By Ajay Shah, on March 30th, 2009
Under a floating exchange rate, firms have a correct estimate of how risky it is to have unhedged foreign currency exposure. When a central bank artificially distorts currency volatility downwards, as RBI has often done, this gives out the wrong incentives to take on foreign currency risk. Now firms in India are lobbying that they be permitted to delay marking to market of exchange rate losses in the aftermath of a surprising rupee depreciation. Mahesh Vyas has facts on Indian firms and currency exposure, in the immediate context of the debate on fudging AS 11 disclosures. Also see editorials in Financial Express and Business Standard.
By Winton Bates, on March 30th, 2009
This morning Jim asked me how long it will take for the Australian economy to get back on a sustainable growth path. I was not able to answer directly. I suggested that what happens to economic growth in Australia will depend on what happens in the rest of the world. I added that if the U.S. starts to grow again in 2010 then that will have a positive impact on growth prospects for Japan and China and for commodity exporters like Australia.
Jim asked: “How confident are you about the U.S. starting to grow in 2010?” I started making excuses about my lack of knowledge of the U.S. economy and my poor knowledge of short term macroeconomics. That was when Jim said: “You know that political leaders all over the world have been saying that they will do what it takes to restore confidence and get sustainable recovery.” I nodded as Jim went on: “What they seem to be implying is that they will just keep increasing government spending until people become more confident. Does that make you feel confident?”. I shook my head. Jim then asked: “So what will it take to restore investor and consumer confidence and get sustained recovery?”
I told Jim that was a very good question. That only bought me about a second to gather my thoughts. The only sensible answer that I could think of was that restoring confidence was a matter of establishing a general expectation in the U.S. (and other major economies) that GDP would grow at about the same rate as the trend rate of growth in their productive capacity.
Jim interrupted: “That means boosting aggregate demand. Isn’t that what governments are trying to do now?” My response was that our focus should be on establishing the expectation of sustainable growth in the monetary aggregates rather than just a short-term boost in aggregate demand, with the expectation of a subsequent contraction as soon as inflation raises its ugly head again.
Jim interrupted again: “Next you will be telling me that Milton Friedman was right and what we need is a rule requiring the monetary authority to maintain a specified rate of growth in the stock of money.” I admitted that I still thought Friedman was on the right track, but technical difficulties involved in targeting the money supply would make it more sensible to target growth in nominal GDP (i.e. PY rather than M).
Jim said: “So what you are saying is that if the U.S. central bank were to announce a target rate of growth of nominal GDP and start making appropriate adjustments in monetary policy to achieve that target, then this would restore confidence and promote a sustainable recovery.”
I wish I had sufficient confidence to tell Jim that he had hit the nail on the head. Instead I suggested that rather than trying to put words in my mouth he should take a look at Scott Sumner’s blog: TheMoneyIllusion.
Postscript:
I particularly liked the following posts on Sumner’s blog: Why did monetary policy fail?; and The Economics Babel.
By Bron Suchecki, on March 30th, 2009
The CEO of the Perth Mint gave a presentation to the WA chapter of the Australian Institute of Company Directors on Wednesday that I thought I’d share with you. It was only three slides as it was a 10 minute slot. All of the figures behind these charts come from the World Gold Council.
First up is quarterly known supply.

Key take away point is that while the various supply sources change from quarter to quarter, overall it is relatively consistent and more importantly, bears no correlation to the gold price. The second chart is known demand, with an emphasis on “known”.

Now this is a bit more variable than supply, but again there is no clear correlation to the gold price. I should note that known investment means coins, bars and ETFs but does not include over-the-counter professional trading.
The fact is that even if we did know the unknowable (such is the nature of the gold market, it is a secretive thing) demand would equal supply anyway. Also consider that the data is not perfect, that classifications may be wrong (eg how much of Indian jewellery demand is really investment demand).
So how to get through this. The next slide takes an admittedly simplistic approach and says lets look at non-investment supply (primary mine supply and scrap – we assume that scrap is not investment bars for example) and take away non-investment demand (industrial and jewellery – again not a perfect assumption about jewellery).

What this number then (approximately) represents is net investment. You’ll note that when it was negative the price was flat and when it was high the price rose. Not perfect correlation and it could be improved with more accurate source data, but hey, you’re getting what you pay for.
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