Agricultural Markets Ripe for Speculative Picking

Most people probably don’t realize (I didn’t) that the U.S. has a strategic grain reserve. Well had. It’s almost entirely depleted. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) operates the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) which, according to the USDA site, performs the following functions:

“The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) is a Government-owned and operated entity that was created to stabilize, support, and protect farm income and prices. CCC also helps maintain balanced and adequate supplies of agricultural commodities and aids in their orderly distribution.”

Some may recall that in the 90’s there was a big push to get the country off various forms of welfare including farming subsidies. A 1996 farm bill nixed government grain reserves and Farmer Owned Reserves (FOR), the latter of which was intended to geographically spread out the country’s grain reserves to protect against something unforeseen happening to the stockpiles. The reserves are just now running out.

Now that decision is looking to have been a very bad one indeed with this year’s corn crop caught in a perfect storm. One-hundred-year storms flooding the Midwest combined with an 8% reduction in acreage dedicated to corn will amount to a 10% hit on this year’s harvest. Then, too, there’s the rising demand from the ethanol distillers. In 2006, they used 20% of the corn crop, 27% in 2007, and the expectation is that ethanol will absorb somewhere around 40% of the 2008 crop. Though at $7 a bushel of corn, ethanol producers are losing money at today’s pump prices. Yet, since ethanol burns less efficiently than gasoline and requires special equipment, there’s little room to jack up the pump price without killing the market.

Corn is having a serious ripple effect out into the other grain markets and feed for livestock without putting much of a dent in the energy market. That’s got speculators and the hedge funds looking beyond the usual agricultural companies for ways to get in on the action.

Putting a Number on Illegal Immigration

Western governments have frequently come under attack for failing to control illegal immigration and for having little idea of how many unauthorized migrants are living within their borders. Unauthorized migration takes many forms such as Mexicans slipping over the border into the southern U.S., East Asian workers being transported by traffickers into Western Europe and people who enter a country legally but overstay their visa. The presence of significant numbers of unauthorized migrants within a country will adversely affect the accuracy of methods used to calculate important economic indicators including per capita income and unemployment rates. Moreover, the uncertainty about population numbers makes it difficult for governments to plan and adequately fund service provision in such areas as education, health and policing.

Researchers in many countries have attempted to develop methods for estimating numbers of unauthorized migrants in order to provide data for use in improving immigration controls and help increase the accuracy of population estimates for use in governance. However, this has proved to be a formidable task given the clandestine nature of unauthorized migration and the vested interest of such migrants in remaining hidden from the authorities. With the use of creative methods, some success has been achieved but only with large margins of error.

Legalizing Incentives

Methods of counting unauthorized migrants fall broadly into two categories: direct and indirect. Direct methods involve the use or collection of data relating specifically to this group. Particularly valuable direct data collection opportunities arise when governments implement regularization programs as occurred in the U.S. in 1986. At best, however, the data generated from such programs only provides a rough indication of numbers of unauthorized migrants since eligibility for regularization usually depends on meeting certain conditions such as a minimum residence period; moreover, it is impossible to tell what percentage of eligible applicants actually apply for regularization.

Since many unauthorized migrants will take up employment in their new country, employer surveys are another means of collecting data on them. Some employer surveys have been quite successful in generating information on the nature and distribution of illegal working. However, their use in providing information on the size of the unauthorized migrant population is limited. For one thing, illegal working is not synonymous with illegal residence – some workers may hold valid residence visas but be prohibited from employment. Moreover, some unauthorized migrants may be working in areas not covered by the surveys or may be economically inactive. Similarly, immigration enforcement data on detections of unauthorized migrants are likely to capture only a small proportion of the whole illegal population.

Creating Blanks and Filling Them In

Indirect methods of counting unauthorized migrants involve comparing different sources of data and making inferences. The “residual” statistical method has been used by both U.S. and UK government statisticians in recent years. Basically, this involves comparing census and immigration data from two different points in time relating to the foreign-born known to be resident in the country. The data is used to calculate the “residual” population, defined as the total number of foreign-born residents minus all legal immigrants and temporary legal migrants, with data adjusted for mortality and emigration over time. A small proportion of the residual population is assumed to be quasi-legal, including those awaiting the outcome of an asylum application; the remainder is defined as population of unauthorized migrants.

The residual method was used to estimate that there were approximately seven million unauthorized migrants in the U.S. in January 2001, equating to around 2.5% of the total population. Within the UK, this method was used to arrive at a central estimate of 430,000 unauthorized migrants as at April 2001 or 0.7% of the population. Both estimates were acknowledged to have very large margins of error; the UK study noted, for example, that the actual figure was likely to be anywhere within the range of 310,000 to 570,000 depending on different assumptions that could be made in the statistical model. Critics have argued that these figures vastly underestimate the true scale of unauthorized migrations; more recent U.S. studies have put the likely numbers of illegal immigrants as closer to 11 or 12 million and even as high as 20 million.

The answer to the question “Can unauthorized migrants be counted?” seems to be “Yes but not all of them.” Innovative techniques including qualitative research might be used to find out more about the characteristics of unauthorized migrants, but the shifting target of their total number within a country is likely to remain elusive and subject to debate.

The Capitalist Case Against Rent

Here’s a question only an economist or a five-year-old would ask: what is rent?

Non-economists might define “rent” as payment received by a property owner for allowing someone else to use that property. Take for example the owner of a house who rents it to a family for $800 a month. While socialists might excoriate the landlord for expropriating wealth from his tenants, capitalist economists would see the relationship as purely positive: the landlord and the tenants freely contract and arrive at a mutually agreed-upon price. The landlord gets money; the tenants get a place to live. It’s a win-win situation, as are all voluntary exchanges in the free market.

