchmark interest rate at 0%. This initially spurred an increase in financial institution investment in treasury bills to shore up their balance sheets – a practice that served as probably the most under the radar bailout packages in federal government history. The ability of financial institutions to take Federal Reserve dollars at 0% interest and invest them in federal treasury notes with a set interest rate, essentially meant that the federal government was simply handing the financial institutions an allowance (or bailout). The Federal Reserve paying interest on bank reserves is not a solution. Not only is borrowing nearly free money from the Fed to then loan funds back to the Fed at a higher rate immoral, this will force up interest rates on treasuries which, ironically, present policy is trying to prevent.

In the case of a 30 year bond, this was 4.7% as of 1/6/09. Whether by design or by accident, this will serve as a creative federal subsidy until, due to a climbing deficit and reduced faith in the government´s credit, these institutions find it too risky to invest in treasury bills and look elsewhere, or the Fed is forced to raise interest rates due to concerns about creating an artificial bubble for the financial industry, or in housing.  Either that, or the Federal Reserve will displace the market and become the exclusive buyer of treasuries.

The irresponsible lending practices of the Federal Reserve and the reckless spending levels of Congress will inflict greater damage than the country would have felt had the housing and financial institutions been allowed to find equilibrium on their own in the first place. The involvement of the federal government hasn´t saved the U.S. economy; it has simply prolonged and likely worsened the pain of the eventual economic reset. A structurally sound financial system shouldn’t need bailouts or rescues. Swift and steady action is required to help brace the country for a potentially worse decline.

Federal spending must be checked and reversed, including a plan to permanently eliminate the deficit and restore faith in the U.S. government´s credit, thus re-establishing confidence in the bond market. The Federal Reserve must also seek to raise interest rates to prevent inflation and offset any potential asset bubble bursting created as a result of the recent 0% interest rate. Entitlement spending must be decreased and non-essential programs phased out in order to help lessen the strain on the federal budget. All of these actions are necessary now to help soften, and potentially prevent, a predicted economic decline within the next 10-20 years.

Danny Tarkanian
Republican Candidate for the United States Senate
Tark2010.org

Here is a very good recent article that dovetails with this issue: Watchdog: Bailouts created more risk in system

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