Bernanke’s Plan to Avoid a Second Great Depression

The day that the $700 billion bailout bill went down to a shocking defeat in the House of Representatives, the Dow Jones Industrial Average suffered a record 777 point one-day crash. “Something must be done!” bellowed the bureaucrats and billionaires. But following the passage of the bailout, the Dow and the broader S&P 500 index each lost 22.1% in just a little over a week. Yes, the markets roared back the following Monday, with the Dow gaining a record 936 points. But those 936 points aren’t worth as much as they were a week ago.

What Really Caused the Great Depression?

Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke is considered by many to be one of the foremost experts on America’s (first) Great Depression. In fact, it’s his analysis of the Depression that has led to his nickname “Helicopter Ben.” Bernanke believes that the Depression was caused or prolonged by deflation—falling consumer prices—and that it could have been easily avoided if the Federal Reserve just created more and more money. Flooding the economy with new money—as if it were dropped from a helicopter—would reduce the dollar’s purchasing power and keep prices rising: the key, in Bernanke’s view, to avoiding economic calamity.

But the Austrian school of economics offers a much different analysis of the causes of the Great Depression. Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard and other notable Austrians argued that it was the Federal Reserve’s expansion of the money supply during the “Roaring Twenties” that caused the stock-market bubble that finally burst in 1929 and that it was increased government intervention into the economy that intensified and prolonged America’s misery.

Bernanke and most mainstream, non-Austrian economists are obsessed with the idea that falling prices must be prevented at all costs. But in fact, falling prices are the natural result of progress in a free-market economy. From the end of the Civil War to the birth of the Fed in 1913, prices actually went down, not up. But in the 95 years since the Federal Reserve Act, the dollar has lost 95% of its purchasing power—and that’s according to the government’s own numbers, which are questionable at best.

Inflation: The Fed’s Real Mandate

Financial pundits are fond of spreading the lie that the Federal Reserve System was created to combat inflation. The obvious fact of the matter is that it was created for the explicit purpose of inflating. Inflation—that is, the expansion of the money supply—is the only real tool at the Fed’s disposal, and when you have a hammer, all problems look like nails. Bernanke believes he can keep prices from falling by creating new money, and in the long run, he’s undoubtedly right. But at what cost?

On September 29, the day the bailout was temporarily blocked, the Federal Reserve thwarted the public will and issued a $630 billion “bailout” of its own by expanding the money supply. The next day, Bernanke and Co. lowered their target for the fed funds rate from 2% to 1.5%. But the fed funds rate is not an interest rate that the Fed can set by decree. As the rate banks charge one another on overnight loans, it is set on the open market and only “targeted” by the Fed. When the target rate was 2%, the real rate was 7%. How does the Fed try to get the real rate to match its target? By doing the only thing it can do: creating money out of thin air and funneling it into circulation.

There is a rate that the Fed does set by decree: the discount rate. This is the rate at which troubled banks can borrow directly from the Fed. The week before the bailout, banks borrowed a record $262 billion from the Fed, but that record was shattered just one week later as banks tapped Bernanke and Co. for a cool $409.5 billion more. And then last week, the Fed offered to put up as much as $1 trillion to purchase the short-term “commercial paper” debt of private corporations. This all in addition to the $85 billion the Fed used to “rescue” bankrupt insurance giant AIG.

And where does all of this money come from? The Fed has the legal authority to create it by fiat!

The Redistributive Effects of Monetary Expansion

Not to be outdone, the Treasury used its newfound powers to extend the bailout by taking a $250 billion step towards the complete nationalization of the banking system. Where will this $250 billion, or the $700 billion for the bailout, come from? Obviously, the federal government doesn’t have a hoard of money lying around—it’s broke. In fact, the national debt clock in New York City has run out of digits! The only way for the government to pay its bills is to issue new debt, most of which will be “monetized” by—you guessed it—the Federal Reserve. This is a fancy way of saying that the government will use its intermediary, the Fed, to simply print the money needed to fund its socialization schemes.

With all this new money in circulation, the purchasing power of the money in your pocket is going to go down. It will take more dollars to buy a gallon of milk, and, yes, it will require more dollars to buy a share of stock. But the “gains” in the market have been and will be illusory and, contrary to the Ben Bernanke/Milton Friedman “helicopter” theory, the government doesn’t drop new money from the sky. Unless you’re an old buddy of the Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, chances are you won’t be one of the first beneficiaries of the funny money, but that gallon of milk will still cost more at the store.

This, in a nutshell, is the Fed chairman’s strategy to prevent a second Great Depression. Does it sound like a good plan to you?