Why then did the classical capitalist economists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries castigate the seekers of rent as parasites and worse? It has to do with varying definitions of rent, then and now, economic and non-economic. The etymology of the term is quite fascinating.

For the moment, let’s stick with land rents. A landowner who has more property than he can use should be entitled to rent that property to those who don’t own land of their own, right? Who would stand to lose in such a transaction? Although socialists would argue that the landowner should not be permitted to “own” property that he himself cannot use, the classical economists who railed against rent were capitalists (or proto-capitalists), and it is their argument against rent that’s most interesting. Why were they so dead-set against rent seeking?

A Medieval Practice

For the answer, we need to study the etymology of another term—real estate. The real in real estate is derived from “royal.” This dates back to the feudalist age where all land was owned by the king. He parceled it out to barons and earls, who then gave it to lesser lords, but the land belonged to the king and the king alone: it was part of the royal estate.

Under feudalism, barons—land lords—would assess rents to the occupiers of their lands. Although acreage might stay within a peasant family for centuries, the land was still subject to rents—much like property taxes—assessed by the baron, who would then kick money back to the king. In this fashion, barons could live handsomely without lifting a finger to do much of anything other than collecting their rents. They did not work hard, save money, and buy the lands that they rented out—they were given the privilege to collect rents by monarchial fiat.

The vernacular use of the word “rent,” as applied to real estate, is largely the same today as it was in feudal times. The differences, however, between “rent” under feudalism and “rent” under capitalism are twofold: first, ownership under capitalism is not (or at least shouldn’t be) obtained through government privilege, but instead, through legitimate and legal means. Secondly, the amount of rent charged under capitalism is mutually agreed upon by all parties involved rather than arbitrarily set by a feudal lord and subject to change upon his whim.

Modern English speakers took the term “rent” and applied it any instance in which a property owner allowed his property to be used by another party in exchange for financial consideration. Economists, however, took the word in an entirely different direction. To them, “rent” meant the profit derived from any activity made possible due to government privilege. Land ownership, of course, was the most striking example of this, but not the only one.

Regulation by Another Name

The classical-conservative feudal economies were heavily regulated—even more so than the post-New Deal/Great Society United States. Virtually every possible economic activity required a license from the king or one of his subordinate lords. An earl, for example, would have to pay a hefty fee and get permission before allowing a market to take place in his earldom. And once he had such a license, he might expend resources ensuring his neighboring earls were denied market licensure. Rather than investing to make his own market better, the earl would engage in “rent-seeking” activity—currying political favor to shut out competition and derive an unfair economic advantage enforced by law.

This kind of rent seeking is alive and well in the United States, and it greatly hampers our standard of living. Most regulations are lobbied for by the very industries they’re intended to regulate because regulations shut out smaller competitors who can’t afford to abide by them.

The ultimate rent-seeking “success story,” of course, is the creation of the Federal Reserve. Here private bankers wrote and passed a law, through their congressional proxies, that gave them the exclusive monopoly on money creation. Instead of spending resources to make their banks better, they lobbied hard for the government privilege, and it paid off. Now ninety-five years old, the Fed is a cartel of private banks (your local branch included) that has the full backing of the government. Fed banks (again, your local branch is one) cannot fail. If they make bad loans, no problem—the central bank can bail them. The Fed has the authority to create money out of thin air and charge interest on it—if that isn’t economic rent, I don’t know what is.

Government intervention into the economy causes economic distortions and opportunities for rent seeking. Rather than investing to make better products or services, corporations spend billions of dollars pursuing economic rent. Anti-corporate activists of the political left need to wake up and realize this, rather than agitating for the very regulations the corporations actually want in the first place. Then the word “rent” could lose its double meaning and be defined as a five-year-old would understand it, leaving economists with one fewer tool with which to confuse the laity.

Top 3 Strategies that Could Lower Your Medical Bills

The cost of healthcare is always a major concern in the U.S. With approximately 47 million uninsured people and soaring costs, the already-beleaguered healthcare system has been a major topic of debate in this, an election year.

In “Options for Slowing the Growth of Health Care Costs” from the April 2008 issue of the New England Journal of Medicine, the authors present several options that they see as potentially cost-saving. Their “top three” picks that they believe have the greatest potential are capitation, strengthening reviews for new drugs and technology, and electronic health records.

Capitation, in which providers of care are paid a fixed amount of money to provide for the healthcare needs of a patient population, has been tried and found wanting. Providers of care have balked against caps placed on their provision of service, and patients have been dissatisfied with being unable to freely choose their own physicians. Given that it is an unpopular choice for many physicians and patients, an effort to expand capitation to more healthcare sectors will likely be an unpopular choice that will meet much opposition.

The idea of a national oversight committee to provide more effective and stringent reviews for new drugs and technology and which would be required before reimbursement was made is a sound idea in theory. However, as the authors point out, “concern about this approach comes from members of industry, who worry about the possible effects of such reviews on the time and costs associated with getting products to market.” This may be a valid point: tying up new drugs and technologies in bureaucratic red tape might unnecessarily lengthen the time it takes to get them to patients who need them. This could be a drawback if the new products have the potential to save money in the long run in terms of making patients well faster.

The authors believe that use of electronic health records can be a cost-saving strategy. “We believe the greatest cost-reducing effect of electronic health records will result from improved coordination among health-care providers and from decision support that improves clinician’s use of tests and treatments.” The major drawbacks mentioned by the authors in this study are the costs involved in implementing electronic health records into practice and, perhaps more importantly, physician’s potentially negative attitudes towards using computers to tell them how to practice medicine.

The authors suggest several potential cures for what ails the U.S. healthcare system, but will anyone be able to agree on which, if any, methods to use.