Health Insurance Companies Take Advantage of Doctors, Part V

I previously wrote about the EOB and how insurance companies try their many tricks to decrease reimbursement to physicians. Most physicians do not fight back. Some do. Medical Economics has highlighted the plight of one physician who has been fighting back. Their story is about a Chicago ENT surgeon who brought a lawsuit against an insurance company for bundling and downcoding claims. Apparently, the insurance company settled with him for $140,000.

As I mentioned in a previous post, bundling is when insurance companies downcode or combine multiple codes into one in order to reimburse the provider less.  In this physician’s case, the insurance company was bundling endoscopies with office visits and was reimbursing for the least costly services only.  Additionally, the insurer downcoded several codes based on software it uses and tried to say that the lowered reimbursement was a “negotiated write-off” as though the physician’s practice had agreed to it. This is exactly the type of thing I was referring to when I said that insurance companies “force” physician’s to accept lower payment. As this insurance company’s logic shows, failure to fight downcoding and bundling is equal to “acceptance” by the physician. Thus, if you do not correct it, it is assumed that you accept it.

Interestingly, the practice in question has a threshold for when to trigger legal action. When denials reach over $50,000 by one insurer, it triggers the next step in legal action.

Details are not given as to who actually pays for all of these legal costs. However, you can be sure that the addition of an attorney to your practice is probably prohibitively expensive. But when the potential windfall is large – this practice says that several hundred thousand dollars are collected each year via denial appeals – it may well be worth the investment.

If any reader out there knows of any stories like this, I would be interested to hear about them. It is not often that you find a provider willing to sue an insurer over downcoding. But I anticipate to see this gain popularity in the future.

Paul Krugman: ‘Nobel’ Laureate?

On October 13, it was announced that controversial New York Times columnist Paul Krugman had been awarded the “Nobel” prize in economics. Yes, “Nobel” appears in quotes for a reason. That’s because, unlike the other Nobel prizes which were established by inventor and philanthropist Alfred Nobel, the “Nobel” prize in economics was established (and funded) by the Sveriges Riksbank – the Swedish central bank.

Not surprisingly, critics of central banking – such as the great Ludwig von Mises and his protege Murray Rothbard – were never tapped by the selection committee. In fact, in the nearly four decades since the first “Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics” in 1969, the Swedish central bank has only awarded its top honor to one critic of central banking – Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek – and he had to share the 1974 award with a Swedish socialist.

That the Swedish central bank awards the “Nobel” prize in economics is not well known, but it’s hardly a secret. Wikipedia states plainly: “The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel is not a Nobel Prize. However, the nomination process, selection criteria, and awards presentation are conducted in a manner similar to the Nobel Prizes.”

So, if I used a “similar nomination process, selection criteria, and awards presentation,” could I establish my own awards for YouTube videos and call them Oscars? Maybe, if I had the power to create money out of thin air like the Sveriges Riksbank.

But what of Krugman? Does he deserve recognition as a great economist? Not according to the Austrian school. Dr. William L. Anderson, an Austrian who teaches economics at Frostburg State University in Maryland and is an adjunct scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, says Krugman isn’t an economist at all: “Yes, Krugman has a Ph.D. from MIT in economics,” says Anderson, “but his writings, both popular and academic, demonstrate that he does not believe in laws of economics.”

Why does Dr. Anderson feel this way? Well, Krugman is described as an “unreformed Keynesian,” meaning a follower of the economist John Maynard Keynes, whose theories were largely the basis for the massive ramp-up of the U.S. welfare state beginning with the New Deal and lasting through the mid-70s. The problem with Keynes’s theories: they’ve been positively refuted.

For example, Keynesianism teaches there’s a “trade-off” between unemployment and inflation. When there’s low unemployment, says the Keynesian Phillips Curve, there will be high inflation, and vice versa. Therefore, if employment is too high, we can “fix” the problem by expanding the money supply – or so thought Keynes. The problem is that, in response to the gross excesses of the Johnson and Nixon administrations, we had “stagflation” in the late 1970s: high unemployment and high inflation. And we’re likely headed there again, particularly if we follow Krugman’s favored policies.

Krugman is more well known for his criticisms of the Bush administration and Iraq War than for his economics. Bush, of course, deserves as much criticism as any president in history, and the war in Iraq deserves even more. But Krugman, who made his name as a polemicist and now has new gravitas as a “Nobel” Laureate, will likely have a prominent role in the nearly inevitable Obama administration. Sadly, this could make us pine for the good ol’ days of Bush/Cheney.